December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: A brief comparison of email encryption protocols
by Adam Shostack 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Eric Murray wrote: | Adam Shostack writes: | > | > Leaving it out may be ok because we can define a standard location by | > key type: | > | > key://slack.lne.com/~ericm/key.asc | > key://slack.lne.com/~ericm/key.x509 | > | > key://slack.lne.com/~ericm/x509/key.cert | > key://slack.lne.com/~ericm/pgp/key.asc | > | > I have no objection to defining a shorter URL, but would want some | > indicator that we're in user space, not host/domain/realm space. A | > ~username serves that purpose as well as /u/ and is a more common | > usage. | | Ok. Sounds good, for user-maintained keys like PGP anyhow. | More hierarchical keys, like X.509, could be maintained | by a CA that also maintains the server... some people who | could use encryption don't know, and don't want to know, enough | about it to even be willing to hold their own certificates. They | want it to "just work". I think that this scheme should be flexable | enough to be able to support a CA maintaining user's certificates | for them. Note that this doesn't mean that the CA/key server | would know the keys, i.e. this should not support GAK*. Having keys placed in a namespace defiend by a user does not mean the user needs to make the key available, only that the key can be found there. Nothing says we can't have key://keys.verisign.com/~ericm if they issue keys in some space that maps into user names. | > My last comment is that if we define a URN scheme for keys, we should | > force a dependable structure on it, so that its predictable where to | > find a users PGP key from an email address, without having to check 6 | > locations. Nothing is there now, we should require order to make | > everyones life easier. | | Along those lines, I was envisioning adding a KEY RR type to | DNS, and using it to maintain pointers to keyservers. [...] | This sounds so obvious that I'm sure that I'm not the first | or even the tenth person to think of it, and in fact I | see a KEY RR type defined in the BIND 4.9.3BETA17 source. But | there's just a type there, nothing else to support it. | Anyone know what it's for? Donald Eastlake is writing the spec for storing keys in nameservers. Its in the process of moving to draft standard; there will probably be something about it after LA. I think its: ftp://ds.internic.net/draft-ietf-dnssec-secext-09.txt Adam -- "It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once." -Hume

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Re: Remailers run by spooks
by tbyfield＠panix.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:11 AM 3/4/96, Just Rich wrote: >However, I also have no doubt that Strassmann and Marlow are spreading >disinformation and exaggerating their capabilities in an attempt to break >the web of trust and incite a witch hunt. It won't work. The answer in any >case is more use of remailers, not less. Just turn up the noise level. >You already know that nothing is 100% secure, but you do what you can. >It's a war of attrition. Only the shadow and a few bureaucrats know whether spooks have infiltrated the remailer operators' web of trust. I'd imagine the payoff in suggesting the possibility would lie in breeding mistrust not among operators but, rather, among potential users: diminishing the use and propagation of remailers would lower the overall noise level, making case-by-case interception and cracking that much more manageable. But this hall-of-mirrors speculation is really just misguided FUD: improving protocols, more remailers, and expanding webs of trust are the prize to keep our eyes on. Ted

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Re: A brief comparison of email encryption protocols
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:03 AM 3/1/96 -0800, Eric Murray <ericm(a)lne.com> wrote: >Suggestions? maybe key:/pgp/slack.lne.com/ericm/key/asc? >Finally, a question: should the keyserver be able to serve >keys in a way that is secure from a MITM attack, or can it depend >on the certificate chain in the key certificate itself to >validate the key certificate? I think it can, but I am not >sure, so perhaps someone smarter than I can explain why, or why not. Web of trust is clearly the way to go, but it helps to have both. 1) You need Web of Trust anyway 2) You may have multiple signatures, by people other than the keyserver; issues like "Company X Authorizes Key NNN for purchase up to $D" are outside the scope of keyservers. 3) If the keyserver managers _want_ to sign the key, they can. 4) It's much more convenient to run a non-trusted keyserver; there's a lot less security paranoia required, and enough less work that more people will run them. On the other hand, sending signed responses from the keyserver is clearly valuable. The big MITM risk is for revoked keys; the MITM may be able to block transmission of the revocation notice or, for Certificate Revocation List models like X.509, the CRL, and send an old key. Having the MITM sign and timestamp the response reduces the risk that an old self-revoked key will get through.

