December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

NYT/CyberTimes on CWD article
by declan＠well.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"We are writers, not crytographers." -Declan --- http://www.nytimes.com/library/cyber/week/0706patrol-reporters.html July 6, 1996 Reporters Claim to Have Lists of Blocked Sites By PAMELA MENDELS Reporters Brock N. Meeks and Declan B. McCullagh say they've got a little list. Several actually. The lists are of Internet sites that, in the eyes of several companies making parental control software, could be considered inappropriate to children. The lists are supposed to be secret. But Meeks and McCullagh say they have obtained lists compiled by Microsystems Software, Inc., the Framingham, Mass.-based manufacturer of Cyber Patrol; Los Altos, Calif.-based SurfWatch Software, a subsidiary of Spyglass, Inc., and Santa Barbara, Calif.-based Solid Oak Software, Inc., maker of CYBERsitter -- three of the leading producers of parental- control filtering software. McCullagh said that he and Meeks were able to view the complete Cyber Patrol and CYBERsitter lists and part of the SurfWatch list. In an article published this week in CyberWire Dispatch, a report on Internet-related issues distributed through e-mail, Meeks and McCullagh wrote that they had taken a peek at some of the sites contained on the lists and had then contacted groups that might be concerned about the listings. Representatives of organizations ranging in advocacy from feminism to gun lobbying to animal rights said they been disturbed to learn that some sites they endorse had made the lists. Kim A. Gandy, executive vice president of the National Organization for Women, said Friday that she was upset to learn that CYBERSitter blocks access to NOW's Web site. Further, she said she did not like the company's rationale: that the NOW site contains links to, among other things, sites about homosexuality. "It's ridiculous," Gandy said. "It's insulting. And I think most parents would not approve of that kind of censorship. Lots of parents don't want children surfing pornography, but would not think of denying them access to legitimate information." Marc E. Kanter, director of marketing for Solid Oak, confirmed Friday that NOW's site had been included on the CYBERsitter not-for-children list because of its links leading to "sexual preferentation" sites. "This is what our users want," he said. "If they don't want to restrict access to this material, they don't have to buy it or they can simply turn it off. We are not trying to play any political role. We are simply providing a tool for parents." Officials of the Gay & Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation were also upset that the Cyber Patrol list blocked several Internet discussion groups devoted to news of interest to the gay community. "We feel that this is the kind of thing important to gay and lesbian youth, to read about our community," said Lauren R. Javier, director of information systems for the Gay & Lesbian Alliance, adding that the newsgroups contained little if any sexually explicit material. Javier added that Cyber Patrol officials had been responsive in the past to complaints, so he wanted to give them "the benefit of the doubt" and intended to contact them about the matter. For his part, Nigel R. Spicer, president of Microsystems, said he had not examined the reasons that all the gay newsgroup sites named by the article were included on the Cyber Patrol list. The one site he did check after reading Meeks' report, however, was on the list because it contained links to personals ads, he said. McCullagh is keeping mum about how he and Meeks got the lists in the first place, although he denies that either of them personally decoded the software. "Brock and I are not cyptographic analysts," he said. "We don't spend our days de-encrypting files. We are writers, not crytographers." Spicer was less than happy about the prospect that Cyber Patrol's list may have fallen into outsiders' hands. He said that, so far, he had been unable to confirm whether the reporters had the true list for Cyber Patrol and, if so, how they had managed to obtain it. "It's always a concern if you believe people are getting access to material you've gone to the trouble to not make available," he said. "If we believe the encryption scheme has been compromised, we will make another one." Kanter, of CYBERsitter, said the list mentioned in the Cyberwire Dispatch article was, indeed, his company's. "I hope that list doesn't get out beyond where it was," he said. Jay S. Friedland, vice president of marketing for SurfWatch products, said Friday that he had not yet read the article. He said the blocking companies keep their lists secret for two reasons: to prevent their misuse and to keep their competitive edge. "Clearly, each company has a proprietary advantage," Friedland said. "One of our competitors could take and use the same information." ###

