December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

PGP 2.6
by pcw＠access.digex.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Here is an exchange I had with the folks at MIT who did PGP2.6. I've suggested that they delay their anti-patent-infringement gadgetry until PGP2.6 is more widely available for _all_ platforms. >> I use a Macintosh. Is there a Mac PGP 2.6? > >Me too. Hopefully we will have a MacPGP 2.6 shortly (I am not sure whether >we will do the port at MIT, or whether the traditional MacPGP development >team will do it, probably the later). > > -Jeff Perhaps you should delay the expiration of old, pre-RSAREF PGP keys until after a Mac version is available. That would avoid cutting off a large part of the populace.

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Response to Uni's "Lawsuit" Message
by jazz＠hal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Quoting from Curtis Frye's response: What exactly is Netcom's liability in this case? If a service provider is treated as a phone company, abuse of the service could be grounds for discontinuing the service. As Netcom did not discontinue tmp's service (see below), perhaps there is room for suit there. By your phrase "treated as a phone company", are you implying Common Carrier status? If so, I wonder under what grounds a common carrier is allowed to terminate service? Certainly, non-payment of bills is one. If person A alleges person B has made threatening phone calls, can the phone company terminate person B's service unilaterally based solely on the allegations? Must it wait until civil suits or criminal charges are brought? My understanding of common carriage was that the carrier was obligated to provide service to everyone within its service area, whether or not it liked their politics, or bedmates, or the content of their communications. What protection should Netcom, and other access providers, have against the abuses of their subscribers? Damn if I know, but it's an important question to stay awake at night worrying about... What was in the contract signed by the subscribers? You can bet that if I ever start an on-line service, there will be an "indemnify and hold harmless" clause, and provisions for demanding proof of umbrella liability coverage; lack of coverage upon demand would be grounds for termination. In other words, if tmp@netcom were a subscriber to my service, and someone alleged wrongdoing to this degree, my action would be to demand of tmp proof of umbrella liability coverage of $1,000,000; without such proof, account revoked. The only way to put teeth in an indemnify-and-hold-harmless clause for an individual, I guess. Very much in line with your earlier thoughts on the potential (non-) application of traditional libel/slander law to the Net -- would the Courts allow cyberspace to be that much more rough-and-tumble, with higher standards of abuse required for successful suits? They'll have to, with the current state of the art with respect to authentication and non-repudiation. A plaintiff will have to work pretty hard to prove a particular human generated a piece of email, given the ease of spoofing, remailers, anonymity and pseudonymity. I also thank Uni for posting. Jason Zions

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Canadian site
by dave.hodgins＠canrem.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

For any other Canrem.com members reading this, I've uploaded a file called PGP26INF.ZIP, that contains a copy of all files that can be downloaded from net-dist.mit.edu, without recognition as a Canadian, or U.S. Site. Regards, Dave Hodgins. ********** Original From: DAVE HODGINS * CARBON * To: MIT POSTMASTER * COPY * Date/Number: 05/24/94 - Not Yet Posted ********** On: CRS - 0104 - Internet_Mail ----------------------------------------------------------------------- As per my message, to you, on 05/15, PLEASE add canrem.com to your list of Canadian sites, that should be allowed access, to the PGP 2.6 files! I just tried to download the files, and was again, denied access to the directory. Please send me an email message confirming completion of the above, so I don't have to waste telenet time (which I pay for), looking up a directory name, that I cannot access! Regards, Dave Hodgins, (416) 538-6516 2350 Dundas Street West, Apt. 2505, Toronto, Ontario, Canada M6P 4B1 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- 230-If you are FTP'ing in to get PGP, and your DNS name of your host isn't 230-one that is "obviously" from the U.S., you may get a permission denied 230-message when you try to cd into /pub/PGP. If this happens to you, and 230-your host is located in the United States or Canada, send mail to 230-postmaster(a)bitsy.mit.edu to be added to a special exception list. The site I'm using is being denied access. Please add canrem.com (CRS Online, formerly Canada Remote Systems) to your special exception list. The IP address is 198.133.43.nn, where nn is any number from 1 to around 200. Could you email me when this has been completed? Thanks, Dave Hodgins, Toronto, Ontario, Canada. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLdZptKsStlBrWUZ9AQEtXgQAlRYyMbQ+e1zc8Igr4xL6o7BzmR7wr2Mj HJL4qAYjwIErG/QuAay8c+rDsiHulaM5aoXRifWa7NI46qfD33mQ5be89gjCzB/D CpUoH81Vfb+bqi9PiJDqZsBhoPgRJ8cot47P3EYxM/9ZgrtUKlWJZlLLV2XPlqQ4 9qihKaa3adI= =9hvn -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- cc: ALL in 8 on CRS cc: CYPHERPUNKS(a)TOAD.COM in 0104 on CRS --- * RM 1.3 00820 * Internet:Dave.Hodgins@Canrem.com Rime->118 Fido(1:229/15)

