December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Does information want to be free?
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>>I confess I was amused by how he described those Internet anarchists >> who delighted in publicizing books that should in fact be restricted. > I am amused (though I am not taking sides) by the general lack of >attention or rhetoric that "crypto-anarchists"/"cypherpunks"/whatever, >otherwise privacy respecting people, usually espouse. Many of us do care about those privacy issues - computers are very good at combining information from multiple sources, and crypto is about the only technology that lets you change the balance of power away from computerized centralization to individual-controlled decentralization. On the other hand, the phrase "books that should in fact be restricted" is viewed by many of us to be a synonym for "the empty set"; "books about government leaders which should be restricted" is an even emptier set, whether they're true, bogus, or some of each. In general, a Cypherpunk(tm) approach to protecting private information is not to advocate laws against distributing it, but to build tools to let you protect it while giving it to people that you _do_ want to have it; perhaps to use individual contracts to protect the information, but also to build tools to support contractual agreements and identify leaks. In some cases, boycotting organizations that violate privacy is a good idea (and building alternatives can support boycotts); flaming them for rudeness is another approach :-), and helping organizations understand the privacy implications of what they're doing and helping them use privacy-preserving methods instead of hanging an SSN on everything is another good cypherpunks activity. On the other hand, building anonymous publishing systems so people can blow the whistle on their government officials is a good thing, even though it may be used by people rude enough to pry into people's private lives. Also, while publishing one politician's cancer experience may be rude, publishing a recent American president's growing senility should have been done more aggressively, as should publishing the moral failures of his Vice president.... # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # http://www.idiom.com/~wcs # Dispel Authority!

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Re: Remailer Operator Liability?
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 05:53 PM 6/15/96 +1000, Zed wrote: > >Unlikely. The use of anonymous remailers was given as a reason for why it >was impossible to effectively determine if indecent material was being >distributed to a minor who was using a nym. I think pressure on anonymous >remailers is going to increase as various groups complain that the paw >innocent widdle kiddies are "vulnerable to corruption"(or some bullshit like >that) because their age can be hidden. Read the decision. The CDA _may_ be >declared constitutional if there was an effective and reliable way of >preventing minors from accessing "indecent" material - which anonymous >remailers make harder to do. However, even if remailers didn't exist, kiddies could still be unknowingly reached via mailing lists (anyone know who came up with the term "email exploder" that the Court used instead of "mailing list"?), freenet accounts, un- age verified accounts opened anywhere on earth, or borrowed accounts. The decision mentioned some of this. DCF

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UK users about to get clippered
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

If you live the UK, brace yourself for HMG's "Clipper" annoucement later this week. Look particularly carefully at the escrow agencies. - Remailereuters

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Re: Remailer Operator Liability?
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 05:53 PM 6/15/96 +1000, Zed wrote: >On another front, anonymous remailers were brought up in the latest hearing >of the Church of Scientology's court case against Dennis Erlich. Judge Whyte >expressed concern that trade secret status could be destroyed simply by >posting information through an anonymous remailer. Of course, trade secret status could also be destroyed by posting something straight without anonymity. And were one judgment proof one's exposure as the poster would be meaningless. Even a completely non-anonymous account may be hard to trace if you have a common name and the account is based somewhere far from home. If you open an account on a Dutch system using your (common) name, you might be hard to find. It's the ease of publication not the anonymity that makes the Net dangerous for trade secrets. DCF "If the most common given name on earth is Mohammed and the most common surname is Lee does that mean that the most common name is Mohammed Lee?"

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Re: pretty good reputation
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Here are some references to the material on reputations I mentioned before. ftp://prospero.isi.edu/pub/papers/security/insurance-cccs94.ps * Charlie Lai, Gennady Medvinsky, and B. Clifford Neuman. Endorsements, Licensing, and Insurance for Distributed System Services, In Proceedings of 2nd the ACM Conference on Computer and Communication Security November 1994. This discusses some concepts related to extending trust relationships through a network. ftp://research.att.com/dist/mab/policymaker.ps "Decentralized Trust Management" by Matt Blaze et al This suggests a formal way of specifying trust relationships among keys. In effect you have little programs that get activated by certain keys, or by certain signatures. It is a very flexible methodology which could be adapted to many ways of specifying trust relationships. http://theory.lcs.mit.edu/~rivest/sdsi.ps (or .tex) "Simple Distributed Security Infrastructure" by Ron Rivest and Butler Lampson This is a key certificate structure which is somewhere between a hierarchical and a web of trust system, somewhat influenced by Blaze's ideas. It is pretty limited though in the kinds of trust delegation it allows. You can accept another person's signatures on specific keys but you can't mark him as a generally-accepted signer. However you can develop chains of signatures as in PGP and perhaps some extra mechanism could be used to decide when to trust them. Hal

