December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: The Packwood Memorial Diary Server
by jim＠bilbo.suite.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Jim choate writes: > The courts could then assume that the purpose of the > server is to collect and store documents in such a way that > there is a priori intention to prohibit legal agents from > accessing said data under court ordered supeona. This > qualifies as a conspiracy in every legal jurisdiction > that I know of. It also opens the sysadmin open to > prosecution as well. > > Won't float in any pond I know of... > Are there really no countries in the world that would permit such a server? How depressing. If true, I guess the next question becomes: How can you offer a service to the Internet, but make it impossible for a Bad Guy to physically locate you? Perhaps the server shouldn't stay in any one location for very long. Bring it up and post an Internet address. Operate for a few days, then shut it down and move to some new location, with a new Internet address. Sounds possible, but damned inconvenient. A wireless connection would help. The server host could be in a van or RV or something. <sigh> Jim_Miller(a)suite.com

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Re: Multikey crypto
by smb＠research.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Since I am relatively new to the field of encryption forgive me if this is a FAQ. Has anyone ever done anything with an encryption scheme that allows multiple unlocking keys? What I'm thinking about is a way to encrypt some data and then create multiple keys that will decrypt the data. I want to be able to encrypt a document and then give multiple people access to the document and be able to lock out a key and/or generate new keys without having to redistribute keys to everybody that already has one. I realize that this makes it easier to attack the encrypted information since there are multiple keys to unlock the data but I don't consider this a big problem. If someone wants to throw heavy duty horsepower at the problem they will crack it eventually anyway. There are a number of ways to do that. The best overview can be found in @incollection{Simmons92, author = {Gustavus J. Simmons}, title = {An Introduction to Shared Secret and/or Shared Control Schemes and Their Application}, booktitle = {Contemporary Cryptology: The Science of Information Integrity}, year = 1992, pages = {441--497}, editor = {Gustavus J. Simmons}, publisher = {{IEEE} Press} } The best-known scheme is described in @article{sharesecret, author = {Adi Shamir}, journal = {Communications of the ACM}, number = {11}, pages = {612--613}, title = {How to Share a Secret}, volume = {22}, year = {1979} } but also see @article{sealing, author = {David K. Gifford}, journal = {Communications of the ACM}, number = {4}, pages = {274--286}, title = {Cryptographic Sealing for Information Secrecy and Authentication}, volume = {25}, year = {1982} }

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Re: Crypto-Doc Gopher
by consensus＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 3:29 PM 1/26/94 -0700, Eric Johnson wrote: >The Crypto-Doc Gopher is open: > > gopher://pmip.maricopa.edu:770/ > >It may in the future become a WWW server; who knows. You are aware that you really don't have to have a http server to serve HTML documents. I do it only with ftp (see my signature file for URL.) It is not as elegant as an http server with it's lower overhead protocol, but it works! ..Christopher Allen ..Consensus Develoment Corporation ..4104-24th Street #419 ..San Francisco, CA 94114-3615 ..(415) 647-6384 Fax ..(415) 647-6383 Voice ..email: consensus(a)netcom.com ..mosaic frontpage: .."ftp://netcom.com/pub/consensus/www/ConsensusFrontDoor.html"

