December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

CA DMV Records Confidential? NOT!
by remailer＠merde.dis.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

No matter WHAT California Privacy Law cueently states about the confidentiality of DMV records Home addresses and such... its STILL trivial to get the info from the DMV in a semi-legal way(Social Engineering...) Faked Insurance Investigator Letterhead created on your Laser Printer and an out of State PO Box work wonders... or simply subscribe to NCI, Nighthawk, Superbureau or any number of info brokers... then you can get it ONLINE... Anon

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LD's lance account is toast
by catalyst-remailer＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Seen on news.admin.policy today... Don't know if this affects any other accounts he has at Colo State, e.g., detweile(a)cs.colostate.edu (unless they are the same). -------------------------------- Newsgroups: news.admin.policy From: steved(a)lance.colostate.edu (Steve Dempsey) Subject: Re: "Introduction to Blacknet" articles Message-ID: <1994Feb15.213135.81770@yuma> Sender: steved(a)mestas.lance.colostate.edu (Steve Dempsey) Date: 15 Feb 94 21:31:35 GMT References: <199402151712.RAA28875(a)an-teallach.com> Nntp-Posting-Host: mestas.lance.colostate.edu Organization: Colorado State U. Engineering College Lines: 21 In article <199402151712.RAA28875(a)an-teallach.com>, gtoal(a)an-teallach.com (Graham Toal) writes: |> |> Does anybody have any idea how extensive the posting of the |> "Introduction to Blacknet" - articles is? |> |> Unfortunately it's our old friend Detweiler (The Medusa etc) again. |> He's doing it to deliberately discredit anonymous remailers because |> of a net.war he's engaging in against individuals on the cypherpunks |> mailing list. Yes, it was Detweiler. I generously gave him some notice that his account would be terminated; he went off the deep end and left a process running overnight posting the Blacknet article to random groups every 10 minutes. About 120 copies went out before I could put a stop to it. Apologies for letting it go on so long. Such abuse will not continue from this site. ================================ Engineering Network Services Steve Dempsey Colorado State University steved(a)longs.lance.colostate.edu Fort Collins, CO 80523 ================================ +1 303 491 0630

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No Subject
by nobody＠jarthur.claremont.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

As one who used to do quite a bit of Detweiller bashing in private... I have come not to think of him as a problem... but simply as a relentless evolutionary factor forcing the structure and methodlogy of remailers to evolve to be more secure, better equipped and in all a better product then the community had prior to their abuse... Whether any of us like LD personally or not we ARE evolving our technology to meet his threat... and I am personally glad its happening earlier than Later.. The Puzzle Palace is a FAR more potent adversary... kinda of like the BORG... Best we evolve the technology as quickly as possible before its outlawed and it has to be taken underground .... War on DRUGS??? How about the WAR on Forbidden Math? Anon

