December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: T.A.Z. on Disk
by jrochkin＠cs.oberlin.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>On Fri, 20 Jan 1995, Angus Patterson wrote: >> >> > I also saw another e-book site that had some more of [Bey's] stuff, can't >> > remember what it was though. > >On Fri, 20 Jan 1995, Mark Grant wrote: >> There's some more on the WWW at http://www.uio.no/~mwatz/bey/index.html. > >Bey sings the line that good is no different from evil, feeling >is better than thinking, and truth indistinguishable from lies. > >Sounds like a pile of crap to me. Still, I suppose that feelings >and lies are a poets job. Hm. Can we maybe head off the Ideology War before it becomes unstoppable? Cypherpunks write code, and do lots of other stuff too, but I'm hoping that endless political wars is something cypherpunks don't do, or at least try not to do on the cypherpunks list. [It's possible that the ideology of the list is as homogenously anarcho-capitalist as it seems, but I'd bet there's enough anarcho-others to sustain several never-ending political 'discussions' of the sort that will make the list even less useful then when we spent dozens of messages a day talking about logos.]

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RE: syrinx remailer up and running
by Johnathan Corgan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Well folks, the syrinx remailer is up and running now. The particulars: > >Address: syrinx(a)c2.org Could you post the capabilities of this remailer, like cpunk, hash, pgp, ksub, latent, etc.? == Johnathan Corgan "Violence is the last refuge of the incompetent." jcorgan(a)scruznet.com -Isaac Asimov

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Re: traffic analyzing Chaum's digital mix
by Wei Dai 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > From: Hal <hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> > > I know that the Eurocrypt 89 proceedings had some articles on > cryptanalyzing Chaum's mixes. My library has an excellent crypto > selection but is missing this volume. Can anyone who has read this say > whether there is anything in those papers that isn't obvious? I found a copy of these proceedings in the library today. There is a paper titled "How to break the direct RSA-implementation of MIXes" by Birgit Pfitzmann and Andreas Pfitzmann. Here is its abstract: MIXes are a means of untraceable communication based on a public key cryptosystem as published by David Chaum in 1981 (CACM 24/2 84-88). In the case where RSA is used as this cryptosystem directly i.e. without composition with other functions (e.g. destroying the multiplicative structure) we show how the resulting MIXes can be broken by an active attack which is perfectly feasible in a typical MIX-environment. The attack does not affect the idea of MIXes as a whole: if the security requirements of [Chaum's paper] are concretized suitably and if a cryptosystem fulfills them one can implement secure MIXes directly. However it shows that present security notions for public key cryptosystems, which do not allow active attacks do not suffice for a cryptosystem which is used to implement MIXes directly. We also warn of the same attack and others on further possible implementations of MIXes and we mention several implementations which are not broken by any attack we know. My interpretation is that PGP-based remailers are not susceptible to the attack described by this paper. (Of course, they are currently vulnerable to much more trivial ones.) Wei Dai -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBLyMeCTl0sXKgdnV5AQFoggP/XzBFSyChFgNMrX3gCQSNfOiwHrAEKgpD a0TGYX9KBRqRd6cdDIdauDzFtPST1XjU/1RpYvlGjKIhOSd60JZwO+7185SJGBM9 q/4cqE/hOiHzB2gaoHiQFySDIkfFTeJdlIiTiS/OjbR5awkMCF+zU8cxPrgWTrxr /sM1C39O8Cc= =J20K -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: port 25 forgeries
by pstemari＠erinet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:35 PM 1/21/95 PST, santa(a)northpole.toad.com, org(a)toad.com wrote: > ... >Received: from relay2.UU.NET by eri.erinet.com (4.1/SMI-4.1.1) > id AA16848; Sun, 22 Jan 95 02:56:29 EST >Received: from toad.com by relay2.UU.NET with SMTP > id QQxztg01780; Sun, 22 Jan 1995 03:01:32 -0500 >Received: by toad.com id AA23166; Sat, 21 Jan 95 23:55:03 PST >Received: from northpole.org (tower.stc.housing.washington.edu) by toad.com id AA22783; Sat, 21 Jan 95 23:36:47 PST > ... Presumeably the (tower.stc.housing.washington.edu) comes from a PTR DNS lookup. What happens if the IP address of the remailer isn't available from DNS, or the in-addr.arpa entry is wrong? (I don't know who exactly is responsible for the in-addr.arpa entry--is it the same as for the others?) --Paul J. Ste. Marie pstemari(a)well.sf.ca.us, pstemari(a)erinet.com

