December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Scienter and all that stuff
by chen＠intuit.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> In article <9409201859.AA00254(a)doom.intuit.com>, > Mark Chen <chen(a)intuit.com> wrote: > >> The facts and the law only matter when the government doesn't have > >> a hard on for you. If the government wants to get you [and, perhaps, > >> if you're not a millionaire "sports figure"] it will get you. The > >> crime bill just makes the task a bit easier. > > > >This is quite accurate. Howard Zinn makes the same point in > >_Declarations of Independence_. > > Where does Steve Jackson fit into this theory? > > I don't think it's nearly as black & white as you suggest: Our systems > are not monolithic and some consitutional and democratic principles do > still have some sway. Noam Chomsky discusses this when he talks about > reasons for optimism. > > Which is not to belittle the orginal point that we have reason to be > paranoid: it's just to say that we don't have total justification for > despair, either. Yes, it's often easy to identify a single piece of the overall dynamic and use it to account for everything that happens. I'm only saying that legal guarantees are not necessarily the last word about what the government can and can't do to you. Chomsky's optimism (as you know) doesn't stem so much from a faith that our legal system will one day start working properly, as from a faith that people are capable of evolving - an outlook that you and I seem to share, but that many on this list don't. - Mark - -- Mark Chen chen(a)netcom.com 415/329-6913 finger for PGP public key D4 99 54 2A 98 B1 48 0C CF 95 A5 B0 6E E0 1E 1D

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Re: Virtual assasins and lethal rema
by doug＠OpenMind.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

TJHARDIN(a)delphi.com writes: >Adam is absolutely right.... Even if a killer is so anonymous that she can't >be linked to a given crime by the employer who will talk 99.9% of the time >any pressure is applied, she must still continue to accept various >contracts. >The police would then set up one of their stings & "hire" her anonymously >for another job & snatch the killer up when she attempts to fullfill this >contract. Likewise, the very first offer of employment may well be of this >sort. Once again (and hopefully for the last time!), I reiterate that it is the person *placing* the contract who is at zero risk (except for the risk of losing their digital cash). Stings can be set up to catch the killer, but providing the person doing the hiring trusts no one but himself, there is no risk to him. To the extent that there is *any* risk to this person, the goals of crypto anarchy have not been met. This pertains to every conceivable security leak that might affect the person placing the contract. Doug ___________________________________________________________________ Doug Cutrell General Partner doug(a)OpenMind.com Open Mind, Santa Cruz ===================================================================

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HTTP authentication efforts
by paul＠hawksbill.sprintmrn.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Howdy guys 'n gals. As much as I'd love to rant about Detweiler getting an account on Colorado Supernet, I must put aside my insidious remarks for the time being. Does anyone know, on the off-chance, who is currently working on HTTP authentication processes for web browsing and Mosiac? Pointers appreciated. _______________________________________________________________________________ Paul Ferguson US Sprint Managed Network Engineering tel: 703.904.2437 Herndon, Virginia USA internet: paul(a)hawk.sprintmrn.com

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Reserved DC-Net IP addresses - NOT!
by rishab＠dxm.ernet.in 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

hughes(a)ah.com (Eric Hughes): > Speaking of long-term integration on the internet, might it not be a > good idea to get some IP address range assigned for dc-net use? I don't agree. Apart from the IP address crunch that already poses a problem for the IETF, I don't see why DC-Nets should be limited to specially allocated addresses. DC-Nets should be implemented a layer over protocols such as IP, or as extensions to them. It should be possible for _anyone_, regardless of IP address (officially allocated DC-Net number) to connect with _any_ others on a DCN, with some software or other interfacing. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Rishab Aiyer Ghosh "Clean the air! clean the sky! wash the wind! rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in take stone from stone and wash them..." Voice/Fax/Data +91 11 6853410 Voicemail +91 11 3760335 H 34C Saket, New Delhi 110017, INDIA

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Re: Scienter and all that stuff
by chen＠intuit.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

James Donald writes; > L. Todd Masco writes > > I don't think it's nearly as black & white as you suggest: Our systems > > are not monolithic and some consitutional and democratic principles do > > still have some sway. Noam Chomsky discusses this when he talks about > > reasons for optimism. > > Of course Noam Chomsky is optimistic - he favors limitless and absolute > state power and the forcible and violent silencing of all those who > deviate from political correctness. > > If I was campaigning to make a the US a totalitarian terrorist > state, I would be full of optimism. Before this gets out of hand (which it certainly will), I very gently suggest that you read something which Chomsky has written before favoring us all with your opinions. -- Mark Chen chen(a)netcom.com 415/329-6913 finger for PGP public key D4 99 54 2A 98 B1 48 0C CF 95 A5 B0 6E E0 1E 1D

