December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

FW: NSA Takes Over Healthcare Reform
by Blanc Weber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Dr. David Chaos <dchaos(a)delphi.com> Newsgroups: comp.org.eff.talk Date: Fri, 3 Jun 94 02:07:20 -0500 June 3, 1994 NSA CLIPPER CHIP FAILS, AGENCY SETS SIGHTS ON HEALTHCARE (ups) After the discovery of a fatal design flaw in the Clipper chip's "crime-busting" LEAF system, NSA has shifted its focus to a "more attainable goal, healthcare reform", said an anonymous government source. "It appears that President Clinton's healthcare reform package will likely result in citizens, who can afford it, leaving the country for private healthcare provided by foreign countries. Based on this, NSA believes they have a clear, jurisdictional mandate to develop healthcare policy." the source further stated. "With NSA's technological superiority, we should have a system in place which will prevent medical subversion within a few months. Even the Bahamians will be powerless to overcome it" said the source. Despite objections from diverse medical organizations, the President supported NSA's position that they are the most qualified to determine healthcare policy. He further justified the agencies assertion that the details of the policy must remain secret to prevent medical malingerers from abusing the system. Secret details of the policy, obtained by confidential informants, indicated that it would be based on the "KneeCapstone" and the "Clapjack" algorithms. An "independant" examination by the renowned doctor and cold-fusion investigator, Dr. Staley Ponz, was recently conducted on the KneeCapstone and Clapjack algorithms. "These algorithms are totally and completely malingerer proof...I really mean it, this time, honest!" said Dr. Ponz from an undisclosed location in South America. Further details on the plan will be forthcoming "real soon now" said government policy advisor, Tyrone Shoelaces. Reprinted, with permission, by, Dr. David Chaos

1 0

No compulsory licensing of patents in USA.
by greg＠ideath.goldenbear.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Perry Metzger writes: > smb(a)research.att.com says: > > Why can't they refuse to license a patent? > I was under the impression that the law obligated you to license > patents -- albeit not necessarily at an attractive price. I am quite > likely to be mistaken on this -- my memory on the topic is very > sketchy, as demonstrated by the fact that I didn't realize the > government can patent things (although I was right on copyrights.) - From "Intellectual Property: Patents, Trademarks, and Copyright in a Nutshell", pp 12-13, Miller & Davis, West Pub., 1990. (not a particularly authoritative cite, but it ought to do) "During the life of the patent, the owner has the complete right to determine who, if anybody, will have the right to use, make, or sell the patented item, 35 USCA (s) 261, and to a more limited extent, how or where it will be initially exploited. It is important to understand that American law does not require the patentee to put the patent into use or allow others to do so. The first requirement, of putting the patent into use, is called 'working' the patent, a requirement with some historical meaning and considerable foreign patent law significance. The second requirement, of allowing others to use the patent, is called 'compulsory licensing.' Like working, there is no absolute American requirement of compulsory licensing, but other aspects of the law, especially antitrust, may have the effect of obliging a patent owner to license others to use the patent." -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.5 iQCVAgUBLe+bQn3YhjZY3fMNAQFMbQP/d6MuZtq87sbJIyZQaG05fMfvd2M0uCNP hL18MTRCMAr+6esg5/QOsSwJ7Xd4XiRPFG3Dhq8U1Itl0zemcKd+5u0pxgAP3Dbu GkNTDfk3x5TQMjzScchdkL7+V/yZ3G00GnH+kJwGdfIckJd/35nocN0KFVAle/28 Zi66/HIz3Sc= =AnQK -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

Black Eye for NSA, NIST, and Denning
by an5877＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- On the one hand, I applaud Dr. Blaze for the discoveries based on his black-box analysis of the NSA product. How fortunate to have him working in a laboratory seeded with this gear. On the other hand, I am amused at the "big deal" being made about such a minor result. This "protocol failure" exposes the NSA product to no new threats. If one's objective is to use SKIPJACK but to defeat key escrow, pre-encryption is easier, conceptually simpler, and may be more secure, depending on what is actually inside the SKIPJACK code. I won't ask why the big deal is being made about all of this -- the agenda surrounding Clipper and friends is clearly a political one, not a technical one, so it is no surprise to hear even the technical voices, i.e., this list, trumpeting Blaze's paper as though it were a dagger in the heart of SKIPJACK. But let's all acknowledge the technical weight and importance of Blaze's result for what it is: minuscule. DEADBEAT <na5877(a)anon.penet.fi> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.4 iQBFAgUBLe9KWPFZTpBW/B35AQEbdwGAmBpl2lBCtLkPN4QBruEEKsstCWWpIEGm KMBK2YlxL5V9fnHRDn3RlRJT6Ji++7yd =gIHN -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)anon.penet.fi. Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized, and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)anon.penet.fi.

