December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

1996-02-13 VP Gore Unveils On-Line Service for Businesses (fwd)
by Ed Carp 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Tue, 13 Feb 1996 22:28-0500 From: The White House <Publications-Admin(a)WhiteHouse.Gov> To: Public-Distribution(a)CLINTON.AI.MIT.EDU Subject: 1996-02-13 VP Gore Unveils On-Line Service for Businesses THE WHITE HOUSE Office of the Vice President ________________________________________________________________________ For Immediate Release February 13, 1996 VICE PRESIDENT UNVEILS NEWEST ON-LINE SERVICE FOR U.S. BUSINESSES Gore Says U.S. Business Advisor Key To Governing In Information Age Vice President Gore today (2/13) unveiled the a new and improved "customer-designed" version of the U.S. Business Advisor. The "Advisor", which was first presented at the 1995 White House Conference on Small Business, underwent a six-month redesign that addressed the specific needs of the business community. The improved "Advisor" will provide users with one-stop electronic access to more than 60 different federal organizations that assist or regulate businesses. This on-line service, which directly links American businesses with the federal government, was originally developed by the Vice President's National Performance Review in cooperation with federal agencies and the business community. Today, at the annual convention of the Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association (AFCEA) in Tyson's Corner, VA, the Vice President officially placed the new Advisor on the World Wide Web (http://www.business.gov) "By employing state-of-the-art information technology, the Advisor is improving communication between American businesses and their government," the Vice President said. "Because this version was developed with the support of the business community, the Advisor serves our customers on their terms. Both Fortune 500 companies and start-up businesses will benefit from this improved service." The Advisor provides an interactive environment where businesses can: file documents electronically with the government; retrieve documents, applications and other information; get answers to commonly asked questions; obtain names and contact numbers of business agencies; acquire news on specific business topics; and send feedback. The improved version of the U.S. Business Advisor was unveiled today as the Vice President delivered the second of three speeches on technology and the future of America. The "Technology Trilogy" began Monday (2/12), in Baltimore, MD, where the Vice President spoke to the American Association for the Advancement of Science. The final speech is scheduled for tomorrow (2/14), in Philadelphia, PA, where the Vice President will visit the first programmable computer, also known as the ENIAC.

1 0

Re: V-chips, CC, and Motorcycle Helmets
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 07:36 PM 2/13/96 -0800, Bill Frantz wrote: >At 8:15 PM 2/13/96 -0500, Declan B. McCullagh wrote: >>That may well be true, but speaking as someone who's worked on U.S. >>Presidential campaigns, that kind of protection is expensive, >>time-consuming, intrusive, and unlikely to be extended. > >I assume that both Declan and Jim Bell agree that people high in the >government will be immune because they already enjoy this level of >protection (limitation one). So the only people we can hit are the cannon >fodder, not the ones who gave the orders. It has always been this way with >war. Actually, I think the primary targets will be either the middle level manager types, or the ones who have attracted a substantial amount of bad publicity by "following orders." Lon Horiuchi (the sniper who shot Vicki Weaver) for example, would be a excellent example of a person who'd try to claim, "I was just following orders." Okay, maybe he was, but so was Adolph Eichmann. Once the tax collectors/enforcers were targeted, the rest of the government wouldn't be able to operate, and would collapse. >If, after a couple of the Waco people had been hit, I was given the >responsibility to protect them I would proceed as follews: > >(1) Gather them and their families onto some Army base and step up the >patrols. Now I have them safe. And, of course, you've just ruined their lives. Think about it. By doing this, it is made absolutely, completely, and abundantly clear to them that THEY are considered "the enemy" and that their lives are forever put at risk. Previously, government employees could hold their heads up high and be proud of their "public service." Now, if they're discovered, they have to disappear. Does this treatment sound familiar? Their job description and circumstances will more closely resemble that of a Mafia enforcer than a proud public servant. They'll have to teach their children to lie about what their parent does, rather than risk getting exposed. Who, exactly, would want to work for the government under such circumstances? Remember, we're not just talking about a tiny fraction of their number; if the most egregious ones were hidden the ones that were less secure would be killed in their place. Remember, the only reason the government can even afford so many employees is because taxes are collected; what happens when literally every IRS agent resigns to avoid the bullet or bomb? The remainder, the "less bad" ones, couldn't be paid. At that point, government collapses. >(2) Train and release them thru the witness protection program. Cost >$20,000/person (if I remember the article John Young posted a pointer to >correctly. (Thanks John)) This is probably about the same as the cost of >their training, so it makes economic sense. Except that you can't do this for every government employee, and who's going to want to work for the government if it is made clear to them that someday they'll either be killed, or discovered, or they will have to "go underground" to survive. Not a very good prospect. And what happens if they think there's a fairly good chance that my system will succeed? Most people want to be able to retire with a pension; what's the prospect for collecting a pension from a demolished government?!? > >(3) Make sure that the names/faces of the cannon fodder in future actions >are not available to make it harder to target the guilty. > >Bill Then they'll target the "names," the ones who show their faces. See how this works? If the only way you can maintain the government is to keep them all absolutely anonymous, then that government has FAILED. Furthermore, this system's anonymity allows disgruntled public employees the chance to collect money by "turning in" their bosses to the public's ire; if the personnel list for the government is nominally a secret, it will "leak" eventually and those on the list will be followed, confirmed, and targeted. I'm not a betting man, but if I were forced to place a bet, your position doesn't have a prayer.