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clipper cracking
by Brian D Williams 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Tim May says; >Yeah, I guess Duncan is right. I did write some comments about the >procedures that would be needed to reverse-engineer the Clipper >chip (having started Intel's electron-beam analysis lab in 1981), >but I don't think I ever advocated it as a Cyperpunks project, >that's for sure! >(If I'm misremembering, someone will correct me.) >Might I suggest first spending several thousand dollars to buy--if >you can--some Clipperphones, then tear them apart to see how the >chips are mounted (rumor: surface mount, hard to get at) and what >kind of encapsulization is used. I'll be happy to provide a few >hours or more of free consulting on what kind of plasma asher >you'll need to get to the chip surface, some approaches to >voltage-contrast analysis, and other "peeling" steps to consider. >--Tim May I remember that post, in fact I have it right here <digital rummaging sounds> Here's a fairly long posting I made to sci.crypt and comp.lsi about reverse engineering the Clipper chip. Especially on the technical issues about tamper-resistant modules and electron-beam probing. (followup to comp.lsi added, as they may have something to say on this) allyn (allyn(a)netcom.com) wrote: I ran an electron microscope/chip testing lab for Intel, circa 1981-84. (We built a kind of "time machine" for imaging the internal states of complex chips--the 286 in those days--and displaying them on an image processing system which "subtracted out" the states of bad chips from known good chips and thus allowed us to analyze the nucleation and propagation of logic faults through the chip. Very useful for finding subtle speed and voltage problems, as well as gross faults, of course.) Analyzing the Clipper chip, or any "tamper-resistant module," will not be trivial, but neither will it be impossible. Some issues, questions, problems: 1. Getting through the package to the chip surface itself is problematic. Proprietray molding compounds may be used to make this tough. (For example, carborundum and sapphire particles are often mixed in, so that mechanical grinding and lapping also destroys the chip. And plasma ashing won't work.) 2. Sometimes the package itself has "traps" which wipe the chip (the data) if breached (fiber optic lines mixed in the epoxy, for example). This seems unlikely for a relatively low-cost solution like the Clipper. Papers presented at the "Crypto Conference" have dealt with this. (The main uses: nuclear weapons "Permissive Action Links" and credit card "smart cards," which use less intensive measures, obviously.) 3. Once at the chip surface, via grinding, chemical etch, plasma ashing, etc., the chip can be analyzed. Carefully photographing the chip as layers are etched away (or even carefully lapped away) can reveal much about the internal operation, though not the data stored in internal ROM, EPROM, EEPROM, Flash EPROM, etc. If the Clipper/Capstone algorithm is embedded in the microcode and not apparent from the visible circuitry, then it must be read by other means. 5. Voltage contrast electron microscopy allows internal chip voltages to be read with good reliability. Cf. any of the the many papers on this. Commercial e-beam probers are available. (How voltage contrast works is itself an interesting issue, and there are many good references on this.) 6. However, operating the chip is necessary to read the internal states and voltage levels, and opening the chip under "hostile conditions" (read: limited numbers of samples, no knowledge of the molding compound, no help from the manufacturer) often destroys the functionality. It can be done, but count on lots of trial and error. 7. Metal layers may be used to shield lower signal-carrying layers from scrutiny by electron beam probes. Intel, for example, builds the new Pentium on a 3-layer metal process in which the top layer almost completely covers the lower layers. (Extremely sophisticated measurements using lasers (Kerr effect) and magnetic field sensing may be possible. Count on a very expensive set-up to do this.) 8. Other "tricks" may route parts of the key circuitry through buried layers, polysilicon lines, several layers of metal, etc. 9. VLSI Technology, Inc., the company with the "tamper-resistant technology" used by Mykotronx (VTI will fab the chips), may also be storing bits in very small EEPROM cells, which are very hard to e-beam probe (especially without disrupting them!). Note also that Intel bought a partial stake in VLSI. (I'm not imputing anything and don't know if Intel is somehow involved in the Clipper/Capstone effort. In fact, I left Intel in 1986.) 10. The easiest way to get the Clipper/Skipjack/Capstone details is probably the old-fashioned way: offer money for it. With anonymous remailers and digital cash, this may be much easier. Just some thoughts on this extremely interesting issue of reverse-engineering the Clipper. - -Tim May No, you clearly did not advocate this as a Cypherpunk project, but feel free to elaborate.... Brian Williams Extropian Cypherpatriot "Cryptocosmology: Sufficently advanced comunication is indistinguishable from noise." --Steve Witham -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLUgn+tCcBnAsu2t1AQEVLgP8DVxH2AJgk/6M8+Xj2i6L+GIJCRahkg5A pjKIFQcE++nQwqmnOnAAl/zr7jR8hezLl/e5CNaD4Chjo21MDuoj8+ZQZPOAF85s lxhBxmy6prME36EA4cOpgwOvZrKpMeEskRUmXoLJfd9DVcJKhMImHbsDrNNaplij cm4BJIC0ch8= =FHiQ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Anonymous Anonymous ftp
by jim＠bilbo.suite.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim May writes: > [stuff deleted] > > How is anonymous 2-way communication possible? Several > ways: > > - prepaid mailers, good for sending a packet to a > destination. With the final address nested insided a > series of encrypted packets, no mix along the way can > identify Bob without extensive collusion with other > mixes. > > [stuff deleted] > > - pools, a la the pools used by Miron Cuperman and by my own > BlackNet experiment. Not a fast 2-way communication > system, but it works. > > - a Penet-style 2-way system, with additional security. > Multiple... > I understand how you can do 2-way anonymous communication via message pools and Penet-style systems, but I don't "get" prepaid mailers. Could you post an example showing how two people can converse anonymously via prepaid mailers. Thanks, Jim_Miller(a)suite.com

