December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

OTP for remailers?
by jimn8＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I hope this isn't redundant; if this idea has been covered, sorry. Wouldn't it make sense for remailers to use OTP's for encryption? Public keys are great, but they can be black-bagged. I'd imagine that a copy of the private key to a popular remailer could be very valuable to anyone who could monitor remailer traffic transparently. A one-time pad on CD-ROM should hold enough pad data to last for several days' worth of data sent between remailers, even at high message volumes. So OTP's could be used practically between friendly remailers. Do existing remailers change their public keys often enough to limit exposure by their users in the event of the key being compromised? If so, perhaps I should be less concerned than I am. Nevertheless, I'd like to be able to talk to a remailer via a one-time pad. The OTP could be sold to remailer users as a means of generating revenue (a OTP CD-ROM could be made for about $20 and sold for a very reasonable price but still be profitable!) Once the OTP is used, it can (and should) be destroyed. On the other hand, data encrypted with a public key is vulnerable to black bag attacks on that key, as I just said. The cost of burning CD-ROMs is going down pretty rapidly. Wholesale cost of a burning mechanism should be well under $1,000 within the next year or two, and RNG hardware is coming online too. Blank media runs $15-$20, although Kodak sells PhotoCD media cheaper, at a loss, to developers who promise to use the discs for PhotoCD images ;) I don't really have anything in principle against the use of public keys for remailers; it would just make me feel a bit easier about their security if the private key couldn't be black-bagged with a using them if my communication to them couldn't be black-bagged with a simple bug that transmits the private key. I'd imagine a bus snooper chip could be made easily enough that could look for instruction and data flow corresponding to keys, and transmit it over low bandwidth channels to a listening station. I find it harder to imagine a device that could tap an entire data stream from a hard drive and transmit the complete contents undetected (assuming the remailer operator checks for bugs.) Now for a discussion on how to get a OTP CD from Finland without having the mail intercepted... nahh, never mind. - Jim Nitchals

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No Subject
by Ed Switalski 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

------- Forwarded Message Return-Path: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com Received: from hedera.bnr.co.uk on bnsgs200.bnr.co.uk over SMTP (5.65c/UK-2.1-MX(adur)); Thu, 17 Mar 1994 09:37:18 GMT Received: from eurogate.bnr.co.uk by hedera.bnr.co.uk with SMTP (PP); Thu, 17 Mar 1994 09:37:14 +0000 Received: from relay2.UU.NET by eurogate.bnr.co.uk with Internet SMTP (PP) id <25474-0(a)eurogate.bnr.co.uk>; Thu, 17 Mar 1994 09:37:08 +0000 Received: from toad.com by relay2.UU.NET with SMTP (5.61/UUNET-internet-primary) id AAwhpd03977; Thu, 17 Mar 94 04:28:59 -0500 Received: by toad.com id AA08739; Thu, 17 Mar 94 01:16:04 PST Received: from eurogate.bnr.co.uk by toad.com id AA08728; Thu, 17 Mar 94 01:15:46 PST Received: from bnr.co.uk by eurogate.bnr.co.uk with SMTP (PP) id <25199-0(a)eurogate.bnr.co.uk>; Thu, 17 Mar 1994 09:15:20 +0000 Received: from bnsgs200.bnr.co.uk by hedera.bnr.co.uk with SMTP (PP); Thu, 17 Mar 1994 09:15:11 +0000 Message-Id: <199403170915.5154(a)bnsgs200.bnr.co.uk> Received: from bnsgs207.bnr.co.uk on bnsgs200.bnr.co.uk over SMTP (5.65c/UK-2.1-MX(adur)); Thu, 17 Mar 1994 09:15:06 GMT To: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+(a)andrew.cmu.edu> Cc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Subject: Re: Radio Networking In-Reply-To: Your message of "Wed, 16 Mar 1994 21:12:00 EST." <YhVvlky00awO45VkcL(a)andrew.cmu.edu> Date: Thu, 17 Mar 1994 09:14:32 +0000 From: Ed Switalski <E.Switalski(a)bnr.co.uk> Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com Precedence: bulk >About how far can one transmit with 250mw? *** Quite Far ! With coherent CW you can key morse Japan/US i.e cross the Pacific on a few watts. CCW involves getting the Tx master oscillator and the receivers local oscillator phase-locked (by using the local time/frequency standard transmitter (e.g. WWV MSF etc -one can also get nifty little rubidium standard clocks quite cheaply these days). US readers might care to look in the ARRL handbook for 1982 or thereabouts. CCW implies slow signalling speeds- a few baud, very narrow detection bandwidth few hertz (to match signalling) and coherent TX and RX. The ultimate limit is probably phase shift in the ionosphere. Use a frequency that a bit off Big Brother's scanner channel spacing and your emmission may not be detected -unless the spook is right on top of you. Which is just as well given it might take DAYS to download a .ps document ;-( Note this is a slow and gentle way of doing things, as opposed to a high-bandwidth, time-compressed (fairlyly high-power) "screech" transmission with somthing like meteorscatter. Regards, __o __o Ed \<, \<, _________________________________________()/ ()_____()/ ()_____________ Ed Switalski email: eswitals(a)bnr.co.uk Dept GM21, BNR Europe Ltd, Oakleigh Rd South, tel: +44 (0)81 945-2924 New Southgate, fax: +44 (0)81 945-3116 London, N11 1HB LON40, internal ESN (730) 2924 _______________________________________________________________________ ------- End of Forwarded Message

