December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: the public key minefield
by baumbach＠atmel.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[my silly public key example deleted] > No, because of the language in the patent which requires that it be > infeasible to find the deciphering key from the enciphering key. Here's > the claim, from patent 4218582, that covers all of public key cryptography: > > 1. In a method of communicating securely over an insecure communication > channel of the type which communicates a message from a transmitter to > a receiver, the improvement characterized by: > providing random numbers at the receiver; > generating from said random numbers a public enciphering key at the > receiver; > generating from said random numbers a secret deciphering key at the > receiver such that the secret deciphering key is directly related to > and computationally infeasible to generate from the public enciphering > key; > communicating the public enciphering key from the receiver to the > transmitter; > processing the message and the public enciphering key at the > transmitter and generating an enciphered message by an enciphering > transformation, such that the enciphering transformation is easy to > effect but computationally infeasible to invert without the secret > deciphering key; > transmitting the enciphered message from the transmitter to the > receiver; and > processing the enciphered message and the secret deciphering key at > the receiver to transform the enciphered message with the secret > deciphering key to generate the message. Doesn't a patent have to have enough information for a person skilled in the art to construct a prototype? I publish for the first time here my invention. I will patent it within a years time. Striped Vegetables ---- This isn't enough for anyone to do anything. If I were more specific, I might have something patentable, but then by claims wouldn't be as broad. If you figured out how to make an anti-gravity device. That device would be patentable. The concept of "anti-gravity" device is not patentable. If I could duplicate the effect of your anti-gravity device without using any of the same novel mechanisms. My device would be separately patentable. Peter Baumbach baumbach(a)atmel.com

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QPK SOURCE ONLINE
by charliemerritt＠BIX.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Cypherpunks: I now have David Colston's [5542837(a)mcimail.com] source code for "CALL SECURITY". I also have the IBM PC executables. CALL SECURITY is an implementation of David's QPK (quick public key) algorithm. If you are on BIX I can E-mail to you with binary attachments, please specify which files. I am not sure how to get this to an FTP, BIX doesn't have FTP posting yet. I know it is done from BIX, help is welcome. So, I will make this software available on my PC this *WEEKEND ONLY* The purpose is to S P R E A D this stuff around. Please upload to an FTP, BBS or what-have-you. SEC_SRC.EXE 64668 bytes self extracting source code SEC_RUN.EXE 278542 bytes self extracting RUN TIME EXECUTABLES (PC) 2400 baud only 8n1 zmodem, ymodem, xmodem You will connect with Telix "qdhost" script. Enter full name (chrs (space) chrs) please be truthful Password is QPK (in caps) Phone (501) 839-8579 Voice (501) 839-3543 I do not run a BBS, forget these numbers after this week end United States calls only, honor system, please. email charliemerritt(a)bix.com

