December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Fred Cohen: Re: CFS and Linux
by Perry E. Metzger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

More Fun from Fred. For those that haven't been following, he threatened to sue me for quoting an Alice post as "Alice B. Cohen", and threatened to have his attorneys seize the machines the cypherpunks mailing lists run on for being part of a "criminal conspiracy" against him. Perry ------- Forwarded Message From: fc(a)all.net (Fred Cohen) Message-Id: <9512231834.AA23326(a)all.net> Subject: Re: CFS and Linux To: perry(a)piermont.com Date: Sat, 23 Dec 1995 13:34:49 -0500 (EST) In-Reply-To: <199512231833.NAA07171(a)jekyll.piermont.com> from "Perry E. Metzger" at Dec 23, 95 01:33:45 pm X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.4 PL22] Content-Type: text X-UIDL: 819744158.001 > Fred Cohen writes: > > The dollar value would be $1 plus a public apology plus all costs of the > > suit plus my time to right the wrong (at my usual fee of course). Of > > course the fact that you have decided to make this posting in public > > justifies my extensive efforts to clear my reputation which, unless you > > apologize immediately will be surprisingly enjoyable for me. > > Go and sue, Fred. Its what I have lawyers for. If you can even find an > attorney willing to take your "case", mine will likely remind yours > that lawyers can now be punished by the court in many jurisdictions > for knowingly aiding in bringing frivolous suits. If you are seeking > $1 in damages the court is especially likely to consider the whole > thing a waste of time. Your choice, but it's not a very nice Christmas present to find yourself in litigation. I'll give you till Tuesday to reconsider. If I see the public apology, I won't call the lawyers. If I were you, I would talk to those lawyers of yours and get their opinion of whether it's worth your while to be malicious toward people in this way in exchange for defending against a law suit when all you have to do to prevent it is apologize for what you now know to be a falsehood. - -> See: Info-Sec Heaven at URL http://all.net/ Management Analytics - 216-686-0090 - PO Box 1480, Hudson, OH 44236 ------- End of Forwarded Message