1 0

More DaveMail: New Date: 2/22/96
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Mime-Version: 1.0 Date: Mon, 12 Feb 1996 17:27:12 -0800 To: telstar(a)wired.com (Todd Lappin -- Wired), davenetworld(a)wired.com, eric.alderman(a)hmg.com, shabbir(a)vtw.org (Shabbir J. Safdar), sac88867(a)saclink1.csus.edu (Allen Cole), nagel(a)applelink.apple.com (Dave Nagel -- Apple), apj7(a)columbia.edu (Andrew Johnston), strindberg3(a)applelink.apple.com, robg(a)prognet.com (Rob Glaser -- Progressive Networks), esp(a)montreal.com (David Kramer), ebelove(a)staff.ichange.com (Ed Belove -- AT&T Interchange) From: dwiner(a)well.com (DaveNet email) Subject: New Date: 2/22/96 Sender: owner-davenetworld(a)wired.com Precedence: bulk --------------------------------------- Amusing Rants from Dave Winer's Desktop Released on 2/12/96; 5:18:26 PM PST --------------------------------------- Rob Glaser, robg(a)prognet.com, was the first to question the choice of 2/12/96 for the 24 Hours of Democracy project. He said: "I think this is a very good idea overall. But I think it is unnecessarily (insanely?) ambitious to try to pull it off on Wednesday." Many more emails like that followed. As the day progressed, I realized that while I'm itching to get the ball rolling, it's taking longer than I thought it would for the pieces to come together. So we're pushing the date back. ***February 22, 1996 The start time will be: 12:01AM, Pacific, 2/22/96. The end time will be: 11:59PM, Pacific, 2/22/96. February 22 is George Washington's Birthday. A national holiday in the United States. It's a bank holiday. The post office is closed. We celebrate the birth of our founding father. The leader in our war for independence. He was the first president of the United States. The man who, according to legend, could not tell a lie. So -- instead of writing a love letter to the Internet, tell the truth about democracy. The founding principles of the United States. The Declaration of Independence. The Constitution. The Bill of Rights. How would George Washington feel about the Internet? And even though 2/22/96 is not Valentine's Day, if you want to write a love letter to the Internet, that's probably OK too! Stay tuned to <http://www.hotwired.com/userland/24/> for news on sponsorship, press information, free web posting via email, clip art, and information about how you can contribute to the success of 24 Hours of Democracy. Thanks! Dave Winer PS: Remember Abraham Lincoln, whose birthday is today, and remember slavery, the Civil War, and then freedom. Can it happen here? It did! ----------------------------------------------- 2/22/96: <http://www.hotwired.com/userland/24/> --- end forwarded text -------------------------------------------------- The e$ lists are brought to you by: Making Commerce Convenient (tm) - Oki Advanced Products - Marlboro, MA Value-Checker(tm) smart card reader= http://www.oki.com/products/vc.html Where people, networks and money come together: Consult Hyperion http://www.hyperion.co.uk info(a)hyperion.co.uk See your name here. Be a charter sponsor for e$pam, e$, and Ne$ws! See http://thumper.vmeng.com/pub/rah/ or e-mail rah(a)shipwright.com for details... -------------------------------------------------

