December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

FYI - telecom bill or not there are still censors
by John Pettitt 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This arrived in my mailbox (I have *not* personally confirmed it) .... According to reports popping up in other places around the Compuserve Information Service it appears that they have taken a stance of Internet censor and are now blocking access to certain Usenet newsgroups. This move took place just before the Christmas holiday and remains unannounced to the membership/subscriber base. Just about any Usenet newsgroup with the word "sex" or "erotica" are no longer available. Attempts to subscribe to these newsgroups produces an error message stating that the newsgroup does not exist. In reality its access has been blocked. A short list (very short) of other newsgroup feeds that are no longer accessible as provided by another party to me include: alt.homosexual alt.magick.sex alt.magick.sex.angst alt.motss.bisexua-l alt.politics.sex alt.recovery.addiction.sexual alt.recovery.sexual-addiction alt.religion.sexuality alt.sex alt.support.disabled.sexuality clari.news.crime.sex clari.news.gays clari.news.sex gay-net.coming-out rec.arts.erotica shamash.gayjews soc.support.youth.gay-lesbian-bi Other newsgroups also remain blocked or eliminated from a provided pick-list and if this is allowed to continue the likelihood of this spreading to other topics that a select group find offensive or intolerable is a very real threat. A number of these newsgroups are legitimate groups for people needing support or recovery or places where frank discussions on adult subjects take place. Some are religious in nature though non-mainstream. Others are associated with the gay lifestyle. As you can see there is a definite trend being set here. So far much of this change in access remains unknown to the vast majority of Compuserve customers who remain away from their terminals for the holidays. If this bothers you I would suggest that you send a message to Compuserve customer services at GO FEEDBACK. Those using autopilot programs send e-mail to Feedback at 70006,101. From outside of Compuserve send e-mail to 70006.101(a)compuserve.com We are supposedly paying a monthly fee which includes =full= Internet service and access. We are no longer getting it. That is misrepresentation. Take this issue to your other favorite forums, newsgroups, etc. If we allow freedom of speech and access to be lost now we will never get it back.

2 1

Some IETF drafts possibly of interest
by Rich Salz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Internet-Drafts are available by anonymous FTP to ds.internic.net in the directory internet-drafts. Other places, too -- don't ask me, tho; for questions, please mail to Internet-Drafts(a)cnri.reston.va.us. The first two seem interesting even if SKIP has no future in IPng. The last is useful because I keep pushing GSSAPI as a standard crypto API. :) Title : Encoding of an Unsigned Diffie-Hellman Public Value Author(s) : A. Aziz, T. Markson, H. Prafullchandra Filename : draft-ietf-ipsec-skip-udh-00.txt Pages : 6 Date : 12/22/1995 It is useful to be able to communicate public keys in the absence of a certificate hierarchy and a signature infrastructure. This document describes a method by which certificates which communicate Diffie-Hellman public values and parameters may be encoded and securely named. Title : Certificate Discovery Protocol Author(s) : A. Aziz, T. Markson, H. Prafullchandra Filename : draft-ietf-ipsec-cdp-00.txt Pages : 13 Date : 12/22/1995 Use of Public key cryptography is becoming widespread on the Internet in such applications as electronic mail and IP Security (IPSEC). Currently, however, a common public key certificate infrastructure does not exist which is interoperable with other systems and ubiquitous. In light of this, we describe a protocol which may be used to exchange or retrieve certificates (essentially signed public keys) with or from another entity. The protocol may be used to request certificates from a directory/name server or from the entity who owns the certificate. Title : The Simple Public-Key GSS-API Mechanism (SPKM) Author(s) : C. Adams Filename : draft-ietf-cat-spkmgss-05.txt Pages : 42 Date : 12/22/1995 This specification defines protocols, procedures, and conventions to be employed by peers implementing the Generic Security Service Application Program Interface (as specified in RFCs 1508 and 1509) when using the Simple Public-Key Mechanism.

2 1

Re: Cybercash security
by jim＠SmallWorks.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The thing I'd like to understand about Cybercash is... how do I get the cash back out of the system?

3 3

Re: IPSEC == end of firewalls
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Bill Frantz writes: >> At least maybe I can avoid Perry's wrath for an off topic post :-). > >Just for reference, the topic of firewalls and whether cryptographic >tools render them obsolete is not off topic for cypherpunks. In fact, >its one of the rare topics that is actually totally proper here... Expressed that way, I must agree. However, I think we also agree that firewalls in general should be elsewhere. Bill

1 0

Re: An IDEA whose time has come (Notes from the RSA Conference)
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:52 AM 1/22/96 -0800, Jonathan Zamick <JonathanZ(a)consensus.com> wrote: > Right now I'm trying to convince Ascom to develop a > crippled version of IDEA to simply give away if anyone wants it for export. > (Like most of the folk here, I don't see a 40 bit key as very valuable, but > it is useful for companies which don't have contacts in Europe.) A crippled version is easy - generate a 128-bit random key, make 88 bits available as salt, leaving 40 hidden bits. The problem is how to make the salt-bits available without interfering with applications and protocols. If you wanted a 64-bit crippled version, most applications need 64 bits of IV anyway, so you could use 64 bits of salt for that, leaving 64 more. To do a 40-bit version, you _could_ use 64 bits of salt and wire down the other 24 bits into a well-known pattern instead of choosing them randomly. That's three characters of ASCII, and I'd suggest "NSA" as the obvious pattern :-) So generate your 128-bit random number, replace the first 24 bits with "NSA", copy the 64 bits into the IV, and use it for your key. #-- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com, Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281 # # "Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty" used to mean us watching # the government, not the other way around....

