December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Random Number Generators
by Timothy L. Nali 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi all For a class project, I will be designing a VLSI cmos chip to generate truly random numbers (The chip will be fabricated). I'm limited to a 2-micron standard cmos technology (no fancy BiCMOS, MISC, or anthing else). The most promising design I've seen so far (that I can actually do) is based on clocking a D flip-flop in the following way: ----- 8Khz clock ------ | |----- Random output | | | | (sloppy) slow clock ---- |> | | | ----- The slow clock has enough random variation in it's period for the Dff to generate random numbers. The random bits will , of course, have biases that will need to be corrected with things like Xor gates. Can anyone give me pointers or references to other types of true random number generators and to ways of correcting the biases and other problems in the resulting random bitstream? I'd also appreciate a pointer to an intro text (if such a thing exists) on what makes random numbers good random numbers. (and before you say it, yes I have Applied Cyptography. It's a great book.) One thing I'm concerned about is making sure the random bitstream is uniformly random. What effects, if any, will things like thermal noise, power comsumption (what if there is a sudden rise in power comsumption in another part of the circuit), etc. have on the randomness of the bitstream? I'd also appreciate any other suggestions or advice you have on RNGs. Thanks in advance.

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Non-bogus reporter seeks sources for story on MS Windows networking/security problems
by Rich Graves 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Free-lance writer and co-author of "Practical UNIX Security" seeks substantive reliable sources, preferably for attribution, on the history of the SMB, C$, and .PWL encryption bugs in both Windows 95 and Windows for Workgroups, but especially on what problems will remain after next week's "Service Pack 1." He might drop the story because of a dearth of sources and promises from Microsoft that everything has already been fixed, and will be distributed to the Netless masses via the SP 1 CD (the contents of which are not public knowledge, but which surely went to manufacturing some time ago...). I don't want to spam his mailbox, but his PGP key is 0x903C9265, with fingerprint 68 06 7B 9A 8C E6 58 3D 6E D8 0E 90 01 C5 DE 01. You might also run into him in person at this week's RSA Data conference in San Francisco. Please reply directly to the reporter with a subject line starting with "MS*" (assuming that's not too maudlin for you) because he gets a lot of mail. He isn't seeking any more mail on unrelated subjects. Stuff funnelled through me, especially from anonymous sources, is properly not considered relibable (though I might appreciate a Cc). Bcc'd to the reporter. - -rich -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMP1D1o3DXUbM57SdAQER4wQAnmmESUU8WW4awrHiBTzSVn8j1cN1gUI/ xxfRHVZ5AQGmQPMRNgr9tJaeN4c+5LsR7CzVxhTlGNTnU5B5cg6w3LvOgXpfhhVW MdNvxB/b8XJBs3XybuTtTnxYC+Qv8Hm1PPt63ULaurFW9c2BPhJk7ZcHo1Ju3X72 e/9VZtmSIBo= =WslA -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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WP: Encryption rules hurt exporters
by Declan B. McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Washington Post January 17, 1996 Study: Encryption Rules Hurt Exporters By Elizabeth Corcoran Washington Post Staff Writer U.S. export restrictions on technology for encrypting information are slowing American companies' success in some foreign countries and retarding the growth of an international market for such technology, according to a new report released by the U.S. Commerce Department. The study is likely to become the latest ammunition in the struggle between the administration and many U.S. high-tech companies and civil liberties advocates over how tightly the United States should control the export of sophisticated data scrambling, or encryption, technology. Both sides are likely to try to use the report to their advantage. U.S. businesses contend that they are losing market share to foreign competitors because they are not allowed to include the most sophisticated encryption technology in their software products. "The day we show lost market share [in the overall market for software] is the day that we start losing the whole ballgame," said Rebecca Gould, director of policy for the Business Software Alliance. The report, which was commissioned in late 1994 by the national security adviser and carried out by the Commerce Department's Bureau of Export Administration and the National Security Agency, aimed to assess the impact of encryption export controls. It assigns no dollar values to any sales lost by U.S. companies, but notes that there are many foreign-made encryption products available overseas. On the other hand, some of those products do not work well, the report says. Still, it cites evidence that U.S firms are not making significant progress in the business of selling encryption technology. In three countries -- Switzerland, Denmark and the United Kingdom -- market share for U.S. encryption products declined during 1994, the report said. Sources in 14 countries said that export controls "limit" U.S. market share, while those in another seven countries said such controls have "either no impact or no major impact." Although the report maintains that sources in "most" countries indicated that U.S. market share is "keeping pace" with overall demand, in many of the countries surveyed, "exportable U.S. encryption products are perceived to be of unsatisfactory quality." Today, a Washington-based policy group supported by a dozen major computer companies plans to release its own commentary on export encryptions, calling for the government to lift its export restrictions.

