December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: The mother of all FAQs
by merriman＠metronet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Rishab Aiyer Ghosh writes: > >Yes, "FAQ" is a misnomer (a miscyphernomer?). And as long as it is, it >won't answer questions that get asked here, such as: > >"I've looked for a FAQ on versions of RC4 that run on the Amiga, and I >can't find anything." > >(Well, I'm kidding about this one, but similarly obscure questions do >come up. Rishab is right that most "FAQs" are becoming much more than >that. It seems to me we need a new term.) > Knowledgebase? Reference? Dave Merriman - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Finger merriman(a)metronet.com for PGP/RIPEM public keys and fingerprints. Unencrypted Email may be ignored without notice to sender. PGP preferred. Remember: It is not enough to _obey_ Big Brother; you must also learn to *love* Big Brother.

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Thank you Bob Anderson (fwd)
by jim＠RSA.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

FYI... I'd appreciate if you posted this wherever you saw RC4... WARNING NOTICE It has come to RSA Data Security's attention that certain RSA trade secrets, in the form of confidential and proprietary source code, have been misappropriated and disclosed. Please be advised that these acts, as well as any retransmission or use of this misappropriated source code is a violation of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act and various other state and federal laws. Any person or entity that acquires, discloses or uses this information is subject to criminal and civil penalties including an injunction, compensatory damages, punitive damages and payment of RSA's attorneys fees. RSA considers this misappropriation to be most serious. Not only is this act a violation of law, but its publication is a gross abuse of the Internet. RSA has begun an investigation and will proceed with legal action against anyone found to have violated its intellectual property rights.

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RSADSI vs Remailers?
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Newsgroups: alt.security.pgp,sci.crypt,comp.org.eff.talk,comp.org.cpsr.talk,alt.security.ripem > From: strnlght(a)netcom.com (David Sternlight) > Subject: RSADSI Warning > Date: Fri, 16 Sep 1994 23:27:18 GMT > > The notice below is being posted by request of Jim Bidzos, President of > RSADSI and PKP. I have no business connection with RSADSI except as a > licensee of RSAREF. > > WARNING NOTICE > > It has come to RSA Data Security's attention that certain RSA > trade secrets, in the form of confidential and proprietary source > code, have been misappropriated and disclosed. Please be advised that > these acts, as well as any retransmission or use of this > misappropriated source code is a violation of the Uniform Trade > Secrets Act and various other state and federal laws. Any person or > entity that acquires, discloses or uses this information is subject to > criminal and civil penalties including an injunction, compensatory > damages, punitive damages and payment of RSA's attorneys fees. > > RSA considers this misappropriation to be most serious. Not only > is this act a violation of law, but its publication is a gross abuse > of the Internet. RSA has begun an investigation and will proceed with > legal action against anyone found to have violated its intellectual > property rights. Note the original post header. It came via the jpunix remailer. > From inbox/cpx Fri Sep 9 20:41:47 1994 > From owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com Fri Sep 9 20:17:32 1994 > Date: Fri, 9 Sep 1994 22:11:49 -0500 > Message-Id: <199409100311.WAA12423(a)jpunix.com> > To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com > From: nobody(a)jpunix.com > Subject: Thank you Bob Anderson > Remailed-By: remailer(a)jpunix.com > Complaints-To: postmaster(a)jpunix.com > Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Precedence: bulk I wonder if there is any connection to this: > From owner-remailer-operators(a)c2.org > From: "John A. Perry" <perry(a)jpunix.com> > Subject: getting in trouble.. > Date: Fri, 16 Sep 1994 14:56:51 -0459 (CDT) > Sender: owner-remailer-operators(a)c2.org > > > Well it's happened, > > Someone out in net land felt it was necessary to call my place of > employment and complain that the remailer was being used to send > copy-written software as well as encrypted software out of the country. > Needless to say, my employers didn't take kindly to this. The remailer at > jpunix is temporarily shutdown for a few days until this blows over and I > can find out exactly what the legal implications are. I'll keep everyone > updated. > > John