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)miron.vip.best.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"portal"} = "<hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"alumni"} = "<hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"c2"} = "<remail(a)c2.org> eric pgp hash reord"; $remailer{"penet"} = "<anon(a)anon.penet.fi> penet post"; $remailer{"flame"} = "<remailer(a)flame.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut post reord"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"ecafe"} = "<cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org> cpunk mix"; $remailer{"amnesia"} = "<amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ksub"; $remailer{'alpha'} = '<alias(a)alpha.c2.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'nymrod'} = '<nymrod(a)nym.jpunix.com> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"lead"} = "<mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"treehole"} = "<remailer(a)mockingbird.alias.net> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"exon"} = "<remailer(a)remailer.nl.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"vegas"} = "<remailer(a)vegas.gateway.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"haystack"} = "<haystack(a)holy.cow.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"ncognito"} = "<ncognito(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> mix cpunk pgp hash latent"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (c2 alpha) (flame replay) (alumni portal) Use "premail -getkeys pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu" to get PGP keys for the remailers. Fingering this address works too. Note: The remailer list now includes information for the alpha nymserver. Last update: Mon 17 Jun 96 6:46:17 PDT remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- replay remailer(a)replay.com ****+*+***+* 6:14 99.98% alumni hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu #######**#+# 2:57 99.97% ecafe cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org *##.-#+--#+# 50:08 99.96% vegas remailer(a)vegas.gateway.com -** **+*#*+# 6:21 99.90% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com .-+++++++-+ 3:15:05 99.90% c2 remail(a)c2.org -++-++++-++ 1:07:45 99.89% flame remailer(a)flame.alias.net +++++++++++ 1:05:51 99.76% penet anon(a)anon.penet.fi _______._ 60:16:03 99.64% portal hfinney(a)shell.portal.com ##*### ##+# 2:46 99.49% nymrod nymrod(a)nym.jpunix.com +**#++*+* * 9:43 99.45% lead mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu +-++++++++++ 45:49 99.29% exon remailer(a)remailer.nl.com *** *++***+* 5:07 99.23% haystack haystack(a)holy.cow.net *#* +--#*-*+ 23:51 99.18% amnesia amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com ------- --- 3:19:01 96.26% extropia remail(a)miron.vip.best.com ---.-- ---- 6:23:54 94.00% ncognito ncognito(a)rigel.cyberpass.net -....- .. 14:29:58 89.44% treehole remailer(a)mockingbird.alias.net +-++++++ 3:28:59 62.60% alpha alias(a)alpha.c2.org ++***+- 37:51 49.39% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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Re: PBS show
by Peter Trei 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Received: from toad.com [140.174.2.1] by alcor.process.com with SMTP-OpenVMS via TCP/IP; Thu, 13 Jun 1996 14:15 -0400 Received: (from majordom@localhost) by toad.com (8.7.5/8.7.3) id JAA03979 for cypherpunks-outgoing; Thu, 13 Jun 1996 09:36:36 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail.pacifier.com (root(a)mail.pacifier.com [199.2.117.164]) by toad.com (8.7.5/8.7.3) with ESMTP id JAA03971 for <cypherpunks(a)toad.com>; Thu, 13 Jun 1996 09:36:30 -0700 (PDT) Received: from ip9.van1.pacifier.com (ip9.van1.pacifier.com [206.163.4.9]) by mail.pacifier.com (8.7.5/8.7.3) with SMTP id JAA22527; Thu, 13 Jun 1996 09:36:13 -0700 (PDT) Message-Id: <199606131636.JAA22527(a)mail.pacifier.com> X-Sender: jimbell(a)mail.pacifier.com X-Mailer: Windows Eudora Light Version 1.5.2 Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Date: Thu, 13 Jun 1996 09:35:16 -0800 To: tcmay(a)got.net (Timothy C. May), cypherpunks(a)toad.com From: jim bell <jimbell(a)pacifier.com> Subject: Re: PBS show Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com Precedence: bulk Jim Bell wrote: >But the Apple II WAS a toy! Non-detached keyboard, poor placement of reset >key, upper-case only, 40-character wide display, odd microprocessor, VERY >SMALL capacity floppies (which were very slow as well), as well as a hostile >legal situation regarding the building of clones. Hell, they even objected >to other companies building boards which plugged into the bus! The reason for the 40 column screen was quite simple - many customers did not want to shell out a few hundred dollars for a monitor, and instead installed a cheap RF modulator and used an old TV for a screen. The resolution of a TV is inadequate for 80 coumn text (think about the smallest easily readable text you've seen on braodcast or cable). The Apple ][ did not include the RF modulator because it wasn't FCC certified with one - but every dealer also sold $20 modulators tailored for the machine. With the unshielded plastic case, I could wipe out any other TV within 30 feet - a significant distance for a NYC apartment dweller, which I was at the time. While it was not the first machine I programmed (the PDP-8e has that dubious honor, circa 1971), I learned a lot from my Apple ][. Among other feats, I added lower case support to Apple Kermit, and implemented Life in 6502 assembler using HIRES graphics. Peter Trei trei(a)process.com Peter Trei Senior Software Engineer Purveyor Development Team Process Software Corporation http://www.process.com trei(a)process.com

