December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

(Fwd) The Guardian OnLine
by whitaker＠dpair.csd.sgi.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded from Ian Geldard, with his permission. Note that the address is "online(a)guardian.co.uk"; misspelling of guardian, below. The Guardian (still known to most Brits as "the Manchester Guardian") is a national daily broadsheet newspaper. -Russell --- Forwarded mail from igeldard(a)capital.demon.co.uk To: russw(a)netcom.com Russell, Thought you might like to know, if you don't already know, that the Guardian has started to produce a new weekly supplement called The Guardian OnLine, which is "exclusively devoted to the startling developments in computing, science and technology." The first edition (Thursday May 19) had a lot about the Internet and the recent crackdown on the Fidonet system by Italian police. Might be worth sending them items about cypherpunks etc. email: online(a)guradian.co.uk snail: OnLine, The Guardian, 119 Farringdon Road, London EC1R 3ER TTFN - Ian -- +-----------------------------------------------------+ | Ian Geldard | FidoNet 2:254/151 CIS 70734,426 | | London U.K. | Internet igeldard(a)capital.demon.co.uk | +-----------------------------------------------------+ --- End of forwarded mail from igeldard(a)capital.demon.co.uk -- Russell Earl Whitaker whitaker(a)csd.sgi.com Silicon Graphics Inc. Technical Assistance Center / Centre D'Assistance Technique / Tekunikaru Ashisutansu Sentaa Mountain View CA (415) 390-2250 ================================================================ #include <std_disclaimer.h>