1 0

Re: Crippled Notes export encryption
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 05:53 PM 1/23/96 -0500, jpb(a)miamisci.org (Joe Block) wrote: >At 9:06 AM 1/23/96, Herb wrote: >>Careful... what would YOU have done, with your customers demanding stronger >>crypto today and you unable to legally give it to them? > >Umm - contract the crypto overseas somewhere it would be legal to export it >from? Then import the code to the USA, with a press release to WSJ & NYT >stating that American programmers were being put out of work by ITAR. The problem is whether you can separate the functionality of what you're exporting sufficiently from what you're contracting out that the exported material isn't a "component of a cryptosystem"; it's tough to do a good bones version of code if you're concerned about satisfying both the letter and spirit of a law to avoid hassles with the government. On the other hand, if you're as big as IBM or even MIT, sometimes you can do it.... #-- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com, Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281 # # "Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty" used to mean us watching # the government, not the other way around....

1 0

Re: Who would sign Lucky Green's key?
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:24 PM 1/23/96 -0800, Lucky Green wrote: >The latest discussion about key signing parties and related questions asked >in private email got me thinking about signing keys for nyms. What would >one have to know to sign a key for a nym? Would you sign my key? Why? There are nym keys i have signed before. They are usually for nyms of friends and they are usually signed with another nym key. Kind of a fictional web of trust... I normally only sign keys for people I have met and trust to be the individual with the key claimed. "True names" and other legal fictions do not interest me as much as the individuals involved. Alan Olsen -- alano(a)teleport.com -- Contract Web Design & Instruction `finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ "Is the operating system half NT or half full?"

1 0

re: [local] Report on Portland Cpunks meeting
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 07:11 PM 1/23/96 -0800, jim bell wrote: >At 04:26 PM 1/23/96 -0800, Alan Olsen wrote: >>Key fingerprints should be brought on paper becuase it is not always assured >>of having a computer there to read the disk. (We had a lap top that was >>refusing to read disks effectivly. We had to use on of the Habit's >>computers.) > >...which, of course, had been infected the night before by a black-bag job >by some NSA operatives with a "fiddle with PGP and make the key signatures >come out wrong" virus... <G!> Well, it was only YOUR key that we were verifying! >Paranoia strikes deep... Into your keyring it creeps... It starts when your always afraid... Step out of line and the orbital mindcontrol lasers will zap you away... Alan Olsen -- alano(a)teleport.com -- Contract Web Design & Instruction `finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ "Is the operating system half NT or half full?"

1 0

Re: [local] Report on Portland Cpunks meeting
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 16:40 1/23/96, Perry E. Metzger wrote: >Each person gets a sheet. Either each person in the room reads their >fingerprint in turn from their own copy, with each person in the room >checking the read fingerprint against the fingerprint on the handout, >or an appointed reader (or set of readers at the last IETF) read the >fingerprints in turn and ask the owner of the key to then simply say >"yes" or "its mine" or whatever to verify that the fingerprint matches >their own copy of the print. How do they verify that the person confirming the fingerprint is indeed the person supposedly owning the key? -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred.

3 2

Re: NY State to restrinct netporn?!
by Deranged Mutant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

You wrote: > I heard about it and want to search NY's gopher site for the bill to get > the exact wording. Did the article give any more specifics, i.e., who > proposed it, the specific name of the bill, etc.? Not much info in the article. It wasn't the central focus... actually, the article dealt with the political cynicism of the new measures. More from the article (all that really mentions the bill at all): The cyberspace bill, passed by the Senate last week, could make it a felony to have sexually explicit communication with a minor through a computer network, especially if the communication included pictures of sexual activity or an invitation to have sex. Which doesn't say much about the bills content. Technically this is already illegal, so why pass a cybespce-specific bill? What are the responsibilities of publishers, ISPs, SysAdmins, etc.? What if a minor pretentds not to be a minor? IMO, It sounds like another meaningless bill that looks good on political mailings... What's the NYS gopher address again? Rob. > At 07:23 AM 1/23/96 +0000, you wrote: > >This in today's LI Newsday, p. A6: > > > >Crime Time in Albany > >Bills Reflect now popular get-tough stance > > > >by Liam Pleven, Albany Bureau > > > > Albany - A bill that would restrict sexually explicit material on > >the Internet - which the Assembly took little notice of last year - > >is suddenly headed tothe governor's desk after winning legislative > >approval yesterday. > >... --- "Mutant" Rob <wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com> Send a blank message with the subject "send pgp-key" (not in quotes) for a copy of my PGP key.

1 0