December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Restoring the list membership
by rishab＠dxm.ernet.in 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I forgot to add: as there were 700+ members, and most of them lurked and rarely posted, and Mike Ingle only sent his announcement to those who had posted in the last 2 weeks, it would be unfair to assume that those who haven't resubscribed are uninterested. A few have posted to the list that they didn't receive Mike's mail, and rejoined after querying majordomo, etc. Others may still be wondering whether it's just low traffic, or a toad.com problem, and not deduce that they've been unsubscribed. -------------------------------------------------------------------------- Rishab Aiyer Ghosh rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in Voicemail +91 11 3760335; Vox/Fax/Data 6853410 H-34C Saket New Delhi 110017 INDIA The National Short-Sleeved Shirt Association says: Support your right to bare arms! --------------------------------------------------------------------------

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Old list traffic
by rishab＠dxm.ernet.in 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

dave.hodgins(a)canrem.com (Dave Hodgins): > Is there any way to obtain a copy of all of the messages since last > Friday? > > Please email me with any responses. This has come up before, so I thought you would all like to know that I've kept a more or less complete archive of list traffic since last December. Unfortunately you can't ftp it _from_ me, though I can ftp parts _to_ anyone.

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Re: AOL for Acronym OverLoading
by fnerd＠smds.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

And the current worst AOL (acronym overload): ATM Network -- Automatic Teller Machine, Asynchronous Transfer Mode Recently saw an employment ad for an "ATM Network Administrator". The whole job description was ambiguous ("you will oversee the operation of our ATM network...") until you got to the name of the company. -fnerd - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - To auditors without the code, calls seem indistinguishable from noise. --George Gilder -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a aKxB8nktcBAeQHabQP/d7yhWgpGZBIoIqII8cY9nG55HYHgvt3niQCVAgUBLMs3K ui6XaCZmKH68fOWYYySKAzPkXyfYKnOlzsIjp2tPEot1Q5A3/n54PBKrUDN9tHVz 3Ch466q9EKUuDulTU6OLsilzmRvQJn0EJhzd4pht6hSnC1R3seYNhUYhoJViCcCG sRjLQs4iVVM= =9wqs -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Forward of alt.security.pgp message
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I thought I would post this to try and spur some discussion. It is my reply to DS's bid for the security of centralized authority in key certification. In article <strnlghtCpzCqo.Jzr(a)netcom.com>, David Sternlight <david(a)sternlight.com> wrote: >In article <Cpz2HA.HAG.3(a)cs.cmu.edu>, >Rujith S DeSilva <rudis+(a)cs.cmu.edu> wrote: > >> >>Mr. Sternlight said that RIPEM can have signed messages in which the >>authenticity of the public-key can be assured in the same message, and that >>PGP cannot do so. >> >>Mr. Repenning's `one-word reply' was a PGP signed message in which the >>authenticity of the public-key was assured in the same message. >> > >Nope. His message simply provided his public key without any authentication >other than those he got to sign it. Since those are themselves not >authenticated except by the few who trust them, his public key is basically >unauthenticated. What he DID do is prove that the message was authenticated >with that public key. So what? > >Ripem provides a certificate in which a known Certification Authority (in >most cases RSADSI--eventually the Internet authorities themselves--vouches >for the sender's public key and one knows what standards have been applied >to prove identity. That public key is used to sign the message. Thus the >person is matched to his key and certified by a high-level-of-trust standard >certifier. That key then is used to authenticate the message. > >Putting it another way, I can't get an RSA Certificate without passing a >number of tests of my identity--for the Unaffiliated User Heirarchy that >involves proving to a Notary Public I'm me, with 3 pieces of ID including a >photo ID, and making that assertion under penalty of perjury. > >Thus the chances are pretty good I'm me and the key is mine. I dispute this. It is a simple matter to circumvent this requirement. If you would like to find three or four people on any given weekend who have the capacity to obtain a "trusted" certification in another name, or any name they wish, I suggest you try a college bar in Georgetown, or any other college area for that matter. Even passports are subject to sophisticated and fraudulant application. Your blind trust in the ability of perjury to deter is misplaced, and I might add, typical of your legal process way of approaching problems. All a centralized authority really accomplishes is to put a cap and a floor on the threshold to accept a given key as "valid" or that said keyholder's name really is "Bob Dwyer." PGP claims no such authority. PGP merely says: This is who has certified and vouched for the ownership of this key. Take my key signing policies. I will sign anothers key in two instances. 