December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

SS Follies
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>>Although knowingly providing a fake social security number when one >>has any expectation of gain is, I believe, a felony. >> >>42 USC. sec. 408. > >Indeed. Except that this only applies to official uses. Obtaining a gain from a particular SS "account". I don't think it applies if you lie to your employer. >Plus, should one "just make a number up," odds are good that it "won't >compute," that is, that it will either collide with an existing number (and >identity, and reported income) or that it will fail the checksum/allocation >tests. No checksums involved (scheme invented in the '30s before that sort of thing) but there are unused ranges and geographical ranges. Freeware program like ssn.exe (available in all the usual places) will let you vet numbers. >The IRS imposes penalties for faking SS numbers. (Not to mention the >punishment meted out by the Sturmgruppenfuhrers of the SS!) If you use a "wrong" SS# on a W-4 form you will (some of the time but not always) receive a computer generated note from the SS warning you that your earnings have not been deposited into the proper account and if you don't correct the error you may lose benefits. Further action almost never occurs. Obviously more of a problem if done on 1040 forms. >A simple transposition of two digits may not get you zapped, but a >large-scale transposition or outright falsification will. If and when they >catch up with you. In the case of a school or cable TV company or something that wants the SS# to use for ID or credit purposes, nothing bad is likely to happen even if you are "caught". The SS doesn't verify SS#s for the credit agencies these days so they've had to build their own databases. If caught by private parties, all you have to do is say, "the SS# is Mark of the Beast mentioned in Revelations. It is part of a Satan-inspired One-World-Government Plot to establish *His* rule over the earth. I will not abide it." They leave you alone after that. Civilians are remarkably easy to cow if you express strong opinions. Real dialog from September 1983 in a Midwest State: Officious Intermeddler: "Why aren't you in school?" 12-year-old girl: "My daddy doesn't believe in sending me to those schools. He says they're controlled by Communists." Almost real dialog from the Spring of 1996: Parent: "My child has no SS# because (he/she) has lived overseas for (his/her) entire life." College admissions bureau-rat: "But how can (he/she) have a Passport without an SS#?" Parent: "That's our problem, not yours unless you've joined the State Department in the last 15 minutes." Most SS# problems occur in cases where one interacts with official persons. Since it is rarely necessary to interact with official persons, one can easily minimize these problems. Don't return their phone calls to your voice mail. Don't go to their offices. Like Rumpole of the Baily with his letters from Inland Revenue, drop their notes into the circular file. Don't ask, don't tell. Very little prison time has (yet) been served for SS# fraud. This may change if the "Immigration in the National Interest Act of 1996" passes since it increases penalties for uttering false documents in some cases. It doesn't apply to your interactions with your cable company. DCF