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Spread-Spectrum computer clock?
by jimbell＠pacifier.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Recently there has been a substantial amount of discussion concerning the use of accurate timing in an attempt to uncover encryption keys, by carefully noting the length of time that a decryption takes in a computer of a known cpu speed. I have noticed that most of the discussion focussed on the delay time of the overall operation done over a network, for example a LAN or perhaps the Internet, but it has been recognized that imprecision due to indeterminate network timings make such a tactic problematic at least. However, being a ham and occasionally listening to the various odd noises produced by a computer when you tune a VHF or UHF ham radio to a harmonic of the clock speed, it ccurred to me that the delay times WITHIN a particular encryption/decryption would be far more easily measured with local RF snooping. I would imagine that if you can determine even a fraction of a bit of key from a network "ping," you could do a lot better "listening" to the execution of a program within a few hundred feet with an ordinary radio receiver and a sophisiticated analysis program. Okay, I admit, this is certainly not a new idea. The military's TEMPEST program is to build electronic equipment which is so "quiet" that it is impossible (or, at least, arbitrarily difficult) to capture useful information by inadvertent radio transmission. Obviously, that is out of the league (not to mention the budget) of the vast majority of the users of personal computers. Nevertheless, it seems to me that if we as a community of computer users are interested in security, we should not merely focus on the mathematics and algorithms used and their reliability, but also secondary methods to break the systems involved. True, most of us are not sufficiently interesting "targets" to justify this kind of attack, but machines such as encrypted remailers are sufficiently "high value" that protecting them would be worth a little extra effort I'm not under any illusion that we can hope to make them "snoop-proof", but a little effort should substantial raise the difficulty level.. More than a year ago, it occurred to me that it might be worth it to build a CPU clock replacement module that took the place of the main CPU crystal oscillator, and replaced it with a oscillator module whose frequency was (very long period!) pseudorandomly varied, possibly with a resolution of 16-bit and over a range of perhaps 1%., with the frequency varying every few tens or hundreds of microseconds. The result, I presume, is that every operation synchronized to the microprocessor clock would vary in time and would be hard to "tune" with a normal radio receiver. It seems to me that this would make the resulting computer harder to "bug" using standard equipment. If this were do-able and were in fact done, it would probably be worth it to "tailor" the spectrum of variation in clock speed so that these variations do not tend to average out over "long" times, for example a few hundred milliseconds or even tens of seconds. This would at least help to disguise the decryption-time information that is commonly discussed. A complicating factor is the fact that modern motherboards often generate their microprocessor clocks using PLL synthesis from a master clock, probably the 14.318 MHz clock. On the one hand, that might make the process easier; only one clock to vary. On the other, it is at least conceivable that there are some devices in any given computer which depend on a precisely constant clock speed, and would not tolerate such variation. This was probably more true in the early days of the IBM PC; today you usually see separate crystals on any cards that need truly specific frequencies. (Hey, I didn't say this was a perfect solution, merely one that would raise the barrier a bit...) Other potential tactics. (Some of which are already happening; if anybody out there is more informed about such techniques, please tell me) 0. Copper-screen cages. Okay, maybe this appears to be a bit too obvious, but it really isn't too involved: A few years ago, I happened onto a roll of honest-to-goodness copper screen; sort of line window screen but made of pure copper. Sewn/soldered into a bag, it would make an excellent cover. (openings required for floppies and CDROMS, as well as cables are obviously a complication, but... 1. Use CPUs with Internal caches as well as external caches, both to reduce the amount of electronic noise transmitted to antenna-length wires outside the microprocessors, as well as make external memory accesses less predictable and less frequent. Fortunately, I suppose, the natural transition to 486's, DX2's and DX4/4s) and Pentiums has make this happen without any anti-snooping motivaition. 2. Eventually, CRT's will be replaced with some sort of matrix-type displays that emit far less useable information and will be easier to shield. 3. Filtering of every wire that comes out of the computer's case, primarily using a combination of ferrite beads and decoupling capacitors. This would be especially true of the telephone line, which would be accessible from outside a house or office. Also, use of multiple powerline filters/surge protectors in series. 4. I'd pay particular attention to the keyboard interface and its associated microcontroller: Years ago, I speculated that if a VFO (voltage to frequency converter) was placed on the data line between the keyboard and the computer, it would transmit the identity of every key pressed. (This would obviously include passwords, too) (Does the keyboard hardware of the typical PC allow echobacks, whcih would allow the CPU to fill the CPU/Keyboard channel with apparently meaningless random garbage, thwarting RF overhearing of this data?!?) And I wouldn't be surprised if the NSA has built replacement keyboard controllers to be used to surreptiously replace on garden-variety keyboards, controllers which deliberately "broadcast" such information in an even easier-to-discern pattern. Even a short access to such a keyboard and it might be telling your secrets. Even if a black-bag job wasn't possible, If it were possible to tune to its normal keyboard microprocessor operation rate, and given a known keyboard scan pattern a particular pressed key could be identified. Given how cheap keyboards are these days, a slightly paranoid person might buy one from a trustworthy source and glue the case shut to prevent tampering, and replace it monthly with cast-offs. 5. While this isn't my area of expertise, it occurs to me that softrware should be written to complete operations in an identical time frame, no matter the input data. While this has already been hashed over on the nets, the "solution" that is typically discussed involves adding a null loop at the end of the real operation, and contining only after the "wall clock" shows enough time has passed. This isn't an adequate solution, I think, if local RFmonitoring of the computer can be done. (It will know when the actual result ended) A better (and, sadly, more inefficient) method would involve executing BOTH branches of conditional jump, and only using the data generated from the desired half at the very end.. Another possibility might be (for certain large mathematical algorithms) is to split up the functions and to execute them in a "random" order, with enough "dummy" operations inserted to further disguise the facts. For example, if you're multiplying two 1024-bit values to get a 2048-bit result, program this to be done in a pseudrandom order and intersperse any operations with pseudorandom operations to disguise it. (A pseudorandom interrupt generator might help, here.) 6. Think like an NSA hack. If I were such a sneaky bastard, I'd try to figure out a way to module a visible LED on the computer's case with data, or modulate the video display's brightness to signal slow-speed data.. Well, that's just a few thoughts. There's a lot more material out there that ought to be discussed. Admittedly, these subjects can appear to be a bit more than a little paranoid, but without such discussion we're almost certain to be at risk.