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Clipper hearings
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Begin Forwarded Message talk.politics.crypto #3763 (4 more) Subject: Clipper hearings. Not yet scheduled for CSPAN. From: kwebb(a)unm.edu (Kyle L. Webb) Date: Wed Mar 16 21:07:21 EST 1994 Organization: University of New Mexico, Albuquerque Lines: 28 Forgive me if this has been put out before. I called Senator Leahy's office, and was told that the Clipper hearings were to be held Friday March 18th at 1030 am EST in room 226 Dirksen Senate Office Building. I sent email to cspanviewr(a)aol.org which is CSPAN's viewer comment address letting them know of this. Today I got back a reply that there was as yet no plan to cover this event, but that the info had been forwarded to the programming staff. My guess is that it is far more likely that these hearings will be shown by CSPAN if there are a large number of requests to either the email address for CSPAN or phone calls to the CSPAN office, inquiring if the hearings will be broadcast. If getting information on Clipper into the public eye is important, then getting the hearings carried by CSPAN would be a good way to start. CSPAN's viewer services phone number is (202) 626-7963 (I got this number from CSPAN's gopher server, so it's been on the net before) Kyle L. Webb Dept. of Physics + Astronomy kwebb(a)carina.unm.edu University of New Mexico - fin -uni- (Dark)

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Senator Leahy's hearing
by bart＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Will you be covering this hearing on the important issue of the Clipper chip and our rights to privacy? It will be on March 18th, this Friday, at 10:30 am EST in Room 226 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building. Hope you can tape it for rebroadcast if you can't cover it live. Please let me know your schedule as soon as possible as I would hate to miss it, and have lots of friends who I would like to advise of the time and date.

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Address correction
by bart＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The address given by Black Unicorn to mail to cspan was in error, my mail to cspanviewr(a)aol.org bounced. To rattle their cage, try cspanviewr(a)aol.COM.

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Guardian, front page, March 17.
by gtoal＠an-teallach.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"The security services are said to have warned the Department of Trade and Industry that they will need to act more publicly if the service (talking about the Royal Mail - G) is privatised. They also point out that unlike the privatisation of the telephone network, which left the British Telecom network intact and easy to tap, the privatisation of the Royal Mail will lead to independent competitor services, making the interception of mail much more difficult." G

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OSS
by Mike Markley 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Last night (4/16/94) both the Discover Channel and A & E Network ran specials on the OSS and the part that they played in helping the Allies win World War II. It was kind of interesting to see what went on back then. I didn't watch the whole thing because I grew tired of watching grainy black and white footage of people walking through mud and water in rain forests on Pacific islands. I'm just curious if there is any connection between these broadcasts, which were quite rah-rah about the need for covert intelligence agencies, and the current Skipjack debate. Mike. -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= Mike Markley || The opinions here do not represent the mmarkley(a)microsoft.com || opinions of my employer. Attempts to || associate the two are pointless. "I want to look at life, In the available light" - Neil Peart -

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Whats so bad about a surveillance state
by Brian D Williams 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Disclaimer: The opinions expressed are my own and do not represent the views of Ameritech or it's alliance partners. Blanc Weber Postulates: > -With the rise of fiber telcos are laying fewer cable > routes and just stuffing the routes they do dig up with > more fiber than is necessary for replacement of the > existing copper, leaving some major areas with only a > single path in and out as one bundle of fiber replaces > tons of copper that was laid in multiple paths > originally becayse it would not fit in one path. Saves > the telcos money, but a single backhoe might be able to > cause some major damage now... Well, I can't speak for the other Telco's, but here in the Midwest this is flat out untrue. Project looking glass which resulted in a Billion dollars of additional fiber installed in the last year, and an additional billion a year for the next 6 years is completely diversified. Countercurrent rings, diverse pathways, the whole bit. I believe the Internet was a model for these strategies. I might add that this is not new, we've been pursuing these strategies as long as I've been here. (about ten years) There were a couple of incidents involving landscape contractors in the last year, none resulted in significant outage. This is particularly interesting since the utilities run a service called JULIE (for Joint Utility Locating something or other) which you are supposed to call 48 hours before you dig, we'll send someone out to make sure you don't encounter anything. Brian Williams Extropian Cypherpatriot "Cryptocosmology: Sufficently advanced comunication is indistinguishable from noise." --Steve Witham -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLYiI2NCcBnAsu2t1AQGlPwP/ax2RmIZf0gFe86gwQmFqxNKcte5lRscW 2Y3AaPjLWIkN9O8IfMf5ZUaLQMMCEKJWfWUzq1B53Gwp3O3aTvpNhCpCnrHI8od7 uw8OcwyNKkYy4MyAtd4aCDkf7dMDuo4APZgSrS7IFSVRIK5ciFx6FopYyATuaOCa ZuywqzZWObI= =2g/i -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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RE: The Joy of Digicash
by Blanc Weber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From Hal: Proper cash will produce a symmetrical pattern. By choosing good CA rules, the patterns will be different for each bill, some nicer than others, leading to attractive fractal-looking patterns for many bills. When you wanted to "look at your money" you could run the program on the digital cash. People might even trade for especially attractive bills. ..................... This sounds really cool, if it could work that way. I can imagine a large screen wall display of these fractal images continuously running in color in the entertainment room, as a kaleidescopic display of all my cash holdings.......if the patterns begin to repeat themselves too soon, it means I don't have very much in the digibank. :>) So there couldn't be anything else which would produce these same patterns and thus be confused for the original or actual? Blanc