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Isolated Double-DES
by ritter＠cactus.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ritter Software Engineering 2609 Choctaw Trail Austin, Texas 78745 (512) 892-0494, ritter(a)cactus.org 2x Isolated Double-DES: Another Weak Two-Level DES Structure Terry Ritter February 16, 1994 Introduction The time has come to replace DES, the US Data Encryption Standard, but there is no clear alternative. While there are many ciphers which are demonstrably faster and also arguably stronger than DES, the fact that cipher strength cannot be _tested_ but must instead be_argued_ makes many users nervous. The US government offers some alternative ciphers, but those are secret designs whose strength _cannot_ be argued, again making users nervous. The current leading candidate for a replacement to DES is "triple- DES," a three-level construct using DES at each level. This is a comforting design, because users are already convinced that DES can be relied upon for a certain level of strength. Unfortunately, a software implementation of triple-DES takes three times the processing of normal DES. While this is a mere detail on systems which process the occasional enciphered email message, operational speed is fundamental to widespread industrial use. Ciphering speed is essential in LAN servers and other fully-enciphered communications nodes. Speed is also important when ciphering is an integral part of laptop software which communicates to a central facility. Fast software ciphering is important. Because the ciphering speed for triple-DES is not acceptable, no three-or-more-level construct could possibly be satisfactory in this respect. This limits our design alternatives to one-or two- level constructs based on DES. The goal, then, is to find--if possible--a construct which is based on DES, has strength substantially beyond normal DES, but requires less processing than triple-DES. This time we start from the base of double-DES, and directly confront the known weakness of that approach: Double-DES The classical double-DES construct is something like this: A v k1 -> DES1 v B v C v k2 -> DES2 v D where each single capital letter represents an 8-byte DES block. Double-DES is normally not used, because of the meet-in-the-middle attack: Meet-In-The-Middle Attack on Double DES Assume we have known-plaintext A for ciphertext D: Encipher A under every possible key k1, and decipher D under every possible key k2. (The cost for this is only two full DES key searches.) Then check for matches between B and C. If there are multiple matches, the correct k1 and k2 will be there somewhere, and we can isolate the correct pair with one or two more known-plaintext blocks (this is a loose interpretation of [2]). This works for the normal double-DES construction because it is possible to check for matches between B and C; the weakness seems to be the ability to check for a match. Assuming that we have properly identified the principal weakness of double-DES, let's fix it: We can isolate the two values, making a match check impossible, so that not even one bit can be checked. Isolated Double-DES Consider a two-level DES construct like this: A v k1 -> DES1 v B v km -> XOR v C v k2 -> DES2 v D where k1 and k2 are 56-bit keys, but km is a 64-bit key. Technically, this construct could be considered to be either double-DES with an intermediate ("isolating") XOR operation, or triple-DES with XOR replacing the middle DES operation. But since the processing cost for this system is similar to double-DES, it is reasonable to call it a form of double-DES. While it is true that we now have three keys for a two-level DES structure, this is no worse than triple-DES with separate keys. But is it stronger than double-DES? Isolated Double-DES Meet-In-The-Middle Attack Again, encipher A under every possible key k1, and decipher D under every possible key k2 and check for matches between B and C. But in the isolated construction, every possible pair of values (B,C) has some key km which would make that pair match. Thus, the weakness of match identification in the original construction is not possible in the alternate construction. The keyspace seems to be 56 + 64 = 120 bits, which would probably be satisfactory for another couple of decades, or until an open science of cryptographic machine design has matured. It still has a small block size, however. Larger Blocks DES uses a relatively-small 8-byte block, so if DES were used in Electronic Code Book (ECB) mode and large amounts of plaintext were known, a dictionary attack would be possible. Fortunately, DES is normally used in Cipher Block Chain (CBC) mode, making dictionary attacks difficult. But a dictionary attack on ECB mode could be viewed as a "certificational attack" which is "indicative of weakness" in the cipher itself. [1:466] If we make the modest assumption that ordinary text has an information content of under 40 percent of the binary size, then a 64-bit block of text generally contains less than 26 bits of uniqueness. Worse, short words occur far more often than an even distribution would indicate. Although it would certainly be ill- advised to send 2^26 blocks (2^29 bytes) of data under a single set of keys, it is interesting to note the relatively small size of this figure when compared to other cryptographic quantities. For this reason, it seems appropriate that any new standard specify an expanded block width. Here is a double-width approach, 2x2 DES described in an earlier article: A B v v k1 -> DES1 k2 -> DES2 v v C D Exchange Right 4 Bytes E F v v k3 -> DES3 k4 -> DES4 v v G H Note that the 64-bit quantity G (for example) is a complex nonlinear function of A, B, k1, k2, and k3; a total of 296 bits. Nevertheless the system is still solvable with meet-in-the-middle: 2x2 DES Meet-In-The-Middle Attack With one known-plaintext block, we can search one top key and one bottom key (say, k1 and k3) and find pairs (E,C) which match at the appropriate 32 bit-positions. Then we can identify the correct pair with additional known-plaintext blocks, resolving the keys at 32-bits per known-plaintext pair. We can guarantee that the two keys will be found by searching all possible k1 and k3. This is only twice the normal DES keyspace, but may well require a huge amount of storage to identify all the values and associated keys (say, E and k3) which match a particular result (say, C). We do not want to run through every k3 every time we change k1. 2x2 DES Differential Attack Eli Biham [1] points out that a differential attack can eliminate the need to store the result from every possible key. In this case we need two different large blocks of known-plaintext with plaintext or ciphertext half the same (say, A:B -> G:H and A:X -> Y:Z). With A the same in both large blocks, we know that the left-half of E must also be the same. Then, since we have two different blocks, we can step through all possible values for k3, deciphering G into E and Y into E' each time, looking for any results with the left-half the same. This should occur about every 2^32 trials, producing 2^24 trials which match, which should be resolved in only one or two more set of known-plaintext blocks. No huge storage is needed. 2x Isolated Double-DES Consider a pair of isolated double-DES structures, combined as described for 2x2 DES: A B v v k1 -> DES1 k2 -> DES2 v v km -> XOR1 kn -> XOR2 v v Exchange Right 4 Bytes v v k3 -> DES3 k4 -> DES4 v v C D The result is a double-width structure, in which every ciphertext bit in C depends on each and every bit in A, B, k1, k2, and k3, as well as half the bits in km and kn. Ciphering occurs at the rate of double-DES. While it is certainly true that six keys are needed, keys need be transmitted far less often than data, and by having separate keys we avoid attacks which depend upon having the same key at multiple parts of the operation. If we say that enciphering occurs "from the top down," (XOR before exchange) then we would say that deciphering occurs "from the bottom up" (exchange before XOR). 2x Isolated Double-DES Meet-In-The-Middle Attack The double-DES meet-in-the-middle attack depended upon having a structure in which the enciphered plaintext was identical to the deciphered ciphertext. This allowed both keys to be manipulated and the resulting data space searched for matches. In isolated double-DES any enciphered plaintext value can be related to any deciphered ciphertext value by varying the middle or "isolating" key. Thus, meet-in-the-middle seems not very useful. 2x Isolated Double-DES Differential Attack The 2x2 differential attack depended not upon identical top and bottom values, but upon producing an identical value (in particular known bit positions) from a bottom deciphering (for example). This situation is not affected by the XOR and so the differential attack will still work. Conclusion 2x Isolated double-DES falls to a differential attack. References [1] Biham, E. Mon, 7 Feb 1994 16:59:28 GMT. Comments on Nx2 DES. <CKv5v5.EnF(a)chinet.chinet.com> [2] Merkle, R. and M. Hellman. 1981. On the Security of Multiple Encryption. Communications of the ACM. 24(7): 465-467.