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NetDay96 (fwd)
by Emanuel Barros 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I apologize for those that are out of California, but other wise please consider helping. This is a very worth while cause. This will bring us much closer to educating all the children in our schools about what's going on on the internet. TIA eman(a)netcom.com ---------- Forwarded message ---------- >On NetDay96, March 9, 1996, a hundred thousand volunteers in >California >will go to twelve thousand schools in California, and install the same >Category 5 wire we use in all California business local area networks. >We will connect five classrooms and the library to a central closet, >in >preparation for connection to the Internet. This is a barnraising, a >kickstart for networking in the schools. > >Every high tech employee in California should be involved. Every >contractor for a high tech company should be involved. Anyone -- >employee, customer, or supplier -- that you can think of who believes >linking our children to the Internet is a good idea should be >involved. > >What do you do? Go to www.netday96.com, find a school, and volunteer >to >help put that school on the Internet on March 9. Go to that school on >Saturday, March 9, and help ten other people pull wire from five >classrooms and a library or computer lab to a central closet -- you >don't >need any particular expertise. That's it. You can choose a school >from >the twelve thousand home pages created on a server at the Well: >www.netday96.com. All schools, private or public, are there; if it >has >more than ten children in a classroom, it's a school -- if you don't >see >your school, mail netday(a)kqed.org and NetDay will put up a home page >for >you. > >As NetDay approaches, you will see pages go up for every company in >California supporting NetDay, together with the count of participants >from >each company. > >We're jumpstarting the schools. Our goal is to bring every school in >California past the first barrier to access: interior wiring. We then >use the new capability in the schools to persuade the carriers to >provide >Internet access. And it's working. > >We now have commitments from MCI, Netcom, and ATT to provide free >dialup >a ccess to the Internet for every school in California. Higher >bandwidth >will come next. > >We've talked the vendors into creating NetDay Kits that they will ship >directly to the schools. A standard kit, with two to three thousand >feet >of Cat 5 wire, jacks, a 24-way patch panel, connectors, and cable ties >will cost between $350 and $500. Pacific Bell is sponsoring 1,000 >kits. >Small electrical contractors are sponsoring two or three schools. >Individual parents are sponsoring schools. You can. Your district >office >can. All details are at the NetDay web site: www.netday96.com. > >Please sign up now. > >Our first need is to show a groundswell of volunteers. We announced >NetDay in San Francisco on January 19, at a school wired by Sun and >3Com >employees on Volunteer Day in November. Vice President Gore arrived to >praise the volunteers, and thank all California high-technology >companies >participating in NetDay. Volunteering has taken off, but we need to >reach >ten thousand in the next week or two. > >Please volunteer today. > >This Web site is the first use of the World Wide Web to organize a >mass >volunteer event. Please help make it a success. > >Please mail this request to anyone on your mailing lists. Please ask >all >webmasters to put a pointer to www.netday96.com on their home page. >We >are organizing this in a totally decentralized way, using the Web. >This >is the first time this has been tried, and I believe the Net can do >it. > >We can do it.

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re: Validating credit cards
by A. Padgett Peterson P.E. Information Security 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Actually can think of several phleneomum that would satisfy but first need to separate transactions into relating to electronic items and relating to physical items. In the case of physical items, pickup for shipping is probably done in batches (example: for FedEx the last pickup typically at 5 pm). It is not necessary to verify transactions instantaneously but rather when the order is processed /shipped. This could be done in a batch mode syncronized with order processing. In the case of electronic media there are two choices: either immediate access or delayed access. In the first case either access can be granted or immediate verification can be done. In the case of immediate access, it should be limited to items of restricted value. In delayed access the same batch processing mode can be performed (during the 0-dark hours most likely). This leaves only cases where immediate access must be granted and I suspect that in most cases the vulnerability of 6-24 hours of access before verification will be small. Where the possible loss is low, we are back to (a). So in the small proportion of transactions where immediate verification and transfer is necessary, I have no doubt that the existing infrastructure can handle it. At "slight additional charge" by the credit card company no doubt. Warmly, Padgett

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Re: art-stego
by JonWienke＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

.WAV files are potentially a good place to store stego information. With a 16-bit file, as many as 8 of the least significant bits in each sample can be replaced with encrypted info without making the file sound too wierd (depending on the natural background noise of the recording). If you make one of those "waves on the beach" relaxation things, you might be able to get away with even more. Another thing--just a wild idea--test the randomness of encrypted data by storing it in an 8-bit mono .WAV (your choice of sample rates) file and listening to it. Any correlations or patterns in the data should show up in the playback as hums, clicks, squeals, or something. It may even be possible to determine the algorithm by the sound patterns--a sort of "audio cryptanalysis." Has anyone tried this? Are there any .WAV stego programs out there? Jonathan Wienke

