December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)miron.vip.best.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"portal"} = "<hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"alumni"} = "<hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"bsu-cs"} = "<nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu> cpunk hash ksub"; $remailer{"c2"} = "<remail(a)c2.org> eric pgp hash reord"; $remailer{"penet"} = "<anon(a)anon.penet.fi> penet post"; $remailer{"hacktic"} = "<remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"flame"} = "<remailer(a)flame.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut post reord"; $remailer{"rahul"} = "<homer(a)rahul.net> cpunk pgp hash filter"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"ford"} = "<remailer(a)bi-node.zerberus.de> cpunk pgp hash ksub ek"; $remailer{"robo"} = "<robo(a)c2.org> cpunk hash mix"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"rmadillo"} = "<remailer(a)armadillo.com> mix cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"ecafe"} = "<cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org> cpunk mix"; $remailer{"wmono"} = "<wmono(a)valhalla.phoenix.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut"; $remailer{"shinobi"} = "<remailer(a)shinobi.alias.net> cpunk mix hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"amnesia"} = "<amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ksub"; $remailer{"gondolin"} = "<mix(a)remail.gondolin.org> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"tjava"} = "<remailer(a)tjava.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"pamphlet"} = "<pamphlet(a)idiom.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ?"; $remailer{'alpha'} = '<alias(a)alpha.c2.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'gondonym'} = '<alias(a)nym.gondolin.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"lead"} = "<mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"treehole"} = "<remailer(a)mockingbird.alias.net> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"nemesis"} = "<remailer(a)meaning.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"exon"} = "<remailer(a)remailer.nl.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"vegas"} = "<remailer(a)vegas.gateway.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"haystack"} = "<haystack(a)holy.cow.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"ncognito"} = "<ncognito(a)gate.net> mix cpunk latent"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (c2 robo alpha) (gondolin gondonym) (flame hacktic replay) (alumni portal) Use "premail -getkeys pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu" to get PGP keys for the remailers. Fingering this address works too. Note: The remailer list now includes information for the alpha nymserver. Last update: Mon 6 May 96 6:45:06 PDT remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- shinobi remailer(a)shinobi.alias.net *-*--*+***+* 38:35 99.99% alpha alias(a)alpha.c2.org +-+++--+.+++ 1:16:28 99.99% hacktic remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl +******++*** 8:55 99.98% portal hfinney(a)shell.portal.com ####*-##-### 11:44 99.93% haystack haystack(a)holy.cow.net #+*-**-*#*# 21:39 99.90% lead mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu ++++++++++++ 38:55 99.88% ecafe cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org #* -####*# 30:12 99.76% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com __._.--++++ 13:34:46 99.68% extropia remail(a)miron.vip.best.com -----_.--.- 11:22:42 99.61% exon remailer(a)remailer.nl.com ##****+***** 2:29 99.53% flame remailer(a)flame.alias.net -+++ .----+ 6:11:21 99.42% alumni hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu +*## +#-### 20:24 99.35% penet anon(a)anon.penet.fi _...____ . 54:35:54 99.35% c2 remail(a)c2.org +++++- +++++ 1:18:29 98.98% amnesia amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com --______. - 49:22:17 98.80% vegas remailer(a)vegas.gateway.com #- .---###** 4:29:32 98.30% replay remailer(a)replay.com ****+ +*** 5:21 93.85% treehole remailer(a)mockingbird.alias.net +-----+ 2:56:21 90.38% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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US Crypto Laws cripple Euros
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text X-Authentication-Warning: fma66.fma.com: majordomo set sender to owner-espam(a)lists.espace.net using -f X-Orig-From: rah-web <rah(a)shipwright.com> X-e$pam-source: Various X-Sender: rah(a)pop.sneaker.net Mime-Version: 1.0 Date: Sat, 20 Sep 1997 14:15:15 -0400 To: espam(a)intertrader.com From: Robert Hettinga <rah(a)shipwright.com> Subject: US Crypto Laws cripple Euros X-MIME-Autoconverted: from 8bit to quoted-printable by lbo.leftbank.com id OAA08597 Sender: owner-espam(a)lists.espace.net Precedence: bulk Reply-To: e$(a)thumper.vmeng.com X-MIME-Autoconverted: from quoted-printable to 8bit by pop.sneaker.net id QAA18355 --------------------------------------------------------------------- This mail is brought to you by the e$pam mailing list --------------------------------------------------------------------- From: rah-web <rah(a)shipwright.com> Reply-To: rah(a)shipwright.com MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Robert Hettinga <rah(a)shipwright.com> Subject: US Crypto Laws cripple Euros http://www.techweb.com:80/wire/news/1997/09/0917crylaws.html Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; name="0917crylaws.html" Content-Disposition: