December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: GAK Hacks
by aba＠dcs.exeter.ac.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim May <tcmay(a)got.net> writes on cpunks: > We did it for SSL, let's do it for GAK. > > Demonstrate that superencryption (encrypting within a GAK wrapper) defeats > GAK. And other kinds of hacks, including releasing "damaged" (inoperative) > versions of the proposed code (when it becomes available). I was just drooling over the fun to be had if and when this crap goes through. Surely a very fun thing to do. A new legit hobby for all those games crackers out there. (Hmm maybe not so legit, micro$oft has non- reverse engineering clauses on their stuff, but that doesn't stop anyone, and there's always remailers). One of their requirements was resistance to static patches, as someone else pointed out that is just not possible in software, if some gets really bored they can at worst disassemble the entire thing, and re-write it from scratch without any silly GAK stuff, or with a row of 00s where the escrowed key goes. > Or releasing "work-alikes." Etc. > > Granted, the demonstrations will be less clear than breaking the 40-bit key > was, partly because there is no clear-cut standard out there, and many > aspects of GAK are still in flux. > > But it could still be a powerful example, an example "by direct > demonstration," that government-mandated key escrow is problematic. > > (Of course, a sufficiently powerful or clear demonstration, picked up by > the popular press the way the SSL challenge was, could also cause the > government to tighten up the rules on GAK, such > as--speculatively!!!!--adding "compliance audits" to the GAK laws.) So the question is what do you prefer: 40 bits only or 64 bits which can be broken? Is it worth sabotaging what is essentially an impossible task open to having the GAK element hacked out? It would be much more fun if they'd agree to no limits on key sizes, and GAK. What happens if the result of the talks which Pat Farrell kindly described is that it is impossible? What is their next move? We've had "voluntary" hard-ware key-escrow, and it got chucked out by widespread derision of the idea, now the same in software. Which direction does the next phased attack come from? > But GAK Hacking could be an interesting project. indeed. Adam

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Novadigm patents diff(1) and rdist(1).
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Resent-Date: Thu, 28 Aug 1997 09:06:38 -0400 X-Authentication-Warning: qnx.com: localhost [127.0.0.1] didn't use HELO protocol To: 0xdeadbeef(a)substance.abuse.blackdown.org Subject: Novadigm patents diff(1) and rdist(1). Date: Thu, 28 Aug 1997 09:02:11 -0400 From: glen mccready <glen(a)qnx.com> Resent-From: 0xdeadbeef(a)substance.abuse.blackdown.org X-Mailing-List: <0xdeadbeef(a)substance.abuse.blackdown.org> archive/latest/2159 X-Loop: 0xdeadbeef(a)substance.abuse.blackdown.org Precedence: list Resent-Sender: 0xdeadbeef-request(a)substance.abuse.blackdown.org Forwarded-by: Nev Dull <nev(a)bostic.com> Forwarded-by: Sean Eric Fagan <sef(a)Kithrup.COM> Novadigm sues Marimba and threatens W3C. http://www.novadigm.com/aB5.htm About The Patent Novadigm's Patent (Number 5,581,764) "Distributed Computer Network Including Hierarchical Resource Information Structure and Related Method of Distributing Resources" describes the processes needed to generate from a common reference model a unique content configuration for each target end user, and to "difference" the "desired state" configuration with the actual-state of the target, yielding highly granular and very specific updates to distributed content automatically. The patent covers two central areas: Desired state configuration-processes which incorporate essential elements of both "push" and "pull" distribution models. By generating from common reference model a unique user configuration which describes the specific software or content a target user should have, producers can automatically 'push' content to specific servers, desktops, or users; or groups of users. In addition, the 'pull' process provides a means for users to control when the flow of information takes place, what information is delivered, and where it is stored. Fractional Differencing-processes for comparing and contrasting the desired state configuration identifying what components a target should have with the resources it actually has, resulting in a concise and highly detailed difference configuration describing what components are needed-or should by removed-to ensure the targeted user is properly configured with a minimum of network traffic. --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/

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Re: Notes from NIS&T Key Escrow Export conference.
by pfarrell＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>"If keys are escrowed, what purpose does a 64 bit limit serve?" This question was asked, it seems like a zillion times, but probably no more than four or five times. It is a bit of a belt and suspenders idea. But it also shows how scared they are about real encryption. It is clear that this meeting is a shame. Everyone in industry says it won't be marketable. The Govies say it will be great. What they really want is to force weak crypto on the US by forcing the vendors to make a weak product "for export" when all the vendors say that they have to have _only one_ version. If they have one version, and it is weak, we are safe from drug dealers, pedophiles and terrorists. (BTW, I'm used that phrase yesterday, so it should be in the Federal register's offical record.) >Secondarily, I observe that this apparently precludes the use of OTP. No, they don't care about the cipher, only the key length, But with a 64bit, GAK'd key, you can't say much without repeating the P, and that makes it a TTP or a FTP (two time pad, or four time pad) which isn't very useful. You probably can gzip "attack at dawn" to 64 bits, but not much more. Pat Pat Farrell grad student http://www.isse.gmu.edu/students/pfarrellA Infor. Systems and Software Engineering, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA PGP key available via finger or request #include standard.disclaimer Z~v :$