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NYT/Markoff article on RC4
by Brian A. LaMacchia 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

An article by John Markoff on the release of RC4 source code just came over the NYT wire. It's coded "financial;" I expect it to appear in Saturday editions. Doesn't say much we don't already know (quotes the RSADSI statement that "...its publication is a gross abuse of the Internet."). The article does mention this list, which is called, "a specialized computer network mailing list of computer researchers who oppose the Government's stringent controls on data encryption technology." There's a bug in the article: it says the code was first circulated on Tuesday, Sep 13, and was posted via an anonymous remailer in the Netherlands. I assume Markoff is talking about the message: Message-Id: <199409132036.AA24724(a)xs1.xs4all.nl> Subject: RC4 ? To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com From: nobody(a)vox.xs4all.nl (An0nYm0Us UsEr) The "Thank you Bob Anderson" message (which was the first posting of the RC4 code that I saw) was posted last Friday, Sep 9, via the anonymous remailer at jpunix.com. --bal

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Re: RC4 - A response from RSA Data Security, Inc.
by Jim Gillogly 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From: jim(a)RSA.COM (Jim Bidzos) > Any person or > entity that acquires, discloses or uses this information is subject to > criminal and civil penalties including an injunction, compensatory > damages, punitive damages and payment of RSA's attorneys fees. Let's count the entities that have acquired this information. What're the most recent valid Usenet survey numbers from Brian Reid about the distribution of sci.crypt? Collecting a dollar from each of these entities would pay the salaries at RSA for a while... Jim Gillogly 26 Halimath S.R. 1994, 04:24

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PKZIP encryption broken
by khijol!erc＠apple.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- - From a recent comp.risks post: Newsgroups: comp.risks Subject: RISKS DIGEST 16.39 Message-ID: <CMM.0.90.1.778901594.risks(a)chiron.csl.sri.com> Date: 7 Sep 94 01:33:14 GMT Sender: usenet Reply-To: risks(a)csl.sri.com Distribution: world Organization: The Internet Gateway Service Approved: risks(a)csl.sri.com Lines: 624 RISKS-LIST: RISKS-FORUM Digest Tuesday 6 September 1994 Volume 16 : Issue 39 FORUM ON RISKS TO THE PUBLIC IN COMPUTERS AND RELATED SYSTEMS ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy, Peter G. Neumann, moderator ***** See last item for information on RISKS (comp.risks) ***** Contents: PKZIP encryption broken (known plaintext attack) (Paul Carl Kocher) - ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Sun, 4 Sep 1994 17:31:28 -0700 From: Paul Carl Kocher <kocherp(a)leland.Stanford.EDU> Subject: PKZIP encryption broken (known plaintext attack) I finally found time to take a closer look at the encryption algorithm by Roger Schlafly that is used in PKZIP and have developed a practical known plaintext attack that can find the entire 96-bit internal state. The basic encryption algorithm has four steps, two of which are based on linear shift registers, one is like a linear congruential, and the final converts the contents of an internal state register into an 8-bit value to XOR onto a plaintext byte. A complete description of the algorithm is included in the file APPNOTE.TXT, which is included with PKZIP version 1.1 (check Archie for "pkz110.exe"). Although the algorithm is substantially better than the toy ciphers used in many products, I have developed a practical known plaintext attack that finds the 96 bit internal state. Unlike the ZipCrack program I released a couple years ago, this attack finds the internal state registers directly and does not involve a brute-force attack on the password. If adequate known plaintext is available, my attack will find the state, regardless of the password's size or content. My attack is an improvement on a known plaintext attack described in a paper by Biham (unpublished work) that takes 2^38+ operations. My improvements reduce the amount of work required by approximately a factor of 1500 with 200 bytes of plaintext. With less plaintext the attack will take somewhat more time, but just 40 bytes should be enough to be practical. I've written code for all steps of the attack; a version written in C with a few optimizations in inline assembly runs in less than a day on my '486. The attack will work with versions 1.1 or 2.xx of PKZIP and other programs using the same algorithm. A more in-depth description of the attack will be made available soon, but I wanted to let people using PKZIP (and any other programs that use the same algorithm) know immediately about the weakness. Paul C. Kocher kocherp(a)leland.stanford.edu Independent data security consultant/contractor. 415-323-7634 [Disclaimers removed. PGN] - -- Ed Carp, N7EKG Ed.Carp(a)linux.org, ecarp(a)netcom.com Finger ecarp(a)netcom.com for PGP 2.5 public key an88744(a)anon.penet.fi ** PGP encrypted email preferred! ** "What's the use of distant travel if only to discover - you're homeless in your heart." --Basia, "Yearning" -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAwUBLnqUyiS9AwzY9LDxAQECcQP/cYtGpd8882KPmdPN0N1MZf4sjo4Mu8SY V9zEcRnU7VXU1WgqJiGSgyOQbYAaRxDSudtYKH5DHY+qvqLE397nkRuv1qjf5d9b PZ5Pw4YOEhAxVeq4DDSLYO5Lf2T4qs7IjVMETZjibV0feodbridG9XliEFdhrPWK vVhX3ZMWXH8= =oH6T -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Virtual assasins and lethal remailers
by doug＠OpenMind.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Adam Shostack writes: > The anonymous nature of the funds & contract negotiation will >make finding this person more difficult, not impossible. A number of people have raised this idea in one form or another when confronted with these notions. However, the point I think needs to be stressed is that: To the extent that evidence can be found, the goals of crypto anarchy have failed. It is certainly true that police can search for a motive, can point at the usual suspects, etc. Adam claims: >The tracing of >the money from payer to assassin might be difficult, but there will >probably be a large, unaccounted for withdrawal from some back >account. To the extent that this is true, then it is also true that people are not able to keep their financial status and records completely secret, and the state can continue to enforce the collection of taxes. Strong crypto has the potential to completely remove these things... what if no one knows what secret bank accounts the suspect uses? The status of the suspect's funds and all cash transactions can be completely private, with no way to find them (even with all the court orders in the world). There are, indeed, many weaknesses to such a scheme in the real world *today*, but it is the aim of crypto anarchy to remove all such weaknesses. Doug ___________________________________________________________________ Doug Cutrell General Partner doug(a)OpenMind.com Open Mind, Santa Cruz ===================================================================