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Re: CCC Crypto Lock
by Deranged Mutant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 6 Jul 96 at 4:10, anonymous-remailer(a)shell.port wrote: > MicroPatent, 4 July 96 [..] > Abstract: Disclosed systems and methods for protecting a > software program from unauthorized use and copying > through the removal at least one of a plurality of > instructions comprising a software program, and > encrypting the removed instruction utilizing an > encryption algorithm to produce an encrypted instruction, > the encryption algorithm responsive to a randomly > generated key. Would certain computer viruses be considered prior art here? (Be it that they encrypt for the purposes of hiding rather than copy protection though.) Rob. --- No-frills sig. Befriend my mail filter by sending a message with the subject "send help" Key-ID: 5D3F2E99 1996/04/22 wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com (root@magneto) AB1F4831 1993/05/10 Deranged Mutant <wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com> Send a message with the subject "send pgp-key" for a copy of my key.

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Re: What remains to be done.
by Deranged Mutant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 6 Jul 96 at 13:32, Anthony Daniel wrote: > Should try SECURE DESK-TOP as well (PC only), it can encrypt (DES and IDEA) [..] > And it can add PEM capabilities to most e-mail clients and it's WIN95 and PGP capabilities would be nice. :) > user friendly. Try it at: > > http://www.systems.it/secure > > There are NO export restrictions on it as well because it's Italian made. Well, it can't be downloaded from a US site to a non-US site anyway. It's nice to see some non-US strong crypto in that it will be all the more impetus to relax ITAR. Rob --- No-frills sig. Befriend my mail filter by sending a message with the subject "send help" Key-ID: 5D3F2E99 1996/04/22 wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com (root@magneto) AB1F4831 1993/05/10 Deranged Mutant <wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com> Send a message with the subject "send pgp-key" for a copy of my key.

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Re: CWD -- Jacking in from the "Keys to the Kingdom" Port
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:27 AM 7/6/96 +0000, you wrote: >On Fri, 5 Jul 1996, CyberEyes wrote: > >> NOT talking about Lynx, what DOS-based Web browser is there? > > Net-Tamer. > > Requires a PPP connection, and precious little else. The problem is getting PPP to work under DOS. If your kid can do that, then he will have no problem in disabling any sort of filtering, as well as wiping the hard drive and installing Linux with X11R6. DOS stacks are a pain to get functioning, usually have little to no useful instructions, and tend to be harder than hell to find. (Or as Homer Simpson once said: "Mmmmmm! Packet drivers!") I expect to see a case where some kid gets in trouble for filtering out what his parents can see, read, or hear. Or sets the school filter to only allow going to porno sites. I find it humorous how many people think that they can use technology to babysit their kids when the kids understand the technology much better than they do in most cases... --- Alan Olsen -- alano(a)teleport.com -- Contract Web Design & Instruction `finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ "We had to destroy the Internet in order to save it." - Sen. Exon "Microsoft -- Nothing but NT promises."

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Re: [RANT] Giving Mind Control Drugs to Children
by AwakenToMe＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Did I miss something?? I fisrt came here and asked something about protected mode and was yelled at for asking it in this newsgroup. Now we're onto mind control drugs? uhhhhhh ok.

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Re: Need PGP-awareness in common utilities
by Deranged Mutant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 6 Jul 96 at 15:11, bryce(a)digicash.com wrote: [..] > I really don't see why programs like majordomo, UseNet > moderation-bots, and most noticeably the PGP key distribution > program are PGP-unaware. > Okay, fine. Having waited for FIVE YEARS or however long it has > been, you who are responsible for such handy dandy programs may now > convincingly argue that you might as well wait for another few > months to get PGPlib. But I sincerely hope that once PGPlib arrives > we don't wait another five years before using it. Good point... > There is another argument that people sometimes make-- that > it is too complicated to ensure pubkey<->True Name. SO WHAT! I've <i>never</i> seen that argument. It's a non-issue for making programs PGP-aware. [..] --- No-frills sig. Befriend my mail filter by sending a message with the subject "send help" Key-ID: 5D3F2E99 1996/04/22 wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com (root@magneto) AB1F4831 1993/05/10 Deranged Mutant <wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com> Send a message with the subject "send pgp-key" for a copy of my key.