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Re: GAK
by cman＠communities.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

One good (non-cypherpunk) argument against GAK is that it concentrates a very large quantity of valuable keys in a few places, where they become an extremely attractive target for government or corporate espionage. You could compare this to the function served by banks, but banks tend to notice fairly quickly when money is missing. Compromising keys doesn't involve removing anything, or throw the books out of balance; they just get copied. The compromise is only revealed if they are used clumsily. Note that a few million keys would fit very easily on even a low-end DAT tape (easily hidden in a pack of cigarettes).

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Re: Notes from NIS&T Key Escrow Export conference.
by Peter Trei 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> >"If keys are escrowed, what purpose does a 64 bit limit serve?" > This question was asked, it seems like a zillion times, but > probably no more than four or five times. > It is a bit of a belt and suspenders idea. But it also shows how > scared they are about real encryption. Is there an actual quote - did an identifiable government person actually use the 'belt and suspenders' line? This is getting to the point where journalists could have something to hang a story on. I think we can infer from this that the USG has, or soon expects to have, the ability to brute 64 bits of key. > It is clear that this meeting is a shame. Everyone in industry ^^^^^^^^ A shame certainly, but I suspect you meant 'sham' (not a spelling flame, the difference in meaning is important). > Pat > Peter Trei Senior Software Engineer Purveyor Development Team Process Software Corporation http://www.process.com trei(a)process.com

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Re: New service allows customers to track stolen PCs (fwd)
by Sean Roach 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:51 PM 8/28/97 +0000, Vipul Ved Prakash wrote: > >*** New service allows customers to track stolen PCs > >Absolute Software announced Wednesday the CompuTrace Online Monitoring >Service, a new service that provides CompuTrace customers with various >PC monitoring reports via a private, secured Internet website. >Customers will now have access to the whereabouts of their PCs via the >Online Monitoring Service from any location at any time. CompuTrace's >technology silently calls in to the CompuTrace Monitoring Center on a >regular basis. The activity is reported to customers on a regular >basis, or via the new CompuTrace Online Monitoring Service. ... In a few years, when nearly every home computer is a laptop or other portable. The government will require that a similar service be installed in every machine, (to cut down on theft). A few years later, the government will demand open access to this database (to track terrorists). Even later, as nearly everyone will have a computer by this time, the government will have an effective method of controlling the movement of the population. Why don't we just slap one of those radio transponders around our ankles that some of the more stylish parollees already wear.

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Re: Collection of personal info
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:46 PM 9/7/95 -0400, dmandl(a)panix.com wrote: >> And once the interface improves... > >...I won't have to deal with the inefficiencies of real sex, live >music performances, or (non-virtual) world travel ever again. > >> Actually, the creation of separate "spaces" that can only be entered with >> your (each person's) permission will have a big impact on life in the real >> world. Dave. Sorry you didn't catch the implied change of tone in the above. I meant to show a switch from Space Cadet rhetoric about the nets to a more realistic view. >> And once the interface improves... >> Actually, the creation of separate "spaces" that can only be entered with >> your (each person's) permission These separate spaces won't wipe out the Real World (used with permission) but they will influence it as a form of private property that is self enforcing neither dependent on force for protection nor capable of being penetrated by force. This is a BIG THING. You can't live in it yet but you will certainly be able to trade digital goods and services there and stash digital goods (work product, databases, etc.). Having a place that is under your exclusive control has enormous practical and psychological implications. Think of the change that occurred when peasants came to be able to own land. Cyberspace contains spaces that can be cheaply created, individually owned, and free of confiscation. And since the bulk of the wealth of OECD countries is non-physical (consisting of various forms of ownership rights and "choses in action") that wealth can be protected cryptographically. >I've got to tell you, Duncan, this kind of rhetoric pushes me over to >the luddite side more every day. > >No flame intended--just one man's opinion. Don't you like the idea of a "place" that's yours alone? It's not dangerous (to you). It increases your choices. Your power. DCF "You don't have to be nice to nation states you meet on the way up if you're not coming back down."