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Spy Tech
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Three feathers for spying technology: TST: "MI6 stole secrets from French navy." Top secret technology for tracking nuclear submarines has been stolen from a French naval base by MI6, Britain's foreign intelligence service, after a French civilian engineer was paid thousands of pounds to betray one of his country's most closely guarded secrets to an MI6 front company which posed as a technical defence consultancy and publishing house. TST: "High-flying gliders replace satellites." Solar powered gliders circling above cities could provide a cheap alternative to satellites for global communication systems, according to a group of American scientists. WaJo: "Israel Asks White House to Place Curbs On 3 U.S. Satellite-Surveillance Firms." The request is regarded as "very sensitive," according to one U.S. official, because Israeli officials say it relates to their national security concerns. However, officials of the affected U.S. companies charge it amounts to unfair competition because an Israeli company is about to enter the space surveillance business and it wouldn't face similar restrictions. http://pwp.usa.pipeline.com/~jya/tekspy.txt (18 kb) Spy surf: http://www.anonymizer.com Or, TEK_spy

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The Ultima Spy Book
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Ultimate Spy Book by H. Keith Melton (Dorling Kindersley, London) DK Publishing, New York First American edition, 1996. $29.95. ISBN 0-7894-0443-5 Over 600 illustrations of the tools and tricks of spycraft for killing, betraying, deceiving, surveilling, encrypting, decrypting, communicating, burgling, recruitment and training, fucking up and rotting in jail, and flacking spy fluff until tip-canoe-ed. --------- Eye pix of cipher devices: Kryha, Bolton, Hebern, M-94: http://pwp.usa.pipeline.com/~jya/cd1.jpg Hagelin's M-209 and CD-57: http://pwp.usa.pipeline.com/~jya/cd2.jpg Enigma: http://pwp.usa.pipeline.com/~jya/enigma1.jpg Enigma innards and Geheimschreiber: http://pwp.usa.pipeline.com/~jya/enigma2.jpg Purple: http://pwp.usa.pipeline.com/~jya/purple.jpg ---------- CYA: http://www.anonymizer.com

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No Subject
by mixmaster＠remail.obscura.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:14 PM 6/16/96 -0500, "John A. Perry" wrote: :-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE----- :Version: 2.6.2 : :hIwDSReYoIbc3PkBA/9xblBrrofx89t5QoJVwCyGB/+futdCXEolwcsQdwWGcDtc :7Vn7orCB8v6iQO+sCgAlYf38ftUxGmzebDd/7eWodTGx8XKnzBIZ9E6bRS38XLRa :XDaipoiNRDi7gX2DA5ADtshTLtUiCjaYurGxGEla2iIMrEacGEyyekdZpUYT1KYA :AAJ17fM4D2X8vpKTtWLr/6REeQvxPU80FpWKa/q1b6wMZ43oG9ZolMONj65hWqX0 :mhY+wp/vUsvQ21P/9VzYF0sy9JIAr45VhoDZBBCG0UW23WoOInXko2Kl2UeZmrut :xR/nZm1sMzU+XYr7QG17aOfeezRs/frYEpvuAbrWYNELlPH72OBJ368nSkesiTo+ :gELda7vNsD12UTEl7gRAo3WizCY2zsQySLOShEiAX7f5vYco8A6pEwJ4XYs4pGn6 :xV4JNUeMjBKGtVkGoZJln3x7W1brgGmRNQbY/dcmCkExOOp+4myRVu0/ufH7n5TO :FWqrb+nqyjgnirqS9DwoqB5JsHiMWU/dJBaCtXH4i1p//oeE9FE82nE2vAOZGMvn :D+MRnheCVRi2TWnwe44PnB+L5z7+J+YJyulGM3bvXhZukjGCAj+EMmWxqkSgc2NS :/xh6efgZNACmQIqxLdsw6TLbh9p+yMaxtaCZU9Bs9jw8dN+7FBZxgFG/hrrI1uh3 :oFahFMDXXAUMUs7lFOcxjAWTRRZKKSOG2mg5M5mr8VbY+5BQdcJJeY+jSCnDinUC :wGFfEWlZMV7sdKhzA0YkHJYBgAPtmTaxrHQidPce46FbIeYVRsUOSEtvttYpMjIz :mCVc5ywueUXbUe5UW3KrlV8uxKH3fEIEZ9Pxf3M9XR/aFXysccnzNzbe87XN8PDk :mxzsRzmoD0CgCSAGfNrTdWl8bFQGnEaweMPnSIFzbSJkRcO0oiBU4/dhEFYiPgx5 :UD2r0uFNjKPt4KFBbFJLi0mrMuOCaxjhva7i70GQ95b4qVsyOZLN5KYSUnSDxDX4 :HFUIrEI/rsw= :=BesD :-----END PGP MESSAGE----- : My Cypherpunk's New Member's Package did not contain the key to decypher this obviously witty and succinct message; I would appreciate an individual with full membership to pgp this and post it for the benefit of others. Anyone with key id 86DCDCF9 come on down! Thanks.

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