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Re: Transforming variable- to fixed-length keys
by Deranged Mutant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 7 Jul 96 at 1:47, pgut001(a)cs.auckland.ac.nz wrote: [..] > I've run into a problem in writing a general-purpose n-byte input to m-byte > output transformation function. What this does is take an arbitrary-length > user key and transform it to a fixed-length encryption key (for example an > entered passphrase into a 112-bit triple-DES key). The constraints on memory > usage are: > > - The input (user) key can't be altered (you can't change data passed in by the > caller) > - The user key can't be copied to an internal buffer (it can be of arbitrary > length, and is sensitive material so shouldn't be copied elsewhere) > > In other words there's no temporary storage available apart from what's > provided in the output key. This is almost always a different length from the > input key. > > Some other constraints are: > > - The transformation must be algorithm-independant (it shouldn't, for example, [..] > - The transformation must be able to be iterated to make a password-guessing > attack harder to perform. Hmm. What about the following: Use a constant (non-weak) key for a cipher (perhaps the hash of the passphrase under certain circumstances?) For iteration-0, CFB (or some other feedback mode)-encrypt the passphrase from the input buffer to the output buffer (assuming the library doesn't require that the plaintext and ciphertext be in the same buffer) For following iterations, repeatedly CFB-encrypt the buffer, using a counter in data bytes. This method could use hash algorithms in MDC or Luby-Rackoff forms as well as block ciphers (and perhaps some stream ciphers). Another method might be to seed a PRNG similar to that used in PGP 2.x with the passphrase, have it stir the bytes a number of times, and then use the output as the key: randPoolAddBytes(passphrase, passlen); for(i=0;i<iterationCount;i++) randPoolStir(); randPoolGetBytes(key, keylen); > Here's my initial approach, if anyone has any comments to make on this or knows > of a better way to do it, please let me know. [..] > The first stage in the key hashing prepends the length of the string as a > big-endian 16-bit count to the user key: > > +------+-------------------------------------------------------+ > |Length| User Key | > +------+-------------------------------------------------------+ > > The aim of the hashing is to reduce this variable-length input string to a > fixed-length key appropriate to the encryption algorithm being used. This is > done by treating the user encryption keys as circular buffers and repeatedly > hashing chunks of the user key and xoring the result into the output buffer. [..] > Since the input to the hash function is much larger than its output, a > significant amount of the user key affects each chunk of the encryption key. > The size of each "chunk" is determined by the hash function being used. For > example with the MD4 hash function, 64 bytes of user key affect each 16 bytes > of encryption key. [..] Questions: Are you using the previous chaining-variables/hash for each successive chunk? How do you pad passphrases that are smaller than the minimum input for a hash function? Rob. --- No-frills sig. Befriend my mail filter by sending a message with the subject "send help" Key-ID: 5D3F2E99 1996/04/22 wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com (root@magneto) AB1F4831 1993/05/10 Deranged Mutant <wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com> Send a message with the subject "send pgp-key" for a copy of my key.

