December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Russian Crypto Laws
by Michael Froomkin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Does anyone know whether 1) the russians have issued any crypto licenses to either russians or foreigners? 2) whether anyone has been prosecuted for unlicensed crypto use in Russia? or even been charged or warned? [The above may have been dictated with Dragon Dictate/Win 2.0 voice recognition. Be alert for unintentional strange word substitutions.] A. Michael Froomkin | +1 (305) 284-4285; +1 (305) 284-6506 (fax) Associate Professor of Law | U. Miami School of Law | froomkin(a)law.miami.edu P.O. Box 248087 | http://www.law.miami.edu/~froomkin Coral Gables, FL 33124 USA | It's warm here.

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Re: Patents and Trademarks invalid
by jf_avon＠citenet.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Here's an idea: whenever someone uploads something like the RC2 source code, >why not have everyone attach it to their .signature? Is criminal justice >seriously going to pursue tracking down millions of people that did this? >Or would they pull the plug. Man's survival tool is his mind. Patents and copyright are establishing the ownership and protection the result of the exercise of his survival tool. Therefore they are good. To try to eliminate them is equivalent to promote slavery. JFA **** NEW PGP 2.6.2 KEY ********* This key is actually suspended, as of Feb, 16 1996, was never distributed, and might be subject to deletion. Sorry for the trouble my mis-management might have caused. 2048 bits Key ID:24201BA1 1996/02/13 Jean-Francois Avon <jf_avon(a)citenet.net> Key fingerprint = 23 B6 24 31 86 67 FB 35 C7 A7 AF 12 A1 61 E9 3D **** OLD KEY: DO NOT USE ANYMORE UNLESS FOR VERIFYING SIGNATURES **** 1024 bits Key ID:57214AED 1995/10/04 Jean-Francois Avon <jf_avon(a)citenet.net> Key fingerprint = 84 96 76 AE EB 7C AB 15 88 47 87 B0 18 31 74 9F

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Pentagon net-trolling (from RRE)
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