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Re: Past one terabit/second on fiber
by droelke＠rdxsunhost.aud.alcatel.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > In the April 1996 issue of Fiber Optic Product news, there is an article on > a Lucent Technologies (formerly Bell Labs...no relation...sigh...) product > which wavelength-multiplexes quantity 8, 2.5 Gb/second signals on a single > fiber, for a total of 20 Gb/sec. This is a real, purchaseable system. On > the same page is a somewhat more experimental system, done by Corning and > Siemens, in which eight channels at 10 Gb/sec each were transmitted on a > single Corning fiber. > > "Wow", I said. Far faster than the 2.5 Gb/sec transmission that is > currently fairly standard for long-haul fiber trunks. The ads say they are selling it - that doesn't mean shipping it... yet at least. (Note that my employer is a direct competitor of Lucent so I have a vested interest in setting the facts straight) > I wasn't prepared, however, for page 38, in an article titled "Research > Teams Achieve 1 Trillion bits a Second." In fact, three separate groups did > this. I copy the article below. Yes - this is still very much a lab situation only though. It will be quite a few years before we hit that in real systems. [...] > > Even if we only consider that 20 Gb/second fiber from Lucent, that is > equivalent to about 300,000 simultaneous voice calls. An OC48 signal (~2.5 Gb/sec) will handle 48 T3's or 48 * 672 voice calls. Multiply by 8 for 20 Gb/second and you get 258048 voice calls. Pretty close to 300k I guess. > With a standard, > 36-fiber cable, that represents 18x300,000 two-way calls, or about 4.8 > million calls. This is probably far greater than the maximum number of > people on LD in the US at any given time, and that's just a single cable trunk. I don't know that any number fiber cable is "standard" but 36-fiber cable is not unusual. To find the capacity of a cable, you have to cut the number of fibers in half (as you did) because generally each fiber is used only for a single direction of traffic. You then have to cut it in half again because phone companies have everything redundant. So, for a connection between two cities, there are generally 2 cables in different locations (so one backhoe doesn't get both), with on average only 1/2 the fibers in each carrying paying traffic. > If we assume that the fiber cable costs $1/meter per fiber, and the cost of > trenching, burial, and interconnects raise this to $10/meter/fiber, and if > we generously assume that the average LD call goes 3000 miles (5,000,000m), > that call occupies 1/150,000th of a $50 million fiber for a few minutes. If > we suppose that the fiber has to gross $100,000,000 per year to pay for > itself, and even if it's only operating at an average 10% load level(both > assumptions are pessimistic, that only works out to a cost of 1.3 cents per > minute per call. That's why these LD phone companies are so scared: If we > can transmit Internet on fiber, that fiber can accept this extra traffic at > very low marginal cost. I can't vouch much for your cost numbers - other than to apply the factor of 2 adjustment noted above. I would add that much of a phone companies cost is in billing and customer service, etc. Not the cost of installing and maintaining the fiber and equipement. This is how the smaller carriers buy lots of bandwidth off of the big guys, and remove all the billing, etc. problems to themselves. They big guys are still making money selling the bandwidth, and the little guy makes his profit by selling for slightly less than the big guy and somehow making his billing, customer service, etc. cost him less. Internet telephony should make the use of bandwidth even more efficient - thereby cutting costs. The big guys who own the fibers will still make money - the pipes that carry internet traffic are still needed. But the little guys will get squeezed out. (until they become ISPs ;-). Internet traffic could theoretically be carried over this large amount of protection fiber (mentioned above) that is out there for a much lower marginal cost than the current T3 or OC3 pipes that are being used. The only "problem" being that these are lower priority channels, so that if a failure occurs anywhere, the traffic on them is dropped. Most customers are demanding high uptimes so much that the idea of a very lost cost, but much less reliable service hasn't caught on yet. Dan ------------------------------------------------------------------ Dan Oelke Alcatel Network Systems droelke(a)aud.alcatel.com Richardson, TX

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(Fwd) New Anonymous Remailer
by David E. Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

------- Forwarded Message Follows ------- From: privacy(a)interlink-bbs.com Subject: New Anonymous Remailer Date: Wed, 15 May 1996 06:34:02 GMT To: info-pascal(a)ARL.MIL You may be familiar with anon.penet.fi, which give you an anonymous account. Our service allows YOU to choose what the return address will be! Please write for more info.