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Jingling Bells
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

That NY Times upbeat shopping report on gift-horse laundering recalls Judeo-Christo-Muslim-Buddhist-whatever X-marketing of indulgences to complicitously blessed international drug-running bandit-patrons of days gone by. Battling the state for tax-whack is the grand legacy of brawling twix cult and state. Tithe or tax, forgiveness or the noose, adorable mass-murderer, theism or atheism, no exit, you're hoisted. It's a fine compact for building monuments to bedrugged faith of earthly pleasures, temples and capitols, cons spiritual blessing and caressing cons secular for percentages generous. Bedrugged with the rich history and rewarding journalism of such back-scratching by gods of mammons galore, one wonders how many Caribbean rimmers of yet unadvertized international cults are now bulging their laundry sacks cuts of the drugs. To the cults of rome and jerusalem and mecca for swamplords of rickety blow-downs, of scientologists mimcking these venerable predecessors, add the ex-swiss bankers now sweltering in hellish Cayman, the hot-eyed ex-usa's with kids in college, sole-practitioner very hungry beagles, all deeply inhaling the colombian aroma. All offering mother goose refuge from Sam, off-shore, in the cave of shadows, any world of illusory power where you're willing to pay the stiff-arm dues for protective delusion. There's no fee meal like that served by god-mammon's own earthly courtesans and courtiers sweet-and-sour abrading innermost money=immortality fears. CoS's E-meter-cleaner is dead-on for E-cash-drug jingling bells.

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Re: Only accepting e-mail from known parties
by Jeff Hupp 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 25 Dec 95 at 7:45, Dr. Dimitri Vulis wrote: [much on a pgp based gateway filter for email] : : This is much better than nothing. This would stop the e-mail being : sent to everyone who's ever posted to Usenet. I see a couple of attacks: : : 1. Alice only accepts signed e-mail from Bob. Carol receives a signed e-mail : from Bob to Carol, sends 10,000 e-mails to Alice (via sendmail) with From: bob, : same body+signature, possibly varying message-ids and subjects. : : 2. Alice only accepts signed e-mail from Bob. Carol, a rogue sysadmin, : intercepts an e-mail from Bob to Alice, sends 10,000 more copies of it to Alice : (via sendmail) with From: bob, possibly varying message-ids and subjects. : : As I keep pointing out, pgp-signing the body is not enough. : Keep checksums of signitures (or body text) for a week, duplicate messages are routed to /dev/null. -- JHupp(a)gensys.com |For PGP Public Key: http://gensys.com |finger jhupp(a)gensys.com You are lost in a maze of twisty little standards, all different.

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To Youall
by blancw＠accessone.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

^ _:(O):_ <<<<<+>>>>> }}:{{ '^'^'^'^'^' ~~d^~q~V~p~^b~~ ^ |[pg/M\pgvgp/M\gp]| ^ g/M\pgp/M.M\pgp/M.M\pgp/M\p /M/:\M\V/M/:\M\V/M/:\M\V/M/:\M\ ~==|\M/&:&\MVM/&:&\MVM/&:&\MVM/&:&\M/|==~ *{$$$MeRrYxmaS$TocpunKs(a)eVeryWheRE.CoM$$$}* ~==|\/M\:/M\V/M\:/M\V/M\:/M\V/M\:/M\/|==~ '{\O[o%[anDtimMIe&eLDee,to0]&o]O/}' ^/.\:^.^W^.^:^.^W^.^:^.^W^.^:/\.^ {p\qVp^q:p^qVp^q:p^qVp/q} o=o\==o===O===o==/o=o x..X\..X../X..x (dbdb\W/dbdb) )'\\%//'( '***' &:& : .

