December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: remailer@soda
by gtoal＠an-teallach.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

remailer@soda (formerly hh@soda) now uses pgp's implementatoin of idea for the encrypted response block function, making it much more secure (i hope). Good stuff. But could you do the limited-use destroy-the-key stuff before you release it please - I'm really dubious about this single key you're using. It destroys confidence in the system completely for me. G

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Tessera the PCMCIA Card
by koontzd＠lrcs.loral.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From Electronic Designs, April 4, 1994, by DAVE BURSKY New Products, Digital ICs (approximately 1/2 page) P. 148 CRYPTO ENGINE EASES PUBLIC-KEY SECURITY ... Developed by National Semiconductor, the iPower secure microcontroller holds the encryption algorithms, secret data, and the central processing unit that processes them. The chip was designed to remian secure from electrical probes through the signal pins, as well as from analytical probes that etch package and circuit layers. Any such penetration would cause the stored data to be "zeroed" before it could be read out. The iPower SPU consists of a 32-bit CPU core with on-chip ROM, a real-time clock, and a interfaceto off-chip nonvolatile (battery-backed_ RAM that holds scrambled data. The remaining blocks on the chip include the encryption engine, some battery-backed RAM to hold secured data (master keys, algorithms, or records) and a host-system bus interface. The SPU chip can be combined with off-chip low-power RAM, a battery, and a PCMCIA interface to squeeze the entire public-key token on a card that meets the PCMCIA's type-1 format. The cards, dubbed Tessera after the token ancient Romans used as a ticket or means of identification, can now be implemented at a relatively low cost (less than $100 dollars per user for large orders) compared with previous solutions. Nevertheless it provides the highest level of commercial security (FIPS 140-1 level 3). Encrypted data could provide positive identification of users, store private medical records, include authorization codes, or even perform secure transaction processing. ... ---------- Tessera was an identifier for slaves. FIPS 140-1 level 3 is not the highest commercial security level, (per FIPS 140-1, January 11, 1994): ... 1.4 Security Level 4 Security Level 4 provides the highest level of security. Although most existing products do not meet this level of security, some products are commercially available which meet many of the Level 4 requirements. For the Tessera we know utitilizing CAPSTONE, Escrowed Encryption is present. It would hardly qualify for performing secure transaction processing for say money transactions when the U.S. government and/or other law enforcement agencies have the ability to break open the monetary instrument, by obtaining a warrant or through "other authorized access". The degree of privacy afforded is not absolute, even to the extent of the strength of the cryptographic algorithm (assuming transmission of the Law Enforcement Access Field (LEAF)). Likewise those able to obtain access have the ability to tamper with or spoof transactions. Were it used to control access to facilities, it would certainly enable "black bag jobs" both physical and virtual. (Its a type-1 PCMCIA card)

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Hyperdrive
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm still looking for info on the encryption function in "Hyperdrive" Anyone have any clues? -uni- (Dark)

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Blacknet and espionage.
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Just some sage advice for newbies: Stay away from Blacknet unless your a serious customer. Ames was a major Blacknet user. I don't think the authorities will take a bright view of anyone posting about it publically. On the otherhand, if you have legitimate information to pass, and want money for it, and don't mind taking quick and speedy trips to other jurisdictions in disguise, go for it! -uni- (Dark)

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remailers
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

For some reason I have not been able to get any of the remailers to work with PGP encryption. In addition, the ping figures at the end of the soda finger file don't seem to have changed since I first looked at them some days ago.... is this just me? Is anyone out there chaining with PGP supporting remailers? Could ya drop me a line, preferably with some reply option, and give me a few hints? [sigh]