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Re: crosspost re remailers
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:30 PM 5/14/96 -0700, Rich Graves wrote: >Actually, there hasn't really been any discussion on cypherpunks, which I >find a little surprising. I'd have thought that a remailer going down >because of political/legal pressure would raise more of a ruckus. People >seem jaded, but I'm not sure why. I thought the statement that remailers are supposed to be ephemeral and common was the answer. If one is shut down, a dozen spring up in its place. Advertising new remailers does become an issue. What mechanisms are in place for new remailers to advertise themselves? I find it interesting that this remailer is being shut down by private action and not by government. (Yes, they are threatening government action, but if they couldn't do that they would find some other threat.) ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Bill Frantz | The CDA means | Periwinkle -- Computer Consulting (408)356-8506 | lost jobs and | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | dead teenagers | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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Re: distributed keys
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 8:47 AM 5/15/96 -0600, Matt Smith wrote: >Has anyone heard of an algorithm for managing keys automatically in a >distributed system? > >For instance, if some low level security were to be implemented in a >a networking stack where authentication was to be implemented, you would want >to have each node have it's own signature so that signature checking can >take place when one node connects to another node. The trick is then >getting every node's keys distributed to every other node. > >... > (4) Have a machine responsible for generating the public-private keys for each node. It has its own public-private key pair. It uses it's private key to sign each node's public key. Every node gets three keys: it's public and private keys, and the public key generating machine. When nodes make contact they exchange signed public keys and verify the signature of their partner's key with the public key of the generating machine. This is a simple certificate hierarchy scheme as seen in SET, the US Post Office CA system, and VeriSign. Note that the generating machine does not need to be on any network. In fact, it could spend most of its time locked up in a safe since it is only needed when generating new keys. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Bill Frantz | The CDA means | Periwinkle -- Computer Consulting (408)356-8506 | lost jobs and | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | dead teenagers | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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RE: Why does the state still stand:
by jamesd＠echeque.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:01 PM 5/14/96 -0700, blanc wrote: >3 problems which immediately come to mind: > >. What if someone, hired on one occasion but fired at another, > decides in anger to > "turn coat" and report everyone to the > IRS (or other fine government agency)? I expect that as corporations move to the net, they will not have the highly centralized structure of existing corporations. In any case this structure is in large part imposed by the state in order to facilitate tax collection. For example the existence of the "Human resources department" is largely the result of state coercion of corporations. In web businesses ones primary relationship will be with ones immediate coworkers, rather than the greater corporation. They will consist rather of a network of relationships -- contracting will move up, and the Keiretsu structure will move down. I expect the institutional structure will resemble that of the mafia -- a loose confederation of networks rather than tight whole. Thus defection by one party can only cause limited damage. In my judgement the Keiretsu form of economic organization is growing in large part because of improved communications and lowered communication costs. The Keiretsu form does not in itself facilitate tax evasion, but it does mean that the state has to apply coercion more directly to more people in order to collect taxes, and that its coercion has to be more visibly arbitrary and disruptive. >. What if a company does not pay as expected - other than adopting > Assassination Politics, what method could an employee use towards > getting their expected remuneration for work done? In order to do business, one will need a good name (or good nym). If one does not have a good name, one will be poor. That is why I said "every man his own credit bureau". >. Wouldn't everyone need to have two jobs (or source of regularly > accepted cash), in order to be able to pay for services where > suppliers do not accept virtual cash transactions? (TCM has > mentioned before about the need to pay for some things > in tiny quantities - like quarters for a phone call, etc.) Existing forms of ecash are costly and inconvenient, hence unsuitable for spending in tiny quantities. I expect that in the not very distant future every shop will offer its own cash, and that some of these will be in the form of millicents -- suitable for automatic lightly supervised transactions between computers. I expect the transaction cost advantage will eventually be on the side of electronic money, rather than physical money. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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Re: SEVERE undercapacity, we need more remailer servers FAST
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The problem that I think the Scientology postings raise is that the remailers cannot really be used to post copyrighted material. That is what got the netherlands hacktic remailer shut down. This shows, BTW, that being outside the United States is no guarantee of immunity. Most Western countries support copyrights. Maybe the operators can try to plead that they are like "common carriers" and should not be blamed for what people post. Still it is going to take deep pockets at best to prevail in this dispute, and it isn't even clear that the remailer will win. Maybe the lawyers on the list could comment on legal liability of a remailer used to repeatedly post copyrighted material, whether Scientology scriptures or Microsoft Word binaries. I don't see how it can happen. (This ties in, BTW, with my posting yesterday about problems with the "anonymous company" concept. It is not clear that any of the technologies we have discussed will allow continuous, long-term and reliable broadcasting of illegal material.) Presently all the remailers operate for free, which makes it even harder to justify taking the chance of facing an expensive lawsuit. On the other hand, at least if no commercial gain is involved the operator might escape some forms of damages if he loses. A for-pay remailer which is posting copyrighted material could be in even more trouble, it seems to me. Again, legal opinions would be welcome. This was the basis for my suggestion that remailers may have to stop supporting posting of messages, and instead be used for private mail between consenting individuals. Granted, this would probably eliminate 99% of non-cover remailer traffic. But I would argue that as long as the core functionality is there of letting people communicate with each other anonymously and consensually, we would still offer an important service. After all, what is the purpose of anonymous remailers? It isn't really to allow harrassing and abusive messages to be sent to one's enemies. And it isn't to defeat intellectual property laws by proving that no one can stop this material from being posted (remailers can't succeed in doing this, as I said above). Rather, I view remailers as a natural extension of encryption. Encryption hides the contents of the messages you send from eavesdroppers. But they can still see who you are communicating with. Remailers extend privacy protection beyond "what you say" to "who you say it to". When used with pseudonym servers and some of the extensions we have discussed here over the years (maildrops, etc.), they can allow the anonymous two-way communication that is needed for real privacy. This has nothing to do with tweaking Microsoft or Scientology by posting information they own. If people want to do that, they need to find another method. Maybe they can get usenet shut down if they try hard enough. I don't know how that battle is going to come out. But I don't see the remailers as playing an important role there. Hal

