December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)miron.vip.best.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"portal"} = "<hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"alumni"} = "<hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"bsu-cs"} = "<nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu> cpunk hash ksub"; $remailer{"c2"} = "<remail(a)c2.org> eric pgp hash reord"; $remailer{"penet"} = "<anon(a)anon.penet.fi> penet post"; $remailer{"hacktic"} = "<remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"flame"} = "<remailer(a)flame.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut post reord"; $remailer{"rahul"} = "<homer(a)rahul.net> cpunk pgp hash filter"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"ford"} = "<remailer(a)bi-node.zerberus.de> cpunk pgp hash ksub ek"; $remailer{"vishnu"} = "<mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord"; $remailer{"robo"} = "<robo(a)c2.org> cpunk hash mix"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"spook"} = "<remailer(a)spook.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"rmadillo"} = "<remailer(a)armadillo.com> mix cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"ecafe"} = "<cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org> cpunk mix"; $remailer{"wmono"} = "<wmono(a)valhalla.phoenix.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut"; $remailer{"shinobi"} = "<remailer(a)shinobi.alias.net> cpunk mix hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"amnesia"} = "<amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ksub"; $remailer{"gondolin"} = "<mix(a)remail.gondolin.org> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"tjava"} = "<remailer(a)tjava.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"pamphlet"} = "<pamphlet(a)idiom.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ?"; $remailer{'alpha'} = '<alias(a)alpha.c2.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'gondonym'} = '<alias(a)nym.gondolin.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'nymrod'} = '<nymrod(a)nym.alias.net> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'cubed'} = '<alias(a)alias.alias.net> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"lead"} = "<mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"treehole"} = "<remailer(a)mockingbird.alias.net> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"nemesis"} = "<remailer(a)meaning.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"exon"} = "<remailer(a)remailer.nl.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"vegas"} = "<remailer(a)vegas.gateway.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"haystack"} = "<haystack(a)holy.cow.net> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"ncognito"} = "<ncognito(a)gate.net> mix cpunk latent"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (c2 robo alpha) (gondolin gondonym) (flame hacktic replay) (alumni portal) (vishnu spook wmono nymrod) Use "premail -getkeys pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu" to get PGP keys for the remailers. Fingering this address works too. Note: The remailer list now includes information for the alpha nymserver. Last update: Mon 8 Apr 96 6:48:25 PDT remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- cubed alias(a)alias.alias.net *+#********* 15:15 100.00% exon remailer(a)remailer.nl.com **-*++++***+ 7:10 100.00% ecafe cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org ######*#+### :53 99.99% shinobi remailer(a)shinobi.alias.net ###*###+-.-# 57:53 99.96% ncognito ncognito(a)gate.net **-###***#*# 1:58 99.95% spook remailer(a)spook.alias.net **+****+**** 19:38 99.92% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com --*-+-+-++++ 4:47:31 99.92% amnesia amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com -+++----++- 2:23:46 99.89% portal hfinney(a)shell.portal.com #*##- *##### 6:42 99.89% alpha alias(a)alpha.c2.org ++**++ ++++* 43:53 99.83% vishnu mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net **--+*+--.-* 5:31:24 99.82% treehole remailer(a)mockingbird.alias.net -+++---..-+ 7:01:45 99.73% alumni hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu -###-### ### 25:20 99.66% vegas remailer(a)vegas.gateway.com #+##-* -***+ 1:08:32 99.49% hacktic remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl ****** ***** 8:32 99.37% flame remailer(a)flame.alias.net ------ ---- 4:10:53 98.99% penet anon(a)anon.penet.fi _..._---.-- 27:54:21 98.63% replay remailer(a)replay.com +**+ -**** 15:48 98.40% nymrod nymrod(a)nym.alias.net *+--**+--. * 6:11:27 98.39% c2 remail(a)c2.org -+++ +++++++ 40:17 97.18% gondonym alias(a)nym.gondolin.org -+---+ .- 16:49:10 89.13% extropia remail(a)miron.vip.best.com -- ------- 7:03:22 88.90% gondolin mix(a)remail.gondolin.org -----+ .- 15:51:19 88.04% haystack haystack(a)holy.cow.net ***+*#*-## 47:06 84.29% lead mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu ++++ 38:07 69.04% nemesis remailer(a)meaning.com ***** 2:39:59 38.60% tjava remailer(a)tjava.com 1:02 -3.94% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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RAS_put
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

4-08-96 WSJ eyes the Rasputin of the plot linking: 1. Encryption export 2. Microsoft 3. The Seychelles 4. Internet regulation 5. Privacy rights 6. Immigration reform 7. Anti-taxation 8. The computer industry RAS_put

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Re: (Fwd) British Study Claims That Photo Credit Cards Don'
by Deranged Mutant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 8 Apr 96 at 11:44, Declan B. McCullagh wrote: > Fascinating stuff. I've used Mike Godwin's driver's license to buy a > beer when I didn't have mine with me. And, trust me, we look nothing > alike. *chuckle* It was a semi-common practice when I was in high school to show licenses to buy beer, because they never looked at the birth dates. The state got wise to it and now put in big red letters "UNDER 21" on minor's licenses.... Rob. --- Send a blank message with the subject "send pgp-key" to <WlkngOwl(a)unix.asb.com> for a copy of my PGP key.