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Re: Detweiler abuse again
by mcb＠net.bio.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Jim Wise writes: > > It's really not censorship for Hal or any other remailer operator to > > say _his_ machines, accounts, reputation, etc., will be used to mail > > death threats to whitehouse.gov, for example, or mailbombs to > > newsgroups and mailing lists. > > While it is not censorship as such, it rather seems against our stated > goals as cypherpunks to advocate such filtering...not because of what > it blocks from our own sites, but it _does_ affect those downstream. With due respect for the sentiment, I really think that the concept of "downstream" will not be with us for very much longer, and in most places is already quite archaic. If the net-sites of South Island NZ wanted the alt.sex groups, they were free to find other sources for them, such as a commercial service provider. Getting a free newsfeed is nice, but it is folly to rely on it. I think it is a mistake to base (or debate) ethical questions about what traffic one wishes to accept and carry upon mechanical matters such as the topology of one particular transport mechanism for message-based communications. > Another key point is that we not let our own personal feelings interfere with > our political actions. I'm sure most of us here were offended by the > suggestions in the heat of the anonymity debate that all anonymous > postings to newsgroups be killed...yet here are cypherpunks advocating the > filtering of all Detweiler and Detweiler-seeming posts. Sure, the guy's > a prick, but should we let him turn us into fascists? Good point. Depends what you mean by "filtering", though. I would prefer that remailer operators and other service providers NOT block anyone's messages based on content or identity of origin, merely based on whether or not they interfere with the operation of the service, or jeopardize the service's future operation (i.e., on legal grounds). *But*, I do support the right of individuals and private sites to "filter" messages based on content or identity of origin, by means of killfiles or similar. -- Michael C. Berch mcb(a)net.bio.net / mcb(a)postmodern.com

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Bye from Xenon.
by Nikolaos Daniel Willmore 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Date: Wed, 16 Feb 1994 23:43:14 -0800 Message-Id: <199402170743.XAA24572(a)mail.netcom.com> To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com From: catalyst-remailer(a)netcom.com Subject: LD's lance account is toast Remailed-By: Remailer <catalyst-remailer(a)netcom.com> Comment: This message is NOT from the address on the 'From:' line; it is from an anonymous remailing service. Please report problem mail to catalyst(a)netcom.com