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Looking for a paper...
by Jim McCoy 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I am trying to hunt up a copy of: The Dining Cryptographers in the Disco: Unconditional Sender and Recipient Untracability with Computationally Secure Serviceability by Michael Waidner and Birgit Pfitzmann So far the only ref I have found is the abstract in Eurocrypt '89, but I can't seem to locate a copy of the entire paper. If anyone knows of where I might find a copy I would appreciate it... jim

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Minor edit to the PGP 2.6 distribution
by Jeffrey I. Schiller 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

About one half hour ago I replaced the PGP 2.6 distribution files with a newer version. The change represents a new mitlicen.txt file (minor wording correction, no big deal) and a corrected UNIX makefile. The source itself and the executables were not changed. -Jeff

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PGP 2.6 is dangerous in the long term ?
by mgream＠acacia.itd.uts.edu.au 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Personally, I happen to dislike the PGP 2.6 saga; I think it's effectively turning the wheel back viz. "US only software" as well as confusing the issue ("oh, which PGP do you have ?"). Some say that it's not a problem in the sense that PGP 2.3a will be upgraded to "support" PGP 2.6. Even this situation is clearly undesirable as PGP itself becomes a fragmented product -- esp. as I think "new users" will opt for PGP 2.6, and others will change too because of the purported "legitimacy". The result is that PGP 2.6 _will_ become heavily adopted in the US. This it not the point, however. As the RSA patent is expected to expire in the coming years, one would expect the liberation of PGP, at least in terms of the RSA algorithm (negating the export control issues). The sinister fact of PGP 2.6, and other derived RSAREF product is that even as the patent itself expires, RSADSI still exerts control over PGP by way of RSAREF. Being Australian, I've not read the RSAREF conditions, but there is at the point that commercial use will still not be possible (at it would be under non-RSAREF 2.3a) when the RSA patent expires. So quite possibly, PGP 2.6 is doing a great deal more longer term damage to the viablity of PGP than is immediately obvious. Is this a valid viewpoint ? Matthew. -- Matthew Gream Consent Technologies Sydney, (02) 821-2043 M.Gream(a)uts.edu.au

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RE: Bruce Sterling's talk at CFP
by Blanc Weber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm glad that Bruce Sterling made the comments which he did, in that gathering of the right people to hear these statements. Although he sounds as though he thinks that everyone ought to be their brother's keeper, I think the paragraphs below do point out the hypocrisy in worrying about the gravity of what could be communicated in a telephone conversation or over the net that might result in advancing a criminal act, when "People stumble through the streets of every city in this country absolutely wrapped in the grip of demons, groping at passersby for a moment's attention and pity and not getting it." The contrast between cries for safety legislation and the abhorent conditions under which many live, do not demonstrate a delicate sensitivity towards higher standards of functioning which could make one sympathize with the alarms about opening up a pandora's box of crime, in such a climate of seeming disconcern for the sufferings of the individual. Who is being saved from what, and who really cares? If the answers to these questions are not resolved, then what sense does it make to put such alarms into a non-existent context. "There may be securicams running 24 hours a day all around us, but mechanical surveillance is not the same as people actually getting attention or care." And it's not the same as actually knowing what is important to an individual, and it does not convince that, although truly important values which could build up a society are being neglected, attending to these exceptional threats to safety will keep everyone from total disaster. "You want to impress me with your deep concern for children? This is Chicago! Go down to the Projects and rescue some children from being terrorized and recruited by crack gangs who wouldn't know a modem if it bit them on the ass!" Another convincing demonstration of efficacy in responding in a coordinated fashion to the safety requirements of a great society, protecting the sacredness of vulnerable littel children, the purity of the moral atmosphere, and being of practical use to all. Maybe I could appreciate someone's deep concern for my safety, but yet be unconvinced of the consequential benefit of their ministrations when there is so much evidence to the contrary. I wouldn't make the points which B. Sterling made in quite the same way, but he did present the message to our "guardians" that they are not pulling the wool over *every*one's eyes, that their hypocricy is patent, and that their motives are ridiculous about their proposed goodwill to mankind. Blanc