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Re: Looking for code to run an encrypted mailing list
by John Pettitt 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I wrote : >> >> Poster crypts mail with pgp using list exploder key. List exploder decrypts >> mail and recrypts with keys for all current list members and then sends the >> mail. >> >> [I don't want all the list members to need to know every other list members >> public key] > At 09:24 PM 3/4/96 -0800, Alan Bostick replied: >Is this the right way to go about doing this? > >If the mailing list has N members, then, for each message posted to the >list, the list processor must decrypt the message and then reencrypt it >N times. > Hmm thats not what I meant - I just envisioned giving all the recipient public keys to pgp and saying letting it do the rest. This does result in all recipients gettingthe key fingerprints of all other recipients which is not a problem in my application. Alan goes on to suggest sumthing very similar except that he does not decrypt the body first - which apart from meaning I'd have to hack pgp acheives the same effect. The overal intent was to have a message go from one list member to all others with a) a signature to provide strong attribution and a measure of non repudiation b) low probability of interception c) only the gateway has to have all the public keys. Inbound the process looks like this: decrypt and validate signature (leaving original signature) add gateway info (sender signature validation, date received etc) sign the whole thing with the gateway key. crypt with all list member keys (i.e. one message readable by any member) send to members. Several people have pointed me at PGPdomo which I now have a copy of and will be looking at as a basic for this (assuming it's not an exact fit already).\ [thanks to all those who responded] John -- John Pettitt email: jpettitt(a)well.sf.ca.us (home) jpp(a)software.net (work)