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Re: "Contempt" charges likely to increase
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:03 PM 4/7/96 -0700, david friedman wrote: >Unicorn wrote: > >> No ISP in its right mind is going to ask for trouble. If I'm a >>prosecutor and I suspect that the ISP may be complicit in hiding >>evidence, I'm going to ask for a search and seizure warrant (a la sun >>devil) and just walk in and take the equipment I believe the data to be >>on and then satisify myself that it's unattainable. > >Last semester I taught a seminar on computers, crime, and privacy and we >had, as a guest lecturer one evening, Silicon Valley's one full time >computer cop (he works for the SC County D.A.'s office). One of his >comments was that ISP's were generally very cooperative, because they knew >that he could legally impose large costs on them by seizing their systems >as evidence. It is exactly this attitude that we need to change. I presume you saw my comment from a day ago, when I pointed out that before 1968, local phonecos were doing wiretaps without any sort of court order, simply because the local cops (or FBI) asked, even though those requesting the tap could not use the evidence in court. And even _that_ level of cooperation was presumably done without any plausible risk that the prosecutor could sieze a phone switch for non-cooperation. It is even likely that the phoneco could have acted to lose the prosecutor/police his job if they had decided to press and publicize what must have been an illegal request at the time. The fact they did not is telling. It was clearly not an "arm's length" relationship. It was a relationship of friendly people who regularly did favors for each other, playing with their customer's privacy. This is the reality that we must face and deal with: Officials abuse their positions all the time. They will do so if the system is designed to allow them to. Allowing officials to sieze an ISP's equipment is just asking for trouble. In my opinion, ISP's should be able to decide ahead of time whether to cooperate if they are asked for information. They should be entitled to take a position that they will (or will not) contract with their users to prevent any disclosure of information, and this decision should be legally binding on the prosecutor as well. The "feedback loop" is closed by the fact that bad publicity may accrue if the ISP refuses to cooperate, leading to a "market" of different ISP's with different standards. I am convinced that whatever benefit may arguably accrue from being able to subpoena information is far lower than the cost of loss of freedom that surely will occur if prosecutors are able to strong-arm ISP's into illegal cooperation, such as occurred with phonecos before 1968. I'm still waiting for somebody to show that the majority of crimes that are investigated using subpoena power are "malum in se" crimes, as opposed to "malum prohibitum" ones. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: Spinners and compression functions
by JonWienke＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In a message dated 96-04-08 04:01:28 EDT, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com writes: >Data contains varying quantities of predictablity and unpredictability. >Some of the predictability has simple enough structure that a basic >compression function can find and exploit it to squash the data. >Some of the predictability doesn't. For what it's worth, compressing >the data before using it for other things does leave you with somewhat >more consistent entropy per byte for "typical" random input, because it >eliminates the easy stuff. That was the entire point of my original posting on this subject. I was proposing using a compression function on spinner data, which contains very little entropy and compresses well. (50 - 80% on idle loop timing data, depending on processor load) I don't believe I said anything about compressing image data of any kind, or audio recordings of humpback whales doing the wild thing, etc. Noise sphere plots of ZIP files look pretty good, regardless of how good or bad the plot of the unZIPed file looks. (Raw idle loop timing plots are terrible.) I have posted a longer reply to Perry via E-mail... Jonathan Wienke