1 0

Pointer to pro-"compromise" analysis of Japanese Crypto Policy
by johnsonr＠hoshi.colorado.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Japanese encryption policy evidently has no room yet for key "compromise" by the Japanese government. However, Mr. Baker holds out hope that that may change. Forwarded-by: bostic(a)bsdi.com (Keith Bostic) Forwarded-by: Phil Agre <pagre(a)weber.ucsd.edu> EMERGING JAPANESE ENCRYPTION POLICY by Stewart A. Baker Steptoe & Johnson sbaker(a)steptoe.com http://www.us.net/~steptoe/276915.htm

1 0

Re: Assasination Politics
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:48 PM 2/12/96 EDT, E. ALLEN SMITH wrote: > I have changed the subject header (despite its destroying threading >with the way my mailreader works) so that Perry et al can more easily filter >this out. I have concluded that Assasination Politics, since it is a possible >development of true anonymnity, etcetera, is a proper discussion topic for >cypherpunks - while not cryptography in and of itself, it is a possible result >of cryptography. I'm glad some people see that. This may, in fact, turn out to be one of the most important products of modern, public-key cryptography. >From: IN%"frantz(a)netcom.com" 12-FEB-1996 03:24:07.29 > >>Again, absolutely. Hell, I can't even devise a filter that will let me >>filter out Jim Bell's rants while letting me see his reasoned arguments on >>anonymous assassination. (I would love to have him address the Salman >>Rushdie issue, a man who is still alive despite a considerable announced >>price for his head. There appear to be limits to who can be subject to >>assassination for pay.) > > Actually, that's an argument for non-misusage of Assasination Politics. >If the person hides, there's not much one can do about it. But a hiding >law enforcement agent can't be out violating people's rights. Bingo! That's why this system will be so effective; it will DETER bad behavior on the part of the government and its agents. >(I will mention >that whether a right is violated or not is essentially a matter of the >perceiver - under any system, whether governmental or not. All ethical >arguments assume either some degree of common ground that can be argued from, >or the finding of logical inconsistency). Those who do so via the net can be >taken care of via the other mechanisms discussed here. It's just that the >physical part is a possible net weakness. > Moreover, just because _some_ rights-violaters (not that Rushdie was >one) aren't killed doesn't mean that all of them wouldn't be. A system doesn't >have to be 100% efficient to be effective. Yup; it's interesting that Franz didn't see this... Maybe he just didn't WANT to see it! > However, the Rushdie case does bring up one problem I have with >Assasination Politics as currently constructed. While people are unlikely to >patronize a general/non-discriminatory organization, a more particular but >non-libertarian one is still possible. For instance, if the Christian >Coalition put together an organization, anonymously, what would prevent them >from offing everyone who was a major leader against them - such as a doctor >researching new abortion techniques, or a geneticist (such as myself) doing >gene therapy work they found offensive? The patrons would know that _they_ >wouldn't be targeted after all... I would appreciate a response from Jim Bell >on this subject. > -Allen Your question was actually a two-parter. I will separate it below and comment on the pieces: >For instance, if the Christian >Coalition put together an organization, anonymously, what would prevent them >from offing everyone who was a major leader against them - "Who needs leaders"? Think about this, carefully. The current political system is based on the idea that if you don't like the way things are being done, you have to publicize your unhappiness, to organize, and for that you normally "need" leaders. With "Assassination Politics," _leaders_ will not only not be necessary, they might be the prime targets for unhappy people! But this will work both ways: "Christian Coalition" LEADERS will be targets themselves if they publicly advocate the killing of abortion doctors. > such as a doctor >researching new abortion techniques, or a geneticist (such as myself) doing >gene therapy work they found offensive? I wish there was some sort of "perfect, easy solution" to this dilemma, but it's possible there isn't. Ultimately, anybody who does anything that angers enough people, ENOUGH, will be a potential target. I don't think this is a major admission however; society has ALWAYS been this way. In the early 1600's in Salem, women were killed simply due to false accusations