December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Laws Outside the U.S.
by Cyber City 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim May writes: > Indeed. One of the mysteries is why so few French are on our list...I > can't recall any, actually. Their country has some of the most > draconian laws, it is alleged, and, as Phil notes, an active SDECE > industrial espionage unit. I noticed the following in sci.crypt recently. There are some useful crypt- analysis papers in the archive, among other things: > From vaudenay(a)dmi.ens.fr Wed Sep 14 11:52:18 EDT 1994 > Subject: New WWW-Crypto-server > Organization: Ecole Normale Superieure, Paris, France > > We are happy to annonce the birth of the html pages of our team : > > http://www.ens.fr/equipes_dmi/grecc > > Most of our papers are available. > > --Serge for the GRECC team. The French company BULL makes a nice encrypting laptop computer, called "Sub Rosa", which is used by Canada's Department of national revenue auditors. -- Alex Brock

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THOSE DARNED HIT MEN
by Patrick J. May 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Sandy Sandfort writes: > SCENARIO ONE > > I set up a meat-and-potatoes escrow business. I keep my nose > clean. I honor my obligations. I build up a good reputation. > At some point, I'll be approached by a murderer and the person > who is hiring him or her. I'll accept the payment. When the > murder is committed, I won't pay off. The murderer will (a) sue > me (I don't think so), (b) damage my reputation (I'll leave this > one as an exercise for the student), or (c) murder *me* (ah, but > first he has to find me; in the world we posit, that won't be > very easy). If this scenario happens very often, it'll take all > the profit out of the murder business. Of course, the murderer > can get the money face-to-face from the customer, but then we're > back to today's square one. Regarding (b), why wouldn't reputation be as important to "Murder Escrows R Us" as to "Meat-and-Potatoes Escrow"? Certainly the smaller market will result in higher charges for customers of MERU, but I don't see a qualitative difference in operation. Also, there is no reason for MAPE to know that they are paying a killer. The escrow could be set up to pay off or refund when a trusted certification agency instructs MAPE to do so. It might be possible to spread the pieces around such that no one agent is aware that they are participating in a murder for hire. > SCENARIO TWO > > I set up a phoney murder-for-hire business. Someone contracts > with me to bump-off their rich uncle. The client deposits my > payment with a reputable escrow company, "Murder Escrows R Us." I > go to the uncle and tell him the whole deal. Using digital > technology, bribed coroners, etc., we fake his death. When the > news hits the Net, the escrow pays me off. The uncle comes back > to life, disinherits whomever he suspects wanted him dead. And I > laugh all the way to the digital bank. I create a new pseudonym, > place another murder-for-hire ad, and do it all again. Given our > Brave New World, nobody can touch me. This is a risk the customer is taking. I'd make sure to only hire killers certified by the Assassin's Guild, just as I'd only use an escrow agency certified by people I trust. I don't see this as a service that is sufficiently different in _kind_ to require protocols not required by other (pseudo)anonymous businesses. - ------------------------------------------------------------------------ A contract programmer is always intense. Patrick May pjm(a)gasco.com (public key available from servers) ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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The National Research Council study of National...
by CRYPTO 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Subject: The National Research Council study of National Cryptography Policy Please redistribute this note to any party that you think might be interested. thanks. A STUDY OF NATIONAL CRYPTOGRAPHY POLICY September 14, 1994 Cryptographic technologies are critical to a wide variety of important military and civilian applications involving sensitive or classified information that must be protected from unauthorized disclosure. In addition, cryptography is a key component of most authentication technologies, i.e., technologies to guarantee the identity of a message's sender. National cryptography policy has important implications for U.S. economic competitiveness, national security, law enforcement interests, and protection of the rights of private U.S. citizens. In an attempt to clarify some of the relevant policy issues, Public Law 103-160 (passed by the U.S. Congress in November 1993) called for a comprehensive study from the National Research Council on cryptographic technologies and national cryptography policy. The study will commence in the first week of October 1994. As this study proceeds, the committee will make all feasible attempts to solicit a wide range of input and commentary from interested parties. Input will be presented to the committee through a mix of briefings, presentations, consultations, invited and contributed papers, and testimony at regional public hearings. In addition, members of the interested public are invited to submit input to the committee as described below. The study plans to address the following issues: * the impact of current and possible future restrictions and standards regarding cryptographic technology on - the availability of such technology to foreign and domestic parties with interests hostile to or competitive with the national security, economic, commercial, and privacy interests of the U.S. government, U.S. industry, and private U.S. citizens; - the competitiveness of U.S. manufacturers of such technology in the international market; - the competitiveness and performance of commercial U.S. users of such technology; - U.S. national security and law enforcement interests; * the strength of various cryptographic technologies known and anticipated that are relevant for commercial and private purposes; * current and anticipated demand for information systems security based on cryptography; * the impact of foreign restrictions on the use of, importation of, and the market for cryptographic technology; * the extent to which current cryptography policy is adequate for protecting U.S. interests in privacy, public safety, national security, and economic competitiveness; * strengths