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Clipper takes another hit...
by Mike Ingle 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Looks like the Clipper fan club is growing by leaps and bounds... PC/Computing, October 1993 Page 468 (opposite inside back cover). Note: _abc_ indicates italics. Illustration: several computers with keyholes in the screens. Clinton's smiling face rises from the White House, as a long arm reaches out with a key... ----------------------------------------------------------------- Penn Jillette Subterranean Clipper Chip Blues "Phone's tapped anyway." So do it for Dylan and for Jefferson (Airplane, Starship, and Thomas). I'VE NEVER HAD a sip of alcohol, nor any recreational drugs (not one puff to uninhale), but, being 38 years old, I feel I was part of the hippie culture. I was young and rural in the sixties, but my formative years were spent listening to music created by people who chased the muse down many chemical alleys. Top 40 radio blared that the government wasn't to be trusted. Dylan sang "Phone's tapped anyway," and his inflection said that was a bad thing. But even as I was sucking up the culture, my skeptical side said that all the "Tin soldiers and Nixon's coming..." stuff might be a little dramatic. Romanticizing living outside the law, coupled with the physiological effect of drugs, might be making these artists a little paranoid, a little nutty. The joke was kinda on me. Paranoid or not, John Lennon _was_ on Nixon and FBI hate lists, the Vietnam War probably _was_ a very bad idea, and the Watergate break-in and subsequent cover-up really _did_ happen. No government is to be trusted. I could have gotten a stronger lesson from the founding fathers, but they didn't have any records out. "You say you want a revolution?"..."The government that governs least governs best." Clinton is younger than any Rolling Stone (unless they replace Bill Wyman with a new bass player from his ex-wife's generation). It would seem that Bill _Jefferson_ Clinton would share the mistrust of Big Brother that we tapped our collective foot to. But remember, he's not Bob Dylan and Neil Young - he's Kenny G and Fleetwood Mac. Watch him. Willy picked up Bush's evil encryption Clipper Chip fascist football and ran with it ("Meet the new boss - same as the old boss"). The Clipper Chip is supposed to give us more privacy, which we need. An ex-friend of mine taped Madonna talking to her business manager on her cordless phone, and some punk ("punk" in the prison sense) broke into my Internet account and read my mail. The Clipper Chip, which was designed by government engineers, would be used to scramble and decode information so that only the addressee could read it. The government would sell this chip below market value (some people believe they'd be getting something for nothing; some people believe Elvis put syringes in Pepsi), and we'd all have cheap privacy. Oh, by the way ("The large print giveth, the small print taketh away"), the government would keep all the keys so they could eavesdrop on might-be-bad-guys (with a subpoena, of course). _What?!_ The antl-Clipper Chip people sent me megs and megs of reasons why the Clipper Chip sucks (the information on how it works is kept secret, so private scientists wouldn't be able to check for mistakes; trade with other countries would be difficult; how safe could the codes be kept?; and so on). Big cheese computer people yapped against it, and it got shot down the first time around on the legislation front. On the tech front, there is a great cypherpunk ("punk" in the rock and roll sense) alternative called Pretty Good Privacy, which is nongovernment and free. One of my math-hip friends explained public-key encryption to me, and it's pretty thinking; I'll try to explain it in a future column. There was even talk of making private encryption illegal (an evil idea, pure and simple). The more research I did, the simpler it got. You have inalienable rights including life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. That's it. We have a right to communicate with anyone we choose without anyone listening in. The government works for us. Power to the people. ----------------------------------------------------------------- Wow. One of the better anti-Clipper flames I've seen so far. Simple and to the point. Repost this one everywhere. Technical question: from what I've read, Clipper is only a single- key system, basically an 80-bit super-DES. So when you hit the SECURE button on your AT&T ClipperPhone, how do the phones exchange session keys? DH exchange or something similar? Is this implemented in the Clipper chip itself, or in external hardware? Is the format standardized? If not, there will be plenty of interoperability problems with the first generation of phones. For that matter, there will probably be problems even if it is standardized. Will it work over a standard phone line? If so, the phone must be using data compression and a 14.4 modem or something. They'd have to use forward error correction, too, because a 1-bit error would cause, upon decryption, at least an 8-byte error burst. That's a very noticeable click at 6-8KHz sampling rate. I haven't been able to get any details. I called Mykotronx and they told me that the app notes weren't ready yet, and offered to put me on a waiting list for them.

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Contributions to Zimmermann--Where??
by tcmay＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm preparing to write out a check for the Phil Zimmermann defense fund (lawyers, fees, even in advance of an indictment, and hopefully to head one off), but I seem to have lost the address of the lawyers--this was in a posting in the last couple of days here. (I also looked in various threads in sci.crypt, talk.politics.crypto, etc., but I can't seem to find it.) So, I'd appreciate it if someone could send it to me, or, even better, post it again on the List....sort of a reminder that this case means a lot to our future. If Phil--who appears to be the main target, never mind that the _document subpoena_ was not directed at him this time around--is successfully indicted, sent to trial, etc., then this will have a chilling effect on others. I'll have more to say about this after I've actually put my check in the mail. -Tim May -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.

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Phil Zimmermans's statement (reposted)
by bart＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Date--Sun, 19 Sep 1993 13:38:44 -0500 From--Philip Zimmermann <prz(a)columbine.cgd.ucar.edu> Subject--Zimmermann statement on PGP investigation Some of you may have received my Internet message of a couple of days ago about the ongoing U.S. Customs investigation of the exportation of PGP, which has now progressed to the level of Federal Grand Jury subpoenas. This earlier message was intended by me for distribution to a very small group of friends who previously communicated their concern about me and the investigation and asked to be kept informed. I did not send the message to anyone outside this group. Unfortunately, I did not adequately assert my desire that the message not be further disseminated. It appears that the message has gone completely public. This was not my intention. My lawyer, Phil Dubois, has been in touch with the Assistant U.S. Attorney (William Keane) assigned to the investigation. We have no reason to believe that Mr. Keane is anything other than a professional and reasonable person. He made it clear that no decision has been made regarding any prosecution of anyone for any offense in this matter. Such decisions will not be made for some time, perhaps several months. Mr. Keane also made clear his willingness to listen to us (me and my lawyer) before making any decision. It appears that both Mr. Keane's mind and the lines of communication are open. My fear is that public dissemination of my message will close the lines of communication and put Mr. Keane into an irretrievably adversarial position. Such a result would not serve any of our interests. My lawyer tells me that nothing irritates a prosecutor more than being the subject of what he perceives to be an orchestrated publicity campaign. He also tells me that his nightmares involve FOAs (Friends Of the Accused), invariably people with good intentions, doing things on their own. I understand that the issues involved in this investigation are of the greatest importance and transcend my personal interests. Even so, I would rather not turn an investigation into a full-scale federal prosecution. I ask that everyone keep in mind that the government's resources are limitless and that mine are not. Speaking of resources, many of you have offered help, and I am grateful. Those wishing to contribute financially or otherwise should contact either me or Philip L. Dubois, Esq., at dubois(a)csn.org or by phone at 303-444-3885 or by mail at 2305 Broadway, Boulder, CO, 80304. Mr. Dubois has just got on the Internet and is still learning how to use it. Donated funds will be kept in a trust account, and all contributions will be accounted for. If this whole thing somehow goes away with money left in the account, the balance will be refunded to contributors in proportion to the amounts of their contributions. This message can be widely circulated on public forums. Philip Zimmermann prz(a)acm.org 303 541-0140 ------------------------------