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EFF gun-shy of legally employing PGP
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Newsgroups: alt.2600,comp.org.eff.talk From: grady(a)netcom.com (Grady Ward) Subject: Re: "Porn Press Release" from EFF is a Hoax Message-ID: <gradyCMtHxp.M6L(a)netcom.com> Followup-To: alt.2600,comp.org.eff.talk Organization: Moby lexical databases X-Newsreader: TIN [version 1.2 PL1] References: <CMI2AL.uAD(a)sernews.raleigh.ibm.com> <2m2mou$mp1(a)eff.org> <1994Mar15.170955.21185(a)nntpd2.cxo.dec.com> <2m5p3f$gt4(a)agate.berkeley.edu> Distribution: inet Date: Thu, 17 Mar 1994 16:32:13 GMT Lines: 78 Steve Pope (spp(a)zabriskie.eecs.berkeley.edu) wrote: : page(a)solvit.enet.dec.com (My name is...) writes: : > Yes, but the point of the reply, is that PGP signatures SHOULD : > be used by sysops. : Hmmm... why PGP, as opposed to the FIPS Digital Signature Standard? : Is the latter not in place yet? Yes, you can use the DSS (unless it is given away to PK partners, that is). The importance of using PGP or another strong privately developed crypto is that it supports the industry rather than relies upon the government. But since Mr Godwin has answered the question to his satisfaction and is not responding to further questions, I guess we will never know the real reason why the EFF will not use PGP to digitally sign press releases. Apparently Mr Godwin chooses not to be responsive to the EFF membership with respect to this issue. He only has said that sysops don't use PGP so rumors would not be quashed anyway. From a person of his intelligence this is about the lamest reason I've heard. Let me see if I can speculate on the real reaons the EFF may not choose to use PGP to sign press releases: (0) Using PGP would be provocative to the very powers we seek to infiltrate [ViaCrypt PGP is perfectly legal and fully licensed.] (1) There is not a problem with authenticity. [This must be false, otherwise Mr Godwin wouldn't have begun this thread] (2) Signing with PGP is not effective. [false; MD5 and RSA have no known weaknesses] (3) Signing with PGP is too hard or would take too much time [false, perfect for irregular press releases] (4) PGP signatures take too much bandwidth. [false, again perfect for the mmoderate to longer press releases] (5) Sysops don't use PGP, rumors would spread anyway [Sysops might begin with suitable leadership; the signature of course could be ignored and the rumor spread anyway -- but if there *were* a question of authenticity an individual could check the authenticity without needing to log on to EFF's server or needing to personally contact an EFF official] (6) Signatures make the press release harder to read [false, a single line at the beginning and a block of lines at the end are added, none of the body is changed in any way] (7) We are journalists and attorneys, not nose-picking nerds [??????] (8) We are journalists and attorneys, this might expose up to greater liability and less 'deniability'. [???????] (9) We just defend these 'PGP' and 'BBS' people. We don't actually want to ASSOCIATE with them more than we have to. Cooties. [???????] (10) The EFF does not have to explain its actions or inactions to anyone. [???????] While Sternlight is merely annoying, and sometimes entertaining, EFFs lack of dialogue on this leadership opportunity supporting private crypto signatures is very, very disappointing. -- Grady Ward | +1 707 826 7715 | finger grady(a)netcom.com for free 3449 Martha Ct. | (voice/24hr FAX) | Moby lexicon brochure & samples Arcata, CA 95521-4884 | 15E2ADD3D1C6F3FC | KN6JR monitoring 14.178 & 14.237 USA | 58ACF73D4F011E2F | 1800 UTC - 2000 UTC daily

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