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Re: MIT has released PGP 2.6
by Richard Johnson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- What will we have to do to get MIT-PGP 2.6 via anonymous ftp from net-dist.mit.edu? Like with MIT-PGP 2.5, telnet to net-dist.mit.edu, and answer questions. This time there are 4. The first three questions help MIT protect itself from possible legal problems related to their distributing PGP - they cover their rear ends with regard to ITAR regs (questions 1 and 2) and patent infringement (question 3). First, we must assure net-dist that we're not trying to export MIT-PGP 2.6. Second, we must promise not to export MIT-PGP 2.6. Third, we must agree to the terms and conditions in the RSAREF license. Finally, we must agree that we won't use MIT-PGP 2.6 for commercial purposes. A "yes" answer to that last question is the only thing specifically required by the RSAREF license. Note well that we aren't required to obey strictures in some kind of "README" file. Remember this for when someone tries to muddy the waters with baseless obfuscatory claims about what we agreed to in some auxiliary file, and how that auxiliary file somehow overrules the license terms. :-) I find the RSAREF license quite reasonable, as I did their previous version. I have not yet seen the MIT license. I don't know about the source, because I haven't grabbed it yet. Richard - --------- Here are the details: boojum(101) % telnet net-dist.mit.edu ULTRIX V4.2A (Rev. 47) (bitsy) login: getpgp Warning: no Kerberos tickets obtained. Athena Server (DSMAXINE) Version 7.4G Mon Jul 27 10:22:03 1992 Unable to open /usr/tmp/attachtab: No such file or directory This distribution of PGP 2.6 incorporates the RSAREF(tm) Cryptographic Toolkit under license from RSA Data Security, Inc. A copy of that license is in the file /pub/PGP/rsalicen.txt available via anonymous FTP from net-dist.mit.edu (note: login as anonymous *not* getpgp). In accordance with the terms of that license, PGP 2.6 may be used for non-commercial purposes only. PGP 2.6 and RSAREF may be subject to the export control laws of the United States of America as implemented by the United States Department of State Office of Defense Trade Controls. Users who wish to obtain a copy of PGP 2.6 are require to answer the following questions: Are you a citizen or national of the United States or a person who has been lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States under the Immigration and Naturalization Act? <type "yes" or "no"> XXXXX Do you agree not to export PGP 2.6, or RSAREF to the extent incorporated therein, in violation of the export control laws of the United States of America as implemented by the United States Department of State Office of Defense Trade Controls? <type "yes" or "no"> XXXXX Do you agree to the terms and conditions of the RSAREF license (in /pub/PGP/rsalicen.txt)? <type "yes" or "no"> XXXXX Will you use PGP 2.6 solely for non-commercial purposes? <type "yes" or "no"> XXXXX To get PGP 2.6 use anonymous FTP to net-dist.mit.edu and look in the directory: /pub/PGP/dist/U.S.-only-XXXXX Note: Use anonymous FTP, do not attempt to login to on the "getpgp" account. Holding for 60 seconds ^C to quit sooner. telnet> quit -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.5 iQCVAgUBLeGyAPobez3wRbTBAQHvqwQApqr3yozjVheZxLE7VI8hrPp7eTylUWT1 qh6wtlqVjrsJWnYh+LwOzCEL+o6ZZzuXaKwnoaVZO2C6sf9666ZETSMnCRiCvIBv 0mhgbyc96DCLJVkv1O7gAOmzq3B+bNauXQndjdTr58lRZgoTd7A8FfK0m3xP7y8P 1WYXytLPomI= =ls3s -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Testing compatibility 2.6 v. 2.3a
by ER CRAMER 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Please could someone change the date of his computer after 1 september 1994 and send a PGP-ed message to me so I can test the compatibily of 2.6 (I also implemented the patch send to this server in 2.3a so I can check that too...). My public key: -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.3c mQCNAiv3vSkAAAEEAMGWtCrT8eIhK0qR0yqYepYCcRdjw+EhiIzP4XkHlwkR9iVt 4xnTGHKuuCnGJG0ftez4hEZsTpdrz8mQ0SnYy0KLQ6DUvKH9IMgl6S9yJiYAgtC2 4TN15+t/9ZJjlVMgwtRY5tPLgrZ7h6Jw/rZIj+Wwj78yjcdguYDAdPKe9hHLAAUR tCZFZWxjbyBDcmFtZXIgPGNyYW1lMDAxQGhpby50ZW0ubmhsLm5sPokAlQIFEC20 ++aAwHTynvYRywEBJ/UD+QEah9xIn/Vt3GbJYA3b6i/vXnEhG/z6qrqaJ8fubFin Ia2JMT4AceNEtz+6j7lIz/iJbj9CPIOASnSIQ/hmrERlWcsgWR7U29QnQjunZ6BE S64pONVmEA207lDwgAzUJ4+h+urYTIfz4qW/jHcs6nTfwe5qhfbDM1b6yTe301A/ iQCVAgUQK/qELegWAlGwR3dDAQEd/AQA1iny6lLuQFxVg6yvJ6xjnjSmOpHkz2Un ZTfbnXHtDBLA0CDFT8A4nfW/hLT1j7dx6yD5+lUPkMX1GTttlOMp819VyK8Wm8lv HnkFbehTTmmlY2BxBqWC7EUml39BqQEWbxqlt6M/btScsMVlQJyiluEW1cacYt68 DPpqScQWzz0= =cAIH -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- ... If you outlaw Privacy, only the Outlaws will have Privacy! Eelco Cramer <crame001(a)hio.tem.nhl.nl> ------ --------------------------------------------------