1> If a physical exchange of key materials is made by the key holder, and if that owner can prove access to the secret key. (Signed with my low security key) 2> If I personally know the keyholder and am aquainted in a context outside of the Internet, and the above criteria can be satisfied. (Signed with my highsecurity key) Which will you assert is the more reliable? A central authority that has never seen or heard of said applicant before? Or an authority who has known said applicant for months or even years outside of the internet, and in a personal capacity? (My method #2) Until every man, woman, and teen has a smart national ID card based on fingerprints or retina scan or DNA sampling, centralized authority is really a limiter, and in many cases a deceptive appearance of "secure" certification. (I might add that these methods are unacceptable to me for other reasons). In fact, should you be willing to wager a sufficant amount, and assure my non-prosecution for perjury, I would be pleased to demonstrate the ability to circumvent the centralized procedure in whatever reasonable protocol you would like. Provided I have an individual who I trust to sign keys only of those he knows, the only way to circumvent my PGP authentication requirements is to physically intercept the secret key and break the passphrase, or to resort to rubber hose cryptoanalysis. A tactic that is likely to cause key revocation in any event. >With PGP one >makes up a key, finds someone or other to sign it, and unless the signers >are both known and trusted by every reader, one has nothing. RSA IS known to >every reader and their safeguards are published. So what you really have is the potential for untrusted signatures to be given in PGP. So? How is this a limiter to the user who is careful enough to screen the keys properly? A centralized key signor authority is merely laziness. It is a method forwarded by those who are too sloth to take security in their own hands and wish to have it instead provided for them. This is why PGP is often criticized: Users are simply too lazy to look out for themselves. The answer is to limit everyone. Typical American policy, shoot for the average every time. You don't need to learn how to drive, we'll just make the speed limit safe for any idiot. You don't need to know how to brake, we'll just invent ABS. You don't need to take responsibility for your own security, we'll just invent a mediocre standard to do it for you. >Until PGP has some trusted official signers with high security certification >device protection and identity safeguards, the level of authentication is >its weakest element. No, until users pay more attention to what really is a "high security certification." authentication is its weakest element FOR THOSE USERS. When users really take extensive steps to certify, a certification is MORE secure than a centralized authority. I'm going to trust my million dollar transaction to a trusted friends transaction way before I trust what amounts to the Department of Motor Vehicles' assurance of identity. >By the way, in his example he did it wrong. First public key, then signature >or the poor reader has to invoke PGP twice. And this is a good clue perhaps on his signing procedures and caution in methodology. >David -uni- (Dark) -- 073BB885A786F666 nemo repente fuit turpissimus - potestas scientiae in usu est 6E6D4506F6EDBC17 quaere verum ad infinitum, loquitur sub rosa - wichtig!

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Re: Old list traffic
by Eric Johnson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

: dave.hodgins(a)canrem.com (Dave Hodgins): : : > Is there any way to obtain a copy of all of the messages since last : > Friday? : > : > Please email me with any responses. : : This has come up before, so I thought you would all like to know that I've kept : a more or less complete archive of list traffic since last December. : : Unfortunately you can't ftp it _from_ me, though I can ftp parts _to_ anyone. I also have a "more or less" complete archive of all traffic I've received since the middle of January '94, that is available via WWW/WAIS. If anyone is looking for a home for older articles, I'd gladly add them to my indexed archive. via WAIS (ie.): $ waissearch -h pmip.maricopa.edu -d /cpindex/Cypherpunks <searchterm> or WWW: http://pmip.maricopa.edu/crypt/cypherpunks/Cypherpunks.src which accesses: cypherpunks -- May 19 01:00 -- 16,684,219 --Eric BTW, I receive the list via an "alternate" channel, so if you notice any anomolies, other than short headers after around March 1994, I'd appreciate hearing about it (I pipe my incoming list traffic through a couple filters, but WAIS seems ok with it (now)).