and weaknesses of current key escrow implementation schemes; * how technology now and in the future can affect the feasible policy options for balancing the national security and law enforcement interests of government and the privacy and commercial interests of U.S. industry and private U.S. citizens; * recommendations for the process through which national security, law enforcement, commercial, and privacy interests are balanced in the formulation of national cryptography policy. The study will be conducted by a 17-member committee (listed at the end of this document) that collectively has expertise in computer and communications technology; cryptographic technologies and cryptanalysis; foreign, national security, and intelligence affairs; law enforcement; science policy; trade policy; commercial and business dimensions of computer technology (hardware and software vendors, users of cryptographic technologies); and interests in privacy and civil liberties. A subpanel of the full committee will be cleared at the SI level and have access to all relevant information to ensure that the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the unclassified report are consistent with what is known in the classified world. The project plan calls for the study to be delivered approximately two years after full processing of all necessary security clearances. However, the NRC will make every attempt to deliver the study sooner, and it currently believes that the core work of the study will be completed about 18 to 20 months after funding for the study has been received. Additional time will be devoted to dissemination of the study report and follow-up activities. The final report of the study committee is subject to NRC review procedures that ensure the objectivity and integrity of all NRC reports. The main text of the report will be unclassified; classified annexes (if any) will be made available only to those with the appropriate security clearances. PROVIDING INPUT TO THE COMMITTEE The questions that the study is expected to examine are provided above. Members of the interested public are invited to submit their views on these questions and any other questions that you believe the committee should be addressing through either of the channels below. If desired, requests for personal presentations to the committee should be submitted through these channels as well; the committee will respond affirmatively to as many such requests as possible, but time and resource constraints will limit the number of such requests that can be honored. Internet: send comments and other correspondence to CRYPTO(a)NAS.EDU. U.S. Mail: Cryptography Project Computer Science and Telecommunications Board National Research Council Mail Stop HA-560 2101 Constitution Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20418 COMMITTEE TO STUDY NATIONAL CRYPTOGRAPHY POLICY Kenneth Dam, committee chair, was Deputy Secretary of State (1982- 1985) and is currently the Max Pam Professor of American and Foreign Law at the University of Chicago Law School. General W. Y. Smith, retired, committee vice-chair, is president emeritus of the Institute for Defense Analyses, and has also served in a number of military posts including that of deputy commander in chief of the U.S. European Command in Germany. Lee Bollinger, formerly dean of the University of Michigan Law School, is currently provost of Dartmouth College and a constitutional scholar. Ann Caracristi, retired, was Deputy Director of the National Security Agency (1980-1982). Benjamin Civiletti was U.S. Attorney General (1979-1981), and is currently in private practice with the law firm Venable, Baetjer, Howard and Civiletti. Colin Crook is senior technology officer for Citicorp. Samuel Fuller is vice president of corporate research at Digital Equipment Corporation. Leslie Gelb is president of the Council on Foreign Relations. He served as Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs (1977-1980). Ronald Graham is a director of information sciences at AT&T Bell Labs and a professor of mathematics at Rutgers University. Martin Hellman is professor of electrical engineering at Stanford University. Dr. Hellman was one of the inventors of public key encryption. Julius Katz is president of Hills & Company, and was deputy United States trade representative (1989-1993). Peter Neumann is principal scientist in the Computer Science Laboratory at SRI International. He is the chairman of the ACM committee on computers and public policy, and a member of the ACM study group on cryptography policy. Raymond Ozzie is president of Iris Associates, a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Lotus Development Corporation. Iris Associates is the developer of Lotus Notes. Kumar Patel is vice chancellor for research at UCLA. Edward Schmults was Deputy Attorney General of the United States (1981-1984) and is a former senior vice president for external relations and general counsel for the GTE Corporation. Elliot Stone is executive director of the Massachusetts Health Data Consortium, which is responsible for the collection and analysis of the state's large health care databases. Willis Ware, retired, is with the RAND Corporation as senior computer scientist emeritus. He chairs the Computer System Security and Privacy Advisory Board which was established by the Computer Security Act of 1987. STAFF AND ORGANIZATIONS Marjory Blumenthal is director of the Computer Science and Telecommunications Board (CSTB). Herbert Lin is study director and senior staff officer of the CSTB. Inquiries about this study should be directed to him at 202-334-3191 or via Internet at HLIN(a)NAS.EDU. The National Research Council (NRC) is the operating arm of the Academy complex, which includes the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine. The NRC provides impartial and independent advice to the federal government and other policy makers, by applying top scientific and technical talent to answer questions of national significance. In addition, the NRC often acts as a neutral party in convening meetings among multiple stakeholders on various controversial issues, thereby facilitating the generation of consensus. Within the NRC, the CSTB considers technical and policy issues pertaining to computer science, telecommunications, and associated technologies as critical resources and sources of national economic strength. A list of CSTB publications is available on request to CSTB(a)NAS.EDU or by calling 202-334-2605.