inline; filename="0917crylaws.html" X-MIME-Autoconverted: from 8bit to quoted-printable by lbo.leftbank.com i d LAA08231 [Image] [Image][IBM VisualAge for Java. Voted Best of Show Select at Windows NT Intranet Solutions Conference.] [CMPnet] [Image] [Image] [Image] [TechWeb] Search Archives: Advanced Search Sections News Finance Tips & Tools Product Reviews ActiveX/Java Careers Events Directory Opinion Humor Support Encyclopedia Information Feedback E-mail Newsletters Sponsored by: Featured Sites Net Newsmakers NetGuide Shareware Games Horoscopes [CMPnet Resources] Home Site Map Search Ad Info Sponsor Index [Click here to visit Network Computing's Interactive Report Card] [Image] [Image] [Image] [TechWire] TechWire All Home Stories Features Internet VideosCommunicat ions TechInvestor Home Apple Hardware Software Chips Internati onal U.S. Crypto Laws Cripple Euros, Expert Says (09/17/97; 5:00 p.m. EDT) By Douglas Hayward, TechWire [Image] CAMBRIDGE, England -- The U.S. government's Related strategy of monitoring the computer networks Stories: of hostile governments is damaging the communications infrastructure of its allies, The a leading encryption expert said. Governmen t Eyes The American enthusiasm for using Encryptio n "information warfare" strategies has resulted in a weakening of the U.K. and European Capitol H ill civilian communications, said Ross Anderson, Girds For Key an academic at Cambridge University, at the Clashes O ver International Symposium on Economic Crime Encryptio n held in Cambridge, England, on Tuesday. Computer Information warfare -- the act of monitoring Industry or sabotaging an enemy's communications and Riled Up Over computing infrastructure -- gained widespread FBI Chief 's attention during the Gulf War when the U.S. Suggestio n military hacked its way into Iraqi communication networks. FBI Insis ts On Crypto Anderson was a co-author of a highly critical Access report published in May that attacked the Clinton administration's encryption export Criminal control policies. The report, written by a Informati on group of encryption experts, said an attempt On The Wi res to prevent users from getting access to uncontrolled encryption products would result [*] = L ink to in substantial sacrifices in security and cost. our tech The Clinton encyclope dia -------------------administration, advised for more "We have to by the U.S. National info. question the Security Agency (NSA), [Image] wisdom of wants to be able to introducing continue monitoring the weaknesses into communications of our national potentially hostile infrastructures." countries or groups. To -- Ross Anderson do this, it wants to Cambridge prevent these groups from University using unbreakable -------------------encryption programs. This policy, dubbed Offensive, means the U.S. government insists on maintaining strict controls over the export and use of encryption to ensure that hostile governments and groups don't get access to strong [[Image] encryption tools. But this NSA-backed policy on restricting the spread of strong encryption software has held back the development of secure commercial and governmental communications networks in Europe, Anderson said. Civilian communications networks whose security has been weakened as a result of U.S. policy include the Europewide Global System for Mobile Communications telephone networks, commercial banking networks, and television broadcasting. "We have to question the wisdom of introducing weaknesses into our national infrastructures," Anderson said. Europeans are going to have to take more control over industrial aspects of encryption, he said, and develop policies with less input from the people in the Pentagon. "In the long term, the United Kingdom and its European partners have to start thinking carefully about the defensive vs. offensive aspects of this business, Anderson said. "The time is right for a fundamental realignment of resources in this field." Restrictions on encryption use mean the British Patent Office has to use a weak form of encryption when communicating with its counterparts overseas, Anderson said. "They use the size of keys I give to my students to break as exercises," Anderson said. The result is that highly confidential information, including very valuable details of intellectual property, can be intercepted and decoded, he said. [TW] Search Archives [Image] C M P n e t S P E C I A L R E P O R T S · Upgrading your operating system is nerve-wracking, [Ima ge] but we all have to face the possibility sooner or later. · What are key Microsoft execs and product managers saying [Image] [about IE 4? · Keep your laptop safe with this state-of-the-art safety feature. · What's wrong with a Java network computer? Java. [Image] · There's more to remote access than modem banks. [CMPnet] [Image] [Click here to visit Seagate Software.] [Image] --------------------------------------------------------------------- Where people, networks and money come together: Consult Hyperion http://www.hyperion.co.uk info(a)hyperion.co.uk --------------------------------------------------------------------- Like e$? Help pay for it! See <http://www.shipwright.com/beg.html> Or, for e$/e$pam sponsorship, <mailto:rah@shipwright.com> --------------------------------------------------------------------- --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/