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a picture of the Clipper?
by nate＠VIS.ColoState.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I seem to remember there being a picture of the clipper chip in Popular Science or something.... does anyone remember where this picture is? -nate -- +-------------------------------------------------------------------- | Nate Sammons email: nate(a)VIS.ColoState.Edu | Colorado State University Computer Visualization Laboratory | Finger nate(a)monet.VIS.ColoState.Edu for my PGP key | #include <std.disclaimer> | Always remember "Brazil" +----------------------+

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The "mpack" MIME encoder has just been released.
by Derek Upham 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The newsgroup comp.sources.reviewed has just released the sources to "mpack", a utility for encoding binary files into a MIME-compliant format, then mailing them to recepients or posting them to a newsgroup. "munpack", a utility for decoding the files, is also included. The package is supposed to work on MS-DOS and MacOS systems (and it's quite small), so people playing with PGP might be able to get some use out of it. Derek (the other other Derek) Derek Lynn Upham University of British Columbia upham(a)cs.ubc.ca Computer Science Department ============================================================================= "Ha! Your Leaping Tiger Kung Fu is no match for my Frightened Piglet Style!"

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Help Needed: PGP SIGNED MESSAGE
by Zeek 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

{{ Please excuse the interruption. I'm having problems signing a text message with my secret key and creating output that leaves the text message as is but with an ascii signature at the bottom. Or rather, I don't want the message encrypted, I just want the nifty sig attached and email-able. {{ I've done this before using some combination of -sat or something similar but I have since forgotten. This is a rather embarrassing question, I know it has to be a simple switch in the syntax but I spent 2 hours last night and 1 hour this morning trying to figure the damn thing out... learned a few interesting things along the way. Any help would be greatly appreciated. Please reply to me rather than the list. Thank you, -z (kevink)

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Clipper and Crayolas
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Sat, 25 Sep 1993 12:17:32 -0700 (MDT), <uunet!VIS.ColoState.EDU!nate> wrote - > I seem to remember there being a picture of the clipper chip > in Popular Science or something.... does anyone remember > where this picture is? I know this is not what you're looking for, but I'm in a very strange mood today: Date: Mon, 19 Apr 93 9:21:53 EDT Organization: FIRST, The Forum of Incident Response & Security Teams Subject: Slide presented at White House briefing on Clipper Chip Note: The following material was handed out a press briefing on the Clipper Chip on 4/16. Chip Operation Microchip User's Message +----------------------+ ------------------> | | 1. Message encrypted | Encryption Algorithm | with user's key | | | Serial # | 2. User's key encrypted | |--> with chip unique key | Chip Unique Key | User's Encryption | | 3. Serial # encrypted Key | Chip Family Key | with chip family key ------------------> | | | | +----------------------+ For Law Enforcement to Read a Suspect's Message 1. Need to obtain court authorized warrant to tap the suspect's telephone. 2. Record encrypted message 3. Use chip family key to decrypt chip serial number 4. Take this serial number *and* court order to custodians of disks A and B 5. Add the A and B components for that serial number = the chip unique key for the suspect user 6. Use this key to decrypt the user's message key for this recorded message 7. Finally, use this message key to decrypt the recorded message.

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Thanx 4 the help! (PGP SIGNED MESSAGE)
by Zeek 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Wait!! Ok, I've got it! "pgp -sta +clearsig=on <file>" ! Big thanks to those of you that refreshed my memory. bye. -z (kevink)

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