People should find this interesting. It looks like the Pentagon, at least publically, may be a bit behind the CIA/NSA/etcetera in Internet stuff. -Allen From: IN%"rre(a)weber.ucsd.edu" 19-FEB-1996 01:13:01.46 [I've removed the header, but the author's e-mail address is in the text.] =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= This message was forwarded through the Red Rock Eater News Service (RRE). Send any replies to the original author, listed in the From: field below. You are welcome to send the message along to others but please do not use the "redirect" command. For information on RRE, including instructions for (un)subscribing, send an empty message to rre-help(a)weber.ucsd.edu =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= The following is an article from The Nation magazine (March 4, 1996) that reports on a Pentagon study on how the military can exploit the Internet. The Pentagon paper suggests using the Internet for the routine interception of global e-mail, for covert operations and propaganda campaigns, and for tracking domestic political activity, particularly that of the left. The article was written by David Corn, the Washington editor of The Nation. If you have any comments or leads for follow-up stories, please contact him at 202-546-2239/ph 202-546-1415/fx dacor(a)aol.com To subscribe to The Nation, a magazine of politics and culture, call 800-333-8536. Pentagon Trolls the Net By David Corn c1996 Internet users beware; Pentagon snoops are taking an interest in your cyber-communications. Last summer, Charles Swett, a policy assistant in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, produced a report that assessed the intelligence value of the Internet for the Defense Department. His study discovered the obvious: By monitoring computer message traffic and alternative news sources from around the world, the military might catch "early warning of impending significant developments." Swett reports that the "Internet could also be used offensively as an additional medium in psychological operations campaigns and to help achieve unconventional warfare objectives." A striking aspect of his study is that there is one sort of Internet user who attracts a large amount of attention from Swett: cyber-smart lefties. The thirty-one-page, unclassified study is mostly cut and dry. Much of it describes what the Internet is and what can be found within its infinite confines. Swett lists various "fringe groups" that are exploiting the Internet: the white-supremacist National Alliance, the Michigan Militia, Earth First, and People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA). He highlights MUFON--the Mutual UFO Network--which uses the Internet to disseminate information on "U.S. military operations that members believe relate to investigations and cover-ups of UFO-related incidents." MUFON computer messages, Swett notes, "contain details on MUFON's efforts to conduct surveillance of DoD installations." The report does not suggest that the computer communications of MUFON and these other groups should be targeted by the military--though X Filers will be forgiven for wondering if something sinister is afoot. What Swett apparently finds of greater interest than MUFON and the "fringe groups" is the online left. A significant portion of the report is devoted to the San Francisco-based Institute for Global Communications, which operates several computer networks, such as PeaceNet and EcoNet, that are used by progressive activists. I.G.C. demonstrates, he writes, "the breadth of DoD-relevant information available on the Internet." The paper refers to I.G.C. conferences that might be considered noteworthy by the Pentagon, including ones on anti-nuclear arms campaigns, the extreme right, social change, and "multicultural, multi-racial news." Swett cites I.G.C. as the home for "alternative news sources" that fill gaps in the mainstream media. (It might be good for Pentagon analysts to read I.G.C. dispatches from Holland's Peace Media Service.) Yet he seems to say that one can also track the left around the world by monitoring I.G.C.: "Although [I.G.C.] is clearly a left-wing political organization, without actually joining I.G.C. and reading its message traffic, it is difficult to assess the nature and extent of its members' actual real-world activities." Swett's paper presents the world of opportunity awaiting a cyber-shrewd military and intelligence establishment. The Pentagon and intelligence services will conduct "routine monitoring of messages originating in other countries" in the search for information on "developing security threats." That means overseas e-mail, like overseas phonecalls, will be intercepted by the electronic eavesdroppers of the National Security Agency or some other outfit. The data will be fed into filtering computers and then, if it contains any hot-button words, forwarded to the appropriate analyst. "Networks of human sources with access to the Internet could be developed in areas of security concern to the U.S." (But bureaucrats rest assured; "this approach"--using computer-assisted spies--"could never replace official DoD intelligence collection systems or services.") The Internet "can also serve counterintelligence purposes" by identifying threats to the Pentagon and U.S. intelligence activities. As an example, Swett refers to a message posted in a discussion group for "left-wing political activists" that repeated an A.P. article about an upcoming U.S. Army Special Operations Command training exercise at an empty Miami Beach hotel. Another growth area is the dirty tracks department. Noting that government officials, military officials, business people, and journalists all around the world are online, Swett envisions "Psychological Operations" campaigns in which U.S. propaganda could be rapidly disseminated to a wide audience. He adds, "The U.S. might be able to employ the Internet offensively to help achieve unconventional warfare objectives." Swett does not delve into details on how the Internet could serve such a mission. But he tosses out one possibility: communicating via the Internet with political and paramilitary groups abroad that Washington wants to assist while "limiting the direct political involvement of the United States." Imagine this: contras with computers. Swett does point to a few potential problems. The Internet is chockful of chit-chat of no intelligence value. Retrieving useful nuggets will require monumental screening. He also predicts that one day video footage of military operations will be captured by inexpensive, hand-held digital video cameras operated by local individuals and then up-loaded to the Internet. Within minutes, millions of people around the world will see for themselves what has happened--which could lead to calls for action (or calls to terminate action) before government leaders have had a chance to react and formulate a position. Such a development, he observes, "will greatly add to the burden on military commanders, whose actions will be subjected to an unprecedented degree of scrutiny." And opponents of the Pentagon might try to exploit the Internet for their own devilish ends: "If it became widely known that DoD were monitoring Internet traffic for intelligence or counterintelligence purposes, individuals with personal agendas or political purposes in mind, or who enjoy playing pranks, would deliberately enter false or misleading messages." The study ends with a series of vague recommendations--all to be carried out "only in full compliance with the letter and the spirit of the law, and without violating the privacy of American citizens." The Swett paper is "refreshingly candid," says Steven Aftergood of the Federation of American Scientists, who placed a copy of the document on the FAS web site on government secrecy, where it is being downloaded about twenty times a day (at http://www.fas.org/pub/gen/fas/sgp/.) The I.G.C. staff is amused by Swett's interest. "We must be doing something right," notes George Gundrey, program coordinator of I.G.C.'s PeaceNet. "But it is interesting that all of his [I.G.C.] examples are the most left-wing items [on the network]." Swett's study is not the first of its kind. Under the rubric of "information warfare," other Pentagon outfits and military contractors have studied how to use computer networks to collect public information, disseminate propaganda, politically destabilize other governments, and plant computer viruses into the information systems of foes. (The latter task is particularly foolhardy. Deploying viruses into cyber-space--even if targeted against an enemy--would likely pose a danger to the United States, since this country is more networked than any other.) But Swett's office--the Pentagon's dirty tricks shop--is a newcomer to this scene, acoording to David Banisar, a policy analyst for the Electronic Privacy Information Center. Banisar's group has been helping international human rights groups use encryption to protect their global e-mai, "so the spooks don't listen in" It is natural that the national security gang will try to infiltrate and use a communication medium like the Internet to its advantage. What is most troubling about Swett's paper is its preoccupation with left-of-center travelers in cyberspace and _domestic_ political activities. In the appendix, Swett reproduces four examples of notable e-mail. One (written by progressive activists Richard Cloward and Frances Fox Piven) calls for 100 days of protest in response to the Republican's Contract with America, another announces plans for a demonstration at the 1996 G.O.P. convention in San Diego, the third relays to lefties information on the U.S. Army exercise at the Miami Beach hotel, and the last is a communique from the Zapatistas of Mexico. Swett's use of these cyber dispatches can be explained one of two ways. Either the left has made much more progress in cyber-organizing than the right and "such fringe groups" as PETA, or Swett, true to institutional tradition, is overwrought about the use of the Internet by a certain parties. In any case, the would-be watchers in the defense establishment ought to be watched closely--especially if Swett's report refelcts broader sentiment within the Pentagon.