3 2

Re: Black Eye for NSA, NIST, and Denning
by thad＠pdi.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Subject: Re: Black Eye for NSA, NIST, and Denning DEADBEAT sez >> I won't ask why the big deal is being made about all of this -- the >> agenda surrounding Clipper and friends is clearly a political one, not >> a technical one, so it is no surprise to hear even the technical voices, >> i.e., this list, trumpeting Blaze's paper as though it were a dagger in >> the heart of SKIPJACK. But let's all acknowledge the technical weight >> and importance of Blaze's result for what it is: minuscule. > The importance is that the current justification for Clipper is 1. The benevolent government wanted us to have very good encryption so they gave us SKIPJACK, but 2. They didn't want to hurt themselves by giving away something that they couldn't crack. The Clipper apologists have retreated from the "we are going to use this to catch criminals" posture to "let's give the citizens good encryption that doesn't hurt us". PGP et al was a devastating answer to the first position, so that is why they abandoned it. Blaze's result destroys the current justification, they are giving us good encryption that they can't break. There is then no reason to push Clipper, unless it is fixed, of course. thad Thad Beier Pacific Data Images 408)745-6755 thad(a)pdi.com

1 0

Re: Black Eye for NSA, NIST, and Denning
by sidney＠taurus.apple.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

DEADBEAT <na5877(a)anon.penet.fi> says: >If one's objective is to use SKIPJACK but to defeat key >escrow, pre-encryption is easier, conceptually simpler, and may be more >secure Right now, you need to arrange things with another party if you are going to have secure communication. If Clipper catches on the way the government wants, you may be able to assume that someone you want to contact has an encryption device compatible with yours. If Blaze's hack can be used by the initiator of a communication to defeat key escrow without the cooperation or knowledge of the other person, then Clipper will have made it more difficult for law inforcement, since then criminals and other people with privacy concerns will be able to have secure communication with people who are not part of their pre-arranged secure communications system. That, the defeat of traffic analysis, and the avoidance of the attention one could draw by using non-LEAFed encrypted traffic, are the advantages of Blaze's result. -- sidney <sidney(a)taurus.apple.com>

1 0

A black eye for whom?
by paul＠hawksbill.sprintmrn.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- On Fri, 3 Jun 1994 21:48:53 UTC an5877(a)anon.penet.fi (deadbeat) wrote - > I won't ask why the big deal is being made about all of this -- the > agenda surrounding Clipper and friends is clearly a political one, not > a technical one, so it is no surprise to hear even the technical voices, > i.e., this list, trumpeting Blaze's paper as though it were a dagger in > the heart of SKIPJACK. But let's all acknowledge the technical weight > and importance of Blaze's result for what it is: minuscule. Bullshit. _Any_ pitfall in key escrow system or the Clipper technology itself is far from "miniscule." _______________________________________________________________________________ Paul Ferguson US Sprint Enterprise Internet Engineering tel: 703.904.2437 Herndon, Virginia USA internet: paul(a)hawk.sprintmrn.com -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAgUBLe+x15RLcZSdHMBNAQFgCAQAs6HdAdxs6wVnv2ScKd5cR9jVdz+rVyNn gceOqi/BaOq8utu2lIPvO74qvMufCTycVBrSBPzFIZzfdzGKcwhmKIikpHMCy3f3 II1iM++P6+3HLzVGJUrTca7qMVS8H6fyPda7IufmYDOjqy8KEFfwwkoCXrnTBNY0 VHPYg2HYd3Y= =yI2v -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6 mQCNAiuk0/8AAAEEALqlLc+x9lmgiJCRSpu/aPhQdi0hMjwiGlN2B/GJQqgZPhTb pR+u5/blGogqT+WwcXZ2XfEdIV19FrJY4BXGGn4+4TjdVN3XuuCHuueoygBAmOQD IloU6SJuDqJa0kFA5X/i/1ELn86I5+8A4Hx88FiYJIVUBR6SApRLcZSdHMBNAAUR tCdQYXVsIEZlcmd1c29uIDxwYXVsQGhhd2suc3ByaW50bXJuLmNvbT60JVBhdWwg RmVyZ3Vzb24gPGZlcmd1c29uQGljbTEuaWNwLm5ldD4= =rtcO -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

1 0

Rperkins remailer
by rperkins＠amtsgi.bc.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Just a note to let you know that the rperkins remailer is back in business. This is available via: rperkins(a)nyx.cs.du.edu rperkins(a)nox.cs.du.edu rperkins(a)nyx10.cs.du.edu Sorry it was down for so long, but I lost net connections for a while. I'm still not back on the list, but for those who don't know me, I used to be known as ub075(a)freenet.victoria.bc.ca. Have fun.