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Mr. Sternlight, libel
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I MUST highlight the fact that this is a very general survey of libel law and the state law which is applied will have radical effects on the case. I must also point out that this is in no way legal advice, but merely academic examination. In order to make a prima facie case of defamation the following must be met by the plaintiff: 1> A false and defamatory statement concerning him 2> Publication of the statement. (Note 1) 3> Fault, at least to the point of negligence, some exceptions apply. (Note 2) 4> Special harm of a pecuniary nature or actionability of the statement generally. Note 1: Publication is defined merely as communication to a party other than the plaintiff. Note 2: Fault where the plaintiff is a private citizen varies from state to state between mere negligence, intent to harm and reckless disregard. A statement is defamatory if it has a "tendency to harm the reputation" of the plaintiff. Rest. 2d of Torts sec. 559. The reputation of the plaintiff need not be actually injured, it need only be shown that the reputation of the plaintiff could have been harmed were the statement to have been believed. An exception exists where the statement is not clearly defamatory on its face, and in this instance the plaintiff must usually show special damages which indicate actual damage to reputation and pecuniary harm resulted. The truthfulness of the statement is an absolute defense for an action of libel. Where the defendant has made a charge of wrongdoing against the plaintiff, the defendant must show that the plaintiff actually committed the offense alleged, not a lesser or greater offense. Rest. 2d of Torts sec. 581A, comment f. Where the statement is a matter of public interest, the burden of proof lies on the plaintiff to show that the statement was false. (Potentially this holding in _Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps_, 475 U.S. 767 (1986) is only applicable to defendants who are media organizations.) Non-media defendants are most likely to bear the burden of proof, rather than the plaintiff as the plaintiff burden of proof in the case of public interest matters is to avoid the chilling effect of potential liability and frivolous law suits. In order to assert a defense of libel for the protection of the interests of the recipient of the publication (Netcom), the defendant (Sternlight) must show in most jurisdictions that the defendant was responding to a request for information rather than offering the information without provocation. Rest. 2d. of Torts sec 595(2)(a). I turn to the facts at hand: Here is the letter sent to netcom by David Sternlight as given to me by Mr. Beker: BEGIN ATTACHMENT OF STERNLIGHT LETTER:---------------------------- >From strnlght(a)netcom.com Thu May 19 13:54:09 1994 Date: Wed, 18 May 1994 15:59:44 -0700 (PDT) From: David Sternlight <strnlght(a)netcom.com> Reply to: david(a)sternlight.com To: Netcom Support <support(a)netcom.com>, Brian Beker <beker(a)netcom.com> Subject: Patent infringement In tracking down slow response on netcom8, I discovered that user beker was idle for over 16 minutes, and since the timeout was supposed to be 12, I fingered him to see if he was a netcom staffer. I found his .plan file contained a PGP 2.3a key. That infringes RSADSI's patents. That this is so has recently been confirmed by an independent inquiry by lawyers retained by MIT. The patent holder, RSADSI, has said that no only do versions of PGP except the soon-to-be-released 2.6 and the commercially sold Viacrypt version 2.4 infringe in the U.S., but posted keys and key servers constitute inducement to infringe and/or conspiracy to infringe. Given netcom's new user agreement, I'm user user beker will want to correct this. ----- end Mr. Sternlight has written to a party, not Mr. Beker satisfying the requirement for publication. The publication is "in print" making the analysis one of libel, and not slander. Mr. Sternlight has alleged wrongdoing by Mr. Beker. (Patent infringement) Mr. Sternlight is not (as far as I can tell) entitled to 3rd party interest protection, and is thus not excepted by this privilege as he has not responded to a request for information from Netcom. Mr. Sternlight has cited some source for his legal interpretation, the clarity of this source, or its existence at all will determine Mr. Sternlight's negligence in this matter. The language of the letter seems to suggest that attorneys from MIT have ruled THIS SPECIFIC user as in violation of the patent in question. I believe it would be difficult to show recklessness or intent to harm reputation in this instance. On the issue of harm to Mr. Beker, I have no information. Key in this regard will be the question of Netcom's handling of the situation, and what harm might have occurred to Mr. Beker. Mr. Sternlight may assert the defense of truth. I am not familiar with the patent case such to comment on his likely result here. Were the letter seen to claim that attorneys from MIT had ruled the user Beker specifically as an infringer, I believe he would lose this defense. Further the fact that Mr. Sternlight's letter seems to suggest that Mr. Beker is the subject of scrutiny by attorneys from MIT is a potentially independent issue of defamation. This assertion I feel is more likely to be found reckless. Overall the weakest aspect of the case is damages. It seems hard to show that there were significant reputational damages. Even if all the other criteria are satisfied, the lack of significant damages as a practical matter will likely derail any action. I believe this case _might_ satisfy the Rule 11 requirements for an action in federal court, the weakest part being the satisfaction of the (significant) minimum damages to entertain a federal diversity action. In any event, were a Rule 11 challenge to be survived, it would require a sympathetic judge,and some additional facts, particularly in the area of damages. The bottom line: Weak case on these facts. No damages apparent. -uni- (Dark), who is rusty on libel. -- 073BB885A786F666 nemo repente fuit turpissimus - potestas scientiae in usu est 6E6D4506F6EDBC17 quaere verum ad infinitum, loquitur sub rosa - wichtig!