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PGP 2.6 uses RSAREF version 1
by Hal Abelson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

MIT's release of PGP 2.6 uses RSAREF version 1, under the RSAREF license of January 5, 1993. Some people have wondered whether including RSAREF 1, rather than RSAREF version 2, is an oversight in the PGP 2.6 distribution. It is not an oversight. Version 1 is what we intended. The change from RSAREF 2.0 (in PGP 2.5) to RSAREF version 1 (in PGP 2.6) was done on the advice of RSA Data Security, which has granted MIT permission to access non-published routines in all RSAREF versions 1.nn, and rights in accordance with the version 1 license. -- Hal Abelson Dept. of Elect. Eng. and Comp. Sci. MIT

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(fwd) FBI infiltrates Connected.com
by Jim choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Path: bga.com!news.sprintlink.net!connected.com!connected.com!not-for-mail From: turmoil(a)hebron.connected.com (Turmoil) Newsgroups: seattle.general,alt.activism,alt.2600,alt.drugs Subject: FBI infiltrates Connected.com Date: 21 May 1994 11:48:31 -0700 Organization: Connected INC -- Internet Services Lines: 22 Message-ID: <2rll1v$jmb(a)hebron.connected.com> NNTP-Posting-Host: hebron.connected.com X-Newsreader: TIN [version 1.2 PL2] Xref: bga.com seattle.general:3840 alt.activism:10793 alt.2600:9216 alt.drugs:20914 Recently the staff at connected. has admitted that they have "invited" two FBI agents to roan that system. According to connected.staff these FBI agents are looking for "hackers phreaks" and people having copywritten programs. I am pretty peaved about this, we don't know how long thev'e been here, what rights they have on the system, or much else. Just that they are here. Watching us. Of course, I never use my account for illegal activities. Shit, I don't even do much illegal (except smoke a bit of pot) But I do not like the idea of giving up my rights against undue searches. This seems a reflection on the state of America today. This used to be a free country, but now there is a pig or FBI agent watching EVERYTHING you do. This is NOT the America described in the constitution. It's not a society of free, independent people. It is a dictatorship that must spy on it's own people in order to survive. I am anxious to here what others that read these groups think about this. Have A Nice Day turmoil(a)hebron.connected.com The FBI have infiltrated this site, I am activly searching for a new site

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Email firewall etc
by rishab＠dxm.ernet.in 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Vincent.Cate(a)FURMINT.NECTAR.CS.CMU.EDU: > Companies like the idea of firewall machines to protect the security of > their internal nets. I bet they would also like something called an > "email-firewall". Names are important. :-) I think of the > email-firewall as a slightly modified anonymous-remailer. I haven't delved into the wide world of remailers out there, but I'd like a remailer that encrypted, though did not necessarily anonymize, incoming mail. I'm not really bothered about the NSA reading my mail. In fact, I'm not usually concerned whether someone in New York, for instance read my mail. But I might not want people closer to home (local sysadmins, etc) to read it. I'm sure many others share this position. The problem is that I can't ensure that people encrypt their mail to me. They may not bother, or be unable. An alternative would be for them to send it to a remailer, which, knowing my public key, would encrypt and forward it to me. Comments? -------------------------------------------------------------------------- Rishab Aiyer Ghosh rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in Voicemail +91 11 3760335; Vox/Fax/Data 6853410 H-34C Saket New Delhi 110017 INDIA The National Short-Sleeved Shirt Association says: Support your right to bare arms! --------------------------------------------------------------------------

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