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Re: On the crime bill and remailers
by Alex Strasheim 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hal said: > I strongly disagree with this. Anonymous remailers as presently > constructed will be almost completely ineffective against any significant > government attempts to surveil email traffic. The government does have > the resources today to defeat most uses of remailers. Since present-day > remailers lack padding features, the correspondence between incoming and > outgoing messages, even with encryption, is relatively easy to establish. > This is made worse by the lack of general support for reordering, which > renders the task almost trivial. Although it does seem that the government ought to be able to track remailer traffic, is there any evidence that they are actually doing it in the real world? I've seen posts on usenet which would have presumably provoked a reaction from police, but I can't remember hearing of any cases in which such surveilance occured. == Alex Strasheim alex(a)omaha.com -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.1 iQCVAwUBLn9tpREpP7+baaPtAQHrewQAvJW8zUIQb57XwHHsdGC7gJo9UyFfds4o hu1vTUEsZvzyYJL7BIVgDEnHowVZ6vWyKky2QW+CiYli6Ulo8zFN5zoeWS09vLx2 /pANQPxXC+o61C1rypiR85D/esJ7a7ZRJu8OI5sa98+eLmDDad/j/768OMmFwR8c iI8ZnV2PCbQ= =DwQt -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Scienter and all that stuff
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Responding to msg by jamesd(a)netcom.com (James A. Donald) on Tue, 20 Sep 3:22 PM > >Of course Noam Chomsky is optimistic - he favors >limitless and absolute state power and the forcible >and violent silencing of all those who deviate from >political correctness. > >If I was campaigning to make a the US a totalitarian >terrorist state, I would be full of optimism. I respectfully suggest that that's not what Chomsky advocates. He makes superior detailed analysis and criticism of authoritarian government by brilliantly attacking weak-willed ideologues of all political persuasions which hide under skirts of tyrants. On the contrary, his optimism, it seems to me, derives from his own hard work and original thinking not from parroting any party line. With this he is in the company of original thinkers like Karl Hess, Murrary Bookchin and others who have garnered the courage to grow beyond the simple faith of left-right comforts and conceits. Their writings have a generosity of scope and purpose that exemplify how to assess specific problems and to prescribe remedies, and thereby perhaps help us break free of the mesmerizing, melodramatic defecations of partisan politics. Or so I optimistically muse. John

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Re: On the crime bill and remailers
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: greg(a)ideath.goldenbear.com (Greg Broiles) > In general, scienter/mens rea requirements mean that you must have intended > a particular action (or failure to act) - the question is about your > understanding of the facts of a particular situation, not the legal status > of a particular situation. Given your example, it's illegal to drive > across the border, knowing your pickup contains ammunition - whether or > not you believe your actions are legal. It's not illegal to drive across > the border with a box full of ammunition if you thought you were carrying > a box full of clothes. > > The old saw "ignorance of the law is no excuse" is basically accurate. > Good-faith reliance on legal advice from competent counsel won't even > save you. (but it might get you a malpractice judgement/settlement). I don't know how true this is in general, but my research into the arms export question indicated otherwise. Here is part of a posting I sent to CP some time last year concerning a case in which the defendant did in fact drive to Mexico with a truck load of ammunition: > In U.S. v Lizarraga-Lizarraga, the appellate court wrote (in 541 F2d 826), > > "At trial and on appeal, the defendant admits that he purchased the > ammunition and that he intended to export it to Mexico. His defense is > bsed on the contention that he had no knowledge that his conduct violated > the law. Hence, the appellant claims that to be found guilty under > 22 U.S.C. 1934 [the predecessor to 22 U.S.C. 2778], the government must > prove that he intended to violate the statute.... We agree, and hold > that he was entitled to a specific intent instruction. Accordingly, we > reverse his conviction and remand for a new trial." > > The court discusses several reasons for concluding that "willfully" > implies a need to show specific intent, among them that the articles on > the Munitions List are not obviously illegal to export, finally concluding: > > "Accordingly, we hold that in order for a defendant to be found guilty of > exporting under 22 U.S.C. 1934, the government must prove that the > defendant voluntarily and intentionally violated a known legal duty not > to export the proscribed articles, and the jury should be so instructed." Perhaps the arms export laws are worded differently than some others and so the more stringent rules apply. Hal

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SHAMELESS PLUG
by Sandy Sandfort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C'punks, Mark Chen wrote the follow about the scienter thread: ... Howard Zinn makes the same point in _Declarations of Independence_.... he concludes that law is made not by legislators and judges, but by the policman's club. But less and less every day. As Duncan and I--the official "Pollyannas of Privacy"--have been telling you, technology is on our side. As it advances, technology continues to shift the balance of power from the State to the individual. For my vision of technology in the service of civil liberties, see my upcoming article, "Support Your Digital Police," in the "Idees Fortes" section of December's Wired. S a n d y ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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Re: SHAMELESS PLUG
by chen＠intuit.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sandy Sandfort writes: > Mark Chen wrote the follow about the scienter thread: > > ... Howard Zinn makes the same point in _Declarations of > Independence_.... he concludes that law is made not by > legislators and judges, but by the policman's club. > > But less and less every day. As Duncan and I--the official > "Pollyannas of Privacy"--have been telling you, technology is > on our side. As it advances, technology continues to shift the > balance of power from the State to the individual. Which is why, even with their exceedingly feeble perception of what these technologies portend, authoritarian structures are thrown into fits of nearly hysterical apoplexy when confronted by Things Crypto. > For my vision of technology in the service of civil liberties, > see my upcoming article, "Support Your Digital Police," in the > "Idees Fortes" section of December's Wired. I'm there. - Mark - -- Mark Chen chen(a)netcom.com 415/329-6913 finger for PGP public key D4 99 54 2A 98 B1 48 0C CF 95 A5 B0 6E E0 1E 1D

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