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Anonymous libel and Unicorn's lawsuit
by rishab＠dxm.ernet.in 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The two basic reasons for anonymity, as I see it, are: 1. freedom of expression 2. freedom from analysis, i.e. context-based 'profiling' by companies or governments, based on your non-anonymous posts. In an ideal world one would have the freedom to express without any risk of damage, whether it be economic, material or social. Ideally, I should be able to publicly discuss my views, on anarchy or religion or sadism or whatever, without risking social censure. In an ideally tolerant society, the need for anonymity would then be reduced to (2), freedom from analysis. Unfortunately our society is far from ideal. Though Unicorn could freely post on the relatively more tolerant Net, he still faces intolerance in the 'real' world. For all we may talk about reputation systems, multiple identities and so on, the seven-digit possible loss Unicorn talks about is _real_, in a way cyberspace just isn't, yet. Suppose tmp _had_ posted through chains of remailers? The damage would have been just as real; the remedy would have been far less. Would, and should, remailer operators facing such a situation 'open up'? Uni says Julf would disable tmp though Netcom didn't, Julf understands netiquette. Maybe, but it's not that easy to disable an account through a chain of cypherpunk-style remailers. I remember when we discussed the Usenet libel case in Australia, someone (Tim?) said that anonymous posts, and libellious posts in general, should not be taken that seriously. Uni's business associates are not likely to be so familiar with net culture, and would not understand the anonymous part of it, just the slight (from their perspective) on Uni's character. Of course, Uni should have posted everything through a chain of remailers himself, if he was concerned about his views leaking out of the Net. Does that mean he'd never be able to attend cypherpunk meetings, or have truename contact with anyone, lest he be identified with his anonymously held opinions? If tmp, or anyone else for that matter, were to suspect that Uni was behind specific anon posts, he'd just make that accusation anonymously, in 100 news groups. Libel doesn't have to be proven to be damaging. What I find amusing is that Detweiler was the one who started going nuts while making paranoid warnings about the dangers of anonymity, such as in libel. He seems bent on proving his predictions correct, as many of the recent examples of identity abuse (tm) were instigated by him. (Of course, by this I'm not saying that Detweiler's views are reflected in tmp's posts... ;-) -------------------------------------------------------------------------- Rishab Aiyer Ghosh rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in Voicemail +91 11 3760335; Vox/Fax/Data 6853410 H-34C Saket New Delhi 110017 INDIA The National Short-Sleeved Shirt Association says: Support your right to bare arms! --------------------------------------------------------------------------

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PGP 2.6
by pcw＠access.digex.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Here is an exchange I had with the folks at MIT who did PGP2.6. I've suggested that they delay their anti-patent-infringement gadgetry until PGP2.6 is more widely available for _all_ platforms. >> I use a Macintosh. Is there a Mac PGP 2.6? > >Me too. Hopefully we will have a MacPGP 2.6 shortly (I am not sure whether >we will do the port at MIT, or whether the traditional MacPGP development >team will do it, probably the later). > > -Jeff Perhaps you should delay the expiration of old, pre-RSAREF PGP keys until after a Mac version is available. That would avoid cutting off a large part of the populace.

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Response to Uni's "Lawsuit" Message
by cfrye＠mason1.gmu.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