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Is pgp 2.5 insecure?
by danisch＠ira.uka.de 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hi, I was looking for a pgp public key and got a message of a key server. It will be down until pgp 2.5 is available and then it will not accept any keys generated by a pgp lower than 2.4. What is the reason for this? I thought the only difference was the use of the rsaref code. There should not any difference in the key structure. Is this the way to introduce a clipper-pgp and make people use it? pgp 2.5 will not be available outside USA. Where can I get a description of the diffs of the logical functions? Perhaps I will write a copy of this program using our local toolbox, and make it available outside the USA. Hadmut -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLdvwa2c1jG5vDiNxAQGuZQP7B1FH6SQAfpQ+7h3pHJOAhgV2z3bE3a8A AQNdWPnNhDeky2eQEOuqi22+xFfqc2l3fGAmQnwydRtK89LvQDoFvQngWpeLIbpz Lj54PVLGjiZesJ7NV7BYGgG8rlIWSxhH22R9W4f/xWrgpLrUQ25IsomXaCsU7B+j j9+mrxBm0D0= =n4JA -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Sternlight's attack on 2.3a
by Brian Beker 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Mr. Sternlight continues: -------------BEGIN FORWARDED MESSAGE----------------------------------

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No Subject
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security,alt.privacy From: schneier(a)chinet.chinet.com (Bruce Schneier) Subject: "Interesting Stuff" Checkers at the NSA Message-ID: <Cq2934.q0(a)chinet.chinet.com> Organization: Chinet - Public Access UNIX Date: Thu, 19 May 1994 17:40:15 GMT This is from a flyer that NSA people have been distributing: NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY -- TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER Information Sorting and Retrieval by Language or Topic Description: This technique is an extremely simple, fast, completely general mathod of sorting and retrieving machine- readable text according to language and/or topic. The method is totally independent of the particular languages or topics of interest, and relies for guidance solely upon exemplars (e.g., existing documents, fragments, etc.) provided by the user. It employs no dictionaries keywords, stoplists, stemmings, syntax, semantics, or grammar; nevertheless, it is capable of distinguishing among closely related toopics (previously considered inseparable) in any language, and it can do so even in text containing a great many errors (typically 10 - 15% of all characters). The technique can be quickly implemented in software on any computer system, from microprocessor to supercomputer, and can easily be implemented in inexpensive hardware as well. It is directly scalable to very large data sets (millions of documents). Commercial Application: Language and topic-independent sorting and retieval of documents satisfying dynamic criteria defined only by existing documents. Clustering of topically related documents, with no prior knowledge of the languages or topics that may be present. It desired, this activity can automatically generate document selectors. Specializing sorting tasks, such as identification of duuplicate or near-duplicate documents in a large set. National Security Agency Research and Technology Group - R Office of Research and Technology Applications (ORTA) 9800 Savage Road Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6000 (301) 688-0606 If this is the stuff they're giving out to the public, I can only imagine what they're keeping for themselves. Bruce ************************************************************************** * Bruce Schneier * Counterpane Systems For a good prime, call 391581 * 2^216193 - 1 * schneier(a)chinet.com **************************************************************************

