December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Updated type2.list/pubring.mix
by John A. Perry 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hello Everyone, I just updated the type2.list/pubring.mix combination on jpunix.com to reflect the opening of the czarevna type-II remailer. The lists are available by anonymous FTP from ftp.jpunix.com as well as by Web from www.jpunix.com John Perry - KG5RG - perry(a)alpha.jpunix.com - PGP-encrypted e-mail welcome! WWW - http://www.jpunix.com PGP 2.62 key for perry(a)jpunix.com is on the keyservers. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMamUHlOTpEThrthvAQHGFAP+IAE4NCXH20XuhpYoEZHJYMP4oAkiFxl7 TwkNWcbCC+GJVddjQVoORvLtNNwgeA6RxkJR+sAnwB3NbtynBi1NVymKEUj6FO4W 4Q5i/0BaRbYpMdqpgmYwCbvrFtG3IJh715o9oGG9ylP3f89vDMN9CBw0iSMhJDva DeIyKxaFseA= =RK3J -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

ACLU: Secret Intelligence Budget
by Bob Witanek 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Posted: sspnj(a)exit109.com ACLU News 05-23-96: *House Votes to Keep Intelligence Budget Secret* In a blow to open government, the House of Representatives has rejected a move by the Clinton Administration to -- for the first time -- make public the overall national intelligence budget, The Washington Post reported today. The rejection came on a vote of 248 to 176 on an amendment to a bill that would fund the CIA and 11 other, mostly Pentagon-based, intelligence agencies. The ACLU had supported the amendment, saying that "taxpayers have a right to know what their tax dollars support." But the Post said that House Intelligence Chairman Larry Combest, R-TX, opposed disclosure in committee and led the opposition on the floor yesterday. He said making the overall figure public inevitably would lead to disclosure of individual intelligence accounts, which, he said, could harm clandestine sources and methods. ACLU Legislative Counsel Gregory T. Nojeim disagreed. "Disclosure of the bottom-line figure is the absolute minimum that Congress should do to make the intelligence agencies accountable to the American public," he said. "All of these intelligence agencies have acknowledged that any Cold War justification for keeping the total budget secret has passed." -------------------------------------- -------------------------- *State Police Search Blacks More Than Whites* PERRYVILLE, Md. -- Black drivers are being stopped and searched for drugs at least four times more often than whites by a special Maryland state police squad that patrols stretches of Interstate 95, the East Coast's main north-south artery, the Associated Press reports today. This finding from an Associated Press computer analysis of car searches raises questions of whether troopers are following their own written training procedures and complying with a court ruling that specifically bars them from using racial profiles to determine likely drug couriers. More than 75 percent of all drivers whose cars were searched by the special drug squad through the first nine months of last year were black, the AP said. State police steadfastly denied using racial profiles, which in the past typically targeted young minority men driving late-model cars and carrying pagers or wearing gold jewelry. The Maryland police maintained that black motorists were searched for reasons other than race and that the preponderance of blacks searched amounted to coincidence. Maryland state police are forbidden to use racial profiles in traffic stops under terms of a legal settlement reached in 1994 with Robert Wilkins, a black Washington lawyer searched for drugs as he drove home from a funeral in 1992. The settlement also requires troopers to provide records on all 1995-97 highway searches to the American Civil Liberties Union of Maryland. The AP examined the records for January through September 1995. The AP said that it asked the ACLU for the early reports after a Philadelphia couple filed a discrimination suit in January against three troopers. Charles Carter, now 66, and his wife, Etta, 65, were driving north on I-95 in a rented minivan on July 12, 1994, their 40th wedding anniversary, when troopers pulled them over and searched the van for drugs. The couple claim they were searched because they are black. ``This entire incident was and continues to be deeply humiliating for my wife and myself,'' Carter said in an affidavit. ``It is inconceivable to us that, as American citizens of the late twentieth century, we would be treated in this manner by officers of the law.'' The ACLU said the data may eventually prove a pattern of discrimination. If the organization can show in court that blacks are being searched in inappropriately high numbers, it may consider a class-action lawsuit, said Debbie Jeon, an ACLU attorney. ---------------------------------------------------------------- ONLINE RESOURCES FROM THE ACLU NATIONAL OFFICE ---------------------------------------------------------------- ACLU Freedom Network Web Page: http://www.aclu.org. America Online users should check out our live chats, auditorium events, *very* active message boards, and complete news on civil liberties, at keyword ACLU. ---------------------------------------------------------------- ACLU Newsfeed American Civil Liberties Union National Office 132 West 43rd Street New York, New York 10036 To subscribe to the ACLU Newsfeed, send a message to majordomo(a)aclu.org with "subscribe News" in the body of the message. To terminate your subscription, send a message to majordomo(a)aclu.org with "unsubscribe News" in the body of the message. For general information about the ACLU, write to info(a)aclu.org. - ---------------------------------------------------------------This message was sent to the news