First off, many thanks to Uni for deciding to share his venture into the legal ramifications of Usenet. It's a shame things had to be taken to this extreme, though his reasoning (edited to conserve bandwidth) is flawless and the potential harm quite grave. I address this issue from my George Mason University account as it presents my personal opinions on the subject and does not necessarily reflect the views of Digital Gateway Systems, Inc., a DC-area Internet access provider where I am Director of Sales and Marketing. However, Uni's comments on Netcom's role in the matter are, to say the least, thought-provoking for someone in my position. I have deleted quite a bit of the background and history, though I believe the context of all relevant points has been preserved. Should I make an error in that sense, or misrepresent one of Uni's positions, I hope to be corrected quickly. <--uni's words begin--> I contacted netcom.com to see how they might respond to the suit, and to ask about the need for a preliminary injunction to prevent data in and about tmp's account from being destroyed inadvertently or intentionally. Netcom.com was initially not very cooperative. They suggested I sort the problem out with tmp, and that it was not their issue. This was until my attorney called Mr. Bruce Woodcock at Netcom support services. Mr. Woodcock was VERY cooperative. He was very interested in avoiding liability and was perhaps the best card we had in the suit. While I cannot go into detail as to the specific support he provided, I think it is safe to say AS A GENERAL MATTER that while most internet providers will be very strict about privacy for their account holders, the appearance of legal proceedings and potential court orders make a provider very interested in not being named as a co-defendant. (Note 1) I must thank Mr. Woodcock and commend him on his excellent balance of client privacy and respect for the judicial system. <--uni's words end--> I would imagine that the folks who received the initial communication were not in a position to realize the potential damage that being named on such a suit could cause even if a court chose not to impose monetary liabilities. I live in fear of that sort of occurrence and, while cooperation with lawyers and striking an "excellent balance of client privacy and respect for the judicial system" can be turned into your favor, the risk of someone not being of a mind to settle with the defendant and also willing to drag as many people/organizations down with the defendant as possible is daunting. A question I don't ever expect to have answered, as it involves both a hypothetical situation and is, by its nature, unfair: What if you had lost the Swiss furniture deal? You admitted that you would not have been as sanguine about the affair -- would the rage have led you to forego contacting Netcom and name them as a co-defendant? Even had you later dropped them from the suit, substantial damage would have been done. Also, that action might have caused them to entrench and force you to go through discovery, a long and trying process. Not to mention the expense... One way I had foreseen providing (relatively) anonymous Internet access for my Cypherpunk comrades was to establish an account with no personal information in the system log, post a cash or money order payment to DGS's bank account, and retain an account name-indexed list where I could email individuals whose accounts were due to expire. The problems with this scheme? Keeping track of who was who and making sure no one grabbed someone else's userid (zero knowledge proofs, anyone???) is one, legal liability for providing such a service is another. I need to research the applicable regulations which state how much customer information we are required to maintain, if any. Anyone out there familiar with the laws of the Commonwealth of Virginia on this point? The weak link in the system? Me. Numerous points of failure and susceptible to lawsuits and other legal/non-legal forms of "rubber hose de- anonymization". <--uni's words begin--> In a way I'm sorry the case didn't go to the courts. While it probably would not have been a precedent setting one, because it doesn't seem tmp(a)netcom.com could have appealed a ruling and gotten it into the record books as an appeals case with some precedent, it would have been interesting to see what sort of liability Usenet might present. In a way I felt guilty. Usenet and the net in general is such a break from the normal rules and fears of liability it seemed a shame in a way to introduce the ugly head of jurisdiction and subservience to the legal system to cyberspace. <--uni's words end--> Agreed, though your willingness to settle mitigates the "sin" of the original action, IMHO. I fear that future suits, when they inevitably occur, will be based on a much less extravagant disregard for the truth, possibly setting the threshold for libel/slander on the Usenet at intolerably low levels. As you mention later, the possibility of government-controlled nationwide information networks would be a frightening proposition if the government were to choose a test case, get the best lawyers they could afford (!!??) and take a chance with twelve "peers" sitting on a pine bench for $5 per day. <--uni's words begin--> I also don't like to be a bully. In another way it seemed like a no-lose situation. If I won a suit, I would be vindicated (as petty as that is), and there would be some clue as to how far one could go on Usenet and in cyberspace in general. If I lost, I would be just as pleased that the line had been drawn and the results of basic immunity to defamation and libel would have been quite a social experiment, a result still quite worth the expenditure for me. In addition, I was very interested in discovering how a court, the ultimate throwback to the real world, would impose (or refuse to impose) traditional legal theory on Usenet and electronic mailing lists in general. As a legal scholar, it was a problem that presented a wonderful chance to see the law evolve literally right before my eyes. In retrospect, I'm not sure I would have been so pleased if the Swiss deal had been compromised in the process. <--uni's words end--> As I do not share your frame of reference, it's hard for me to make a judgment on these points. Moving from the theoretical to the practical, seeing the law made before your eyes is an unnerving experience that, as a non-lawyer, I find a bit difficult to view with the detachment you seem to show in this passage. (I'm sure you're concerned as well, it's just that this paragraph, read out of context, is a bit dispassionate.) Also see my points about thresholds of abuse above. <--uni's words begin--> Note 1: It seems to me that the entire event highlights the potential demand for anonymous utilities on both sides. tmp would have been much better off for his ability to use remailers, and I would have been much better off had I guarded my pseudonym more effectively. The interesting solution would be a multi-jurisdictional remailer making records non- reconstructable, and guarding the operator from jurisdiction and liability. tmp's greatest weak spot was Netcom's potential liability. I would have been hard pressed to sue had Netcom not been so easily included as a defendant. Netcom's cooperation (which was not at all "voluntary" I must add, but rather based on significant perceived, potential liability) made expensive depositions and numerous interrogatories throughout the discovery game unnecessary, and probably would have been much more difficult if Netcom had insisted on pursuing a hearing in court on each request and fought tooth and nail as (I assume) Julf might have. <--uni's words end--> What exactly is Netcom's liability in this case? If a service provider is treated as a phone company, abuse of the service could be grounds for discontinuing the service. As Netcom did not discontinue tmp's service (see below), perhaps there is room for suit there. Should, however, an access provider be treated as analogous to a direct mail firm, the responsibility is much more obvious. As various Internet services perform different functions (Usenet is like mass mailing, email is like phone service, IRC is like public conversation etc.), the range of liabilities is staggering. What protection should Netcom, and other access providers, have against the abuses of their subscribers? Damn if I know, but it's an important question to stay awake at night worrying about... <--uni's words begin--> In any event this raises another matter. How then are remailers to be supervised? My personal feeling is that Julf, or any remailer operator, would have blocked tmp's use of a remailer far before Netcom would have. (Note that Netcom STILL has not revoked tmp's account, I guess they are just asking for trouble?) <--uni's words end--> As Julf provides his service as a favor to the Internet community and appears not to be driven by any profit motive (he hasn't solicited a contribution from me, though I haven't used my penet.fi account in a few years), he can allow his "cultural expectations" of the Internet/Usenet community to temper his judgments. As for Netcom, they are taking a foolish risk by allowing tmp to remain as a subscriber. I can say with 99% probability that any DGS user exhibiting behavior similar to tmp's would have been bounced and their money cheerfully refunded. And I'd hope the door would hit him on the ass on the way out... <--uni's words begin--> In as much as remailers are operated by those who have some degree of respect for Usenet and cyberspace in general, the kind of self patrolling that goes on seems to me as effective, provided there isn't an imposition by the operator of the morality legislation that remailers are often used to circumvent (pornography, etc.) In my view the traffic level alone of tmp's Usenet posts is more offensive than any pornography, tax avoidance, political activism, or free marketing that goes on through remailers. It should be this, along with harassment or obvious forum abuse that should dictate the line at which a remailer operator blocks access. In the current system, as displayed by Netcom's policy, it is quite the opposite that is affected. Potential legal liability (which is based on the whims of the empowered jurisdiction) is the only effective bar against misconduct. The implications of a nationalized internet are quite unnerving in this context. <--uni's words end--> See above, and amen. <--uni's words begin--> In a way Netcom is a victim here. They are at the mercy of the U.S. legal system despite what is or is not morally acceptable in cyberspace. In a way they have dug their own hole. Their restrictions, and motivations are based on profit, not on ethics. <--uni's words end--> Very much in line with your earlier thoughts on the potential (non-) application of traditional libel/slander law to the Net -- would the Courts allow cyberspace to be that much more rough-and-tumble, with higher standards of abuse required for successful suits? The proof is left as an exercise for the original poster :-). As for profit motive (and please take this as a VERY GENTLE rebuke), you admitted that your disposition may have been different if the Swiss deal had fallen through. My company is also motivated by profit -- my job is to write the ads and market the groups that will bring in more and more money. I would agree that Netcom, by valuing tmp's $20 per month over the potential harm to the Net community, has taken that view to a bit of an extreme. I would hope that my company would draw the line closer to... well, closer to what I subjectively feel is a reasonable place to draw some sort of distinction on a case-by-case basis. ***Conclusion*** So many issues out here on the bleeding edge...so much to stay up on, let alone get ahead. I'd like to thank Uni for trusting us enough to share many of the details of his suit and hope he continues his valuable contributions to Cypherpunks and net.culture in general. -- Curtis Frye, speaking for himself and trying to put it all together...