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Mosaic to support digital money in September
by jamesd＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Eric Hughes writes > > It seems that you have information that is not in the press release > you include, which talks (as far as I can tell) about catalog > purchases with credit cards. Only what is in the news and stuff. In the cover story of May 11 Computer currents, page 40 Box, Malone and Davidow say that the money enabled Mosaic will be available in the fall (press release says September - I do not believe either of them) and that what we would call a server program (accounting and ordering package) will cost around 10 000 dollars. Obviously their model is the TV shopping channer, whereas the model we want to see implemented is the middle eastern bazaar, with giving and receiving money equally convenient for both parties. My comments were my interpretation of the press release. My interpretation may be misleading or inaccurate. The press release is probably misleading and inaccurate. If someone would get the real info from EIT, I would be interested to hear it. In particular, now that PGP is US legal, are they going to support PGP in mosaic? (They were not going to at the time of the press release) > > Enterprise Integration Technologies and friends will > enable digital money transactions in Mosaic in September > > Is this announced? Read the press release "EIT will make Secure NCSA Mosaic software available at no charge to CommerceNet members in September and NCSA will incorporate these securefeatures in future NCSA Mosaic releases. Enterprise Integration Technologies Corp., of Palo Alto, (EIT), is an R&D and consulting organization, developing software and services that help companies do business on the Internet. EIT is also project manager of CommerceNet. " > The transaction model has a crippled mode for people > outside the US and Canada > > Crippled? Read the press release "Cryptosystem and signature system interoperation is particularly useful between U.S. residents and non-U.S. residents, where the non-U.S. residents may have to use weaker 40-bit keys in conjunction with RSA's RC2 and RC4 variable keysize ciphers. EIT intends to publish Secure-HTTP as an Internet standard, and work with others in the WWW community to create a standard that will encourage using the Web for a wide variety of commercial transactions. " The biggest crippling is that they do not mention supporting PGP. If Mosaic supports PEM, then PEM will win. But PEM is useless. An evil NSA plot? Naw, they have not got the brains. More likely coorporate stupidity. > > They intend that you will be able to write contracts and > internet checks on participating banks. > > Will the recipient of the check be required to be at a participating > bank? I have no idea, but that would seem to be the only way that it could work, but since I screwed up big in my comments on magic money, other folk may well be more imaginative than I am. > And you can already write contracts with existing digital > signatures. A contract is just an agreement between two parties; > intermediation is not required. Quite so. But your typical businessman will not use PGP because it is user hostile, whereas Mosaic is not. The objective is to bring encryptation to the massess. Obviously I would vastly prefer to see PGP integrated into mosaic, I have considered doing this myself, but it is a substantial job with legal hazards, and I am bone lazy and vulnerable to court judgments > For this reason I think decentralized account based > digital money is the best hope. > > Account based money is identity based money, even if the identity is a > pseudo-identity. The whole point of cryptocash protocols is to > separate the link between two account by mediating the transaction > with some instrument. Quite so, as I have been reminded. But regrettably it seems likely that identity based money represents less of a jump from the existing system, therefore is likely be considerably more acceptable to the great unwashed masses. Crypto cash - money based on digital tokens - is rather subtle for the masses. Even I screw up. How do you expect the chairman of the board to comprehend it? To successfully push crypto cash, we would need to make it a lot more convenient. Hint. PGP is *not* convenient. A utility that would make crypto cash acceptable, would probably have to simulate account based money, and would need a relational database built into it. Microsoft visual basic, professional edition, allows one to make products that employ and create a relational database, and give those products away. The database built into the freely redistributable Visual Basic run time modules supports SQL. -- --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves and our James A. Donald | property, because of the kind of animals that we | are. True law derives from this right, not from jamesd(a)netcom.com | the arbitrary power of the omnipotent state.

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