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Re: Rural Datafication (Was Re: Edited Edupage, 9 May 1996)
by Jean-Francois Avon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 14 May 96 at 19:35, Timothy C. May wrote: > (This is having yet another interesting side effect: the wealthy who > can afford digital DSS dishes are suddenly very uninterested in > local cable problems, and the impetus for improvement is lost. > Obviously the "poor" are then left with a decaying, outmoded > infrastructure. Even as a Darwinian, I have to feel for them. They > got sold a bill of goods, about how awarding "the franchise" to TCI > or Sonic or Galactronic Cable would result in "universal access," > and now they're stuck.) Hey Tim, where are your badwith-saving manners? You should simply have said : "You asked for it, brother..." ? ;-) Regards! JFA DePompadour, Societe d'Importation Ltee Limoges porcelain, Silverware and mouth blown crystal glasses JFA Technologies, R&D consultants. Physists, technologists and engineers. PGP keys at: http://w3.citenet.net/users/jf_avon ID# C58ADD0D : 529645E8205A8A5E F87CC86FAEFEF891 Unsollicited commercial e-mail will be proofread at US165 $/h Any sender of such material will be considered as to have ac- cepted the above mentionned terms.

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Re: Why does the state still stand:
by Jean-Francois Avon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 15 May 96 at 0:45, Ed Carp wrote: > The problem, however, is twofold - (1) the government will > play mind games on the rest of the population to make you look like > a terrorist, or whatever turns the populace against you, Well, first of all, we should find how much of the population *really* believe in what govt says. There is a difference between the politically correct opinion that Joe & Jane Public give to a poll interviewer and what they really think. Second, you suppose that Joe & Jane Public really like and approve what they understand from what the medias say. And finally third, this system does not work according to the will of a majority. It wouldn't take too many peoples who believe that the medias and their perceived lack of integrity is widely responsible for the way the world goes right now, to have a substantial prize put on the head of the medias. Therefore, any journalist with two+ working neurons will realize that sticking to the most objective facts available would be the best way to build a great reputation while sticking to govt propaganda would be a great way to attract a prize on his head. > and (2) the > government tends to use a sledgehammer to crack a walnut. They > don't care what kind of collateral damage they inflict (witness Waco > and Ruby Ridge) as long as they can make their point. If peoples decided to put a prize on the medias or some jounalists *before* they do on the govt, it might very well undercut many of the counterattack any govt might have. Among the ways a govt would have to circumvent that might be: - create their own medias and have tight security and anonymity - forbid the press from reporting certain events - etc. (Again, many counter arguments have as a basic premise that the populace is stupid. I do not believe the contrary, I simply say that I do not know. Future will show.) So, to see how AP will make the system evolve, you have to assess the communication capabilities of govt vs the individual. This is central to AP and the nature of actual govts. This is *why* the internet is *so* dangerous to any govts that seek to either retain or increase their power, even if it actually touches only but a tiny portion of world population. For the first time in the history of humanity, we have a peer to peer communication capability and an individual-to-world broadcasting capability that is not controllable in practice by any other entity (such as law, high finance, etc) The explains fully why the various govts what to find a way to enforce internet laws, breakable crypto schemes and non-anonymous protocols. JFA PLEASE NOTE: THIS POST DOES NOT MEAN THAT I ENDORSE MR. BELL'S SYSTEM. MY RATIONNAL CONCLUSIONS ABOUT IT'S INTERNAL MECHANICS AND IT'S INTRINSIC LOGICS DOES NOT MEAN THAT I LIKE NOR ENDORSE THE SYSTEM. I SIMPLY CONCLUDED THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO PREVENT THE SYSTEM FROM BEING IMPLEMENTED. IMO, IT IS UNAVOIDABLE. DePompadour, Societe d'Importation Ltee Limoges porcelain, Silverware and mouth blown crystal glasses JFA Technologies, R&D consultants. Physists, technologists and engineers. PGP keys at: http://w3.citenet.net/users/jf_avon ID# C58ADD0D : 529645E8205A8A5E F87CC86FAEFEF891

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Re: crosspost re remailers
by jamesd＠echeque.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:30 PM 5/14/96 -0700, Rich Graves wrote: > > I'd have thought that a remailer going down > > because of political/legal pressure would raise more of a ruckus. At 11:02 AM 5/15/96 -0700, Bill Frantz wrote: > I thought the statement that remailers are supposed to be ephemeral > and common was the answer. Exactly so: Some nyms are valuable, most are valueless by design. All remailers should be valueless by design. The penet.fi remailer design is unsatisfactory precisely because it penet.fi is valuable, hence a target. If it gets shut down a lot of people lose their nyms, causing much inconvenience. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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