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Response to Uni's "Lawsuit" Message
by jazz＠hal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Quoting from Curtis Frye's response: What exactly is Netcom's liability in this case? If a service provider is treated as a phone company, abuse of the service could be grounds for discontinuing the service. As Netcom did not discontinue tmp's service (see below), perhaps there is room for suit there. By your phrase "treated as a phone company", are you implying Common Carrier status? If so, I wonder under what grounds a common carrier is allowed to terminate service? Certainly, non-payment of bills is one. If person A alleges person B has made threatening phone calls, can the phone company terminate person B's service unilaterally based solely on the allegations? Must it wait until civil suits or criminal charges are brought? My understanding of common carriage was that the carrier was obligated to provide service to everyone within its service area, whether or not it liked their politics, or bedmates, or the content of their communications. What protection should Netcom, and other access providers, have against the abuses of their subscribers? Damn if I know, but it's an important question to stay awake at night worrying about... What was in the contract signed by the subscribers? You can bet that if I ever start an on-line service, there will be an "indemnify and hold harmless" clause, and provisions for demanding proof of umbrella liability coverage; lack of coverage upon demand would be grounds for termination. In other words, if tmp@netcom were a subscriber to my service, and someone alleged wrongdoing to this degree, my action would be to demand of tmp proof of umbrella liability coverage of $1,000,000; without such proof, account revoked. The only way to put teeth in an indemnify-and-hold-harmless clause for an individual, I guess. Very much in line with your earlier thoughts on the potential (non-) application of traditional libel/slander law to the Net -- would the Courts allow cyberspace to be that much more rough-and-tumble, with higher standards of abuse required for successful suits? They'll have to, with the current state of the art with respect to authentication and non-repudiation. A plaintiff will have to work pretty hard to prove a particular human generated a piece of email, given the ease of spoofing, remailers, anonymity and pseudonymity. I also thank Uni for posting. Jason Zions