that they engaged in 'witchcraft." Governments have prosecuted (and persecuted) people for violation of what we now call victimless crimes. In the pre-1960's South, being black was a de-facto "crime": They could be arrested, tried, and convicted on a pretense. Over 60% of prison cells are filled with people who sold chemicals (drugs) to willing buyers. I think it's clear that there are ALREADY plenty of violations of rights going on; at most, you can claim that "Assassination Politics" is "imperfect" in the sense that it doesn't completely solve this problem. But since I do genuinely believe it will eliminate war, militaries, governments, taxes, and other evils, I think we'll end up with a far better society than we have today. >The patrons would know that _they_ >wouldn't be targeted after all... I would appreciate a response from Jim Bell >on this subject. All is not lost, however. I contend that society would likely IMPROVE to the point where the kind of behavior you want to avoid will not commonly happen. Wishful thinking? Well, consider a point which was driven home to me a week ago at a dinner with my parents, sister and brother in law, and my two nieces, ages 4 and 9. We were eating spareribs, and my father (age 65) commented that such meat used to be considered trash meat, and "only the niggers bought it." (BTW, my father was not and is not a bigot, quite the opposite; he used this terminology to relate the general opinion during the time frame he grew up in; he used this terminology to reflect on and deride that public opinion back then.) My older niece looked mystified, and said she hadn't even HEARD the term "nigger." (and she's substantially above average in vocabulary and intelligence for age 9, BTW) While I am not going to claim that bigotry is dead in the younger generation, I think it's clear that it went out of style in the 1960's and progress has since been made in eradicating most of its more egregious effects. In short, in that issue, society has improved, if by no other method than waiting for the bigots to die off naturally and develop a new generation of more tolerant people. Call this "political correctness" if you wish (and I'm about as much an opponent of "political correctness" as you'll find) but the fact is that things are getting better with regards to race relations. Similarly, I think that once public advocacy for killing abortion doctors and others was deterred (by judicious use of Assassination Politics, for example, even if a given example of such use might be considered "wrong" because it was a violation of "free speech") pretty soon it would be hard to gather much enthusiasm for such bad acts. Few people would risk calling publicly for that; the next generation will "never" hear such a thing, etc. Is it unreasonable for me to suggest that over time, the faults you fear will tend to disappear?

1 0

Re: MS CryptoAPI (fwd)
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 07:28 PM 2/13/96 -0500, Rich Salz wrote: >Okay, so how the hell did Microsoft get export approval for this? I mean, >this is the classic crypto-with-a-hole; a service-provider interface (SPI) >with DLL's means "plug your crypto here". This is usually considered an >"anciliary" device in ITAR language, and therefore export controlled. I >mean, how long until you see MSWord with "full privacy" option? > >Word I've heard is that the office of Export Control has had a lot of >turnover and "nobody knows anything" anymore. At the risk of blowing my usual horn, I would argue that one advantage in vocal, common, and loudly hostile talk against government is that they have begun to understand how unhappy we are with them. To make an analogy with late-1700's France, the sound of a guillotine being tested probably had a remarkable effect on the upper strata of their society; likewise, dicussions of how we can all chip in and bump off the whole lot of the bastards might remind a few of they key government players that they are not immune from eventual retribution. Resulting in "a lot of turnover." If we make a "reasonable assumption" that most of those government employees aren't stupid, and they discover that the prospect for Crypto-Anarchy (trademark owned by Tim May?) is good, it seems reasonable to assume that they'll want to avoid being around when THE END comes for their employer. Jim Bell Klaatu Burada Nikto -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMSF8vvqHVDBboB2dAQExXQP+JHO6P80VfXE1+x5JmstA14dg+wlmXBK2 +8UYUnD7IpK2QzIKoEbmot2/WfUK/9zzOiuRuXvzc6FxfscRm7xNzNO28vviTN5U osVNgm72t/R2jZspMPr+cYE3GcxDIcQvTEOth5Tz9J9q7TfI4+NPl68fN7sqEOsG m44PPIy6F2I= =m3hQ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