1 0

Throwing away the whole bushell because one apple is rotten...
by Jean-Francois Avon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 27 May 96 at 12:07, Subir Grewal wrote: > You might want to read up on what > classical liberalism is andd what a minimalist state implies before > you spout Rand. The fact that I quote Rand occasionnally does not mean that I endorse everything she said. The word "spout" seems to be derogatory here and I see nothing that guarantee it. Some of her ideas did not pass the test of reality, and some other did. But the fact that some did not does not invalidate the other that did. :) JFA DePompadour, Societe d'Importation Ltee; Limoges porcelain, silverware and crystal JFA Technologies, R&D consultants: physicists, technologists and engineers. PGP keys at: http://w3.citenet.net/users/jf_avon ID# C58ADD0D : 529645E8205A8A5E F87CC86FAEFEF891 I reserve the right to post publicly any private e-mail sent to me. Unsollicited commercial e-mail will be proofread at US165 $/h Any sender of such material will be considered as to have ac- cepted the above mentionned terms.

1 0

List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)miron.vip.best.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"portal"} = "<hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"alumni"} = "<hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"c2"} = "<remail(a)c2.org> eric pgp hash reord"; $remailer{"penet"} = "<anon(a)anon.penet.fi> penet post"; $remailer{"flame"} = "<remailer(a)flame.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut post reord"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"ecafe"} = "<cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org> cpunk mix"; $remailer{"amnesia"} = "<amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ksub"; $remailer{'alpha'} = '<alias(a)alpha.c2.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"lead"} = "<mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"treehole"} = "<remailer(a)mockingbird.alias.net> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"exon"} = "<remailer(a)remailer.nl.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"vegas"} = "<remailer(a)vegas.gateway.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"haystack"} = "<haystack(a)holy.cow.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (c2 alpha) (flame replay) (alumni portal) Use "premail -getkeys pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu" to get PGP keys for the remailers. Fingering this address works too. Note: The remailer list now includes information for the alpha nymserver. Last update: Mon 27 May 96 6:45:11 PDT remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- portal hfinney(a)shell.portal.com ####+##*#-+# 5:49 99.97% penet anon(a)anon.penet.fi -_______-. 51:37:29 99.86% exon remailer(a)remailer.nl.com ****** +***# 2:57 99.83% replay remailer(a)replay.com *+***+ ***** 5:42 99.60% alumni hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu ##* + *#-+# 5:29 99.58% lead mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu ++++++ +++++ 37:43 99.47% vegas remailer(a)vegas.gateway.com -*#**+*** * 7:27 99.28% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com ++-+++ .--++ 5:21:48 99.11% haystack haystack(a)holy.cow.net *####- +*-*# 33:43 99.01% flame remailer(a)flame.alias.net ++++++ ---- 1:31:02 98.86% amnesia amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com ---+-- ---- 3:18:01 98.65% ecafe cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org -##### ####+ 3:20 97.12% c2 remail(a)c2.org -++-** +- ++ 45:44 96.90% alpha alias(a)alpha.c2.org -++-++ *+ ++ 50:38 96.87% extropia remail(a)miron.vip.best.com ..-.----- 10:35:00 92.95% treehole remailer(a)mockingbird.alias.net --+---- - 3:58:26 85.32% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