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EFF & PGP
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Well, it looks like someone at EFF finally woke up and listened to what the crypto world was telling them! Still not signed to protect against forgeries, but definitely a step in the right direction! ---------- Forwarded Message ---------- EFF PGP Public Key for Encryption ================================= This is the ASCII-armored PGP 2.4 public key for the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF). Note that mail sent with this key will be considered addressed to EFF in general, not to a specific person, unless otherwise noted. To send personal information to someone at EFF, for whatever reason, please use that person's own key, or arrange some other method of communication. This key is provided principally for the sending of sensitive legal information, and the transmission of credit card numbers over the net securely when becoming a member of EFF. It takes us time and effort to decrypt, so please don't use this key trivially. Thank you. To add this key to your public key ring, do: pgp -ka pgpkey.eff pubring.pgp If your public key ring has another name, use that instead of pubring.pgp. For MacPGP, click on Key | Add Key, select pgpkey.eff as file to get key from, and pubring.pgp (or whatever your pubring is) for file to add key to. To encrypt a message, please see the PGP documentation, and remember that you will almost certainly need to generate the result as an ASCII-armored file, so you can email it (non-ASCII-armored PGP ciphertexts are binary, and will get mangled if you try to email them. -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.4 mQCPAi2B6bAAAAEEANVTvM2dhZ0SHsgWOzfn1lRzZcNltsf3Bjt0t5GBuscoyPrD lfBwtzjkZTasK1MfAX/vrUl6BVKb18FCGhuJlmEaZqZ95q5mdsj4tAD18CDg0Jmv bAhWE/JxhhQDG2s9dt5x4GC+ofaHr8nlXKqjyMkb85EyVFHw85hLHLcPIDklABEB AAG0MkVsZWN0cm9uaWMgRnJvbnRpZXIgRm91bmRhdGlvbiAtIEVGRiA8YXNrQGVm Zi5vcmc+iQCVAgUQL+os4hibHbaiMfO5AQEYOAQArtVNhJeRpaShNFd7MQfOFLM9 hql2KBmyvs20/kiwLkGN8Se3GJPYPovBjiB+o9r1GOuc654kxu9KU0m/8SoafWeU p5jBnqlgGwXIo/v5twfKvSnhh75XyGrIwUvlLzxMQaym0slV7YgLUQozWIhuu95d r22qYYdD1PS2SuDpSGGJAJUCBRAtj6o5jC7pCgHDqtsBAVeNA/9ay5pJ7srK7+ns tstaxDe7NnAFLfezgO1yiNED0yM4cDeTNXgZDFNuhzBICmP6fBNSIaUUSwuiQnc8 do45WRo120PX/c+nLoYKeyu8iI0BWA6cjYwk3zKLxpETqpxxKthX6JJ2fxwpL6EQ dF+pmotwtbv3wIH/7FdaZh5r2Nu3/IkAlQIFEC2PJWg2QIGMNPTEcQEBQYoD/2W9 93Yz/c/qmjxpH50blqSPJhd//KYP6AQmmyxI6L+29KqjgflnI56Rk2QUJfs4SnS/ 3jB0H5v9U8u8YocvLsnWL7QvHt0fueoMBk6AFMxgQFzZP3s7dppFncYuiQ710hFL xKu2PFWeurEEZ2VD/KB5fUPdZnwd78bMVj4RIkyJiQCVAgUQLYHqDphLHLcPIDkl AQFBxAP/Q2+RNM218JhEBMcLxoWExWN7wIgIjQF+mZIMvXR9TjhsBtUWQM23XXMi zpQsTCu5/xqTe0OB5no8UfPgktieLyBGFleQgPeXlnmGzcoAeWV6DArFUCN7JKA1 589Zba0/vr4XQpaLgdGInw0nZAYvPKNsKrKl7H37zenmIN9UdTc= =f3Zf -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- ------------------------------

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Re: myk-78
by Matt Thomlinson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I just sent this to a2(a)well.sf.ca.us (arthur abraham) but after a finger attempt, I'm not so sure his account exists there anymore. On Wed, 20 Apr 1994, Matt Thomlinson wrote: > I'm reading through an old post of yours (gosh, 7 days from being a year > old) regarding the clipper chip. > > You laid everything out pretty carefully, but one thing your article > doesn't seem to mention: > > you've created the LEEF [L1|L2|IV] and when transmitted in the block, it > looks like [encrypt(CV), checkword, L1|L2|IV], right? This is a 56+24+192 > bit number ( = 272 bits). > > My question: how often is this chunk sent? seems like you'd only need to > send it once per call, but I'd think they'd send it every so often > throughout a call, although this could cause problems for high-bandwidth > digital uses, right? Also, if someone could tell me if the checkword for the CV is encrypted along with the CV I'd be grateful. That is, is the packet [encrypt(CV,checkword), L1|L....] or [encrypt(CV), checkword, L1|L...] mt Matt Thomlinson University of Washington, Seattle, Washington. phone: (206) 548-9804 Check my home page -- ftp://ftp.u.washington.edu/public/phantom/home.html PGP 2.2 key available via email, or finger phantom(a)hardy.u.washington.edu