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Bye from Xenon.
by Nikolaos Daniel Willmore 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- -= qwerty remailer shutdown notice =- Disclaimer: none. OK tentacles, damage control time. See what one post can start? And you think alt.w.a.s.t.e. would survive (see forwarded posts from Usenet)? I have just remembered that I arrived here on this mailing list in need of remailers, since I was being anonymously Xenon. For that I gave up my anonymity, to the remailer operators. Then I decided to gain some legitimacy by starting my own remailer on Netcom. As Netcom has no Manhattan number yet, and I like to connect at lab, that blew my anonymity for any Unix skilled person who wanted to find out who I was. Finally I lost sight of why I really came here, which was to find out ways to get PGP out to people. And now that I'm posting via qwerty, I don't even need a remailer network any more. I have also come to realize that in the next five years, the ONLY solution to keep people from abusing the remailers is a human being sitting there moderating the remailer. As I do not have the time, and do NOT think it would be profitable to try to pay some undergraduate to moderate qwerty, I have decided to shut qwerty down. The only other solution in my mind is to have qwerty forge its return address, a solution that will likely get my account revoked when the shit hits the fan after just ONE abuse causing postmaster(a)netcom.com to have to pour through sendmail logs and process logs or whatever, to find me. And qwerty(a)netcom.com has become the "PGP Information Clearinghouse". Yes I find it amusing to see "fuck-wads" whine about one bad post to their oh so precious little narrow-minded newsgroup, but I no longer see qwerty(a)netcom.com as an expendable resource, which I can afford to loose. I thought of remaining on the Cypherpunks mailing list, only because Pr0duct Cypher (PGP Tools and Magic Money), Will Kinney (Curve Encrypt), and a few other bright lights post here. But I am a man of action, not of debate, and even on turning to debate on this list, I find very few out here who are as smart, humane, creative, or radical as I am, and therefore I become unfulfilled with the level of discussion I am able to find. I made a big mistake turning away from product development and information distribution to debate, and trying to change people's opinions. This was what lead me to science. I can be found on Usenet, if ever my unsubscribe request will be fulfilled by Eric Hughes, who cannot even figure out how to automate a mailing list, or avoid silly errors with the remailing software. I am sorry to express my disappointment, and the fault lies only with myself, for I mistook you for adults. When a real (my favorite word) cryptography mailing list appears, and is announced on Usenet, I shall subscribe. The "Cypherpunks" have disappointed me, for as I have said before, they are not punks. Nor, I have found, are they "Cypher", if that imply them being competent activists. Hell, they can't even run a mailing list or an ftp site. The clincher came today, when I asked Eric Hughes, "founder of the Cypherpunk movement", about why the FUCK he hasn't fixed macpgp2.3.cpt.hqx to reflect the fact that it is a .gz file, not a .hqx text file. This, after I posted it very loudly to the list that it had a corrupt name, and that a month after I posted the same thing to Usenet. What he told me was this, and I apologize for the pathetic act of posting "personal e-mail" but well, FUCK YOU if it bothers you, or doesn't conform to some RFC standard of "netiquette": >From: hughes(a)ah.com (Eric Hughes) >Look, I don't have the permission to change the file name, or I would have >done it. soda is running with very low quotas and the administrators >changed some of the ownerships without setting the permissions right, OK? And this is our Great White Hope for who will run our future e-bank, and revolution culminating in the fall of the government as we know it? He who speaks in tongues instead of English, about remailers? When I stop laughing, I'll start crying. And Eric, "Hey". Sure liked that STUPID Cypherpunks meeting, with all the God Damned, "Eric_Hughes [Guest] orders Medusa, One Medusa, coming right up!, Don't got your snakes on today, Might I recommend a needle with that?, The bacteria on the bar die as the drink is set down., ld brings Eric_Hughes [Guest] a Medusa." PhUcK y0u EveRyb0dy ;-). Bye, till I get my hands on Stealth-PGP, which should be a few days from now. Then the fun begins: sophisticated steganography. I hope it works out with Stealth-PGP, so I don't have to convince people to rewrite PGP from the ground up, 'cause as you know it takes a lot of work to get past those "closed doors" to talk to those secretive developers of the (grassroots) upcoming new de-facto encryption standard. Why don't I disappear silently? Because I know there are many "lurkers" out there who would appreciate knowing why I left. I get mail from them often. In fact, I