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Re: Acapulco H.E.A.T. Auxilliary Review
by jonathan＠memex.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In a post to cypherpunks, L. Todd Masco <cactus(a)bb.com> wrote: > In article <199409190629.AA24697(a)metronet.com>, David K. Merriman > <merriman(a)metronet.com> wrote: > >There *was* a brief flurry of goodguy/badguy underwater WWF > action, but considering that their alleged bottom time for > the dives was 25 minutes (any diver confirmation out there?), > > At 102 feet? ... it's just from a long-ago PADI training and a > couple of shallow dives following, but from what I remember: > > - the rule of thumb is that 30 feet of water get you an > atmosphere. So you're at 102 you're at just > under 4.5, so you're using air at the rate of > 4.5 times the rate you do on the surface. It's 1 atmosphere for every 33 feet, but either way, I don't see how you managed to get 4.5 * the rate. At around 3 atmospheres, you're using air at about 4 times the 1 atmosphere rate. > - My dives were usually 30-60 feet (say, half the pressure > the H.E.A.T. team dealt with), and I was able to stay > down for over an hour, with one tank. That means > that with two tanks they should have had at least > a similar limit, say an hour. On the other hand, > I wasn't wrestling... Exertion can pull you way > down. If they were giving a definite, solid time > limit, it's definitely bogus ("Let's see, five > minutes at 10 times air consumption while you > fight...") for air limitations. Hmmm. I believe that the diving depth-to-time tables (which I don't have in front of me. I'll get them out and double check later) give a time of around 25 minutes. It has nothing to do with how much air you have. The tables are used to avoid the bends and nitrogen narcosis.

