December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Tamper-Resistance in VLSI
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:06 AM 4/1/96, Mike Duvos wrote: >However, I will observe that whenever technology is put forth for >criticism on this list, there are always a few people who insist >upon maintaining that anything can be easily defeated. > >"All you have to do is <blank>" they exclaim, where <blank> may >be replaced by "Quantum Factoring", "SQUIDs", "Scanning Tunneling >Microscopy", "NP=P", "The EPR Effect", "Nanomachines", or some >other exotic notion which would be lucky if it had even achieved >a laboratory demonstration under carefully controlled conditions >much less a practical application to the problem in question. > >Common to all such claims is a gross underappreciation of the >engineering difficulties involved, in this case those related to >reading logic states buried in a densely integrated digital >device without destroying them. Something that isn't easy to do >even if the device has been designed specifically for the purpose >of permitting such observation in a laboratory environment. While I agree that reverse-engineering/analyzing the internal states of VLSI devices is much harder than some are claiming, it is not the case that a chip must have been designed with this in mind for it to be possible. When, then, is it possible, and when is it not? There is no simple answer; I'd have to look closely at the device, its packaging, how many layers of metal are involved, the size of the target node to be measured, and a raft of other things. >Such distractions, unfortunately, are why good physics rarely >gets discussed in sci.physics, and why discussions on this list >about nuclear bomb design, tampering, and hacking frequently take >off in the crackpot direction. > >The bad eventually drives out the good, and few of the competent >posters are going to continue to comment on a thread which has >degenerated into the "You don't know anything. Mr. Squid can >read your smart card and your brain waves too" level of >interaction. Well, this is my third post tonight on this thread. I admit that it has little to do with practical list issue (but then, what really does?). Howvever, this happens to be an area of primary expertise for me (device physics, voltage contrast, SQUIDs, sensing small charges, and tamper-resistance), so I'm making comments to correct the various misapprehensions here. As to tamper-resistance, there is some exciting work being done on "fingerprinting" of chips, some of which has been publically presented. I'm under an NDA on some of this, but I can say that the cost of reverse-engineering a smart card chip or satellite decoder chip is about to take a quantum leap upward. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: [NOISE] Cable-TV-Piracy-Punks
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:56 PM 3/31/96, Randy Catoe wrote: >>"Perry E. Metzger" <perry(a)piermont.com> writes: >> >> > Or to people with access to scanning microscopy techniques >> > like STMs or AFMs. I suspect that there are lots of >> > techniques that can be successfully used. It used to be that >> > using them required the sort of facilities only available at >> > a large semiconductor manufacturer, but now I suspect that >> > it would be easy for a student at a major university, and >> > probably less easy, but still perfectly feasible, for a >> > person working at home with lots of sophisticated but fairly >> > available equipment like STMs. >> >The proof would be in the pudding, would it not? Are their >documented cases of smartcard scavenging? Intel produced an "encrypted EPROM," for use in coin-op game machines and in similar applications, in the early 80s. My voltage contrast lab was able to use our machine (which I invented and my group then developed and deployed to major sites within Intel) to read the internal data streams out from internal nodes, thus demonstrating that the system had only moderate security. Enough security to stop an attacker from attacking a specific instance of the chip, but enough security to prevent attacks completely. Does this qualify as a documented case, coming as it does directly from the guy who lead such a scavenging attack? --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Key signing - LA & SF
by don＠cs.byu.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I will be in the Los Angeles and San Francisco areas briefly at the end of April. Anyone who would like to trade keysignatures, please email me. (Unfortunately my ability to get around will be somewhat limited) Don ObCypherpunks: I read cpunks by NNTP from nntp.hks.net. Let me assure you, the apparent noise level has gone down by 90% from when it landed in my mailbox. Many thanks to those who provide this service. - -- <don(a)cs.byu.edu> http://students.cs.byu.edu/~don PGP 0x994B8F39 fRee cRyPTo! "It is not worth an intelligent man's time to be in the majority. By definition, there are already enough people to do that." - G. H. Hardy ** This user insured by the Smith, Wesson, & Zimmermann insurance company ** -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQB1AwUBMV8iosLa+QKZS485AQGVJgL/TED+T/49jMtNRbCAHJdo+IkSOTx7Ajrx Ox7+ABlcbCYKudLE70qh7RDdz9TI2sojB6FZ0vyoLGdVM61ljfd9YzZfq/kVXsyY EZ4HM2nGInXBQFo+rfQcn7JbXAT3agz/ =NZjK -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: [NOISE] Cable-TV-Piracy-Punks (fwd)
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 7:54 PM 3/31/96, Jim Choate wrote: >Forwarded message: > >> > Presumedly the state of the EEPROM cannot be deduced by any >> > external examination of the card, and any attempt to >> > incrementally abrade the card down to the relevent circuit >> > elements should completely obliterate the minute charge >> > differences which represent the data. >> >> They aren't immune to the laws of physics. If it can be put together, >> it can be taken apart. I can even surmise HOW it can be taken apart. > >You wouldn't even have to take it apart. Just subject it to analysis using >SQUID's. Using this technology you would not even have to physicaly touch >the card, let alone remove any parts of it. Well, I worked on SQUIDs (Superconducting quantum-interferometric devices) in 1972-3, and also worked on electron-beam analysis of microprocessors and memory device in 1980-84, and I can assure you that SQUIDs cannot do what you want them to do. I'll be happy to supply additional details if there's sufficient interest. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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cryptanalysis questions
by Jack Mott 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

