December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Extropian Justice
by rjc＠gnu.ai.mit.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim writes: > Most of my comments will be based on the material Ram Cromwell writes: > > > First let me explain something to people who don't know. The extropians > > list has a legal arbitration system to help keep down flames. We have > > rules against bringing verbal assaults into heated debates so that > > if you feel someone is insulting you, you may 'press charges'. If > > evidence is presented, the person usually gets a warning. 3 warnings > > and your posting privileges get revoked for a period between 24-72 hours > > to allow a 'cool down' period on the list. This was implemented out > > of neccessity because the list was averaging between 150 to 300 > > messages a day with most of those coming from only a handful of > > people. > > Ironically, I found that the legal code *caused* many flames, for > various reasons. This is my interpretation, and I "assign credit" (in > genetic programming terms) for dozens of flames between various > parties to the existence of a legal code that encouraged/facillitated > the filing of charges and countercharges, the issuance of warnings and > other judgements, and the seemingly endless debate about all of these > issues, as well as of the charges. All true, there was a "shakeout" in the legal system which caused huge debates over the fairness and objectivity of it. Everything has settled down since the commercialization of the list and since the big players have left. > > A common way of resolving a standoff debate on the Extropians list > > is to put your money where your mouth is -- a bet. This causes someone > > to get off their lazy ass and go look up the citation and present it > > With due respect for Ray here, this worked better in theory than in > practice. The issuance of a challenge typically resulted in each side > firing new volleys of charges, of clarifications, and of boring public > debate about the terms, judgement criteria, who would hold the money, > etc. Ad nauseum. I recall only one fairly positive example: some bet I agree that it worked better in theory than in practice, but it did seem to have the effect of shutting down a 'is so, is not, is so!, is not!' flame. For instance, Perry would often get involved in a discussion where each side was claiming a statistic and firmly standing by it without offering a reference. Perry would often end a thread like this by betting a huge sum of money that he was right. It seemed to me, that it often quieted the other person down. The claims might not have been resolved (because no one took up the bet), but the endless standoff of counter claims would end. Besides bets, there was Derek Zahn's accountability society which had one positive result and almost none of the negative flamage that bets had. > By the way, so far as I am aware, *nobody* has ever been kicked off > the Cypherpunks list. Not even Detweiler, who asked to be removed last > Novemeber or so, as he was entering his terminal phase. The disadvantage of this is that since your list software has no filtering capability, I must deal with a huge flood of messages everyday that Detweiler generates. For a simple list like majordomo, I think deleting trouble makers is a good short term solution. > There may be a lesson here. A formal legal code encourages "law > hacking" by those with an axe to grind. A formal system which attempts > to cover all possibilities encourages incompleteness, loopholes. (This > is often analyzed as being the result of Goedel's Theorem, which I > suppose it is in an informal sense :-}.) An interesting speculation. Legal systems are, after all, pretty close to being 'formal systems' Nobody ever said a legal system had to be consistent though. ;-) > I like the Cypherpunks system a lot better. Instead of bogging down in > claims, charges, formal bets, adjudication, appeals, etc., there are > relatively few if any rules. Somehow the turkeys end up leaving. With much heat and light generated in the meantime which is fine for some people, but irritating to others. Keeping in mind Coase's Theorem and Spontaneous Order, Harry and I are going beyond the idea of PPLs by attempting to create list software which allows 'personal justice', filtering, reputations, etc. We personally believe that the whitewater of noise which is out there now will become a tsunami when Joe Sixpack gets his 'entitled' account. The only way to defend yourself from this assault in cyberspace will be intelligent communications software. -Ray

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dispersed DES
by David C. Taylor 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have come up with (and implemented) a version of triple DES for true paranoids, which I call dispersed DES. All I do is append four bytes to the beginning of the output files for each cycle of triple DES. It seems like this should provide even more security than triple DES, but I am no expert. Any comments? Please include "dct(a)newt.cs.byu.edu" in your replies, as I am unable to maintain access to the mailing list because of volume. Thanks. David C. Taylor dct(a)newt.cs.byu.edu