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No Subject
by Audun.Joesang＠alcatel.no 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Aviel Rubin asked: >I am compiling a list of places that are actually using digital >cash. If anyone knows of current implementations, or of any >plans that will probably be implemented, can you please send >me the info.? Thanks a lot. Denmark has got a live system going on for a few years. It's called DANMONT (with a slash through the "O") meaning litterally "Danish coin". They gave a talk at Smart Card '93 at Wembley, London, last year and will give another talk at Smart Card '94 on Wednesday 16th February this year. You can contact Jens Lindboe-Larsen or Annette Falberg of DANMONT,or you can call the Wembley Exhibition organisers on (tel)+44-733-394304 (fax)+44-733-390042.

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LA Times - "Gestapo State"
by catalyst-remailer＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This is a good article from the L.A. Times. It is a bit off topic, so I'll post it anon and avoid the fLamers. AMERICANS ARE PUTTING UP WITH A SPIRALING GESTAPO STATE By Paul Craig Roberts Special to the Los Angeles Times What will become of "law and order conservatism" now that we know that our law-enforcement agencies -- from the Justice Department to local police forces -- can be as criminal as the miscreants that they are supposed to pursue? Unspeakable acts of cold-blooded murder and fabricated evidence now routinely characterize everyday acts of law enforcement in the United States. In Malibu, Calif., a 30-person raiding party of sheriff's deputies, federal drug agents and the California National Guard broke into the home of Donald Scott and shot him dead. Scott, it turns out, was a reclusive man, heir to a European fortune, whose $5 million, 200-acre ranch was targeted by federal agents under drug-forfeiture laws. No drugs or marijuana plants were found, but an alert Ventura County prosecutor, Michael Bradbury, did find that the raiding party had an appraisal of Scott's ranch, along with notes on the sale price of nearby property. Gideon Kanner, a Los Angeles law professor who has examined the case, concluded that the feds thought Scott might have a wife who indulged in drugs and decided to see if they could bag a $5 million piece of property for the Treasury. In pre-democratic times, this was known as "tax farming". Government officials simply seized whatever they could and raked off a commission. Today, the commission is in the form of the bureaucracy's budget. Ever since President Reagan's budget director, David Stockman, invented "budget savings" from tougher Internal Revenue Service and drug enforcement, the pressure has been on these marauders to farm more revenues. The results are mounting abuses of citizens and occasional deaths. What will be done about it? Nothing. Scott, awakened from sleep by the sound of his door crashing in, made the mistake of walking out of his bedroom with a gun in his hand. The military force got off with a self-defense plea. Shades of Waco, Texas, where the FBI and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms folks killed 86 men, women and children, while the attorney general took all the credit to show how tough she is. Noted defense attorney Gerry Spence told the Montana Trial Lawyers Association in July that he had never been involved in a case with the federal government in which the government had not lied and manufactured evidence to gain a conviction. "These are not the good guys", he said. "These are people who do what they believe is necessary to do to bring about a conviction." The law gets hung with the victim. What, you might protest, about the Los Angeles and Detroit convictions of police officers who beat black motorists? Aren't these signs that checks and balances work and that we are free from the arbitrary application of power that medieval serfs had to endure? Alas, these police offers were not done in because they abused their power, but because they were charged with racism and violating the civil rights of a member of a "preferred minority". As incredible as it may seem, in the United States only blacks have any protection from abusive state power. They have a special, racial civil-rights shield. The rest of us must make do with happenstance. Formally, a person could protect himself by getting rich. But today that just makes you more of a target. Witness the fates of billionaires Michael Milken and Leona Helmsley -- and of Donald Scott. Politically ambitious prosecutors need drama, and they don't get that from the local drug pusher. Federal drug agents are not going to waste their time and risk their lives rounding up Jamaican drug gangs (who shoot back) -- especially when inner-city juries may not convict either out of fear or feelings of racial solidarity -- when they can pick soft targets like Scott. Nothing makes it clearer that the United States is no longer a "nation of laws" than federal wetlands regulations. These "laws" have been created entirely by bureaucrats and courts. All over America, people are finding their uses of their property circumvented and themselves in jail because of these regulatory police and their "laws". Recently, the Clinton administartion said: "Congress should amend the Clean Water Act to make it consistent with the agencies' rule- making." And Sens. Max Baucus, D-Mont., and John H. Chaff, R-R.I., have introduced a bill to codify all the wetlands regulations that are being enforced without any legal basis. Note that the two senators did not introduce a bill to stop unelected bureaucrats from illegally creating laws and running all over our constitutional protections. Not even a wrist slap. To hell with the U.S. Constitution, say the senators. Let's pass a law that future courts will use to give carte blanche to the regulatory police. Let's ennoble the bureaucrats. Divine rule cannot be blocked by special-interest lobbying. Roberts, former assistant Trasury secretary, is chairman of the Institute for Political Economy.

