December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

new magazine: Computer Telephony
by cme＠ellisun.sw.stratus.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I just saw Vol 1 No.1 in the corporate library. Subtitle: The Magazine For Computer And Telephone Integration Subscription info: 215-355-2886 - Carl

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Re: ARTICLE: IRS learning how
by peb＠PROCASE.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> You just have to fill out the right forms. Yes, of course, that's what I meant. There are no laws against skirting the paperwork if you are under the limit. Or, as you note, the "IRS 1040 list of foreign bank accounts" is another matter completely. Paul

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Re: Monitor radiation overlooking.
by bgomes＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Victor A. Borisov (blaster(a)rd.relcom.msk.su) writes: > Some words about DES - I spoke with one cryptoanalisyst from > KGB and he sow, that for number crypto algotitm c(key, text) > (key is keyLength tall) present f(key, text), that for all > key1 and key2 present key with length keyLength, that > c(key2, c(key1, text))==f(key, text). > He also say, that now present f() for c()=des(), more f() wery > like des(). > That`s why for decrypting of des(k1, des(k2, ... des(kN, text) ... )) > we must try 2^56 keys with spetial function. And Lyle_Seaman(a)transarc.com replies: > I had a little trouble with the English, but I think I followed the > math. I believe Victor's KGB friend is claiming that DES is a group. > Victor, does the following text contradict your claim? > > (Excerpt from sci.crypt faq deleted) I think that Victor's friend proposes a second function, f(), which is not the same as DES. He is saying that for every set of three keys used for triple-DES (k2,k3,k4), there is a key (k1) such that: f(k1,text) = DES(k2,DES(k3, DES(k4,text))) It seems to me this is different than saying DES is a group, since f != DES. Am I mistaken?

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IRS LEARNING . . .
by Sandy 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT Reply to: ssandfort(a)attmail.com . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Paul Baclace wrote: Well, obviously he should have taken tip from Ollie North and paid a courier to fly back and forth with $9500 at a time. No laws against that. Well, yes and no. As Perry pointed out, there is no limit to how much you can take out if you report it. The trouble is, though it is legal to take out less than $10,000 without reporting it, you can't perform a series of such transactions in order to ultimately move out an amount greater than $10k. They call it *structuring*, and it 'taint legal. Of course, structuring may be difficult to detect, so as a practical matter, you might get away with it. (If, however, you are found with $9500 in cash, they still might seize it under our wonderful new "fruits of drug dealing" laws.) But in any event, there are better ways to accomplish the same result. My favorite *fun* solution would be to buy $80,000 in travellers cheques and then *burn* them. I leave the rest of the transaction as an exercise for the student. S a n d y >>>>>> Please send e-mail to: ssandfort(a)attmail.com <<<<<< ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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Re: Generating random numbers
by cme＠ellisun.sw.stratus.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Date: Thu, 14 Oct 93 17:46:32 MDT >From: "Mike Johnson" <exabyte!smtplink!mikej(a)uunet.uu.net> >Message-Id: <9309147506.AA750645992(a)smtplink.exabyte.com> >Subject: Generating random numbers > >If you have an audio input to your computer, try recording noise from a fan, >traffic on a busy street, or the roar of a crowd at a football game. Then >compress the output to remove any obvious redundancies such as 60 Hz hum from >a fan motor or unused dynamic range of the input digitizer. This results in >much better "randomness" than some keystroke timing techniques. True. You get even better entropy if you turn off the mic (or unplug it) and run the sampled audio output into compress -- assuming your mic is like mine and lets a bit of electronic noise sneak through every byte or two. The fan noise sounds random to us but it's relatively simple, in Fourier space. The same applies to fluorescent light noise. Although it's simple, it can defeat compress - so you end up with low entropy per byte. - Carl

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Re: Detecting double-spending (long)
by an41418＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

So, this method relies on trusting the bank? After all, Alice must include her identity in the messages, so that double spending can be detected later. When the bank verifies that it says 'Alice' and not 'Bozo', then it could keep track of her coins. Is this true? Is there a way of ever having an ananymous cash system where the bank does not have to be trusted at all? What I mean is, where the bank could not possible know the identities of its customers under any circumstances where no violation takes place? Wonderer ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)anon.penet.fi. Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized, and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)anon.penet.fi.