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Canadian Encryption info???
by Deanne H Morgan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have been following this list for several months, but have not seen anything on encryption issues with regards to Canada specifically. Does anyone know anything about [or have any idea where to begin to look for] Canada's policies regarding encryption and encryption technology?? Will Canadian laws change if/when Clipper encryption comes into functional existence? What about if the US enacts laws regarding making other forms of encruyption illegal? Is encryption mentionned in NAFTA or any other negotiated treaty with the United States??? Thanks, Deanne Morgan dmorgan(a)uoguelph.ca

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Information_surety (fwd)
by Arthur R. McGee 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Now that the cold war is over, everyone seems to be branching out: Subject: Information_surety SAND No: 93-2873 Category: Communications, Computers, Information Theory Subcategory: Computer Security, Cryptography, Information security, Computer Reliability Title: Information surety Summary: Sandia National Laboratories has developed considerable expertise in all aspects of information surety, including the design and analysis of cryptographic systems, cryptographic key management implementations of cryptographic algorithms and protocols, system reliability, system availability, authentication systems, biometric identification devices, tamper resistant technologies, and computer and network security. Our unique strengths include our expertise in providing high security and reliability for a complete system and in our highly experienced adversarial analysis team. We have now begun to apply these capabilities in information surety to new problems of national importance. Potential Applications: - Private and secure computerized patient records - Secure home banking - Secure remote access - Private and secure electronic cash - Secure bank cards - Efficient Implementations of Cryptographic algorithms - Digital Signatures - Private communications - Cryptographic key management - Reliability and availability analysis of computing and information systems Status: Joint research projects are encouraged. License available for efficient exponentiation and for probable secure digital signatures. FOR MORE INFORMATION E-mail address, TechTransfer(a)ccsmtp.sandia.gov Telephone: Technology Transfer Center (505) 2-1--888 Location: Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM. Expanded Description: For the past 20 years, Sandia National Laboratories has had responsibility for information surety systems used in command and control of weapon systems and in the communications of weapon release messages. To meet these responsibilities, we have developed considerable expertise in all aspects of information surety, including the design and analysis of cryptographic systems, cryptographic key management, implementations of cryptographic algorithms and protocols, system reliability, system availability, authentication systems, biometric identification devices, tamper resistant technologies, and computer and network security. One of our unique strengths is our highly experienced adversarial analysis team. Before a system is recommended for deployment, it has been thoroughly tested by this team, whose sole goal is to defeat the security features of the system. Sandia has developed rigorous system design methodologies to meet high reliability and availability requirements. Sandia scientists have won awards for their work on cryptoanalysis and resynchronization of encrypted channels. We have now begun to apply these capabilities in information surety to new problems of national importance. References: IEEE article AT&T Technical Journal article fast exponentiation article biometric identification article Other Information Resources: None Related Categories and Subcategories: Biometric identification, system reliability and availability Key Words: Cryptography, coding theory, error correcting codes, privacy, digital signatures, encryption, key management, nonrepudiation, biometrics, reliability, availability ----------------------------- Art McGee [amcgee(a)netcom.com] -----------------------------

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CBW for DOS?
by David Merriman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Stoopid Noobee Kweschun: Is there such an animal as CBW that runs under MS-DOS or (better still) MS-Windows? "posted" or "emailed" replies welcome (hell, I'll even accept some DOS/*nix/MAC OS flames). Dave Merriman - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - PGP Public Key Fingerprint for Dave Merriman <merriman(a)metronet.com> Fingerprint FC BF 45 91 EE B6 D6 C2 80 AB 4B BF 88 D3 55 26

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