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Assassination Biz
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hey, Jim Bell, here are some clients, or competitors, or best, targets? The Hit Men (Newsweek, Feb 26, 96) Call it "in-your-face-capitalism." You lose your job, your ex- employer's stock price rises, the CEO gets a fat raise. Today, the more people a company fires, the more Wall Street loves it, the higher its stock price goes. Cheer up, you're serving the greater good by being blown away by what economist Joseph Schumpeter christened "the gale of creative destruction." The world is changing and no matter how big and rich a company is, it has to adapt or die. But Wall Street and Big Business have made a bad problem worse by being greedheads. Lots of CEOs have messed up big time. They let payrolls get bloated. Then to recoup, the offer up employees as sacrifices to Mammon, god of Wall Street, hoping to get their stock price back up. When the price rises, it's like Wall Street spitting on the victim's bodies. Corporate heads, salaries and layoffs: Robert Allen, AT&T. Salary: $3,362,000, 40,000 layoffs. Louis Gerstner, IBM, $2,625,000, 60,000. Robert Palmer, Digital Equipment, $900,016, 20,000. Walter Shipley, Chemical/Chase, $2,496,154, 12,000. Charles Lee, GTE. $2,004,115, 17,000. Ronald Allen, Delta Air Lines, $475,000, 15,000. John McDonnell, McDonnell Douglas, $577,791, 17,000. Robert Stempel, General Motors, $1,000,000, 74,000. Edward Brennan, Sears, Roebuck, $3,075,000, 50,000. Michael Miles, Philip Morris, $1,000,000, 14,000. Frank Shrontz, Boeing, $1,420,935, 28,000. William Ferguson, CEO Nynex, $800,000, 16,800. Albert Dunlap, Scott Paper. $100,000,000 in salary, stock profits and other perks, 11,000.