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Re: Laws Outside the U.S.
by Carl Ellison 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From: usura(a)vox.xs4all.nl (Alex de Joode) >Date: Tue, 20 Sep 94 22:24:56 +0200 >There are basicly four scenario's that a state can follow to >regulate crypto: > - outlaw it totally > - key depositing > - try to develop a standart > - do nothing >The most prosperous scenario. Crypto use will boom, but >lawenforcement agencies will be deprived from a useful >tool, they can't bug phones any more. I think this is wishful thinking on our parts. Crypto would have to be built-in and automatic (not even a button push required to activate it) before I think you'd see much of a user community. Even then, some people might encounter key exchange problems and beg for a button to *disable* crypto. Until you see a substantial percentage of the population using crypto, I don't think law enforcement will have any problem. They'll worry about drug dealers as a new potential threat, but have them read Kahn about Rum Runners (in a chapter with that in the title). -------------- To me, it's obvious that this isn't a real LE problem. That leaves open the question of why the US and others want to limit crypto. I think part of the answer comes from the USACM report, in the second paragraph of chapter 4. "The development of telecommunications in the 19th century, first via cable and later by radio, presented a challenge to national security so severe as to challenge the very notion of national sovereignty. Nations could still regulate the flow of people and products across their borders, but in a process that continues unabated, news, ideas, and information began to travel in channels far harder to control." This sounds like either a Cypherpunk or Clint Brooks wrote it. I'd guess the latter but I think they'd both be wrong. Since when have nations seen their people as imprisoned? We limit the speech of prisoners, but of citizens? When did nations ever care about limiting the speech of citizens, before the middle of this century (with the advent of OSS/CIA thinking)? Was travel prohibited? Were private conversations with foreigners prohibited? -------------- So -- the argument is bogus. Why advance it? My answer: because the Agency advancing it (with cypherpunks as unwitting accomplices) wants to create the perception of a threat of loss of power in those who have power (Congress, President) so that they'll give state-of-emergency powers to the appropriate Agency to fight back. Net result: no real threat; real increase in power for one Agency. +----------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Carl M. Ellison Phone: (301) 854-6889 | |Trusted Information Systems, Inc. FAX: (301) 854-5363 | |3060 Washington Road | |Glenwood MD 21738 E-mail: cme(a)tis.com | | | |RIPEM MD5OfPublicKey: 39 D9 86 06 86 A9 F0 75 A9 A8 3D 49 58 9C 67 7A| |PGP 2.6.1 Key fingerprints: E0 41 4C 79 B5 AF 36 75 02 17 BC 1A 57 38 64 78| | 61 E2 DE 7F CB 9D 79 84 E9 C8 04 8B A6 32 21 A2| +----------------------------------------------------------------------------+

