December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

RE: DNA
by Pat Farrell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In message Mon, 13 Jun 1994 18:54:10 +0200 (METDST), Mats Bergstrom <matsb(a)sos.sll.se> writes: > Databases of fingerprints and retina-images might still have a future > for specialized applications but DNA-typing (why not on a simple blood > sample at birth) combined with a fixed social security number valid for > life will probably become a widely used method for governments to control > the identity of their serfs. > [good stuff elided] > > Unfortunately there is no known method of encrypting one's DNA code > in situ but hopefully they will safely (in escrow?) encrypt it in > the databanks. This issue came up at the CFP-2 conference (Computers Freedom and Privacy, March 92 edition). There were speakers there claiming that the audience, when getting up from their chairs, would leave sufficient hair, skin flakes, sweat, etc. behind that DNA mapping would be easy. Of course, this mapping would be without the "suspect" having any knowledge of when the map material was gathered. I don't know if this was factual then, but no one rose up to claim that the speaker was in error, and there were lots of folks in the audience that could have challenged it. None did. This speach was a major motivation in my interest in these topics. That, and a chance to listen to Bruce Stirling, DED, and Jim Bidzos... Pat Pat Farrell Grad Student pfarrell(a)cs.gmu.edu Department of Computer Science George Mason University, Fairfax, VA Public key availble via finger #include <standard.disclaimer>

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Matt Blazes paper
by fhalper＠pilot.njin.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Can anyone tell me where the apaper Matt Blaze wrote on Tessera can be found? preferably in a non postscript form. Thanks, Reuben Halper

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Re: Anon posts (was irrit
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com B >Sternlight wars on Usenet. Ironic that a group calling themselves B >"punks" should be civilized, intelligent, scholarly, altruistic, and B >basic good 'net citizens, while sci.crypt is often little more than a B >bunch of people playing "did so!" games. And the PGP group! B > B >>--Tim May USENET vs mailing list. DCF --- WinQwk 2.0b#1165

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Sunday NY Times anti-Clipper, FBI bill editorial
by sidney＠taurus.apple.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Here's a brief quote from a NewsBytes copyrighted article. You can surmise the rest, or go get a copy of last Sunday's NY Times. There are no new arguments in the Times editorial, but the fact that they wrote it is what's interesting: WASHINGTON, D.C., U.S.A., 1994 JUN 13 (NB) -- In a Sunday editorial, the influential New York Times has criticized both the Clinton administration's Clipper encryption scheme and the digital telephony legislation backed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). -- sidney markowitz <sidney(a)taurus.apple.com>

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Re: DNA
by smb＠research.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In my country we are all issued a unique software agent at birth i the format: YYMMDDxxxy where y is a check for authenticity (to make it harder faking a number I guess) No. The purpose of check digits like that is to detect innocent errors in data entry.

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Was the list"wiped" Sunday afternoon
by Syl Miniter 803-768-3759 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I saw a note and havent received any e-mail today