What are the general methods used for statistical analysis of ciphers? Should I just use conventional stat analysis and look for patterns? Does anyone have any source or programs that do some of these kinds of things? -- thecrow(a)iconn.net "It can't rain all the time"

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Re: So, what crypto legislation (if any) is necessary?
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 8:14 PM 3/31/96, Rev. Ben wrote: >I won't post my opinions upon whom I think is an Agent Provocateur, but >Uni isn't one. For what it's worth, I don't think there's a single agent provacateur on the list. At least not a vocal one (which sort of defeats the point). While I expect there may be a few government types who subscribe just to see what's going on (and I don't mean more active subscribers, such as Brian Davis, even though he's an Assistant District Attorney--he openly admits his role and makes contributions openly), I've seen no evidence that anyone is a provacateur. We're fairly open in our approaches, and are not plotting in secret, so the role of an agent provacateur is not clear. Disruptors, yes. But one man's disruption is another man's lively debate. So what else is new. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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EMO_ney
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

3-30-96 Economist, three related E-money reports: "Trials of digital cash and smart cards seem to be going on everywhere. Who will win the race to control tomorrow's money?" "Digitising dollars." Citicorp's Electronic Monetary System could make all forms of physical money redundant, and, if it wins broad acceptance, could help to solve some of the financial industry's most intractable problems. "The foreign exchange market: illiquid lunch." Diminishing liquidity; settlement risk; impact of electronic brokering. EMO_ney

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New release of SFS available
by pgut001＠cs.auckland.ac.nz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have just uploaded version 1.19 of SFS to the grumbo.uwasa.fi FTP site as: 551004 Apr 01 01:19 grumbo.uwasa.fi:/pc/crypt/sfs119.zip This release contains a number of major improvements over previous versions. The most important is that it follows recommendations on the use of encryption software to be released later today in a joint announcement by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe and the US State Department. To this end the new version of SFS will abandon the use of MDC/SHS in favour of a classified algorithm which the both NSA and GCHQ are confident will protect non- confidential data. Although the exact algorithm details cannot be published due to its classified nature, it can be revealed that it uses prime number cycle wheels, a system still employed today at the highest levels. This algorithm improves on MDC/SHS by using a massive 2048-bit key, which would take billions of years to exhaust via a brute-force search. However in order to satisfy the requirements of various organizations such as the Chinese government (who need to ensure that no nasty outside influences pollute the minds of their citizens) and to allow the originators of the 83.5% of all Usenet traffic which contains porn to be prosecuted (a recent example being the widely publicised move by the Office of the Bavarian Illuminati to force Compuserve to drop all sex-related newsgroups), SFS 1.19 will store 2032 bits of the key in the clear along with the encrypted data. The head of the FBI Louis Freeh has been quoted as saying that "this will provide adequate protection against your little sister or your mother, while allowing law enforcement agencies to investigate people using encryption for illegal purposes". The head of the French DSSI agrees: "There have been too many cases of industrial espionage by foreign government intelligence agencies. For example in 1993 one such agency acquired over $1 billion worth of business for their own countries' companies in this manner. SFS 1.19 will protect against this problem, while allowing us to maintain control over French national security interests". The German government has tentatively approved SFS 1.19 for public use provided that it undergo a few small changes to comply with an updated form of the the Fernmeldeanlagen Ueberwachungs-Verordung (FUeV), which will require that all German users of SFS be connected to a central system to which copies of all keys used, times of encryption and decryption, identities of users, and copies of all encrypted data, be automatically forwarded. The Minister of the Interior Manfred Kanther stated that "this should fulfil the requirements of the German government for monitoring possible criminal use, although I might change my mind about this in a minute or two". Peter.