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RE: underground digital economy
by Kurt Buff (Volt Comp) 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Certainly. There are a couple of ways, but all one needs is some sort of gateway to an e-cash, which is simply e-money without identification. The gateway could take the form of a human intermediary, with either services or physical goods being the medium of exchange, or simply an exchange server which takes a cut off the top, as happens in the street all the time in countries that have currency restrictions. Kurt ---------- From: jim@bilbo.suite.com[SMTP:jim@bilbo.suite.com] Sent: Wednesday, January 17, 1996 14:39 To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Subject: underground digital economy Question: The existing underground economy uses the same money as the aboveground economy (i.e. paper money, for the most part). Could a significant underground digital economy develop if the aboveground digital economy used only identified e-money? Jim_Miller(a)suite.com ____________________________________________________________________ The Internet is a land bridge for memes ____________________________________________________________________

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Win95 Registration Wizard info
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I picked this link up from the Fringewear list. It has some interesting information for quelling rumors and starting new ones. ftp://ftp.ora.com/pub/examples/windows/win95.update/regwiz.html The author takes the registration Wizard in Win95 apart and shows exactly what it does and what it looks for. Some interesting information about the encrypted database of product information it uses. It has a complete list of all of the products that the registration looks for. (PGP is not one of them.) Some interesting facts about what it does look for however... Alan Olsen -- alano(a)teleport.com -- Contract Web Design & Instruction `finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ "Is the operating system half NT or half full?"

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RE: Random Number Generators
by JR＠ROCK.CNB.UAM.ES 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: SMTP%"tcmay(a)got.net" 18-JAN-1996 06:33:11.77 >At 11:40 PM 1/17/96, Kurt Buff (Volt Comp) wrote: >>If you're going to work with hardware to get really random numbers, why not >>go to the back of any of several PC-type magazines, and order the radiation >>detector board that someone is hawking? Can't really do any better than >>that, can you? Counting cosmic ray hits and noting their time differentials > ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ >>should be just what the doctor ordered, right? > >Almost all of the counts in simple radiation detectors are from earthly >sources, not from cosmic rays. For Geiger tube counters (not very common >these days), the main counts are for gamma rays and for beta particles (if > ... stuff deleted ... The main problem I see on these sources is not their ramdomness, which, in some instances may be not so good as one would expect, but their subscep- tibility to tampering. First, randomness: for radiactivity counters, decay is a log function of time. This could be used to reduce keyspace search. Second, radiactivity can be quenched. If you are measuring background levels, then you are exposed to external influences too: to be extreme, one can expect your counter to go mad after an atomic explosion in the neighborhood. This reduces randomness and keyspace. Second, tampering: the atomic bomb explosion is a good example: it is possible to produce an external source of radiactivity and influence your detector. Unless you measure alpha particles from a radioactive source of yours... And even then, you'll have to buy your source... >From whom? Just imagine a spy porting a radiating gun and pointing it to your detector. Also, the technology used is normally electromagnetical. One could think of a method to storm a detector with a em field... thus reducing randomness. The point is: since you don't notice these fields or radiations, you are prone to fall in the trap: one gets used to rely on the technology 'cos it always works, and when the day comes since you don't notice anything unusual you don't suspect anything wrong. Your detector may be overloaded and only outputs zeros for a while and you won't notice anything wrong. >RNGs based on thermal noise and natural radioactivity have been discussed >on our list at least a dozen times (multiple posts each time), so I suggest >further research be done there. > >--Tim May This sounds to me more like the way to go: you need to rely on something of which you have full control. Either a RNG function or something that can not be tampered without you noticing. It would be very difficult to produce big changes in temperature without you noticing... Though still you are left with electromagnetic interferences on the detector. My view is that what is needed is something that a) you can fully control or b) nobody can control/interfere/mimic in any way. In this sense, my point of view is: anything that can be influenced from the outside is not reliable. This means you need something that's totally inside and controlable. It should be fairly random, and not able to be influenced from the outside. And possibly originate its own electrical current which is not dependable on external influences of any type. Specially electrical/radiation influences. It should be easy to monitor and difficult to tamper with temporarily (so that tampering could pass unnoticed). The only thing I can think of is a biological source converting chemical products into random electrical data. Biological sources are very difficult to influence rapidly (other than by death which is irreversible), they can't be switched on/off, their range of values is always bounded to physiological limits (i.e. the only way to "overload" them is by killing them or some other drastical and evident measure), have normally a strong resilience to external influences, and as long as you can keep an eye on them, you can remain sure they are alive and not horribly sick. And finally, if you are the source, then you have the highest availability possible and the fullest control. You could measure the changes in charge induced by a electrical fish as it swims. Or changes in conductivity of some plant/animal tissues. Or have a culture of electrical microorganisms. Or just use your own electroencephalogram with the appropriate corrections to remove waves. There are also some biological processes whose production is intrinsically random. Things like some biochemical cycles, or some muscle movements. It's all a matter of finding the best one(s) according to randomness and ease of measure. And you can always combine several sources. There are even some studies already done about the randomness of different biological processes, their predictability and to which extent they can be influenced. The technology to measure most of them is already well developed and highly reliable. It's all a matter of adapting it to a new use. Just my 2c. jr

