Re: Crypto Anarchy (jrk@...)
smb@research.att.com wrote:
Do you want an example? Here's how to shut down an anonymous remailer. First, find a name for a host that no longer exists. Send a note through the remailer to someone putatively on that host, making it appear like a stolen account (bin@foo.bar.edu, or some such). The mail should appear to discuss criminal activity, and be signed with a name from the proper ethnic group. The message will be queued forever, of course, and will likely be stored on the backup tapes for the mail spool directory. Next, send a message through the remailer to president@whitehouse.gov, threatening the president. Poof -- the Secret Service *will* come investigating (those guys have no sense of humor). They may or may not believe that the planted note is genuine. But they will approach the appropriate dean to demand that this tool of criminal activity be shut down.
Well, this apocraphyl scene is easily avoided - remailers can be configured to refuse remailing to whitehouse.gov. But then this is the Secret Service. Are they more likely to a) seize all equipment peripherally related and a bunch that isn't b) inquire about having anonymous mail blocked Undoubtedly we could launch into a discussion of why it is anybody with a pocket full of change can walk up to a payphone and leave a variety of threats at the whitehouse switchboard - the phone company need not fear having its equipment seized, while a computer used in forwarding mail containing the same threats will probably be taken along with anything else the SS feels like taking.
Quick -- how many remailers have the support of the university? How many boards of trustees -- at state universities, often linked to the government -- will back them, if the Secret Service ``requests'' that they be shut down.
Gee, I don't know. Does the phone company have any government deals, say to manufacture products using a government designed chip, that may be at risk if its found out that phone company equipment is constantly being used for threats?? The point is we are in a research & development stage (if you will) with anonymous remailers, reputations, filters, digital cash, dc-nets, etc. It is very likely that the projected reality, desired reality, and actual reality will be quite different; nevertheless, experimentation continues.
smb@research.att.com wrote:
Do you want an example? Here's how to shut down an anonymous remailer. First, find a name for a host that no longer exists. Send a note through [...] send a message through the remailer to president@whitehouse.gov, threatening the president. Poof -- the Secret Service *will* come investigating [...]
Well, this apocraphyl scene is easily avoided - remailers can be configured to refuse remailing to whitehouse.gov.
I don't think that's quite the point. The point that's just one instance. This is part of the problem of our current govt. and current law being obsolete. The recent child porn BBS busts are another good example. The law is clear on kiddie porn. If you have it, and don't know it it doesn't matter. All someone has to do is upload a child porno file to your BBS in the middle of the night and immediately call the cops and report you, to get you arrested and quite possibly convicted. All I have to do to shut down your remailer, or your anything, is *tell* the SS that you want to kill the president. By policy, they treat all threats as real, so you WILL probably get a visit from them (as I understand SS operating procedures, anyway).
But then this is the Secret Service. Are they more likely to a) seize all equipment peripherally related and a bunch that isn't b) inquire about having anonymous mail blocked
Given the SJG case, I think they'd be much more cautious and thorough in their preparations, and would not repeat the mistakes that would lead to supposing outcome a). I don't think the SS would even understand what b). is. The NSA, on the other hand... >:)
Undoubtedly we could launch into a discussion of why it is anybody with a pocket full of change can walk up to a payphone and leave a variety of threats at the whitehouse switchboard - the phone company need not fear having its equipment seized, while a computer used in forwarding mail containing the same threats will probably be taken along with anything else the SS feels like taking.
Probably because the phone service is regulated, national, well established, while BBSs or Internet sites are not. This does not mean that the lack of common carrier status is just, by any means, but I think this is the rationale that would come into play, like it or not.
The point is we are in a research & development stage (if you will) with anonymous remailers, reputations, filters, digital cash, dc-nets, etc. It is very likely that the projected reality, desired reality, and actual reality will be quite different; nevertheless, experimentation continues.
Count on it. Things are moving much too slowly on "our" side. Entities like AT&T, Warner, etc. stand a good chance of controlling much of what becomes "the net" in the future, if much of this technology is not: 1) in place and functional 2) easy to use by the clueless and lazy as well as techies 3) accepted for use within the network, indeed considered *part of* the network both as "flavour" and technical specifications 4) impossible to remove - no govt/corporate turning back of the tide VERY soon. In addition the populace has to become aware of: 1) the fact that computers are not to be feared, but are an empowering tool 2) the fact that a computer that cost $2000 10 years ago costs $200 now. 3) what networking is, what it is good for, and how they can get in on it 4) HOW to do all of this - easy "newbie" software is needed - plug-n-play 5) that privacy is possible. Most have forgotten this. 6) what good privacy and control over their electronic acitivies is for them 7) that it's easy 8) that the govt/corps/media do not like it and are not to be trusted to look after one's own rights. They need to see that it is exactly this misplaced trust that has yielded wiretapping, work place monitoring, TRW, the ment to use SSN for almost everything, non-secure purchasing (credit cards, etc.) Media falsehood, inaccuracy, and ignorance of important topics, even deliberate ignoring of relevant facts, in media "service" that is one-way, dictated, censored, and unexpandable. 9) what alternatives exist 10) what they can do about it. There's a lot of work to do. -- -=> mech@eff.org <=- Stanton McCandlish Electronic Frontier Foundation Online Activist & SysOp "A nation that is afraid to let its people judge the truth and falsehood of ideas in an open market is a nation that is afraid of its people." -JFK NitV-DC BBS 202-232-2715, Fido 1:109/? IndraNet 369:111/1, 14.4V32b 16.8ZyX
participants (3)
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catalyst-remailer＠netcom.com -
Perry E. Metzger -
Stanton McCandlish