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ATF_ear
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

5-6-96. WaPo reports on ATF and LEAs being ostracized by benign feds and citizens fearful of being housed with them. ATF_ear

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IRI_spy
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

5-6-96. WaPo reports on ID by iris scanning and other biometrics spying by NSA and the 200-member Biometrics Consortium. The consortium's espionage site: http://www.vitro.bloomington.in.us:8080/~BC/ IRI_spy

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San Diego CPunk Physical meet this Thursday
by Christian Claborne 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- This Wednesday!!! San Diego Area CPUNKS symposium Wednesday, Sep. 24, 1997. Topic: What action do we take if the situation get's out of hand (See message below from Mark H. below). It is my belief that any group, no matter how small, can accomplish great things if they apply themselves. Cypherpunks are not just "users", they poses several additional quanta of the stuff that enables creative thought, and skill. Don't forget to bring your public key fingerprint. If you can figure out how to get it on the back of a business card, that would be cool. If you want the suspicious crowd there to sign your key, bring two forms of ID. Place: The Mission Cafe & Coffee Shop 3795 Mission Bl in Mission Beach. 488-9060 Time:1800 Their Directions: 8 west to Mission Beach Ingram Exit Take west mission bay drive Go right on Mission Blvd. On the corner of San Jose and mission blvd. It is located between roller coaster and garnett. It's kind of 40s looking building... funky looking (their description, not mine) They serve stuff to eat, coffee stuff, and beer + wine stuff. See you there! New guy, bring your fingerprint. Drop me a note if you plan to attend... 2 -- C -- - ------------------------ Date: Fri, 12 Sep 1997 16:04:22 -0700 (PDT) From: Mark Hedges <hedges(a)infonex.com> To: all-at-infonex(a)infonex.com Subject: federal cryptography legislation Sender: owner-all-at-infonex(a)infonex.com - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- A bill called "SAFE" (HR-695, "Security and Freedom with Encryption") in the U.S. House of Representatives would have allowed U.S. software companies to export strong cryptography, and would have promoted privacy in all U.S. communications. Cryptography is mathematical means of making a message secret. Now, this bill has been rewritten to introduce more restrictive cryptography legislation than ever before seen in the U.S. Public support for cryptography use and export is very strong, as evidenced by the California state legislature's unanimous vote 9/5/97, calling on Congress and the President to revise and relax export laws (SJR-29). Companies world-wide already produce strong cryptograpy software, and U.S. buisness is rapidly losing ground in the world-wide software and telecommunications market. The House National Security Committee this week voted to continue export restrictions in the SAFE bill and to install "key escrow" proposals of the defense and intelligence organizations. This would not only continue the status quo legislation, it would strictly regulate and restrict domestic use of cryptography, an unprecedented act. Key escrow legislation in SAFE would mandate government "back doors" in all communications software before the end of the millennia in the United States, imposing criminal penalties for use of secure cryptography. Effectively, every citizen would be required to give law enforcement involuntary and transparent access to all communications, including financial, business, and personal messages. Key escrow also exposes all U.S. communication to a single point of failure, which a hacker, spy, or corrupt official could exploit to gain access to all personal, industry, and financial information. More information is available in our most recent press release. Press releases can be viewed at http://www.anonymizer.com/press/. Please, call your congressional representatives and senators and encourage them to oppose restrictive legislation on cryptography and mandated government access to all communications. Names and phone numbers for your local legislators can be obtained from www.house.gov and www.senate.gov. Sincerely, Mark Hedges Anonymizer Inc. Infonex Internet Inc. - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBNBnJhBVo2SUWMp6NAQFyNQP/UuogfBfcjRw7q5rda8+1BrGkMEHpixau J7JfbhKyv5yWdPZsnh8F3m/kaUahLEaSdLCcmAJzbroKApGBjUtT6bRacOtVps3X TzZXLO2NZd4UBsksUC1f3WWnnRl8+03jiQMboSpBvUVmHqA1sFiz3OQpJVWv1yge jEEk7R2Maeg= =VrfI - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.0 Charset: noconv iQEVAwUBNCRRAIP1MBWQ+9udAQHNuAf/Wf/vf7O7A3iZhd9BjlzyI0FvcOTelUOs 5JhxXN0w86YWzoluZue8jY7uKmxGVuySdikQSw4OxLS5wZG05nByoIQlhlzLPYIl vrQuQZ0EeGIOycwS7IuNLFFyx+C1E7HxcdX0UR3qMDgEiiFb09DlcuDHeSp52RZW s6t7AFR7ZoVz28KanihgDRQdk9QTw0HuaZV3hHNl11610HaPURRe4SX7zgR1cHAf naoTZI70GqVoUVYVrm+oVHln7HsdFqnrO/1GAVpLzKpEnzfT9C0d0o7T4t/WX4CM yeeO2UZUwfg01VyCHORpFYbx1SrFlW4rZNZqOJMP2lA2cNDZBsLrhg== =/sWk -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ... __o .. -\<, Claborne(a)CYBERTHOUGHT.com ...(*)/(*)._ Providing thoughts on your computing needs. http://www.CYBERTHOUGHT.com/cyberthought/ PGP Pub Key fingerprint = 7E BF 38 3F 24 A7 D1 B0 54 44 96 AA 10 D0 5D 51 Avail on Pub Key server. PGP-encrypted e-mail welcome! Dreams. They are just a "screen saver" for the brain.

