December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Spurious Emissions
by nobody＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Spurious Emissions Problem: Get yourself a sheet of log/lin graph paper. Orient the paper so that the log axis is horizontal, and the linear is vertical. On the very bottom major axis of the lin, mark it as -157. The next major axis up would be -147. Next up from that is -137, and so on, to -117. Label this axis as dbmV/m RMS. On the very left of the log axis, mark it as 100. Next major log line is 1K. Next one is 10K, then 100K, 1M, 10M, 100M, 1G, 10G. Label this as Hz. Starting at the junction of 100/-148, draw a nice, straight line to 2K/-148. Continue the line to 10K/-152, then 100M/-124, then 1G/-120, then to 10G/-120. If a body was to test for emissions at a distance of 1 meter, and kept their emission levels below that line, they might consider themselves Real Resistant. Discussions with a Person Who Knows (but wishes to remain anonymous, curiously) have indicated that a body might like to have a room like this: steel outsides (like, say, one of those steel pre-fab sheds), and make sure that steel was grounded *real good* (like at each vertical support, and for each wall's outside material). To make sure there weren't any gaps, a person might want to use fastening screws every 2 or 3 inches, or better still, weld all the junctions. Then they could put insulation (regular thermal type) inside, and hold it in place with steel (or better still, aluminum, since it literally blocks magnetic fields as opposed to absorbing them like steel does) flyscreen, making sure to overlap the screen a good 6 inches at the junctions, covering all inside surfaces (including any windows), and "sewing" the overlapped screen bits with metal wire (preferably the same metal as the screen). Getting in and out screws up any Effects and Properties, but those can be dealt with by having a good 6 inch solid metal overlap on the door, so that it made good mechanical and electrical contact with the wall when the door was closed - there are companies that are more than happy to sell those little metal fingers that you see on RF gear to help with this. Power should be run through standard solid metal conduit, underground, from the power source (electrically isolated, like a transformer) and only appear aboveground inside the room. It should also be *heavily* filtered. A room like this wouldn't be formally certifiable in any official capacity, but would sure screw up anyone trying to monitor emissions, forcing them to either get in real close (and risk discovery), or give up as being too much trouble. But of course, all this is Pure Supposition and Theory. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Finger merriman(a)metronet.com for PGP/RIPEM public keys and fingerprints. Unencrypted Email may be ignored without notice to sender. PGP preferred. Remember: It is not enough to _obey_ Big Brother; you must also learn to *love* Big Brother.

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Letter from State Dept
by Phil Karn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I received the following letter today from the State Dept. I filed my appeal on June 7, 1994, and according to their own rules they're supposed to respond in 30 days. For background, see http://www.cygnus.com/~gnu/export.html. --Phil United States Department of State Washington, DC 20520 September 20, 1994 Philip R. Karn, Jr. 7431 Teasdale Avenue San Diego, CA 92122 Dear Mr. Karn: I am writing with regard to your appeal of CJ Case 081-94, concerning your "applied cryptography source code disk." As you undoubtedly realize, your appeal raises particularly important and difficult issues. We have met with your attorney, Mr. Thomas J. Cooper, about the appeal, and have consulted with him several times by telephone. I wanted to convey to you personally, as we have conveyed to him, the care with which we are reviewing your appeal. The review has entailed widespread State Department and inter-agency consultation. To ensure that the various legal and policy issues raised by your appeal are satisfactorily addressed, I have found it necessary to extend the normal period for consideration of such an appeal. The consideration of your appeal is now in its final stages. I appreciate the patience with this process that you and your attorney have shown, and look forward to shortly providing you with a response. Sincerely, [signature] Martha C. Harris Deputy Assistant Secretary for Export Controls