1 0

Re: CyberCash just did it!
by peng-chiew low 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Markus Guehrs wrote: > Is anybody aware of the fact that CyberCashs credit card payment system > (http://www.cybercash.com) is an almost 1:1 SET implementation. Since > this system is now working and SET is still a draft I assume the SET > authors got/took/copied many ideas from CyberCashs genius software > system. Out of curiousity I visited their site and I read the part of the security section which I've pasted below. Is it true? After all that I've read about the export issue and here Cybercash tells me they have got permission to export strong crypto? Please note that I am not someone who is familiar with the strength of crypto algo and any response to this post would be most helpful to a newbie in this business. Thanks. Quote from Cybercash's web page : http://www.cybercash.com/cybercash/wp/bankwp.html#security " CyberCash transactions are protected by a powerful and sophisticated system of encryption, combining DES private-key and RSA public-key encryption technologies. In fact, CyberCash's 768-bit RSA key encryption capability is unique in that it is the most powerful encryption technology currently licensed by the United States government for export. CyberCash also has been approved by the government for 1024-bit RSA key encryption, and will be providing that technology by the end of 1996. "

1 0

FW: "Scannist" arrested
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

If there is any residual doubt as to why I'm proposing an "extreme" solution to government, "Assassination Politics," I think the following is just another good reason to do so. I contend that people like that cop and the judge would be FAR more careful in how they do their job if they were aware they might be angering well over a half a million hams. This kind of abuse will happen as long as there is no mechanism to prevent it. > ---------- >From: owner-scan-l >To: Multiple recipients of list SCAN-L >Subject: "Scannist" arrested >Date: Sunday, May 26, 1996 1:47PM > >Two sad things: > >1) Cops in some parts of Kentucky can't tell a scanner >when they see one (or don't see one, in this case), and > >2) the radio in question IS INCPABLE OF BEING MODIFIED TO >RECEIVE OUT OF BAND!!!! Sheesh. > >Peter > >Excerpted from: > >The ARRL Letter >Electronic Update >May 24, 1996 > ><...> > > >TEEN HAM ARRESTED ON SCANNER CHARGES > >Greg Godsey, KF4BDY, a 16-year-old ham from Hopkinsville, Kentucky, was >arrested May 11 by local police who charged him with carrying a scanner that >could receive police radio frequencies. His Radio Shack HTX-202 2-meter >transceiver was confiscated. At a court appearance May 14, he was bound over >for trial on June 4. The judge reportedly didn't hear any arguments >concerning whether the law was broken, possibly because the arresting >officer wasn't present. > >According to reports, Greg, the ARES EC for Christian County, Kentucky, and >a ham since last summer, was detained by Hopkinsville Police. The officer >indicated that when he arrived, Greg "was talking on a radio that is capable >of receiving police frequencies. I verified this by keying my radio, which >broke the squelch on [Greg's] radio." > >Greg denies the charges and says his radio has not been modified and cannot >receive or transmit outside of the 2-meter band. He has sought advice from >the ARRL in resolving the matter. ARRL Regulatory Information Branch >Supervisor Norman Bliss, WA1CCQ, says the Kentucky law exempts equipment >possessed by a licensed Amateur Radio operator that is capable of receiving >police frequencies. > ><...> > >=========================================================== >Material from The ARRL Letter may be reproduced in whole or in part, in any >form, including photoreproduction and electronic databanks, provided that >credit is given to The ARRL Letter and The American Radio Relay League. > > >To subscribe to the email distribution list for the ARRL Letter, send >a message to listserv(a)netcom.com with the body (subject is ignored) > >subscribe letter-list > >To unsubscribe, > >unsubscribe letter-list > > Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