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Re: They're running scared.
by Michael C. Peponis 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- On Sun, 07 Apr 1996, jim bell wrote: [article snipped] >Articles such as this are interesting because they appear to be written >without any illusion that the interests of governments are anything other >than just that, interests of governments. They are NOT the interests >of the average citizen. Absolutly, and it seems that more and more thinking people are realizing this, as for the non-thinking ones, well we are better off without them, the only thing they contribute are problems Debate works to a point, but there comes a point and time where all that can be said, has been said, and we are past that point. Personally, I love national insecurity such as terrorist attacks and random bombings, wish there were more of them by more people. What they do is sow fear, instensify camps, and pit people against each other. Goverments are use to wars, where there are large, well-defined groups assult one another, they have huge problems dealing with small groups of people attack it or each other. That is what will eventually cause it to collapes, which is a good thing. For those who say that such an event would be catostrophic, that is a myth, I worked with someone from Berut a few years ago, when the goverment there collapesed. He said other than the perpetual mortor fire, and speratic bombings, life went on as usuall. People got up and went to work, people bought and sold, etc. From a microsopic scale, nothing had changed, it was only if you looked at the bigger picture that things were different, and quite frankly, those types of things do not effect us individually. I do not need an x trillion dollar economy to continue living at my standard of living, most of us on this list do not, the only people that benifit are the power brokers and the dumb, weak, and stupid. I have nothing against charity(that's what taxes amount to), but when charity reaches 50%+ of my income, and starts to erode my freedom, well now it's a problem. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: cp850 iQCVAwUBMWkWWUUffSIjnthhAQHEiQP/Sp5+UfCFGmvEO/9nRFBLXBm9haPiJC/y oVCoKQi/jeCkXy1HaPjrrObFkV0fvRsHxk5GvHXfX9sIkFi/i9mrGafpXFUuRfkP qua2wYp91Omh39QptHThGgEKl0sdKBzw+/9uHCqwUyViqoZZBO7Y7kUGffT9XL9m 13VTjMTyFz4= =e+UM -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Regards, Michael Peponis PGP Key Available from MIT KeyServer

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Bank transactions on Internet
by Jüri Kaljundi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Suddenly some banks here in Estonia have decided that they must start offering banking services over Internet already during the next months. What worries me is that some of them are talking about using 40-bit SSL as the main security mechanism. What about banks in US and Europe, how many of them are using Internet and WWW to offer their services already? Is it possible to use WWW forms to make real transactions or can you just view your transaction history and account status? In case the banks are using WWW forms and SSL, are the services limited to 128-bit clients? How is the client authentication handled? Does the client just get a plain username and password? I had a look at some banks like Security First National Bank and some others, and it seems that they use just SSL + username/password for they banking services. Does this really work, especially with 40-bit keys? SSL with client certificates would seem a little bit more secure once it is available, but still not secure enough for real banking on Internet. Just curious (and confused), Juri Kaljundi jk(a)digit.ee

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why compression doesn't perfectly even out entropy
by Perry E. Metzger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Jon asked why it is that I contend that a compression algorithm won't in the general case even out the entropy of a semi-random stream. The answer can be obtained by simply trying to run gzip over an image, preferably one that hasn't been compressed. The results are, in general, very bad, even though images are highly compressable (even losslessly). I leave the why up as an exercise to the reader. I have said before and I will say again that the only reliable way of dealing with a stream that has some amount of randomness mixed in with it that you wish to distil down into pure random bits is to use solid reasoning to figure out how many bits of entropy per unit of input you can actually expect to see, add a large fudge factor to cover your ass, and then distil down using a cryptographic hash. Anything else makes me highly nervous. If you can't estimate the amount of entropy in an input stream from first principles, then you are probably in trouble and should seek an input stream that you have a better handle on. Perry