Why There Exists No Middle Ground in the Crypto-policy Debate
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Why There Exists No Middle Ground in the Crypto-policy Debate [This message only appears to be posted anonymously, if you have the correct tools, you can learn my name and e-address. Take that auto-WWW indexers!] Decius <decius(a)ninja.techwood.org> recently presented an essay, entitled ``Crypto-Absolutism,'' which described ``Why and how the middle ground should be found in the crypto-policy debate.'' The essay is clearly wrong in its assumptions and thus its conclusions. Given the perceived flaws in the assumptions, his commentary must be rebutted. Within the context of this rebuttal, ``T-Camp Cypherpunks'' are those ``Cypherpunks'' (whatever they are :-) that follow a technology evolution-based line of reasoning to arrive at the inevitable coming of crypto-anarchy. As well, ``A-Camp Cypherpunks'' are those that advocate crypto-anarchy because they like the social and political implications. It is possible to be an A-Camp Cypherpunk or a T-Camp Cypherpunk without being the other. Of course, it is quite possible to be both. It has often been said on Cypherpunks, that ``we'' are not a ``we''. Decius falls into a trap by assuming that all Cypherpunks are in the A-Camp. This mistake colors the entire essay. The main problem with Decius' essay is that it assumes that Cypherpunks _merely_ advocate crypto-anarchy. In fact, T-Camp Cypherpunks do not stop at this puny point. They observe that crypto-anarchy is the _likely_ _outcome_ of the current technology trend (this trend is discussed below). Note that this observation of fulfillment, if correct, is a far stronger statement than merely advocating that crypto-anarchy should happen or would be a really good idea. A-Camp Cypherpunks also advocate that this trend should be exploited to its conclusion, sooner rather than later, to preempt any massive government crackdowns that would only prolong the transition pains. The rationale being that these supposed government crackdowns have no place in the natural evolution of a free society. And that the continuance of a free society is preferable to that of a move towards a police state, which would be required to facilitate the useless --- in the end --- crackdown on this information technology. Decius is also wrong when he states that crypto-anarchy means people will never again be accountable or recognized (pure A-Campers might like this to be true, although I doubt it). In the T-Camper's view, crypto-anarchy means that people have the choice of when they wish to be accountable and recognized for their statements and information movement-related actions and when they wish otherwise. People are not forced under the crypto-anarchy model to be unaccountable or unrecognizable. Likewise, the crypto-anarchy model allows people to ignore those that are unaccountable and unrecognizable, if they wish. Decius fails to recognize that people could be recognized, and even paid, for example, when operating under a pseudonym instead of completely anonymously (this concept links two Cypherpunks favorites: untraceable anonymous e-cash and anonymous reputations). As primary counter-points to Decius on this issue: - - The people who wrote the Federalists' Papers did so anonymously, yet I suspect that all were well-known and transacted business and other politics under their ``real names'' most of the time. - - Individual articles are anonymously published in the _The Economist_ yet I suspect that people are being paid to contribute information to this newspaper (at least, I know I am paying a lot per year, for a newspaper, to get the information :-). - - The recently released ``Primary Colors'' book by Anonymous. Yet this person, if the publisher is to be believed, is well-known to President Clinton (I think it may all just be a good marketing scam :-). Back to the main point of unstoppable --- in a free society, at least - --- technology trends. Decius has not, but must, account for the following change due to technology: Up until now, communication system deployers (e.g. The Phone Companies) have been basically blackmailed (through easily applied laws and licensing) into creating systems with backdoors for government's use. As system intelligence moves to the end-user devices away from the internal network devices and encryption moves to end-to-end encryption from link-based or non-existent encryption, this form of blackmail will no longer work since there will no longer be a small number of easily controlled entities building and deploying the systems. There will be open standards for the interconnect itself [IPng or whatever]. And anyone will be able to implement end-user devices that layer end-to-end encryption on top of the raw interconnect services provided by the new network model. In some ways, we have already arrived at the new interconnect model: the Internet based upon IP. In the form of today's computers, we also have a rudimentary incarnation of the required intelligent end-user device. In sum, I am a T-Camp Cypherpunk not because I necessarily think crypto-anarchy is a good idea but rather because the technology trend will continue to make it happen. I also happen to be an A-Camp Cypherpunk but it is for the reason that I am a T-Camper alone that I derive that there can be no compromise on the issue of crypto-policy. Not only would it be a bad idea to compromise, but also any compromise will fail due to continuing changes in technology that favor intelligence in the end-user devices and end-to-end encryption over intelligence in the internal network components and easily controlled encryption. It is better to see the technology trend and embrace it to prepare for the new crypto-anarchy to come. ~``Those that prepare for the change will have a lot of success, while those that ignore the technology trend in this area will be left behind.''~ Truer words have never been spoken. Regards, Loren -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMSGeTP8de8m5izJJAQFFrQP/ZQFu64mGC/u4YC7jAsnv22Cx3Eub+xVw i3IYX7aHJopfG3g6IVifaGuEJmHxF6mZDHj+YSS/9fQfHUm7QZtoXmgmvxgWpP3s KiUVLgYA3/cVfZn/6iOUHlQCehzj2N4IPdW2QGWbe2rbk1i1YaiGLpnB+RRXo4nW r7mKrSVOjOQ= =TIOb -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