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Re: Locksmith's Guild wants limit on free speech
by pstemari＠erinet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:42 PM 1/22/95 -0500, John Young wrote: > ... >Both fear that they do not know the code well enough to take the risk of >being found at fault by random municipal inspections of construction. >A-E's dread the liability and blame by owners for well-known construction >corner-cutting, and owners suspect their professionals competency and >ethics -- afraid that the pros will certify in ignorance or cupidity and >that the owners will face costly corrections without having the traditional >scapegoat of over-weening government to justify cheating in the field. A classic example of people being unwilling to accept responsibility for the outcome of their own actions. That said, building inspection serve much the same function as code reviews, and are a "good thing" for exactly the same reason. I suspect that the A-E's will lobby for liability exemptions, and if they fail to get them, they will wind up going to private building inspectors/"code consultants" just like in-house accountants bring in outside auditors. --Paul J. Ste. Marie pstemari(a)well.sf.ca.us, pstemari(a)erinet.com

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$8M for National ID registry
by crawford＠scruznet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"Anti-immigration bandwagon," San Francisco Examiner, Sunday, 11/22/95, p. A-5: Amid an article discussing Clinton's effort to beat the Republican's in keeping out illegal aliens: "A federal advisory commision recently proposed that the government establish a computerized register of the names and Social Security numbers of citizens and aliens authorized to work in the United States, so that employers could check the immigration status of job applicants." "Clinton will seek $8.3 million for a pilot program to evaluate the effectiveness of such a system." Comforting words, especially given that children are to be assigned Social Security numbers at birth. Best Wishes, Michael D. Crawford crawford(a)scruznet.com crawford(a)maxwell.ucsc.edu <- Finger me here for PGP Public Key.

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www.commlaw.com/pepper page
by Syed Yusuf 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

<p> Copyright 1994 by Pepper & Corazzini, L.L.P. All rights reserved. Reproduction is permitted so long as no charge is made for copies, no copies are placed on any electronic online service or database for which there is a fee other than a flat access charge, there is no alteration and this copyright notice is included. <p> legal translation: don't charge money to access this or copies of this page UNLESS you charge for internet access and EVEN then, don't charge extra just to look at this page. didn't want to bring this to the list unless it's to kill this discussion someone misread it.

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Re: transient guerrilla remailers
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Nobody(a)rahul.net, forwarding from homer's remailer, writes: > If c2.org can offer RIAB accounts on a pre-paid basis, what's to > stop people interested in the cause from paying anonymously, > setting up the RIAB, and just walking away? When the pre-paid period > expires, the remailer goes away. Yeah - John Doe pays in cash, or uses a Post Office money order :-), to get X months of remailer service. After the initial account setup, he can keep it up dated by mailing in mostly-anonymous paper cash using the usually-anonymous paper remailer service offered by the US government, dropping the payments in a mailbox. If the sysadm is trustable, no problem, and the degree of trust is whatever a month's remailer service costs. If he's not, John Doe can detect it by occasionally using the remailer, and can spam the net with scanned-in copies of the money order showing it's payable to sysadm. If the sysadm wants to float the (low) cost of running a remailer for a month, he can even keep the money order around for a month or so to use as evidence if he's subpoenaed or otherwise legally harassed. One concern I have about this remailer strategy is whether everyone's remailer shows up as their own, or as "nobody" - can you tell the nobodies apart? John X. Doe