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None
by NSA Spook 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Spook is back! Hello everyone! The Spook is back! mixmaster(a)spook.alias.net is now functional again with bothe Type-I and Type-II remailers. The Type-II remailer supports news posting via mail2news(a)myriad.alias.net. The PGP Type-I key is the same as the old spook. The Mixmaster key however, is new. For your records: spook mixmaster(a)spook.alias.net 5c46a4b6c2cf00bfc7f693be81f88554 2.0.3 vishnu mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net bb460f08811a98682def423d30852d11 2.0.3 flame remailer(a)flame.alias.net 8b52e01256d96db2cefb21a081c64d34 2.0.3 secrets secret(a)secret.alias.net 834795b553fa43cbf33bea8f490a2b77 2.0.3b6 anon mixmaster(a)anon.alias.net e3ca4cc5beb9934ae6d52dd27da80332 2.0.2b shinobi remailer(a)shinobi.alias.net ab3c9b8f6c593ec7af312f5cfec49a9b 2.0.3 treehole treehole(a)mockingbird.alias.net 2c9f098377bf4f068751683f803834f5 2.0.3 mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com db91418edac3a4d7329feaee0b79c74f 2.0.1 knight mixmaster(a)aldebaran.armory.com 6bb0d89a29fd188c67b8e04516b5af33 2.0 rebma mixer(a)rebma.mn.org e7d84921298b0aadaf8f050d145ccf03 2.0b11 replay remailer(a)replay.com e3e2b4d67314b6165ee03b0b0ae07a7f 2.0b11 hacktic remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl bf61835a7b3cfa59c409caeab4e8a222 2.0b11 crynwr remailer(a)crynwr.com 64c62de6b347b3050fbb6e94c649112d 2.0b11 q q(a)c2.org c44e1cb0f0709465c21b07ac972bf973 2.0.1 ecafe-mix mixmaster(a)remail.ecafe.org fff0d827161069a26ca44dead777c9ec 2.0.1 amnesia amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com f37b7c77cd62ede86abb6e10c09601c1 2.0.3 black-ice mix(a)black-ice.gateway.com 42048f5769ecdd8df71abf49389fb3ac 2.0.3 yap remailer(a)yap.pactitle.com cb0ffde1d93706502e3b9a2dea3b12cb 2.0.3 alpha mixmaster(a)alpha.c2.org fb2afc9b497be22ad18abf1c41996eb0 2.0.2 lead mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu a76c3fda7294a6695c5e6a931d1c0b73 2.0.3 gondolin mix(a)remail.gondolin.org ed590656117439564465d5cc539864ad 2.0.3 nemesis remailer(a)meaning.com f59733a7f257900b09eb138764259a38 2.0.3 mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com db91418edac3a4d7329feaee0b79c74f 2.0.1 -----Begin Mix Key----- db91418edac3a4d7329feaee0b79c74f 258 AATL25WGQY5CMM0/xBjYtuN6IT75h+aBQwwKqZZc isOrqdsl8HWAzARrB0iAtcr34c2qqPBzSRNa5UE8 d3jOYu/wp9K9M5abUSRogcDl7gkPlqxc+e72SdKd 2Gdgib8VDGVLpJdaPk4uSY/pkmsYB30OaQH3W8dU PPciTvSJKAYcTQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAQAB -----End Mix Key----- vishnu mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net bb460f08811a98682def423d30852d11 2.0.3 -----Begin Mix Key----- bb460f08811a98682def423d30852d11 258 AAShg2h4xGHueryUFNsFBbtSGZBcj+oDImFMkOZA EQPcbeG6ReEnTnoQ8HBgwtx9isMT9hZ93lBaRY07 ygupHQRi6f+FnlQEZTKqOe+8E+WyDx+ox/1ywgt+ KGFOW+t8WRXA/loKuqD0KH4pwpe7FYE0arGbtm4J EscGM2DE3TeS3QAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAQAB -----End Mix Key----- knight mixmaster(a)aldebaran.armory.com 6bb0d89a29fd188c67b8e04516b5af33 2.0 -----Begin Mix Key----- 6bb0d89a29fd188c67b8e04516b5af33 258 AATOSyg7N2PVg9VgA8voDWglq6ESNBLqH0heB2iE NfvmR/VnyAHCb4ZBtHzvM7ZRBdXYmH/Jt490wg6O ZCbhcIceFKSsibLEH77+111isAhUbHvn0Nh9gOI7 5ngjOGDQaLQvGUbNHRXQaPAZ0rc4lv9gmChJONOJ 7sFC2J96QR4aewAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAQAB -----End Mix Key----- rebma mixer(a)rebma.mn.org e7d84921298b0aadaf8f050d145ccf03 2.0b11 -----Begin Mix Key----- e7d84921298b0aadaf8f050d145ccf03 258 AASjOGqzTLdjweTMiwirrpVNqXj/ODJVyh9pEo5i q5ERILOd1hMNKY9XLNFYM30mUR/Fkh0MnYI/ujWz OTb0rR2a31nvmaLMdaB75nTdGJwHitCmo8k2eTjL XQsXV6zKrzXGp8H8NO34DAFWJy1qVcev+6lLAWGy j/fsJJyJNtl94wAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAQAB -----End Mix Key----- replay remailer(a)replay.com e3e2b4d67314b6165ee03b0b0ae07a7f 2.0b11 -----Begin Mix Key----- e3e2b4d67314b6165ee03b0b0ae07a7f 258 AATZBfJhv+DGg4OEfQfgVnzZZpumEZHI9CES+Ux2 dBp9RBPpJnAtLpcAyCIkNjSaik0togcKhFgcR3nt XIrWclJ/uO/Z1fqW7ESLwzXozCpqnG5S/y6mUPuL yzA9bqtAGd+pvxuK/Cw2Zzx+1QGp0VtWb46KxqvC S4POHYFljkrQiQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAQAB -----End Mix Key----- hacktic remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl bf61835a7b3cfa59c409caeab4e8a222 2.0b11 -----Begin Mix Key----- bf61835a7b3cfa59c409caeab4e8a222 