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Re: dispersed DES
by Matt Blaze 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In local.cypherpunks you write: >I have come up with (and implemented) a version of triple DES for true >paranoids, which I call dispersed DES. All I do is append four bytes to >the beginning of the output files for each cycle of triple DES. It seems >like this should provide even more security than triple DES, but I am no >expert. Any comments? Please include "dct(a)newt.cs.byu.edu" in your replies, >as I am unable to maintain access to the mailing list because of volume. >Thanks. >David C. Taylor >dct(a)newt.cs.byu.edu You have to be really careful when you invent new cipher modes, almost as much as when you invent an entire new cipher. It sounds like you have weakend 3-DES. Where do you get these 4 bytes? If they are fixed or deterministically generated, you will have made it possible for an attacker who can brute-force 1-DES (e.g., with a Weiner machine) to "peel off" each single DES key. Instead of a 112 (or 168) bit work factor (as with 3-DES), you'd end up with a 57 or 58 bit work factor. If you randomly generate the 4 bytes, you have to carefully evaluate your random number method. In any case it sounds like your mode is the weaker of 3-des and 1-des*(the complexity of your random bit generator). Perhaps I don't understand how your scheme works. Also, what intuition makes you think that it's stronger than plain old 3-DES? -matt

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No Subject
by catalyst-remailer＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

ftp.netcom.com//pub/mpj has source for new macpgp

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Unicorn vs. tmp@netcom
by Cyber City 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Recently Black Unicorn posted that he had sued tmp@netcom, and settled out of court. A couple of messages followed which were supportive of his action. The text below is a rebuke to Unicorn. I post it in the hope that it will provide dimension to the debate. To Black Unicorn: Once upon a time, two strangers found a dog. Alice said, "That's my dog: I can clearly tell by its markings". Bob said, "No, I'm afraid you're mistaken. See his ears pick up when I call his name". And so the debate continued, until a third person, Sol, arrived. On hearing the pleadings of Bob and Alice, Sol told them, "Stand 10 meters apart and put the dog between you". Sol the scared the dog with a quick movement and a shout, and the dog ran to its true master. Likewise, when you were tested recently by net abuse, you went for relief to your master, the government. This is what distinguishes you from the rest of us. We might react against the abuse (or we might not), but I think that none of us - or at least a very few - would have gone to court for relief. "I spoke to a Federal Court of Appeals Judge who I have known for a number of years to try and poke some holes in the suit on substantive merits." Despite your protestation, "I also don't like to be a bully", it seems to me that your pursuit of this case was predicated on your ability to be a bully and an insider. Like your colleagues Cantor and Seigel, you emitted flamebait and then pretended offense at the inevitable flames. You taunted tmp@netcom about his illness, reminding him at least three times in one message to take his medicine. Nice behaviour for a person who supposedly believes in privacy. It seems to me that you sized up tmp@netcom as a person who could not fight back due to his illness, and then you provoked him in order to establish grounds for your suit. I believe that your case, which is apparently based upon testimony from your friends, could not have succeeded in court. But it didn't have to, did it? You only had to find someone who was ill, and then kick him while he was down. Was it Rousseau who said, "First, we kill all the lawyers"? The cost of a lawsuit in the U.S. today can easily be over $100,000. The cost of a contract murder is said to be $10,000-$50,000. Consider the economics. I think there is a role to be played by lawyers in the future of the net. The net does not like litigation, because it interferes with the free flow of information. But it does like protocols, which are seen to enhance the flow of information. Lawyers, by their training and practice, are especially good at formulating workable protocols. If we had a protocol governing the use of network resources by sick or abusive users, your conflict with tmp@netcom might not have transpired, or else a solution might have been easily achieved. Conflicts like this are resulting in conversion of newsgroups on Usenet to moderated groups - a very unfortunate trend in my opinion, as Usenet does not provide for the removal of moderators. Here is a proper outlet for legal talent, not in self-serving time-wasting resource-absorbing litigation. -- Alex Brock

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Re: Unicorn vs. tmp@netcom
by joshua geller 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> To Black Unicorn: > Despite your protestation, "I also don't like to be a bully", it seems > to me that your pursuit of this case was predicated on your ability to > be a bully and an insider. Like your colleagues Cantor and Seigel, you > emitted flamebait and then pretended offense at the inevitable flames. > You taunted tmp@netcom about his illness, reminding him at least three > times in one message to take his medicine. did uni do this too? I thought that was me. of course, it very commonly occurs that things that I think I he done turn out to actually been done by someone else. josh

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Re: compatibility with future PGP
by remailer＠jpunix.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

ebrandt(a)jarthur.cs.hmc.edu (Eli Brandt) once said: EB> > From: "Perry E. Metzger" <perry(a)imsi.com> EB> > People overseas want to be able to use this program, too. There are EB> > 250 million people in the U.S., which constitutes under 1/20th of the EB> > Earth's population. EB> EB> You dropped the part of his message where he said that he believed EB> v2.5 was available abroad. If it's not, I don't think it will take EB> long. And once it's escaped from this little prison state of ours, EB> overseas users incur no risk in using it: they can't even be EB> Noriega'd, since they've broken no law in any country. It can be obtained from IRC, /msg pgpserv help. Patrick