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Canadian site
by dave.hodgins＠canrem.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

For any other Canrem.com members reading this, I've uploaded a file called PGP26INF.ZIP, that contains a copy of all files that can be downloaded from net-dist.mit.edu, without recognition as a Canadian, or U.S. Site. Regards, Dave Hodgins. ********** Original From: DAVE HODGINS * CARBON * To: MIT POSTMASTER * COPY * Date/Number: 05/24/94 - Not Yet Posted ********** On: CRS - 0104 - Internet_Mail ----------------------------------------------------------------------- As per my message, to you, on 05/15, PLEASE add canrem.com to your list of Canadian sites, that should be allowed access, to the PGP 2.6 files! I just tried to download the files, and was again, denied access to the directory. Please send me an email message confirming completion of the above, so I don't have to waste telenet time (which I pay for), looking up a directory name, that I cannot access! Regards, Dave Hodgins, (416) 538-6516 2350 Dundas Street West, Apt. 2505, Toronto, Ontario, Canada M6P 4B1 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- 230-If you are FTP'ing in to get PGP, and your DNS name of your host isn't 230-one that is "obviously" from the U.S., you may get a permission denied 230-message when you try to cd into /pub/PGP. If this happens to you, and 230-your host is located in the United States or Canada, send mail to 230-postmaster(a)bitsy.mit.edu to be added to a special exception list. The site I'm using is being denied access. Please add canrem.com (CRS Online, formerly Canada Remote Systems) to your special exception list. The IP address is 198.133.43.nn, where nn is any number from 1 to around 200. Could you email me when this has been completed? Thanks, Dave Hodgins, Toronto, Ontario, Canada. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLdZptKsStlBrWUZ9AQEtXgQAlRYyMbQ+e1zc8Igr4xL6o7BzmR7wr2Mj HJL4qAYjwIErG/QuAay8c+rDsiHulaM5aoXRifWa7NI46qfD33mQ5be89gjCzB/D CpUoH81Vfb+bqi9PiJDqZsBhoPgRJ8cot47P3EYxM/9ZgrtUKlWJZlLLV2XPlqQ4 9qihKaa3adI= =9hvn -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- cc: ALL in 8 on CRS cc: CYPHERPUNKS(a)TOAD.COM in 0104 on CRS --- * RM 1.3 00820 * Internet:Dave.Hodgins@Canrem.com Rime->118 Fido(1:229/15)

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Looking for a paper...
by Jim McCoy 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I am trying to hunt up a copy of: The Dining Cryptographers in the Disco: Unconditional Sender and Recipient Untracability with Computationally Secure Serviceability by Michael Waidner and Birgit Pfitzmann So far the only ref I have found is the abstract in Eurocrypt '89, but I can't seem to locate a copy of the entire paper. If anyone knows of where I might find a copy I would appreciate it... jim

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Minor edit to the PGP 2.6 distribution
by Jeffrey I. Schiller 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

About one half hour ago I replaced the PGP 2.6 distribution files with a newer version. The change represents a new mitlicen.txt file (minor wording correction, no big deal) and a corrected UNIX makefile. The source itself and the executables were not changed. -Jeff

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