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Re: Should *WE* Sue Under CDA
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"tallpaul(a)pipeline.com" 19-FEB-1996 08:49:19.72 >On a personal and emotional level I *love* the idea of watching a group of >pro-CDA fundie christers having to sweat in court explaining how their >support for things like incest and murder are protected under the First >Amendment but other people's speech is not. It is a rather humorous idea. >But on a logical level, should we use (or advocate) the court system under >CDA-related topics. >I think not. >Allen's post has great emotional appeal, but it creates at least one >danger. >The first is the hypocrisy involved in advocating something with which we >disagree, like asking the courts to support CDA and use CDA to punish those >we don't like. That does have its problems. I've got the same sort of dilemma in my life; to take government funding (for science) or not, when I disapprove of most such funding. I wind up deciding to, because otherwise the funds in question could be spent less efficiently on science (thus further wasting taxpayer funds) or on something even less legitimate (i.e., the Wo(S)D), given that bureaucratic budgets tend to be decided by who uses up the most money. I can justify this by that one would pick a target that had done something directly wrong: participating in the writing of a bill that violates individual rights. In other words, pick a target that deserves it enough, and striking back at them is justified. The problem is the old ends justify means debate. >The second is creating an Orwellian doublethink in politics where we first >advocate something, like useing the courts. Then, when challenged (about >hypocrisy or anything else) turn around and state that we really did not >adovate what we so clearly did advocate or that we did not "mean" what we >so clearly said. >Ultimately, we reinforce a form of political behavior where nobody is >responsible for their political behavior and nobody expects to be held >accountable for it. >Witness the behavior of people like Rep. Shroeder who voted for CDA etc. >including the anti-abortion aspects, but does not want this to count among >the pro-choice crowd because she didn't "really" vote for CDA etc. to get >it to limit abortions. You have a point. -Allen

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Re: True random numbers
by eli+＠GS160.SP.CS.CMU.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim May writes: >4. I'd avoid altogether phrases such as "generates random numbers," unless >your method uses radioactive decay or Johnson noise measurements, for >example, and maybe not even then. Persi Diaconis gave a talk here last week on pseudorandom generation, during which he was asked by people didn't use hardware RNGs. He said that he wasn't aware of any that passed the standard battery of statistical tests. (He also mentioned that nobody had thoroughly tested the complexity-theoretic generators such as Blum-Micali, and got into a rather vigorous discussion with a professor who argued that testing was superfluous. Diaconis: "You theorists always take that tone!") -- . Eli Brandt usual disclaimers . . eli+(a)cs.cmu.edu PGP key on request . . arrest me: violation of 18 U.S.C. 1462: "fuck".

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NSA net trolling
by Eric Murray 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded from alt.politics.datahighway, sorry I didn't get the Message-ID when it was fowarded to me. This is possibly old news to some, but I think it needs to be spread widely. > Article 1706 of alt.politics.datahighway: > Date: Tue, 16 Jan 1996 > Subject: NSA SHORTCIRCUITING FUTURE CRYPTO CAPABILITIES > > from Global Net News > === > [Want to know the easiest way... Puzzle Palace coauthor Wayne > Madsen, in an article written for the June 1995 issue of Computer > Fraud & Security Bulletin (Elsevier Advanced Technology Publications), > wrote that "according to well-placed sources within the Federal > Government and the Internet service provider industry, the National > Security Agency (NSA) is actively sniffing several key Internet router > and gateway hosts." > > Madsen says the NSA concentrates its surveillance on destination and > origination hosts, as well as "sniffing" for specific key words and > phrases. He claims his sources have confirmed that the NSA has > contracted with an unnamed private company to develop the software > needed to capture Internet data of interest to the agency. > > According to Madsen, the NSA monitors traffic primarily at two Internet > routers controlled by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration > (NASA), one in College Park, MD (dubbed "Fix East") and another at NASA > Ames Research Center in Sunnyvale, CA ("Fix West"). > > Other NSA Internet sniffers, he said, operate at busy routers knows as > Mae East (an East Coast hub), Mae West (a West Coast hub), CIX > (reportedly based in San Jose), and SWAB (a northern Virginia router > operated by Bell Atlantic). > > Madsen says the NSA may also be monitoring traffic at network access > points, the large Internet gateways operated by regional and > long-distance service providers. The NAPs allegedly under surveillance > are in Pennsauken, NJ (operated by Sprint), Chicago (run by AmeriTech > and Bell Communications Research), and San Francisco (Pacific Bell). > > [Quote] > "Madsen claims the NSA has deals with Microsoft, Lotus, and Netscape > to prevent anonymous email." > [quote] > > "One senior Federal Government source has reported that NSA has been > particularly successful in convincing key members of the US software > industry to cooperate with it in producing software that makes Internet > messages easier for NSA to intercept, and if they are encrypted, to > decode," Madsen wrote. "A knowledgeable government source claims that > the NSA has concluded agreements with Microsoft, Lotus and Netscape to > permit the introduction of the means to prevent the anonymity of > Internet electronic mail, the use of cryptographic key-escrow, as well > as software industry acceptance of the NSA-developed Digital Signature > Standard (DSS)." > > Is the NSA really snooping on the Net? And if they are, would that > violate the agency's charter, which specifically prohibits it from > spying within the US? > > "Well, Net traffic is routed from God knows where to God knows where > around the world," says George Washington University Professor Lance > Hoffman, a professor of Communications and Telecommunications Systems > Policy at George Washington University. "So if the NSA is doing this, > they could say they are not violating their charter not to spy in the > US. That's the thing. Intelligent routers send stuff any which way." > > > -- Eric Murray ericm(a)lne.com ericm(a)motorcycle.com http://www.lne.com/ericm PGP keyid:E03F65E5 fingerprint:50 B0 A2 4C 7D 86 FC 03 92 E8 AC E6 7E 27 29 AF