1 0

Black eyes heal
by baum＠newton.apple.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Its important to realize what was really gained by this revelation- - some PR value - several months before fixed Clipper/Tessara chips become available I have no doubts that the problem that was revealed will be corrected. I'm not sure it was a good idea to reveal the weakness. Imagine how much worse it would be (in terms of PR) if lots of phones had been deployed before the flaw was found? On the other hand, it's possible the weakness was known and would have been (is being) corrected quietly. So, there is a small window in which to take advantage of the PR, and the delay in revised chip availablility. Unless there are some major defections in Congressional support because of this, I don't think much will change; Clipper will become a reality. A competing product could devastate it- yes, government subsidies & requirements might form the nucleus of support, but having to deal with NSA restrictions and sole sourcing of the chip makes it a real, expensive pain to turn it into a product. I don't think the revision will be completely trivial, either. The way these chips are built means a much more extensive verification process must be used- not just reburning a PROM. A standard micro and a standard encryption chip on the side (don't have the references here, but at HotChips there will be a paper on a 100kbit/sec Single Chip Modular Exponentiation Processor from Holger Orup of Aarhus Univ. Denmark) could make a viable, competing product. Note that I'm not volunteering or suggesting that one of you should go out and implement my great idea- just making predictions. ************************************************** * Allen J. Baum tel. (408)974-3385 * * Apple Computer, MS/305-3B * * 1 Infinite Loop * * Cupertino, CA 95014 baum(a)apple.com * **************************************************

3 2

RE:LEAF forgery
by VACCINIA＠UNCVX1.OIT.UNC.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Perry responding to one of the points I made Said: >VACCINIA(a)uncvx1.oit.unc.edu says: >> How true, yet the NSA also had a lot to lose by putting out a flawed >> backdoor in Skipjack which essentially negates much of this features (LEAF) >> value. They did so none the less. >All the evidence is that it was an accident. You contend, without >evidence or even a rational reason, that they did it intentionally. I do not contend this, I contend they were negligent in checking their work. That they were lax in their standards and that this lackadaisical attitude bespeakes arrogance. An arrogance that would allow them to think that they COULD put in a trapdoor (besides the LEAF) in Skipjack and easily get away with it. >I'm not a conspiracy theorist. I operate on evidence and the >assumption that people behave in their self interest. NSA had nothing >to gain by sabotaging their own efforts in this manner. Even if they >had another back door it is worth their while to make the public back >door as good as possible. The notion that they would have done it >badly intentionally for no reason when doing it well would be easy is >at the very least without evidence or even rational suspicion. > >What would they possibly have to gain via such an act? It would be in the NSA's self interest to have there own little door into Skipjack, wouldn't you say? Especially when the agency is quite satisfied that no one knows their algorithm. I don't see the evidence you are operating on, but will grant you the self interest part I mentioned above. >> In addition, it is possible that the agency is not alarmed about their LEAF >> problems because they don't need to use it. >They may be able redesign the system before widespread deployment. >Its also in their interest to play mistakes down. How do YOU know they >aren't really embarassed? Well, they did say so. But, I did agree with the play down mistakes position in the last post. Vaccinia(a)uncvx1.oit.unc.edu -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLe/ZTT2paOMjHHAhAQHOCgP+MPt5QxnQF/2rbPpFWZi8t6iTb+6x45OF sHoC7nZ/yLBjMpn8SdR4Jzf36m2yndQcVVBPAVkfMOAJ0V+mAZcrCqH+jrZWuX55 4Z1/A3fkuFmIp3/7irGnQENQ4PBcWZb7gSihPk4Ytc4EjTKdIDc9U6T5xtx+FbT2 /+7D259kgLE= =WPJQ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

2 1

Re: Pedophiles in Cyberspace
by peb＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I agree with Perry's assessment, and would like to summarize the conclusion of the article since it is about the blurring of national boundaries and lack of control by authority: It is expressed that pedophiles who can communicate with like-minded people anywhere in the world (where laws against it do not exist) will get the impression that they are normal, okay people who live under an unjust state. Additionally, it is mentioned that unsupervised (i.e., no psychiatrist present) discussion between pedophiles will also reinforce their predilections. Unfortunately, the article does not mention how the blurring of national boundaries and uncontrolled (polically incorrect, etc.) conversations would also be beneficial. Perhaps the real upshot of the article is "May you live in interesting times". Paul E. Baclace peb(a)netcom.com

2 1