258 AATkwgy72zwwavCHn1OytNMsBYAIBnCFa2hcbZPi IN6eS4jDgFdld5DlcqqzdN6Lxv96i0Dg7ElFyAFR 5zmof3oaNqh5vbq/fTEbvFtX9EGyuqkfN6fKoAEv G7gtmkfosoIg/jnI8AL9KC/J5mGaxrWYB6XBe+v9 iI1pOSbPsDCsdQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAQAB -----End Mix Key----- crynwr remailer(a)crynwr.com 64c62de6b347b3050fbb6e94c649112d 2.0b11 -----Begin Mix Key----- 64c62de6b347b3050fbb6e94c649112d 258 AATLe0CWPSn844FCeL7FzUlf+vE2qfYBPs/8PYYm BfITjknJjD0dk7vXhX9Qc5PFgDWRHhVoIRlFT3sc Jp2UVFLOZ5zn/WiT9Wa1tZsqejDf3MRIDT/K6cHB uB/SUaxLzNfk/wG1uBTUHukdjwCyDxNLHuYA5mVz opYJhQR0Nc/ESQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAQAB -----End Mix Key----- flame remailer(a)flame.alias.net 8b52e01256d96db2cefb21a081c64d34 2.0.3 -----Begin Mix Key----- 8b52e01256d96db2cefb21a081c64d34 258 AASr5mNwBYFstmsTI7cPjGSLwLc35A3dmh8jHzAF ixoCn8jCc2ZAfD4WnxcwS0UYcpU0oSYZJhLrIBzq VFNWu+C5+ayJMWBW1xr86TJLX/sNSeQBrnUqbKvF CQW69RZzwNybGtlaPNdqhlJLc1Hr50iZOMykDbu5 hT4SY9gw+YvJHQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAQAB -----End Mix Key----- q q(a)c2.org c44e1cb0f0709465c21b07ac972bf973 2.0.1 -----Begin Mix Key----- c44e1cb0f0709465c21b07ac972bf973 258 AATDBaiKBy4jPlRUIQmVvcjO/GhWLbsls+mKloml 5EScYl+3fGw04P4xVcWOSledFVxKVfNy+xTVI8pE XGXSr0cRUIa1NttzNPk/KObb5SvkeqGtWAyRiWBS G91MkWM6LbqzKPcu6gUON47wJCJCzdvgbUIeVJIT MnyBvMWJX5CKAwAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAQAB -----End Mix Key----- secrets secret(a)secret.alias.net 834795b553fa43cbf33bea8f490a2b77 2.0.3b6 -----Begin Mix Key----- 834795b553fa43cbf33bea8f490a2b77 258 AATXbdk8pTt2maDkz/dtKniKIOgGnVt9HPpf85HY Aau2yuMlwupuN4c+XwLzO1hvdKOIkrJWZagWkmZ2 irSV5sxf0vI8JZ+iKx9T+aoQJLUaBsWTUrLh24kP +IUkVL8AmIkk+grFDdzkS2MmfpP707tlgZB4KWkk uvjUPmBySSgS8wAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAQAB -----End Mix Key----- ecafe-mix mixmaster(a)remail.ecafe.org fff0d827161069a26ca44dead777c9ec 2.0.1 -----Begin Mix Key----- fff0d827161069a26ca44dead777c9ec 258 AATgcIZ9GIj6VEZ2UmDO9BGmGVY5tZHVQp+2rChG 0E+lcD8lrHlWGwc/ea9Ycj8z2HGdWZl5ptXqfabf YenIyO7YRr7teAzAAFmkBuwgBGUcpJUvIOjWlXBo OGnku0AQYqOBDZSfknT+dAP01N82qDN13E6dUhEW /0hdDNVghmsy2wAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAQAB -----End Mix Key----- amnesia amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com f37b7c77cd62ede86abb6e10c09601c1 2.0.3 -----Begin Mix Key----- f37b7c77cd62ede86abb6e10c09601c1 258 AAS6A7+7R0y0piA6pLPMX1ZzaLOt2pWFt4LsSfiu hQty8V0SgfdYv5bKc2BGtfl0kLNAOG8dtyJ0TNQO i6ZQJeZySwH6bKXrUM25VpdOmreXdzO/8vIezmOC BfEh+vZE209WFiLBXwohqvwOIiMAYJGYDRB53Coq Afzn2HCG9sQ37wAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAQAB -----End Mix Key----- anon mixmaster(a)anon.alias.net e3ca4cc5beb9934ae6d52dd27da80332 2.0.2b -----Begin Mix Key----- e3ca4cc5beb9934ae6d52dd27da80332 258 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PARTY PICTURES PLUS
by Sandy Sandfort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C'punks, This should be my last post about my party [sound of crowd cheering]. Because several of you wanted more info about the pictures and/or felt slighted by the file identification tabs, I have added additional information: http://www.c2.org/party/masquerade/ Enjoy. S a n d y ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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re: NYT on crypto
by A. Padgett Peterson P.E. Information Security 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>I thought that, for the most part, the telegraph systems described >above were to reduce cable charges (1 code word instead of a 15-word >sentence, a huge savings in those days). Was one use however I seem to recall citations dating back to Niccolo Polo reguarding the use of trade codes & that was a while before the telegraph. If I were really curious, would also check out Reuters, Lloyds, Rothchilds, and the Borgias. Would not be surprised to find a reference in either/all "The Prince", "The Art of War", and the letters of Nathan Hale. However I suspect that Markoff really meant to be referring to mathematical algoritms such as the LOASDR. I suppose that only dates back to the diameters of stygi (sp ?) about the same time that passwords were first recorded (and changed daily). Warmly, Padgett ps if anyone has a spare LOASDR or CMSDR, I would be interested 8*).

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