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Re: Req. for soundbites
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 7:57 AM 2/19/96 -0500, tallpaul wrote: >On Feb 18, 1996 19:27:04, 'frantz(a)netcom.com (Bill Frantz)' wrote: > > >>>A local TV station has asked me for an interview, after I sent a graphic >>>of a mono-digital hand gesture with the phrase "censor this!" to the >Prez, >>>Veep, and the area congresscritters (cc'd to 2 TV stations and a radio >>>station), accompanied by a 'confession' and demand for swift prosecution. > >>> >>>Anyone got any nifty sound bites I can try to toss in? >> For the record, that is not my statement, but one I was replying to. No offense, I think I may have made the same kind of mistake. > >I do not think that sound bites are the way to deal with these complex >issues. Tallpaul is right when he says that one SHOULD not deal with complex issues through sound bites. However, the mathematical model for this part of politics is Prisoner's Dilemma. (BTW It is also the model for negative advertising.) When your opponent goes to sound bites, you also must, or you will lose. The CDA fans have been using sound bites such as, "It will protect our children from netporn." and, "The net is a sea of pornography." Lost jobs and dead teenagers are the strongest images I can present on our side and still feel look at myself in the mirror in the mornings. Regards - Bill ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Bill Frantz | The CDA means | Periwinkle -- Computer Consulting (408)356-8506 | lost jobs and | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | dead teenagers | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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Remailers not heard from; info?
by Bruce Baugh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm curious if anyone knows anything about the status of the following type I remailers. NOT HEARD FROM IN MY JANUARY OR FEBRUARY TESTS amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com NOT HEARD FROM IN MY FEBRUARY TESTS pamphlet(a)idiom.com remail(a)c2.org remailer(a)bi-node.zerberus.de robo(a)c2.org And as long as I'm asking questions :-), I see that some remailers (hfinney(a)shell.portal.com, hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu, homer(a)rahul.net) preserve subject lines while others do not. Is this a readily settable option? If so, I'd like to commend it to other remailer operators. If not, I'd be interested in getting some sense of how difficult a hack it is. -- Bruce Baugh bruce(a)aracnet.com http://www.aracnet.com/~bruce

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Encryption in software licenses...
by David J. Bianco 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Does anyone have a pointer to any good discussions on how to build programs with encrypted license keys? ftp.csua.berkeley.edu used to have such a file (/pub/cypherpunks/cryptanalysis/license.asc.gz), but the archive hasn't been accessible for a few days. Although I remember this to be mostly about how to crack such schemes, it has lots of useful information about how they are designed in the first place. Thanks, David -- ========================================================================== David J. Bianco | Web Wonders, Online Oddities, Cool Stuff iTribe, Inc. | Phone: (804) 446-9060 Fax: (804) 446-9061 Suite 1700, World Trade Center | email: <bianco(a)itribe.net> Norfolk, VA 23510 | URL : http://www.itribe.net/~bianco/

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