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Re: DNA
by VACCINIA＠UNCVX1.OIT.UNC.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Along the lines of Big Brother and your genomic heritage: No, the few cells left on your chair are not enough to provide a genomic map. Hair does, indeed, contain cells capable of being analyzed, in the follicles. PCR (polymerase chain reaction) is capable of analyzing a variety of genetic polymorphisms (genes that vary among the general population) from only a single cell. Thus you could be typed in a limited fashion and identified but not mapped. Small comfort, however, and PCR is becoming easier every day. For escaping DNA typing tests, I suggest carrying along some HeLa cell DNA (that will really screw up the test ;->. Scott G. Morham !The First, VACCINIA(a)uncvx1.oit.unc.edu! Second PGP Public Keys by Request ! and Third Levels ! of Information Storage and Retrieval !DNA, ! Biological Neural Nets, ! Cyberspace -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAgUBLfvO9j2paOMjHHAhAQElBAQA2Q+NCsYT/RxcFzIaDyWh6jRpP1672BZW MvmRccSGKUyhIz54mC19cAaS6LuB1CxyMd2L52hn3eFwaxGbg1J/G3hIrJyCJ+Da ocJGG0cmdnl1Pg7coA3vT3IWDvv58/UHeZeKYgCEbckIQEGCmvKqqMdHd6yxz+K3 TYH75tQW6bU= =HWaa -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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As I delurk, a question... (Clipper)
by roy＠sendai.cybrspc.mn.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- The thought occurs... the NSA doesn't seem particularly distressed that Clipper's LEAF can be spoofed and rendered unusable. Could this indicate that the LEAF isn't really necessary to retrieve the session key after all? - -- Roy M. Silvernail -- roy(a)sendai.cybrspc.mn.org will do just fine, thanks. "Does that not fit in with your plans?" -- Mr Wiggen, of Ironside and Malone (Monty Python) PGP 2.3a public key available upon request (send yours) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3c iQCVAgUBLf0dkRvikii9febJAQFEGQP+JUs/Z67WyE2Xgd6dwwcarHrGUqN7Gl5l IlypdV2dX1McvuREj4WT6w13ljwe8kstLanyZxc2vHxiiEx+49D/wXG985pVNKRr ylJVWYremrtPz4/p4Ibcdy/9Cvh7V0GYtIIVCDzTCsaF8LVXzWQeqlcEiwG5G57D sC/4Ylwhp/U= =b7h/ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Current Remailers
by VACCINIA＠UNCVX1.OIT.UNC.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- After testing several remailers this weekend, three have given no reply. remail(a)c2.org (does this remailer support Request-Remailing-To:?) has not gotten back to me, nor has catalyst(a)netcom.com or remailer(a)rebma.mn.org. anon(a)cyberspace.org mailed me back from its mail daemon to tell me no such account, as did nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu. The following worked: remailer(a)ds1.wu-wien.ac.at very fast remailer(a)chaos.bsu.edu very fast rperkins(a)nyx.cs.du.edu very fast hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu very fast hfinney(a)shell.portal.com very fast remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com took a couple of hrs. ghio(a)kaiwan.com very fast remail(a)vox.hacktic.nl took overnight but it's not in this country :-) Does anyone know if catalyst and rebma are still on line? Scott G. Morham !The First, VACCINIA(a)uncvx1.oit.unc.edu! Second PGP Public Keys by Request ! and Third Levels ! of Information Storage and Retrieval !DNA, ! Biological Neural Nets, ! Cyberspace -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAgUBLfvT4z2paOMjHHAhAQEwiQQA1o9hj0Ip/pWYRcOnveS54Qigfx/cuSKb uLJNW/8qvBCvmWvBabnL8Y3612HCkhyqajgiziQa4cglB/ALALyIZYkJH23xNwfp dv/o/Cn22RQvcFITRxPaMCcjZJUdJZGpDdP11vP1UboNdQHPMIFN54Nq/5XdFFgL 6AE3/hkjG+E= =UBu2 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: As I delurk, a question... (Clipper)
by sidney＠taurus.apple.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>NSA doesn't seem particularly distressed that >Clipper's LEAF can be spoofed and rendered unusable. Could this >indicate that the LEAF isn't really necessary to retrieve the session >key after all? Not necessarily. First of all, why would the NSA let it be known if they are distressed? I'm amazed that they have started talking to the public at all! Secondly, what do they hope to achieve with this whole Clipper thing? Given that they are aware that strong crypto exists and is publicly available around the world, what can they gain by pushing Clipper? Is it some type of political influence in the U.S. that they'll get by winning this round, or do they want the ability to spy on ordinary civilian and U.S. government activity, or what? Whatever it is, if it isn't hurt by people having PGP available, it isn't hurt by the small number of people who would spoof LEAFs. As I read the official pronouncements of representatives of the U.S. government and especially the NSA, I can't figure out what they do hope to achieve. Can anyone else on this list make sense of it? -- sidney markowitz <sidney(a)taurus.apple.com>

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