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NSA already has a key distribution card for us to use
by remail＠tamsun.tamu.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Along the same lines, I'm fairly sure that the NSA had a RFQ out for > much the same kind of thing. (Key management on PCMCIA memory cards.) The card already exists. It is called the TESERA (sp?) card. Guess what, it uses the Capstone chip (clipper + key exchange). I have also heard a rumour that there is a proposal to use a similar version of Capstone for the Administrations Health ID card. Clipper, coming to a health care provider near you...

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Re: Detecting double-spending (long)
by nobody＠alumni.cco.caltech.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

(Actually, it _is_ from the person in the "from" address above. The Portal system, from which I usually post, seems to have lost the ability to send mail to toad.com.) Wonderer asks: > So, this method relies on trusting the bank? After all, > Alice must include her identity in the messages, so that > double spending can be detected later. When the bank > verifies that it says 'Alice' and not 'Bozo', then it > could keep track of her coins. This method does not depend on trusting the bank not to reveal Alice's identity. That's why this is called "cash". As long as she does not double-spend, her identity is kept secret. I'm not sure whether you are asking about the part of the protocol where Alice withdraws her cash from the bank, or the later part where she spends the money and the merchant sends it to the bank. When she withdraws the money, she blinds the f(xi,yi) candidates by multiplying them by ri. For half of those, she has to reveal the ri, but that half IS NOT USED in the rest of the protocol. The ones which are used are blinded and so the bank never sees her <info> in those. When she spends the money and reveals the values to the merchant, Alice only includes her <info> in the form (ai xor <info>), where ai is a random value that nobody knows unless she double-spends. The ai "blinds" the <info> so that (ai xor <info>) does not reveal <info>. Only if she double-spends is both ai and (ai xor <info>) revealed for some i, and only then is her <info> exposed. Hal hfinney(a)shell.portal.com

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IRS LEARNING . . .
by Sandy 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT Reply to: ssandfort(a)attmail.com . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Paul Baclace wrote: Well, obviously he should have taken tip from Ollie North and paid a courier to fly back and forth with $9500 at a time. No laws against that. Well, yes and no. As Perry pointed out, there is no limit to how much you can take out if you report it. The trouble is, though it is legal to take out less than $10,000 without reporting it, you can't perform a series of such transactions in order to ultimately move out an amount greater than $10k. They call it *structuring*, and it 'taint legal. Of course, structuring may be difficult to detect, so as a practical matter, you might get away with it. (If, however, you are found with $9500 in cash, they still might seize it under our wonderful new "fruits of drug dealing" laws.) But in any event, there are better ways to accomplish the same result. My favorite *fun* solution would be to buy $80,000 in travellers cheques and then *burn* them. I leave the rest of the transaction as an exercise for the student. S a n d y >>>>>> Please send e-mail to: ssandfort(a)attmail.com <<<<<< ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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Triple-DES strength (was Re: Monitor radiation overlooking.)
by cme＠ellisun.sw.stratus.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

You wrote: >Some words about DES - I spoke with one cryptoanalisyst from >KGB and he sow, that for number crypto algotitm c(key, text) >(key is keyLength tall) present f(key, text), that for all >key1 and key2 present key with length keyLength, that >c(key2, c(key1, text))==f(key, text). > >He also say, that now present f() for c()=des(), more f() wery >like des(). > >That`s why for decrypting of des(k1, des(k2, ... des(kN, text) ... )) >we must try 2^56 keys with spetial function. I suspect that you will get several comments about the proof that DES isn't a group. That doesn't apply here since you have not claimed that f() is DES -- only that it's DES-like. I would expect the strength of triple-DES to show up in Diff.Cryp. attacks, but maybe not. Meanwhile, I stick to my sci.crypt suggestion: compress|des|tran|des|tran|des If you could get more details from your KGB friend about that attack, there are one or two people here who would be very interested. :-) - Carl

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