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OCT_pus
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

5-6-96. Time: "Master of the Game. The formidable John Deutch is becoming the most powerful CIA chief ever." This power didn't fall accidentally into Deutch's lap; he has lobbied hard for it. While he mouthed technocratic demurrals before the Senate committee, promising not to be too "intrusive" and humbly noting that "my Cabinet colleagues have concerns about how future DCI's would, over the long term, play a role in this concurrence," it was clearly time for the winner to take all. The CIA is already upgrading many of its techniques: breaking into computer systems, intercepting faxes, experimenting with dead drops in cyberspace to receive secrets. The big-ticket spending that is out of control has been satellites. The CIA wants to build $1 billion-apiece "8X" spy satellites to photograph targets, even though it has sitting in warehouses about half a dozen satellites that have the capacity to take pictures for the next decade. But satellites may simply not be that useful. A secret CIA study recently concluded that satellites provide less than 10% of the valuable signal intelligence collected from such rogue states as Iraq and Iran. Most such data are scooped up by ground stations or via phone taps. There is deep anxiety at Langley that Deutch's grab for power is designed to advance his own career. OCT_pus ----- William Safire adds to this in 5-6-96 NYT: www.nytimes.com.

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Re: Key
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Sun, 5 May 1996, Lance Cottrell wrote: > Why did you decide to create this additional key. What role are you > reserving the other one for? It's more convenient for me to sign on a multi-user system. As I don't want to compromise my main key, a lower security document signing key would seem in order. Feel free to copy this to the list. --- My preferred and soon to be permanent e-mail address:unicorn@schloss.li "In fact, had Bancroft not existed, potestas scientiae in usu est Franklin might have had to invent him." in nihilum nil posse reverti 00B9289C28DC0E55 E16D5378B81E1C96 - Finger for Current Key Information Opp. Counsel: For all your expert testimony needs: jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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FIPS for KMI
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

It's worth looking closely at the Cryptography Key Recovery System (CKRS) documents published recently as part of the FIPS KMI program. A meeting is scheduled next month. See the listing of the August Meeting reports at: http://csrc.nist.gov/tacdfipsfkmi/ They show how far the key recovery program has advanced.

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hey
by FARTNOC69＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

well i am a carder well i cant card because i have used all of my drop sites.. i can sell laps 4 top dollar so get back 2 me if u need some one 2 sell stuff!l8erz

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Re: [History] USPS tried to monopolize email? (c. 1981)
by Erik E. Fair 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The U.S. Postal Service's first attempt at E-mail was called "E-COM" (ca. 1984), and it amounted to an electronic submission system for mail that would then be printed, stuffed into envelopes, and delivered in the usual way - but done so at the regional centers. It was geared toward 3rd class mass mailings, and was a dismal failure. While it was cheaper than standard 3rd class mailings, the mailings were output on Printronix dot-matrix line printers, and they looked terrible. Who knows? If they'd invested in laser printers instead... Some of you who were on the UUCP/USENET at the time may remember a small company on the UUCP network in Rockville, MD called "netword", which would accept E-mail for E-COM and deliver it for free; the deal was that the input batches to E-COM had to be of a certain size, and the "netword" folks rounded out their batches with the stuff from the net. Eventually, E-COM was sold (I seem to recall the Netword people bidding on it), and it disappeared shortly thereafter. I know about this story because Netword was a customer of another company which has also since disappeared: Dual Systems of Berkeley, California, makers of a Motorola 68000-based, Version 7 (and later System V) UNIX system on the S-100 (IEEE-696) bus. I worked for Dual from March '83 to June '85 - my first job out of college. Erik Fair fair(a)clock.org

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