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Are booby-trapped computers legal?
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

(I've changed the name of this thread.) At 2:30 AM 9/6/95, Lucky Green wrote: >I am wondering about the legalities of booby trapped computer equipment. >Would it be legal if a clear warning to the fact was posted on the >hardware? There are two types of "booby traps" to consider: * Type 1 Booby Trap: a shotgun is placed inside a home, set to fire if and when a burglar enters. Or an electrified region of a room is set to "get energized" when an intruder enters. These are "surprises" and are canonical booby traps. These have been found to be illegal in several court cases. (I'm not a lawyer, but I've been reading about them for 20 years. Famous cases where a burglar sued, and won, because he was injured when breaking into a house.) * Type 2 Booby Trap: electrified perimeter fences. So long as these are adequately marked ("If you touch this fence, you will probably die"), and are not public nuisances where children and pets will inadvertently validate Darwin's theory, these are--I think--legal. There may be license fees required, to build an electrified fence, but I think it is possible to build a lethal voltage electrified fence on one's property. Thus, I suspect it is fully legal to build an electrified fence around one's PC, providing suitable warnings are included. I would not call the second type a real booby trap, though some courts might, depending. A properly labelled electrified fence seems legal, on one's own property, but may not be. And certainly I think any explosive-rigged system is illegal, for explosives reasons if not for booby trap reasons. I know of no case law on this, and suspect that if an FBI agent were to be electrocuted or blown up upon trying to open/use/disconnect the PC, even with clear warnings, that a prosecution would happen. Results are unclear (to me). (I think that if an FBI agent were to be electrocuted while climbing on a clearly labelled electrified fence, no prosecution would result.) Of course, if a PC were to be clearly labelled as being rigged, then steps could presumably be taken to defuse the arrangement. >Interesting side note: a few months ago, several hundred 5 gallon >containers of insecticide were stolen from the lot of an agricultural >supply dealer here in California. The incident made a small note in the SF >Chronicle. It was mentioned that the FBI is taking part in the >investigation. > >What wasn't mentioned was that this insecticide is an ideal precursor to >various forms of neuro toxins, namely Tabun and Soman, two types of nerve >gas so vicious and toxic that even Hitler refused to approve their use. I >predict that eventful times are just around the corner. As Lucky knows, I live out in the country. I agree that some "muckers" (R.I.P. John Brunner) are likely to mount assaults on urban centers. Bad news for some. But then the good news is that the threat of nuclear annihilation has all but gone away completely, and that cancels out an awful lot of the minor bad news items the scribblers keep telling us are so awful. --Tim May ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Kerberos v5's experience with ASN.1
by Theodore Ts'o 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- To: Cypherpunks Lite <cp-lite(a)comsec.com> Date: Sat, 2 Sep 1995 13:55:38 -0400 From: jis(a)mit.edu (Jeffrey I. Schiller) However, the problem with ASN.1 isn't its waste of space (which actually isn't that bad for a mechanism for encoding arbitrary objects). While I won't argue about the rest of Jeff's note about the use of ASN.1 being a mistake, I do want to point out that certain ASN.1 types are in fact very wasteful of space. Most notable of these is the ASN.1 Generalized Time --- which encodes the a timestamp in ASCII. ASN.1 GeneralizedTime therefore requires 17 bytes to encode, an over four-fold increase in the amount of space needed to store a time, compared with a 4 byte representation of "number of seconds since 1970". This is deadly in a protocol which has to store lots of timestamps, which is the case in Kerberos V5. We could have gotten around this problem by merely storing an integer whenever we needed to store a timestamp, instead of using the ASN.1 abstract type. Then it would have only taken 6 bytes (ASN.1 adds a 2-byte overhead for each object which you store). - Ted -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.1 Comment: Processed by Mailcrypt 3.2, an Emacs/PGP interface iQCVAwUBME9xO0QVcM1Ga0KJAQGiQwQAhSu4WpeVZ+hsN+o+NvWMwP8JK0GojhuI vWE1M3iIZttz4iMEbsziZ1KzWlkFTL8AKVWkzDAZ8t5lNMis9qObCfaQPQkKTLwJ UV20GjebckOzFx7Rp9OPDDI536cepvcjFN0cQkWtmiW2KP04TU9zr4caD4cfozDJ XYGZavYmpBQ= =9YUm -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Monkey Wrench into the works
by Sean Roach 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:54 AM 8/28/97 -0400, David Jablon wrote: > >James, > >You're rebuttal to Myron's message is simplistically >elegant, but just as wrong as the original posting. ... >On 8/27/97, James A. Donald replied paraphrasing Ben Franklin, >(who really knew very little about cryptography): >>What one man knows, nobody knows. >>What two men know, everyone knows. >>Shared secrets just don't work. Perhaps a more accurate, though less clean statement would be. What YOU ALONE knows, nobody knows. What YOU and ONE other person, EVERYONE MIGHT know. Each additional person who is in on the secret opens up the possibility of leaks. Although I deleted it for space, you mentioned Doctors. A lot of people are afraid to tell thier doctors everything that the doctors need to know to do thier jobs because the patients are afraid that, as illegal as it may be, the patients medical history may end up in the hands of insurers, employers, prospective employers, and numerous other people who may want it but shouldn't have it. My dad was at a seminar where a new Scholastic Aptitude test was being introduced. He or someone asked if this information was going to be used to rate the schools. He was assured that no, it wasn't for that. A few years later, Oklahoma schools were being rated on the average score on that test, after eliminating those in chapter 1 programs. My dad's beef was that the smaller schools couldn't afford to maintain some of those programs and would thus, on average, score lower than they should. The example of a secret getting out, however, is clear. The "secret" was given to the wrong sub-department, and not by the schools.

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