think the greatest power in this list, if it has power, lies in the hands of the "lurkers". Those who spread PGP, one copy at a time, and wish to learn here, not live here. And because I want this great audience to hear my words, for I think they matter and will have influence, for I say nay, these are not activists, these "Cypherpunks". They are greedy e-yuppies, who would use encryption for personal gain, at the expense of their fellow man. I have discovered that and I now must part ways, hoping I do not loose contact with those few out here on the internet who are straight thinkers and straight arrows. Another pathetically motivated, but this time nostalgic, quote from personal e-mail: From: Philip Zimmermann <prz(a)columbine.cgd.ucar.EDU> >Your letter is interesting. I'd like to discuss some ideas with you. >We should talk. Please send me your phone number, or call me at >XXX XXX-XXXX. Early morning is not the best time to call. Any other >time is. Please call me. I like your ideas. -=Xenon=- Forwarded from Usenet ("the beginning of the end"): comp.org.eff.talk #27044 (0 + 3 more) [1] From: mcwhirk(a)mail.auburn.edu (Robert K Mcwhirter) [1] Is this Blacknet stuff possible? Followup: comp.org.eff.talk Organization: Auburn University X-Newsreader: TIN [version 1.2 PL2] Date: Wed Feb 16 23:58:30 EST 1994 Lines: 51 [ Article crossposted from sura.security ] [ Author was Pat Eddy ] [ Posted on Wed, 16 Feb 94 17:11:52 -0500 ] Pat, > Can someone at SURAnet comment on this Blacknet stuff that seems to > be hitting some of the USENET newsgroups lately. Are these people > as untraceable as they say ? I saw the posts myself... The best comment I saw was a followup post, to the effect of "some darn kids out there have been taking William Gibson a little too seriously." A little more seriously, though: Yes, it may be very hard to find out who is participating in this scam -- given the number of anonymous posting services and anonymous ftp sites (some of which don't log their transactions at all) they could hide for quite some time from semi-casual scrutiny. However, given CERT's fairly long arm in this arena, I suspect it wouldn't take long for a concerted effort on the part of CERT to shut them down. That depends on CERT's perception of "blacknet" as a serious security threat -- I can't speak for them, but I'd hazard to guess that they are about as concerned about "blacknet" as we at SURAnet are... which is to say "not at all". (I base this guess on a lack on response from CERT regarding these posts.) I also think that blacknet's reach exceeds their grasp -- the claims they make about "sending cash" and "depositing funds in accounts you specify" strikes me as mighty big talk from a group that isn't on Dunn and Bradstreet's register. If anything, their goals are probably much more short term, like ripping off anyone foolish enough to show interest in their "service." And of course, there's always the chance that it was just a joke/boast/prank. Usenet is the Net of a Million Lies, after all.... Nick Vargish ---------------------- ---------------------- -------------------- - - --- |. Nick Vargish .| |. SURAnet .| |. O: (301) 982-4600 .| |. vargish(a)sura.net .| |. systems engineer .| |. rust never sleeps .| ---------------------- ---------------------- -------------------- - - --- comp.org.eff.talk #27045 (0 + 2 more) [1] From: mcwhirk(a)mail.auburn.edu (Robert K Mcwhirter) [1] Blacknet Organization: Auburn University X-Newsreader: TIN [version 1.2 PL2] Date: Thu Feb 17 00:01:11 EST 1994 Lines: 19 I just corss-posted (I think I did it right) an article concerning the 'Blacknet'. What bothers me is not the blacknet itself, but the attitude of the second poster in the thread saying how CERT could 'strong-arm' the anonymous remailers to find out who was running the Blacknet. Is this possible? Would/Could CERT actually do this if they wanted to? What are they? The net.cops? - - -Bob - - -- ==== Bob Socrates McWhirter internet: mcwhirk(a)mail.auburn.edu "God is dead" "Nietzsche is dead" -Nietzsche -God -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3 iQCVAgUBLWLyEgSzG6zrQn1RAQFGRgQAwRKm/6vblnWxwZ9hgfwPo4VKlUwkqIGE 8rJMMDSP9F6W0iGHn0EEXTFShqTRP0DGK93DdWorbv6TIIZxbZnbO7Yrzzn/CR63 neAKwrEoyiBYHwgfw7OvPYx4erQJnd5VFKlc1eXA5usjL4reokg2HpFA/Jr2EvXx OWP1g6YPdPk= =66hE -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: money maker
by an53518＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Count me in. I can take information from the U.S. and Canada and send to the Bahamas and Switzerland (and any other country for that matter). Additionally, I believe I have a fairly safe way to route messages. The only problem is this: would the lag between mailing the email and the financial transaction going through diminish the return on the investment? Perhaps that is something to consider. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)anon.penet.fi. Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized, and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)anon.penet.fi.