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Re: META: Tim's FAQ, ftp to chaos
by Chael Hall 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>About retreiving the gopher files via ftp: I'm not sure it is set up >for that yet. Chael has put in quite a bit of work over the summer, >including updating gopher daemon, and he did mention he would like to >make the heirarchy available via anonymous ftp, or perhaps move the >gopher directory (currently a subdirectory of my home) into the >anonymous ftp area. However, I'm not sure if this has been done yet, >or is doable, etc. > >If there is sufficient interest though, I could place the chapters of the >FAQ into the cypherpunks/incoming directory for the time being. > >-- >Karl L. Barrus: klbarrus(a)owlnet.rice.edu The Cypherpunks gopher hierarchy that was under Karl's home directory has been officially moved to ~ftp/cypherpunks. Gopher should work as normal and all of the files should be FTPable as well! Chael -- Chael Hall, nowhere(a)chaos.bsu.edu

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Re: (fwd) "Will You Be a Terrorist?"
by nobody＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Usura wrote: > Please keep in mind that the US jurisdiction doen't cover the whole earth. > > (There is life outside the US) Unfortunately, most of the remailers aren't.

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Re: Laws Outside the U.S. (fwd) Re: Laws Outside the U.S.
by nobody＠kaiwan.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

|Date: Wed, 21 Sep 1994 10:16:35 -0400 (EDT) |From: Jeff Barber <jeffb(a)sware.com> |To: Hadmut Danisch <danisch(a)ira.uka.de> |Cc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com |Subject: Re: Laws Outside the U.S. |Hadmut Danisch writes: |> The EC forces their countries to |> equalize their laws in the sense of "what you can do in one country, > you can do everywhere". |> If France forbids the import of crypto software, but allows to sell it |> inside of France, then I can sue France, because the french programmer |> can sell his programs in France and I can't. |Isn't it inevitable that this will -- for the same reasons of equity |among the member countries -- evolve into a single set of laws governing |the *use* of crypto throughout the EC? Free movement of goods rules in the EC contain exceptions for public order and national security. National rules control in those areas. SOLONg

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Re: Reserved DC-Net IP addresses
by rishab＠dxm.ernet.in 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

doug(a)OpenMind.com (Doug Cutrell): [I haven't seen this on the list yet, but it looks as if it was meant for all] > Subject: Re: Reserved DC-Net IP addresses > I think you miss the point... there is a need to have a specific > "broadcast" IP address that "speaks" for the whole DC-net. This is so that > someone from within the net can send a message anonymously to *outside* the > net. The members within the net could use standard IP addresses, I would > presume. Eric was talking about formally allocating a range of addresses for IP. That's like putting up an RFC for each remailer, to 'notarize' the fact that the remailer is not the real source. Any IP address can be the apparent source for the DC-Net messages. It only has to be acknowledged by all the participants (just as remailer users have to know about the mailer address). You may need to publicize a _disclaimer_ as IP packets don't carry Comment: lines. You don't need to formally allocate the address, though, and certainly shouldn't have to go to the IETF - that's hardly anarchy! One might have DCN IPs bouncing just as remailers do, and use DCNping to see which are up ;-) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Rishab Aiyer Ghosh "Clean the air! clean the sky! wash the wind! rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in take stone from stone and wash them..." Voice/Fax/Data +91 11 6853410 Voicemail +91 11 3760335 H 34C Saket, New Delhi 110017, INDIA