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Civility
by Tim Philp 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ladies and Gentlemen; As I am sure that most of you have noticed, this is a high volume list. I have just spent the last 20 minutes deleting personal attacks and non-crypto related junk from my mail. Normally, this list is of fairly high quality and I enjoy reading the technical and political discussions that appear here. It must be something in the water but lately the nonsense has reached epic proportions. Now I realize that trying to get an independent bunch of people (as the cypherpunks must be) to conform to a minimum standard of behaviour is like herding cats ( I like that image! <g>) but in the interests of your fellow list members, please take the attacks to private E-mail. This might make the volume of crypto-related material managable to the rest of us. Let the flames begin! ( In private E-mail please!) By the way, seasons greetings to everyone! Tim Philp Brantford, Ontario, Canada =================================== For PGP Public Key, Send E-mail to: pgp-public-keys(a)swissnet.ai.mit.edu In Subject line type: GET PHILP ===================================

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TAX_zip
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

12-24-95. NYPaper: "Money Laundering, New and Improved. To really hide loot, wait for the arrival of 'cybercash.' " The days when you could trust a Swiss banker to hold on to your millions and keep his mouth shut are long gone. Embarrassing disclosure incidents are forcing any money launderer worth his pocket change to go high-tech, using the wonder of home-banking computer programs to zip money across borders. What American authorities fear the most, however, is the rise of "cybercash." "The nightmare of it is that there is no registration of every transaction, the way there is if you use a Visa or Mastercard," said Stanley E. Morris, who heads the financial crimes enforcement network. TAX_zip (7k)

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KID_zoo
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

12-24-95. NYPaper: "Case Involving Free Speech And the Internet Is Settled." A dispute about free speech on the Internet has been settled out of Court here after a local school district admitted that a high school principal had wrongly reprimanded a student for lampooning his school on the World Wide Web. The school district apologized to Mr. Paul Kim for the punitive actions. "We now know our own boundaries," said Ann Oxrieder, the school district's spokeswoman. "The Internet is unexplored territory for schools and we now know that when a student uses his own equipment and on his own time, we should stay out of it." KID_zoo (6k)

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RAT_357
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The NYPaper of 12-23 and 12-24-95 report on the arrest Wednesday and "suicide" yesterday of Thomas Lewis Lavy, who was jailed under anti-terrorism statutes for trying to import from Canada to Alaska 130 grams of the deadly poison ricin -- enough to "kill thousands of people," officials said. Some 40 F.B.I. agents and Army chemical warfare specialists mounted the assault in deadly "survivalist, fundamentalist" Arkansas, right deadly Ollie North's recreational-poison/gun swap fly-in. Lavy's attorney, Sam Heuer, took sharp issue with the government's accusations. "It is such a tragic case," Mr. Heuer said. "An overzealous U.S. Attorney in Alaska and a hot dog F.B.I. agent tried to paint Tom as something he was not. Tom was a very gentle, very kindly person. We have the right to have rat poison or coyote poison, just like we have the right to have a .357 Magnum." RAT_357 (12k)

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FTC Privacy Initiative
by James M. Cobb 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Friend, You may wish to inform yourself about the FTC Privacy Initia- tive: The US Federal Trade Commission has launched a "Privacy Initia- tive" to investigate whether the information collected at web- sites (either that affirmatively submitted by a visitor via a form or information collected based upon a visitor's selection of pages at a site to reflect personal interests) should be the subject of regulation by the FTC. To get background on this effort, you may want to read a speech by FTC Commissioner Varney on Electronic Commerce and Privacy which is available at the FTC's site under speeches http://www.ftc.gov or [at] the Advertising Law Internet Site http;//www.webcom.com/~lewrose/home.html under speeches. This week the staff of the FTC established a mailing list to allow interested parties to discuss the issues surrounding the privacy interests of consumers visiting web sites. To subscribe, send the message subscribe to privacy-request(a)ftc.gov ---- The above is an excerpt from a 12 20 95 message to another list. Cordially, Jim

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