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Re: What backs up digital money?
by jf_avon＠citenet.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >Mark Neely - accessnt(a)ozemail.com.au said: >Well, doesn't this beg the question - the "desire" by people to own them >is not as a result of advertising, but the fact that society has long >fixed them as standard units of "currency". > >If all those centuries ago marble was decided upon as a central >unit of currency, we'd all be killing ourselves to get some, not because >of any aestetic beauty. I do not think so. The common never holds value because value, especially in a crude civilisation, is related to rarity or difficulty to produce and obtain. AFAIK, gold was considered a value in every civilisation. If some did not consider it a value, then, they either ignored it's existence or had so much that it was not a value. Marbles are easy to make in most civilisations. They therefore cannot be used as a value standard. One problem with e-$, as pointed out by many, is that it has to have a *perceivable* value. Backing it by something physical that is already valued might be the best way to launch it. Otherwise, it will have the statute, if not legally, at least in the mind of the average Joe, the same as junks bonds. JFA -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2i iQEVAwUBMV7fLMiycyXFit0NAQEGfAf8C3/kwoJ4Fnk7W7UP0P92+TGtgn3HAf/q AJ9V13iZVuX9hI96lP9PPixWryz0olI6D2df6c509peCoND4JUUXj2eBhJ0U/tHz 3Xw2D2oCep0fgm8NC6TzBBobrzcTExM41N5BG8H76SAJk9bz9zoHRx5OH2HVNCvu WyRXA0g2C9N6v0FpmQaQ2C0ose5c/WVQ9Yk/JmMgc0kw0HaT6VVVDfAkz+jTjCbj +0fh3gLREUdkx3pHXQ6ulfrZ4VoSz1qHSXCVKLy5kODieIYAMkZ0k/aYnbxPZRyX oHmk5kIKP9dO5Ao064ViJACi8gAYlwFp7YOSCexpJRDz0b7UMtO9/g== =a251 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- PGP key at: http://w3.citenet.net/users/jf_avon Jean-Francois Avon <jf_avon(a)citenet.net> ID:C58ADD0D 96/03/01 fingerprint: 52 96 45 E8 20 5A 8A 5E F8 7C C8 6F AE FE F8 91 Unsollicited commercial e-mail will be proofread at a rate of 165 $ U.S. per hours. Any sender of unsollicited commercial e-mail will be considered as to have accepted the above ment- ionned terms.

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Re: What backs up digital money?
by Robert A. Rosenberg 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 15:25 3/28/96, Black Unicorn wrote: >> > At 1:46 PM 3/27/96, Scott Schryvers wrote: >> Between those times the net amount >> of money in bank accounts was reduced, by exactly the amount of >> circulating dcash. > >Ditto uncashed checks. Only Teller's/Cashier's and Traveler's Checks. These represent the conversion of Cash into a promise to pay when the Check is presented. This is the same as dcash. An Uncashed Personal Check (unless it has been certified [which withdraws the money from the account at Certification time]) only represents an unsecured claim on the monies in the account (ie: the Bank has no knowledge of its existence or amount until it is presented for payment/clearance).

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