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[RANT] Re: CWD -- Jacking in from the "Keys to the Kingdom" Port
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 03:27 PM 7/5/96 -0400, Mark M. wrote: >> B) Forget the CONFIG.SYS ... what about kids using Macs or some future >> "Kid Safe" system that has the filters in an eeprom? I'm talking >> about bypassing the censorship on the client-server level. Relatively >> platform independent. > >Using a hardware based filter is about as bad as using the IP security header >fields for content descriptions. It's not at the level where filtering >belongs. Filtering should be at the software level where it currently is. >Since this can easily be broken, it might be better to have "Kid Safe" ISP's >that would use a firewall to filter data. Or even better yet, they could actually teach thier children to deal with such information instead of sheltering them from it. I have dealt with a number of parents who have the idea that they can filter everything the kid hears or sees. The type of intelectual and emotional basketcases that result are not very plesant to interact with. They tend to go through alot of rough times when they have to go out into the world and see a wide variety of views, instead of just seeing what mommy and daddy want them to. What happens from there is generally not very pretty or very fun for the person involved. I do not believe that these types of filters are good. If you have that much concern about what your child can see, then you should not give them net access at all. (And remember to also not to leave them at the library where they might find just as much filth...) "If you don't want your kids to be hit by information, then don't let them play on the information superhighway." Without contradictoy viewpoints, children do not learn how to decern between them. They get indoctrinated into the idea that they must accept ideas as they are fed to them. That learning consists of taking what is provided and not to go out and find those ideas which might be "harmful" or "dangerous" without perental supervision. What we are getting is a bunch of emotional cripples who cannot handle anything intelectually sharper than a rubber ball. (And it must be a ball bigger than two inches in diameter, else they might choke on it.) With these sort of tools, we are conditioning our children that it is OK if someone filters their information before they see it. (Without even knowing the *KIND* of information being filtered, because even *THAT* level of knowledge is harmful and/or proprietary.) That it is OK for some parental figure to eliminate all the "nasty" and "awful" information before someone can hurt themselves with it. That itt is OK to prevent others from viewing information to complex for their childlike minds. We are becoming a nation of the babysat. Anything that our nannys deem harmful is hidden away in the bedrooms of the parental units. And maybe it is harmful. They have to scan through it all day long and look what kind of self-righous pricks they have become! At least I am able to instill some sort of love of knowledge and exploration into my daughter. Hopefully it will stick before the control freaks in this culture are able to knock it out of her... --- Alan Olsen -- alano(a)teleport.com -- Contract Web Design & Instruction `finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ "We had to destroy the Internet in order to save it." - Sen. Exon "Microsoft -- Nothing but NT promises."

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Re: MacPGP 2.6.3 released
by Zbigniew Fiedorowicz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have changed the method of distribution of FatMacPGP 2.6.3. It is now available by anonnymous FTP from Mike Johnson's ITAR compliant crypto archives at ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/. My web page http://www.math.ohio-state.edu/~fiedorow/PGP now contains detailed instructions and URL links explaining how to obtain the software from Mike Johnson's site, rather than the software itself. In particular, it is no longer necessary to have a previous version of PGP in order to get FatMacPGP 2.6.3. Note: my system administrators have changed the IP address of www.math.ohio-state.edu this weekend. If your DNS server has difficulty finding the site, you might try http://128.146.111.31/~fiedorow/PGP Feel free to redistribute FatMacPGP 2.6.3 to friends, acquaintances, etc and to put it up on local BBS's. It is your personal responsibility to insure you don't to violate any laws or international treaties doing so. Zig Fiedorowicz

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Netscape 3.0b5 can unanonymize Anonymizer
by Ian Goldberg 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- The new netscape has this "feature" where the RHS of KEY=value pairs in tags can contain inline Javascript, which is evaluated to get the actual RHS. For example, the HTML: Did you really think you could be <a href="&{window.open('noanon.html','', 'toolbar=1,location=1,directories=1,status=1,menubar=1,scrollbars=1'); '/'};">anonymous</a>? will open a new, unanonymized, window (you don't even have to click on the link). The main problem is that the Anonymizer doesn't filter out the new way of embedding Javascript: &{this.is("javascript code")}; So, if you use the Anonymizer with netscape 3.0b5, _disable_ Javascript until this is fixed (better yet, disable Javascript and Java entirely, but that's another story for another time...). - Ian -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMd6/nEZRiTErSPb1AQGEPgQAu9NaxafrQDrqdTLUkzQ7k0D6Pq8FxIx1 7Mo3j6ACs6Flp2Tq+2szh6Ch+U0r21LL5NuC3zQ/BA9j/UmqU+c5XM7NRFFGEEhY f1RakLlaiWp+gnxv3dgWWMUZ30iB01kNbIGcl4X3FPLUpyavK45KoqjRJh13s/K+ ACWmg1pgmXk= =23r4 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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