1 0

Re: The Anti-Briefing...
by L. Jean Camp 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Excerpts from espam: 24-May-96 Re: The Anti-Briefing... by e$pam(a)intertrader.com > We can all think of repressive steps which undeniably will save the lives > of some children, babies, old people, mothers, etc. > > Banning alcohol, banning smoking, banning sex outside of marriage.... > I would like to point out that these things will almost certainly not save the lives of mothers and babies and were sure as fuck not intented to protect women & children. Clue in, in places where all sex outside marraige is illegal being a victim of rape is a crime. It is rapist protection. The banning of alcohol was used to remove children from the homes of 'unfit' immigrant families. It was about 'culture wars' & racial purity. Drug test are proposed to refuse people benefits (sorry your mom's a pothead kid -- so now your going to be HOMELESS!) Then when this kind of propaganda works, women end up fighting idiots who buy _into_ the idea that _we_ caused the problem and thereby preventing more effective action. You do not need to vomit DoD crap about children. You aren't helping anyone but the DoD. Get a half a clue -- if they wanted to protect children they could support funds for housing, food, and health care for families. Five kids a day die from violence from the hands of their parents. The infant mortality rate in DC is twice what it is in Havana. I'm sure those kids are really happy that they do not have to worry about cryptography or seeing naked people on the Internet. Yeah, these are the important issue today for America's children -- NOT. I hope that you do not seriously buy that crap about prohibition of crypto (or porn or pot, etc) being about "protecting children." All that line does is separate otherwise effective advocates of freedom - - if you're bitching about women & children you're not fighting the NSA and it will keep you from working effectively with anyone in the categories >old people, mothers, etc.. and other not entirely trivial political groups. Jean

1 0

Re: Remailers & liability
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"gbroiles(a)netbox.com" "Greg Broiles" 26-MAY-1996 19:38:38.36 >For what it's worth, I'm still planning to run a remailer again when I get >settled down somewhere. (I don't think remailers do much good where the >operator isn't root, so I'm not bothering with trying to run one on someone >else's system.) My debt/asset ratio is bad enough from all of this school >that I don't have much for anyone to levy against. Ha, ha. Anyone want some >rapidly obsolescing computer and law books? :( Why, precisely, do you think that remailers don't do much good where the operator isn't root? The possibility of the sysop looking at the mail & getting the private key, the increased susceptibility to cracking of non-root accounts, possible sysop non-cooperation in an honest manner (as opposed to the first one), or what? Thanks, -Allen

1 0

Czarevna Tatjana Mixmaster Remailer
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"nobody(a)replay.com" 26-MAY-1996 20:19:44.63 >Questions or comments should be directed to tatjana(a)mindport.net. Might I ask why you didn't mail from this address? -Allen

1 0

Re: Quickremail v1.0b
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"markm(a)voicenet.com" "Mark M." 27-MAY-1996 12:57:44.84 >On Sun, 26 May 1996, Lance Cottrell wrote: >> Which remailers does it install? >Mixmaster, and it gives a choice of either installing the Freedom remailer or >the remailer code written by Matt Ghio. It also has support for reorder >scripts, but I haven't debugged that part yet. What are the major differences between the various Mixmaster remailer codes, especially in terms of the logistics of running a remailer? I'm particularly interested in aspects related to A. running one by someone not particularly familiar with UNIX (e.g., me) and B. a remailer accepting/sending mail only from/to a limited list of addresses (e.g., only other remailers). Thanks, -Allen P.S. I'm planning on starting up a remailer, probably on Lance's machine (to take advantage of his expertise) sometime this summer. I do want to get PGP for the VAX before then, and the MIT site doesn't appear to have this code.

1 0