Re: Regulation of citizen-alien communications (Was: Choices)
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:24 AM 2/11/96 +0000, Ed Carp wrote: >> A foreign person is defined in S 120.11, and means anyone who's not a U.S. >> citizen. Technical data is defined in S 120.33 > >Oh? You mean that I can get busted for giving my Canadian spouse a copy >of PGP? A US *permanent resident* who is not a US Citizen is still a "US Person" for ITAR purposes. DCF

1 0

Firewall USA to Firewall China
by A. Padgett Peterson P.E. Information Security 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Q: The Chinese government has declared its intention to filter out > what it considers to be objectionable material from the Internet. If > you were a consultant for the Chinese government, what technology > would you recommend that they use to do that? Multiple layers would probably do it: 1) Acces only to/from sites with which they have a formal agreement 2) Using secure channels 3) With good application filters (could be created - that I do not know of anyone who has is irrevelant - MIMEsweeper is a start.) Mostly it depends on how seriously they want to block certain kinds of traffic and what of the I'net's capabilities they are willing to give up to achieve that goal. Now before I get flamed again, please understand that I separate what *can* be done from what *should* be done. This is a "can" and is also considering the fact that a sovereign nation has the *right* to do this unless it gives up that right. A US company also has that right where it pertains to their property unless again they give up that right (see: common carrier). Warmly, Padgett ps wife informed me that when traffic backs up, it is ok to leave a hole for cross traffic to use but if you make any sort of gesture to indicate that is what you have done, *you* become liable for the cross traffic's actions. Absurd, no ?

1 0

Re: COO_kie
by Yanni 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> So, Folks, how does one manipulate the cookie in Netscape so that the > user can control what Netscape sees??? > > Michael E. Carboy > carboy(a)hooked.net Simple, read the cookie specs on the NetScape site. :) http://home.netscape.com/ -jon Jon S. Stevens yanni(a)clearink.com ClearInk WebMagus http://www.clearink.com/ finger pgp(a)sparc.clearink.com for pgp pub key My apologies for the loss of bandwidth. :-)

1 0