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Re: "Internetpol"
by Censored Girls Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Netcops By Hank, reprinted with permission <hank(a)vm.tau.ac.il> I eased the unmarked cruiser onto the highway, its 424 cubic cc, VJ engine purring. Traffic was heavy that day, as convoys of Usenet semi-trailers barrelled their way down the Information Super Highway. Biker gangs using Crack steered clear of our sedan searching instead for Internet tourists in Bermuda shorts and Nikon cameras around their necks. "Unit 7, Unit 7. Woman reporting a 426, over," came the printout on the Netcops IRC channel. Friday turned to me and gave me that look. The look that he gets when he wants to tear somone's head off. Friday is 6'6" and 230 pounds. he enjoys inflicting pain when necessary. "It's guys like this who give the Internet a bad name. Let's go see what we can do to help," said Friday, as he placed the flashing blue Kojak on top of the sedan as I popped the car into 5th and slashed by the Usenet truckers hauling their load of pornographic magazines and political soapboxes. We arrived at the Holiday Inn where the lady was staying. Her eyes were red and she looked like a Mac had hit her. Under the hurt she was actually quite pleasant to look at., kind of like the girl next door. Her name was Mary and in between sobs we sat her down and ordered espresso from the lounge bar. "It was terrible. I feel so violated. I'd like to kill the bastard," spat Mary with a vehemence that only Friday could understand. "Just the facts, mam," said Friday. "I'm here overseas for 9 weeks on assignment for my company. My husband is back home with our daughter and we decided to stay in contact via the Internet. I carry my subnotebook with me everytime I travel. My husband and I get along great but 9 weeks away from each other is just too long so we engage in cyber-sex. You know, private IRC channel, getting undressed behind locked doors and describing in intimate detail what wee are doing to each other. We've been doing it almost daily for 3 weeks,". "But this last time was different. My husband asked me to do all sorts of weird and kinky things and I agreed, but it just seemed wrong. After our three hour session, my husband called later that day saying that his Internet system was under ICMP redirect attack and that he hasn't been able to get Internet access for the past 24 hours,". Friday cut her off, "Do you use any protection?". "I normally would have used PGP (Pretty Good Privacy), but I forgot to install it before I left home. Listen, this guy at the other end must have been listening in on my previous sessions with my husband because he knew all the right things to say as to not arouse my suspicions,". Her lip trembled as she tried to hold back her tears but both Friday and myself knew time may heal all wounds but the scars remain. It was now my turn to bring down the hard facts, "Mary it looks like you are the victim of a 426 --net-rape. There are no laws on the Internet, no police, no government to turn to. Friday and myself act as volunteers in this neck of the woods, along with thousands of others throughout the world who mete out our form of frontier justice. What would you like done once we catch the perp?". She didn't hesitate for a moment, "I want nine of his fingers broken,". "Why nine," I asked. "There's no greater torture than using the Internet with one finger,". Friday smiled. Mary had made herself a lifetime fan. EPILOGUE We were able to track down the perp via the historical data sampling we collect daily via our RMON probe. We just correllated the packets with Mary's known IP address and the time of day that the incident happened. Once we had the perps IP address we contacted our fellow "cowboys" in that area who worked with the sysadmin who backtracked through the Unix logs and found the guy. Needless to say, he will never type fast again. ------ The story you have read is true (giggle) the names ahve been changed to protect the guilty. ------ This article appeared in Vol3 No2 Internet Society Magazine, 1994. Registered<BETSI>BEllcore Trusted Software Integrity system programmer *********************************************************************** Carol Anne Braddock "Give me your Tired, your Poor, your old PC's..." The TS NET REVOKED PGP KEY NO.0C91594D carolb(a)spring.com carolann(a)mm.com ************************************************************************ COMING SOON TO AN INTERNET NEWSGROUP NEAR YOU...............CENSORED.COM

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Re: A Legal Web Page Issue
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 9:55 PM 1/22/95, Timothy C. May wrote: >Someone on the Cyberia mailing list has announced that his URL on >legal matters (http://www.commlaw.com/pepper) can only be accessed by >sites which charge a "flat rate." I'm not at all clear what he means >by a flat rate here....is is flat rate per month, or per access, or >what? [...] >So, give it a browse and add it if you find it interesting. When he >sees a bunch of accesses (assuming his system has logs he can look at) >from sites over which he cannot possibly hope to set policy for, he >may realize the futility of this. > >(He can stop accesses, or charge admission, with various means--maybe >not yet fully developed, or with commercial Web servers such as >Netscape is developing--but he cannot release the URL and then enforce >his ideas of who can access it. God forbid we have people trying to >"copyright" their URLs and then collect royalites anytime the URL >shows up in someone's list of interesting places.) What a crazy thought. I will make sure to access his URL early and often. BTW, what is your homepage URL? Or was that just a spoof? -- Lucky Green <shamrock(a)netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred.

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