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PRZ on 2048-bit keys, etc.
by Philip Zimmermann 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Folks, a lot of people seem to be eager to generate 2048-bit keys with various not-from-me versions of PGP that have been hotwired to allow 2048-bit keys to be generated. MIT PGP 2.6.1 was supposed to allow 2048-bit keys, but not generate them. Because of yet another bug, the new intended feature of accepting 2048-bit keys does not really work for 2.6.1. That particular feature was added late, and not really tested before the release. We are preparing a 2.6.2 release this week to fix this problem, and maybe a few others. PGP 2.6.2 will accept, but not generate, bigger keys. Why, you may ask, did I go through the trouble of making (well, OK, trying to make) 2.6.1 accept bigger keys, but not actually generate them? I'm glad you asked. Because this is part of a carefully phased keysize upgrade path. You see, from PGP 2.0 on up, each version of PGP that had to introduce a new data format to support a new feature was done in this same manner. A new format is first read by the new release, but not generated. Then, in the next release after that, the new format is generated. This allows time for the new software (that accepts the new format) to be thoroughly propagated through the user community before the new format is actually generated by the even newer software released later. This makes life easier for all PGP users, by preserving interoperability as much as possible. This means that any two consecutive releases of PGP are bidirectionally compatible. My intent was to get a thorough deployment of PGP software that could accept bigger keys before anyone was actually generating any bigger keys. I do it this way to serve the interests of the PGP user community. PGP development has always worked this way, and no one complained before. Now it seems that people everywhere are all too eager to release their very own hacked version that screws up my efforts to preserve interoperability. They make all kinds of changes without talking to me first, to find out why I do things this way, before dashing ahead with what they think the rest of the PGP users need. My phone number is in the PGP documentation. It would be so easy for code developers to simply pick up the phone and call me, and maybe find out why a particular PGP feature (or bug) is in there, when I intend to fix it, or if indeed it should be fixed at all. I would prefer that people call me before they create and release mutant strains of PGP. A little direct human contact by phone goes a long way in defusing misunderstandings about PGP. I would urge that people not generate 2048-bit keys until 2.6.2 has been in circulation for at least a couple of months, to give it time to spread through the user community. I will release a new version later that actually generates 2048-bit keys, for the diehards that want them, and the new software will offer many other improvements as well. I urge that people use the releases of PGP that I make and publish through MIT. The development process includes participation of the user community, and I take seriously everyone's suggestions for what should be included in PGP. I do not work in a vaccuum here in Boulder. I do not make many public statements about PGP export issues, because my lawyers won't let me, but that should not be interpreted as insensitivity to the needs of the PGP user community. There is still an ongoing criminal investigation concerning export of PGP, and I am still the target. Some militant Europeans may think I don't care about PGP usage outside the USA. At least one guy in Europe has demanded that I make statements about and get involved in export-related issues of PGP, and says I've "sold out" (Really? Sold out to whom? And for how much?). I haven't sold out. But I also don't enjoy the freedom of speech that other Americans enjoy. Of course, none of these remarks I'm making here should be interpreted to mean that I approve of anyone violating US export law. And, BTW-- for those of you who get all paranoid whenever I post something on the newsgroups that is not digitally signed with PGP -- Look, sometimes I just don't feel like signing everything I say. There is another email encryption protocol, PEM, which makes you sign every message, because PEM is designed for accountability for every remark you make, and assigning blame. PGP doesn't require you to sign every encrypted message, because PGP doesn't try to put you under oath every time you open your mouth. In my circumstances, maybe I just don't feel like making every little note I write be a signed affidavit. -Philip Zimmermann prz(a)acm.org

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Quantum cryptanalysis thread on sci.crypt
by Sherry Mayo 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Constraints of time mean I've been skimming thru' c'punx a bit lately, but I was wondering if anyone here has any views on the quantum crytanalysis thread that has been gracing sci.crypt of late. I haven't noticed it here but maybe I missed it (in which case - sorry guys). I first read about it in New Scientist (24 Sept 94) No 1944, p 21. the upshot being that if there is any mileage in the quantum computing idea, then it may lead to computers that can rapidly factorise primes (not good news for RSA). The main objections of skeptics are that noise/defects of manufacture make such quantum computers unfeasible. On the other hand, the New Scientist Article suggests that the technology for making a quantum computer may not be that far away. This may be just sensationalism, but even if its only a dim possibility in 25 years time its got to be worth a mention. Given the recent developments in materials science I don't think the possibility of manufacturing such things can be ruled out as some suggested on sci.crypt. The matter of being swamped by noise may be an insurmountable problem, and anyway is not something I am qualified to comment on. Any well informed people out there with any comments? Sherry

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Majordomo sigh
by pstemari＠bismark.cbis.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Gee, it was awfully quiet this AM.... Return-Path: <Majordomo-Owner(a)toad.com> Date: Tue, 27 Sep 94 08:51:03 PDT To: psmarie(a)cbis.com From: Majordomo(a)toad.com Subject: Majordomo results: ping Reply-To: Majordomo(a)toad.com -- >>>> who cypherpunks Members of list 'cypherpunks': glowell(a)thorn.wpd.sgi.com cypherpunks-local(a)bb.com sebaygo(a)sibylline.com michael.shiplett(a)umich.edu cypherpunks(a)umich.edu Rolf.Michelsen(a)delab.sintef.no adwestro(a)ouray.Denver.Colorado.EDU Andreas.Elbert(a)gmd.de doug(a)OpenMind.com jeffb(a)sware.com ksackett(a)cs.uah.edu collsc(a)snowbird.aud.alcatel.com koontzd(a)lrcs.loral.com trollins(a)debbie.telos.com matthewn(a)uiuc.edu

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Re: Anonymous Long Distance Phone Calling
by GRABOW_GEOFFREY＠tandem.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>You send a $50 or $100 blank Cashier's check, or cash, to the address >stated below. I have purchased a pile of PIN cards and I randomly selec >and send it to you. The company I buy these cards from, keeps no record The aforementioned method provides only hides who paid for the call. Couldn't you do the same with a pocket full of coins? True anonymous phone calls would have to be routed through several long distance companies. Since MCI, Sprint & AT&T don't talk to each other, that ought to be the best way to hide the caller and callie. BTW, does anybody have the access phone numbers for any other long distance companies? G.C.G. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | Geoffrey C. Grabow | "What we demand are rigidly defined | | Oyster Bay, New York | areas of doubt and uncertainty!" | | | -------------------- | | grabow_geoffrey(a)tandem.com | Clipper, SkipJack & Digital Telephony | | | JUST SAY NO!!! | |----------------------------------------------------------------------| |PGP 2.6 fingerprint = AA 9E 35 12 F8 93 72 8D 1C E5 D5 BC 74 BE 49 D3| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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test/ignore
by RGRIFFITH＠sfasu.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This is a test to see if the new addressing scheme at my site has messed up my ability to post to this list as it has some.

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No Subject
by L. Todd Masco 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

who cypherpunks

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test
by pstemari＠bismark.cbis.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

just a test

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test
by pstemari＠bismark.cbis.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

just a test

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