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Re: Tedious Chomsky arguments, some small remailer relevance.
by chen＠intuit.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In response to James Donald: The Hayek quote is correct, and an example of what Reinholdt Niebuhr called "manufacturing consent" (where have I heard this?). I am not going to get into your Chomsky argument, except to say that your excerpt explicitly contradicts your conclusions: > "The Chomsky reader" Pantheon books, 1987, p.201, quotes > a paper written by Chomsky in 1975: > > "When the *New York Times* editors and U. N. Ambassador > Moynihan castigate Idi Amin of Uganda as a "racist > murderer," perhaps correctly, there is a surge of public > pride throughout the country; and they are lauded for their > courage and honesty. No one would be so vulgar as to > observe that the editors and the ambassador, in the not > very distant past, have supported racist murder on a scale > that exceeds Amin's wildest fantasies. The general failure > to be appalled by their hypocritical pronouncements > reflects, in the first place, the extremely powerful > ideological controls that prevent us from coming to terms > with our acts and their significance and, in the second > place, the nation's profound commitment to racist > principle." For which you graciously provide a vigorous, trenchant "analysis": > 1. Whatever Idi Amin is, he is morally much better than > Moynihan and the NY Times editors. There is no mention anywhere of moral superiority. There is a statement of the demonstrable fact that "the editors and the ambassador, in the not very distant past, have supported racist murder on a scale that exceeds Amin's wildest fantasies," referring, perhaps, to the (then) recent Indonesian slaughter in East Timor, or to the secret genocide in Cambodia (the one that happened *before* Pol Pot), or to any number of other U.S.-_Times_-backed atrocities. > 2. Only a country steeped in racist principle will fail to be > appalled when hearing Idi Amin called a racist murderer, even > when he is. This is simply nowhere to be found. "The general failure to be appalled by their hypocritical pronouncements" clearly has nothing whatever to do with Idi Amin. I know that it's difficult for you to conceive, James, but life is not always a football game. Hating the Rams doesn't imply loving the Packers. > ** 3. Only powerful ideological controls can prevent the > public from being outraged when someone truthfully calls a > black man a racist murderer. This is the same as your #2, and again, it is neither said nor implied. I would suggest that you read the passage again, but I don't think it will help. You're evidently quite intent on tilting at Chomsky as some sort of symbol of all that is threatening to your special brand of proto-Malthusian machismo. And it's really an extraordinary conceit to suppose that anyone else cares. You say elsewhere: > This coming thread will actually have some very slight > relevance to remailers, (gasp) in that I point out that the > same reasoning that enables Chomsky to define the > government to be the people, and individuals to be the evil > Capitalist Conspiracy, can be used in the same way; to > conclude that the eradication of Remailers and eradication > of the sort of thoughts that remailers are often used to > communicate, and the eradication of the kind of people that > are on the cypherpunks mailing list, represents a triumph > for liberty and civil rights, a triumph that would prove > how far civil liberties have advanced from the bad old > days. Before doing the service of "pointing out" all of these grandiose things to us, perhaps you should work on your reading comprehension. Your original claim was: > Of course Noam Chomsky is optimistic - he favors limitless and > absolute state power and the forcible and violent silencing of all > those who deviate from political correctness. The "analysis" which you present, apart from being factually wrong in every imaginable way, does not move one inch toward supporting this. If the only purpose of your claim was to serve as a platform for launching vapid diatribes, then knock yourself out. Otherwise, we would all appreciate it if you'd stick to the point. This is the last I will say on the subject, unless the thread assumes the shape of something vaguely relevant. -- Mark Chen chen(a)netcom.com 415/329-6913 finger for PGP public key D4 99 54 2A 98 B1 48 0C CF 95 A5 B0 6E E0 1E 1D

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by owner-cypherpunks 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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