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unsubscribe
by Tom Cropper 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

unsubscribe

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East Europ{ean view on Clipper
by an65939＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The widespread discussion of the Clipper Chip in both US media and relevant discussion lists is limited mostly to American people. Therefore, I wish to add my small opinion from behind the former Iron Curtain based upon my lifetime experience of living in Poland. The discussion is very interesting for me because in a few years' time when we will be more technologically developed (and have bigger GDP so that secret services may flourish) it may repeat itself in my country. I was inspired by the contribution of prof. D. Denning whom I appreciate for outstanding book about cryptography and data security. For years we lived here with the overwhelming impression of being under constant surveillance by omnipotent secret services maintained by undemocratic regime supported by Moscow. For instance people were afraid not to take part in then sham elections. Those elections were openly unequal - their results were obvious for everyone before the results - but were hyped in the media as an act of support for the government. The widespread belief was that if one did not participate he will be denied some "privilege" for example passport and exit visa to the West on the next request. The same applied to not taking part in 1st May official parades which were said to be voluntary. The regime was also afraid of every way of people's informal associating. Participants in unofficial gatherings were photographed and videotaped with the hope of identifying them. Telephone was always considered insecure and all international calls were "for sure" supposed to be wiretapped. As the published files of East Germany's STASI showed these fears were not groundless. From the four years' distance then polish secret service does not seem to had been so strong but its files WERE NOT revealed and the overall impression remains obscure. For years the society had a highly positive attitude towards West and particularly American people despite officially publicized love for Russian liberators. Unfortunately the knowledge of the West was very, very incomplete. Not surprisingly when the communism collapsed in 1989 the society wanted to integrate quickly with the West hopeful to reach their level of freedom and prosperity soon. And to their surprise the West did not fulfil their expectations either because they were false or because at the same time some of Western ideals had proven unrealistic and were to be abolished. And we learned that the Swedish model of caring state is economically infeasible in the long run, that new gospel should be promulgated to change the fast way of western life, that the World had just entered into global recession so everybody is afraid of newly emerged poor democracies, that our model USA is indeed (as described by former pro Moscow propaganda) a ruthless oppressor for some disobedient nations. At the same time we entered the Cyberspace. It was really a unique experience to have the freedom of sending out (to the West) everything one wishes just after the period of total censorship. Recent developments in cryptography and the work of Cypherpunks have created perhaps for the first time in mankind's history the opportunity to create global communities that evade government's surveillance. It seemed that an omnipotent repressive regimes may one day become hardly possible at all. And now we learn that such a privilege cannot be extended to voice communication. I am afraid that similar regulations will apply to communication over future high throughput electronic highways and that the present loose regulations concerning Internet are the result of first incredible speed of the development of this medium (the democratically elected regimes didn't catch up) and second the smaller (for the time being) popularity of email communication when compared to for instance fax and phone. And now conclusions. Despite the gloomy picture I have just presented I am on the whole an optimist. Properties of mathematics behind cryptography are part of the nature itself and like the software cannot be destroyed by human regulations. The governments may slower the outburst of universal privacy but will not evade it. In the Clipper's case I agree with the conclusion of "Newsweek" from 14 Feb. '94 which suggests that the US users will use foreign made devices and foreigners will be reluctant to use US made ones that can be wiretapped. As the fall of Berlin Wall showed the regulations that do not have popular support will one day collapse. Thank you for taking time to read my private opinions and please excuse me poor language (I am not native) and contents (I am very technical). Doodeck ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)anon.penet.fi. Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized, and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)anon.penet.fi.

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