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Multiple Posting
by Mike Ingle 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sorry about the multiple appearance of "Digital Barter Economy". I did not send it twice; Delphi does that sometimes. It seems to think the message bounced the first time, so it sends it again.

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Re: Remailer Noise Traffic
by Philippe Nave 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Eric Hollander writes : > > Hey, no problem, I'll have my remailer barf up a bunch of noise messages if > you'll run a slocal to filter them out. > I don't know what 'slocal' is, but I've got a kill file; if these messages contain some identifying pattern, I should be able to filter them out. Throw me a few of them and I'll tinker with my setup; also, give me some warning about what they'll look like so I can pick them out of the 'normal' mix of inspired brilliance and warped lunacy that passes for Cypherpunks message traffic...... :) [Zing! Off on a tangent.....] Stop me if you've heard this... This looks like a neat opportunity to play with digital money. Note that I said _play_. Apologies to all, but my eyes glaze over when I read too deeply into postings about authenticated foo bar prime number anonymously deniable recursively repudiable ching fong quux blat zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz...... However, if you wanted to send me (n) digital coins, electric cents, donkey farts, or whatever for every (k) noise messages I send/receive, I can see where it would be fun to try to spend them. Everybody else could try to steal them from me, I could try to spend them over and over and try to counterfeit them (perhaps asking for skilled help), and we could fiddle around with Monopoly money to our hearts' content. I'd buy things, somebody would produce goods for sale, we'd screw up the whole 'economy' repeatedly, and you digital-cash types could write enormously complex and elegant papers about the whole thing. - -- ........................................................................ Philippe D. Nave, Jr. | The person who does not use message encryption pdn(a)dwroll.dw.att.com | will soon be at the mercy of those who DO... Denver, Colorado USA | PGP public key: by arrangement. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLUgq+AvlW1K2YdE1AQFoIwQAiCL067b+4zHbPQJYTJiDz0vrwu9dCwr9 9f83J4rAMFWENB/+8MRDskKgG0oY9l1qz/trdwqvkWr5SpYuGGnecULl/8jpAp6f NfNOA3bCopVpnTH4EpHG569kAjcpQk9vWi8zmEj7Y7s/hW4sVZmqmTVvMWbh6EEp yRRlkVmrjVM= =cJX9 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Talk at MIT Feb 2 (mini-abstract)
by Alan (Miburi-san) Wexelblat 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[This was posted to an MIT internal newsgroup; people in the local area are welcome to attend. I do not have any further information. --AW] MIT TOC SEMINAR Wednesday, February 2, 1994 Refreshments at 4:00pm, Talk at 4:15pm in NE43-518 Title: Tracing Traitors by Amos Fiat, Tel Aviv University Abstract: We give cryptographic schemes that help identify the source of a leak. Such schemes are relevant in the context of pay television, and easily combine and complement the broadcast encryption schemes of Fiat and Naor. Joint work with Benny chor and Moni Naor Host: Baruch Awerbuch

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