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Re: the cost of untracability?
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 7:53 PM 4/7/96, Jim Gillogly wrote: >jim bell <jimbell(a)pacifier.com> writes: >>FWIW, I think that there is no capital-gains-type tax on currency >>conversions. In other words, if I take dollars and buy yen today, and the > >I bounced this off a CPA, who said she would be very suprised if this is >really the case: in general the IRS considers increases in wealth to be >taxable, and unless there's a specific exclusion for currency transactions >that she doesn't know about, she suspects this is not the case. As a >conceptual counterexample she points out that you are responsible for any >profit you make from selling your car for more than you pay for it (but, >as you might expect, you don't get to take a loss if you sell it for less). I think your CPA is clearly misinformed, or one of us has misunderstood the conditions under which her statement is true. For example, I read a fair number of corporate earnings reports, and can assure you that many companies report gains and losses on currency conversions. (Many companies use derivatives to hedge themselves against fluctuations in foreign currencies....) Similarly, if I consult the "Wall Street Journal" I find page after page of listings for currency prices, futures on currency prices, derivatives involving said currencies, and so on. I can easily be a "currency speculator" by calling my broker. It may come as a surprise to this CPA (and Jim Bell, from his later message), but gains in this market are taxable, and losses can offset gains, subject to the usual mumbo jumbo rules. It is certainly true that if one converts $300 into yen for a trip to Japan, to have to buy a few beers for cash (Tokyo is expensive), and upon returning to the U.S. their has been some slight gain (yes, a "profit"), that the IRS is not interested. This is a matter of practicality, given that such minor conversions are usually done in cash form, are too small to worry about (minimal gains...a few bucks in the example shown, and usually more than erased by the conversion rate differential). Try speculating _seriously_ in the dollar-yen conversion rate, through the various options listed in financial newspapers, and then telling the IRS that a $100,000 profit, say, is not taxable because of what a CPA said. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: (Fwd) British Study Claims That Photo Credit Cards Don't Work
by David Loysen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:58 AM 4/8/96 +0000, you wrote: >This comes from the FTC Privacy List, and is somewhat relevant.... >(The the "Crypto" in the title isn't, oddly...). > >Some thoughts... (er, questions): >1. What are the implications for log-on systems that rely on >recognition of faces (supposedly impossible for hackers to describe >and exploit)? Does anybody know how well these systems work? If I don't shave over the weekend will my computer know who I am Monday morning? Is my credit card going to have my face digitized and encoded onto the mag stipe for comparision with a video camera image at the time of sale? >2. Legal implications for witnesses? > I think many eyewitness accounts are already taken with a grain of salt, at least as far as picking a suspect. Certainly in court the lawyers say whatever makes their case look better. >------- Forwarded Message Follows ------- >Date: Sun, 7 Apr 1996 08:24:18 -0700 >From: taxhaven(a)ix.netcom.com (Adam Starchild ) >Subject: British Study Claims That Photo Credit Cards Don't Work >To: privacy(a)ftc.gov > > "Crypto-ID" Cards Not Effective > > Recent studies into the effectiveness of photo credit cards >have cast doubt over their ability to cut fraud. Dr. Richard >Kemp, of the Department of Psychology at Westminster University, >London, organized an experiment involving a London supermarket to >test the cards in "the real world." Most if not all credit card issuing banks use some form of fraud detection software. The next generation of these products will be analyzing transaction data from the card clearing banks in real time to stop fraudulent transactions before they are complete. Expect to see more "may I see your ID" questions as these systems flag transactions as possible fraud. I have had a credit card with my photo on it for several years, I can't ever remember a sales person who seemed at all interested in comparing the photo to me. > The supermarket was staffed by six people who were all >warned to be on the look out for fraudulent credit cards. Dr. >Kemp arranged for 44 of his students to pose as shoppers and test >the staffs' ability to spot photo-card misuse. Each student was >armed with four cards. One showed the student as they were, one >showed the student wearing make-up, one showed an individual who >vaguely resembled the student and the last card depicted someone >who looked nothing like the bearer. > People usually recognize photographs of individuals based on >a familiarity of the subject. A photograph captures only one >angle and expression out of thousands of different combinations. >People will recognize photographs of family, friends and well >known individuals easily. But how easy is it to accurately >compare a photograph with the face of a perfect stranger? At a >recent conference, Dr. Kemp said that matching a photo to a >stranger's face was "too difficult." He also said that in a non- >experimental situation, such as a supermarket, the incidence of >fraud detection would be even lower. > The results of Dr. Kemp's supermarket experiment proved very >interesting. In all, the majority of fraudulent cards were >accepted. Amazingly, 35 per cent of the cards bearing a >photograph of someone completely different from the student were >accepted. A massive 64 per cent of cards bearing a similar >individual were also accepted. Another factor which seems to >further prove Dr. Kemp's point is that 14 per cent of cards >bearing a true likeness of the student were rejected. > A few British banks are already offering customers the >opportunity to have their photograph etched onto their cards. >They claim a reduction in fraud has resulted from this. Dr. >Kemp's findings would seem to contradict this belief. Dr. Nicky >Towell, one of Dr. Kemp's researchers, said "There is a widely >held assumption that photo credit cards are a cheap and effective >way of stopping fraud. But this is not the case." > No one can tell how well photo credit cards will catch on. >But with the majority of people carrying at least one, if not >more cards of some sort, how long will it be before photos become >compulsory? The government knows that the introduction of ID >cards is a political hot potato, but how many people would notice >if they turned the cards we already have into crypto-ID cards? > > >Reprinted from The Mouse Monitor, The International Journal of >Bureau-Rat Control, a periodical published by Scope International >for its customers. Scope International is on the Worldwide Web >at http://www.britnet.co.uk/Scope/ > > >Posted by Adam Starchild > The Offshore Entrepreneur at http://www.au.com/offshore > > > >The privacy list is run automatically by the Majordomo list manager. >Send a "help" command to majordomo(a)ftc.gov for assistance. > >Rob. > >--- >Send a blank message with the subject "send pgp-key" >to <WlkngOwl(a)unix.asb.com> for a copy of my PGP key. > > dwl(a)hnc.com David Loysen 619-546-8877 x245

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