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Re: FW: Net Control is Thought Control
by eli+＠GS160.SP.CS.CMU.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In article <+cmu.andrew.internet.cypherpunks+4kz3qSq00UfAM0yv9n(a)andrew.cmu.edu> Mr. Nuri writes: >that 9 of the last 10 flamewars on this list were actually carefully >orchestrated, *manufactured* by a single person interested in making >this point, and teasing people that refused to believe that rampant >dischord can be sown through a barrage of pseudonyms. Enough already. We all know that discussion groups are subject to disruption by flamers, and that anonymity can reduce accountability. What is more interesting is whether the use of pseudonyms adds any new possibilities. >how can you be so sure that the cypherpunks lists is really what you >think it is? a bunch of people from around the country independently >interested in crypto? an agent provacteur, or agent saboteur, could >create a vastly different perception regardless of the input of other >people. Ah, conspiracy theories again. A conspiracy of one does have certain advantages over the old-fashioned approach of gathering several like-minded people. Communication costs are reduced, and the problem of trust is eliminated. On the other hand, a conspiracy of one isn't much good for anything but playing games on the net -- cattle mutilation is really a two-man job, and infiltrating the U.S. Government is right out. Being a good Medusa may be easier than controlling the banking system, but it seems to be quite hard. Your history suggests that stylistic analysis may be used to link nyms. A sufficiently skilled writer might be able to avoid this. An individual known to me was wanking around with pseudonyms (from nyx, I think) on rec.music.industrial in '92-93; he did a decent job of stylistic variation, but was noticed on the basis of the response patterns of his articles (and nailed by nyx usage logs, but that's another matter). There are several Usenet examples of people trying to use inapparent pseudonyms without lasting success. The classic response, of course, is that the real conspiracies are too good to be detected, and/or they off the investigative reporters. This is not falsifiable, but we can compare pseudonym conspiracies to meat ones: the risk is lower, particularly in an regime of unconditionally-secure pseudonyms from which the Medusa can simply walk away. But you don't get real-world power or money. You get to put in a lot of effort for a chance at unduly swaying public opinion on one forum. (And if you screw up, you get a lot of attention -- this may be a major draw for some.) But there are easier and more effective techniques: press releases and paid advertising, for example. Who needs pseudonyms? Side note: >another very interesting effect to measure is the following: if there >is already a lot of mail on a list, people tend to post less. I would say the opposite. -- Eli Brandt eli+(a)cs.cmu.edu

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Re: Crypto anarchist getting through customs
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:13 PM 1/17/96, hallam(a)w3.org wrote: >...only >conspiracy theories we are interested involve the NSA, MI5 or the Stay-Puffed ^^^^^^^^^^^ >Marshmellowman. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ROTFL. Yes. Well. He just seemed so soft and friendly. I figured thinking about *him* couldn't hurt... Cheers, Bob ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "Reality is not optional." --Thomas Sowell The NEW(!) e$ Home Page: http://thumper.vmeng.com/pub/rah/

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Re: new web security product
by Brad Shantz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Perry Metzger wrote: > I don't think its going to fly. No one wants to pay for an unneeded > $100 piece of hardware to encrypt the same credit card over and over > again, when a nearly zero marginal cost piece of software can do the > same thing. I agree with Perry. Hardware encryption does add a layer of security not normally found in software, but it is hardware. Shoot, I don't even have a 28.8 modem yet, why would I want a black box that supposedly does something with my Credit Cards? Brad

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"trust management" vs. "certified identity"
by norm＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This is reminiscent of a recent idea of mine. Imagine the following signed declaration: I (fingerprint = ...) claim that the code X with SH (secure hash) = ... satisfies contract with SH= ... when its free code pointers are bound to other code conforming to contracts identified within X by their SH's. The contracts would be either formal or informal. When a Java program arrives at a client it can warrant its services if it finds local access to warranted sub-routines. (For this purpose behaviors of objects are sub-routines.) The Java loader can build warrants recursively with such declarations. They would, of course, be relative to the reputation of signers of the above declarations. I have just sent for your paper.

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