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Re: Email firewall etc
by remailer＠jpunix.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in once said: RI> Vincent.Cate(a)FURMINT.NECTAR.CS.CMU.EDU: RI> > Companies like the idea of firewall machines to protect the security of RI> > their internal nets. I bet they would also like something called an RI> > "email-firewall". Names are important. :-) I think of the RI> > email-firewall as a slightly modified anonymous-remailer. RI> RI> I haven't delved into the wide world of remailers out there, but I'd like a RI> remailer that encrypted, though did not necessarily anonymize, incoming mail. RI> RI> I'm not really bothered about the NSA reading my mail. In fact, I'm not usually RI> concerned whether someone in New York, for instance read my mail. But I might RI> not want people closer to home (local sysadmins, etc) to read it. I'm sure many RI> others share this position. RI> RI> The problem is that I can't ensure that people encrypt their mail to me. They RI> may not bother, or be unable. An alternative would be for them to send it to RI> a remailer, which, knowing my public key, would encrypt and forward it to me. Version 1.99 of my Remail for Waffle actually does this: it checks if the recipient of the remailed message has a PGP public key, and if so, it encrypts the outgoing message, if it is not encrypted already. The remailers remail(a)vox.hacktic.nl and remailer(a)jpunix.com use this program. For testing you can also use remail(a)desert.hacktic.nl, or remailer(a)desert.hacktic.nl PAtrick

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Re: dispersed DES
by Matt Blaze 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Good point about the source of the appended bytes. The reason I think it might >be more secure is that the length of the appended segment is less than the >length of the key on each pass, so it would seem to be the equivalent of a >one-time pad for those relying on the appended bytes to get the key. That is my >only basis for not worrying about wekening effects. Any holes? > >dct(a)newt.cs.byu.edu Let me see if I understand your scheme: you prepend 4 unpredictable bytes to the data before running through each single des cycle. What do you do with the 4 bytes from each cycle that are shifted into the end of the datastream? Is the datastram vulnerable to independent search there, too? Assuming the 4 bytes really are unpredictable, and assuming you deal with both "ends" of the stream, there doesn't seem to be an *obvious* attack that allows independent search for each of the 2 or 3 des keys. There was a paper in Eurocrypt this year (that I haven't seen yet) that discusses some not-so-obvious properties of multi-cipher modes that may reveal another attack, however. If you don't think you've weakened 3-des, now the question is whether you've strengthened it (or otherwise improved it). Your method doesn't seem to increase the complexity of a brute force attack on the 112 (or 168) bits of 3-des key material. In fact, you may have actually increased the number of bits of key material (if the decryptor has to know extra secret bytes in order to recover the ends of messages) that the good guy has to manage without increasing the work factor for the bad guy. 3 des is plenty strong, and if you don't trust or otherwise don't want to use 3-des, it's not clear that this offers an improvement. -matt

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Re: Unicorn vs....
by mpd＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Jim Sewell writes: > Granted, tmp is not responsible for so called moral > failures on the part of European business associates of > Uni's BUT tmp IS responsible for damaging Uni's reputation > by making it look as if he said things that tmp couldn't > prove he had said. If Uni lost a 7 figure business deal > because tmp attributed a comment to Uni that Uni didn't > make then tmp is definitely guilty of damaging Uni's > character and SHOULD be sued... But tmp is only responsible for damaging the reputation of the pseudonym "Black Unicorn". This is not the same as damaging an actual person by name. If I am in a frivilous mood someday and post a tongue-in-cheek article on alt.hamsters.duct-tape under the pseudonym "Rodent Ravisher", I have little cause to complain that my real-life reputation has been ruined if someone misrepresents my views. If I am dense enough to publicly associate myself with the post, then perhaps I shouldn't complain when the Good Christians begin avoiding me and perhaps even hiding their hamsters when they see me passing by. In any case, it is certainly not the fault of the other flamers if my career goes down the tubes. > The bottom line is that when you play on the net and flame > each other that is one thing, but when your games cause > someone's business and real-life character to be damaged > then you are playing in the real world and the name of the > game there is SUE, RESPONSIBILITY FOR YOUR ACTIONS, and TAKE > THE CONSEQUENCES FOR YOUR ACTIONS. But flaming an anonymous identity is not the same as flaming a real-life person. Anonymous identities allow one a little vacation from having to be deadly serious all the time. And an opportunity to play Devil's Advocate with ideas that may not necessarily be ones own. Let's lighten up a little here. > I suppose we all could use this as an opportunity to see > how well our anarchist, freedom of speech, privacy, > encryption ideas mesh with the 'real world'. This IS the 'real world'. -- Mike Duvos $ PGP 2.6 Public Key available $ mpd(a)netcom.com $ via Finger. $

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