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Returned mail: Host unknown
by Mail Delivery Subsystem 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

----- Transcript of session follows ----- 550 3toad.com (tcp)... 550 Host unknown 554 <cypherpunks(a)3toad.com>... 550 Host unknown (Authoritative answer from name server) ----- Unsent message follows ----- Received: from hummingbird.CS.Arizona.EDU by optima.CS.Arizona.EDU (5.65c/15) via SMTP id AA23319; Sat, 17 Sep 1994 11:26:06 MST Date: Sat, 17 Sep 1994 11:26:04 MST From: "Patrick G. Bridges" <bridges> Message-Id: <199409171826.AA03054(a)hummingbird.cs.arizona.edu> Received: by hummingbird.cs.arizona.edu; Sat, 17 Sep 1994 11:26:04 MST To: cypherpunks(a)3toad.com Subject: RC4 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >>>>> "ritter" == ritter <ritter(a)pentagon.io.com> writes: ritter> In <CwA0Br.KH0(a)chinet.chinet.com> ritter> schneier(a)chinet.chinet.com (Bruce Schneier) writes: >> I think the smartest thing RSA Data Security, Inc could do at >> this point is to patent RC4. ritter> Sorry, but they don't have that option. ritter> When a product containing an invention is sold ritter> commercially, a one- year count-down starts on the patent ritter> application. ritter> --- Terry Ritter ritter(a)io.com So, to summarize what I've heard so far: So, unless RSADSI had already filed for a patent, they're essentially screwed. The algorithm is revealed, but they can't patent it. The source posted may or may not be copyrighted, but anyone can roll their own version which would not be copyrighted and use it freely, unless Trade Secret law say otherwise, which I've heard several people say it doesn't... What has been done may or may not be criminal... If the posted code IS RSADSI source, this is clearly a breach of copyright law...If it is a reverse engineering job, then it's illegal if the reverse engineer had a no-RE agreement w/ RSADSI, which may not be the case if she just worked back from Lotus Notes, for instance... I can't say I'm upset by the fact the algorithm itself has been made public, since IMHO a new, fast algorithm will help the state of academic research in cryptography, and I think most would agree that peer review is the best way to evaluate encryption algorithms. Still, I wonder about the effects this release will have on the net as a whole... This release could make good scare tactic ammunition for the pro-clipper/DigTel folks to use w/ corporations... It may also fuel worrisome cries for regulation of the networks... - -- *** Patrick G. Bridges bridges(a)cs.arizona.edu *** *** PGP 2.6 key available via finger * Key Fingerprint: *** *** D6 09 C7 1F 4C 18 D5 18 7E 02 50 E6 B1 AB A5 2C *** *** #include <std/disclaimer.h> *** -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.1 iQCVAwUBLns0j0oL7Aaetl5pAQFDkwP+M2cO95+jjj7cZp/6FBmplfYM7WhndGhn AcR+NsS6UNvjU+e/q7ekRXPDAHzh4idTldrGndoUAsvVhdXJpYDOvyGyBG1e0W/c HPLQbiNcURRDkDeTIVLLAtX1ECjmfEeBPC/2iiTq1GaivbEGCL1kq+2AS1dSu31m EZOOOWJQe68= =JdAM -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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NYT/Markoff article on RC4
by Jeff Gostin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"Brian A. LaMacchia" <bal(a)martigny.ai.mit.edu> writes: > The article does mention this list, which is called, "a specialized > computer network mailing list of computer researchers who oppose > the Government's stringent controls on data encryption technology." A tad succinct, but perhaps not too far offbase. Is it fair to say that we support the free flow of information, and place the responsibility for maintaining the privacy of that information on the party said information concerns? Now, I know that saying "we" has certain implications, mainly that of a list consensus. However, it seems that a great many people here seem to post to that regard. Am I correct in my observation? --Jeff -- ====== ====== +----------------jgostin(a)eternal.pha.pa.us----------------+ == == | The new, improved, environmentally safe, bigger, better,| == == -= | faster, hypo-allergenic, AND politically correct .sig. | ==== ====== | Now with a new fresh lemon scent! | PGP Key Available +---------------------------------------------------------+

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