anonymous video rental store
I couldn't sleep last night and, as is often the case, my brain gets a mind of its own and starts thinking irrelevant thoughts. The irrelevant thought that occupied my brain's mind last night was "anonymous video rental store - Is it possible?" Ignoring for the moment the "fact" that video rental stores will some day go the way of the dinosaurs, would it be possible to structure a video rental store with the following properties: 1) The store could not track which customers rented which tapes. 2) The store *could* tell which tapes get rented and which tapes do not get rented. The store would adjust it's selection of tapes based in this information. (get more of the popular tapes, remove the unpopular ones) 3) The store could some how penalize customers that returned tapes late, or not at all. The nature of the "penalty" is flexible. This implies that the store could somehow verify that the tape a customer returned is the same tape the customer rented, but without discovering which tape it is. (I believe this is the hard part) I have a partial solution. Here it is: The store is arranged like a Blockbuster video store in that there are a bunch of shelves with videos on them. For each video, there is a box describing the video and a variable number of tapes co-located with the box. In a Blockbuster video store, the tapes are in plastic cases that identify the video on the tape. In the AVRS (Anon Video Rental Store), the plastic cases would not contain any identification. However, the tapes themselves *would* contain some kind of identification (stickers with video name and bar code, for example) When a customer enters the AVRS, it (the customer) grabs a random handful of tokens from an "available" bin. These tokens each contain a unique identifier. The customer walks around the store searching for videos. When the customer finds a video, it takes one of the plastic cases (opening it to verify it really is the movie it wants). The customer inserts one of the tokens into a pocket that exists on the outside of the plastic case. The pocket is transparent and the token's identification number can be seen. The customer selects the videos it wants, inserting tokens into pockets. When the customer is done, it returns the unused tokens to the "available" bin and proceeds to the check-out counter. The customer hands the clerk an AVRS id card. The AVRS id card contains information about the customer (TBD). The clerk at the checkout counter scans the id card and the tokens that were placed in plastic case pockets.
From this information, the AVRS knows that the customer identified by the AVRS id card has rented N tapes on a given day. (Actually, all the clerk *really* knows is that the customer has rented N tokens.) The clerk
collects some money, the customer leaves with the plastic cases, tapes, and tokens.
The customer returns to the store a couple of days later. The customer removes the tokens from the case pockets. The customer places the plastic cases (with tape inside) in a "tape return" bin and places the tokens in a "token return" bin, and then leaves. Periodically throughout the day, a clerk examines the tapes in the "tape return" bin. The clerk opens each case and scans the bar code on the tape. This way the AVRS can track which tapes get rented and which tapes do not get rented. The clerk returns the plastic cases (with tapes) to the shelves. At the end of the day, a clerk collects the tokens from the "token return" bin and scans them. The computer marks the tokens as returned and clears the appropriate customer record. The clerk places the tokens in the "available" bin. ---- The most obvious problem with this scheme is that the store has no way of knowing if the tape the customer returned is the same tape the customer rented. A customer could return a blank tape without getting caught. (A less obvious problem with the scheme is that the store could use surveillance cameras to identify which tapes the customer selected, but I chose to ignore that problem.) The problem to solve, then is: how can the store catch dishonest customers, yet be unable to track which customer rented which video? There needs to be an additional step at the time a customer returns a tape. The store needs to be able verify that the tape a customer is returning is a tape that was rented from that store and is not overdue. The store doesn't need to know what tape it is, or who is returning it, just that it came from that store and is not overdue. If the tape *is* overdue, then the customer must personally return the tape to a clerk and pay a fine. (and risk a bit of anonymity) Perhaps we could embed some electronics in the tape cassette (or sticker) that would enable a clerk to store a signed "due-back" timestamp on the cassette without being able to store any information that would identify the tape. The signed timestamp would have to be transferred through the plastic case, since opening the case would reveal the tape inside. Sounds sort of like a blind signature. Needless to say, it should be difficult for the customer to tamper with the information on the cassette. Any comments or better ideas? Jim_Miller@suite.com
I couldn't sleep last night and, as is often the case, my brain gets a mind of its own and starts thinking irrelevant thoughts. The irrelevant
...
1) The store could not track which customers rented which tapes.
2) The store *could* tell which tapes get rented and which tapes do not get rented. The store would adjust it's selection of tapes based in this information. (get more of the popular tapes, remove the unpopular ones)
3) The store could some how penalize customers that returned tapes late, or not at all. The nature of the "penalty" is flexible. This implies that the store could somehow verify that the tape a customer returned is the same tape the customer rented, but without discovering which tape it is. (I believe this is the hard part) ... Jim_Miller@suite.com
One easy way around this is to have completely anonymous customers: The store doesn't record any id at all. The simplest way to do this is to have customers make a cash deposit large enough to cover replacement costs of the videos. You would have to limit the number of videos, especially/only for those without a track record. You could even leave an anon email id to allow them to remind you to return an overdue video, etc. The only risk here is that someone besides the account owner might 'close' the account and take the deposit. A good 'id' card/number should solve that. Actually, around here, that isn't too far from what you end up with after being a customer for a year: I've moved, changed phone numbers and have a new VISA, since the old one expired. I'm sure they still have my dr. lic. num and maybe even my ssn though. Not even knowing that you're a customer seems better than trying not to track which videos you have. How about an anon deposit service that multiple companies (utilities, etc.) could put claims on, similar to VISA holds. sdw -- Stephen D. Williams Local Internet Gateway Co.; SDW Systems 513 496-5223APager LIG dev./sales Internet: sdw@lig.net CIS 76244.210@compuserve.com OO R&D Source Dist. By Horse: 2464 Rosina Dr., Miamisburg, OH 45342-6430 GNU Support ICBM: 39 34N 85 15W I love it when a plan comes together
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How about an anon deposit service that multiple companies (utilities, etc.) could put claims on, similar to VISA holds.
The ideal implementation would be as a cash pool: you put in a total of $X to cover your utility and service deposits, then provide potential claimants with blinded withdrawal tokens. So, when I go to Huntsville Utilities and ask them to turn on the power at my house, rather than writing a check or giving them personal information, I just tell give them a blinded token which they could use to withdraw $X from my account at the Austin-Internet Credit Union. One potential problem is that some services (phone, gas, water) require physical location information as part of their service. You have to give the correct physical address for infrastructure services, but you could give a false name. Other services, though, like the video rental store, probably wouldn't care. Another problem is how you ensure security of transactions: you don't want the service provider to debit the account unnecessarily, and the service provider will want to keep you from closing the account and leaving them without payment. I suspect that a properly blinded protocol would work but haven't brainstormed one yet. - -Paul - -- Paul Robichaux, KD4JZG | Richard Davis was twice convicted of kidnapping. Intergraph Federal Systems | He was released twice; then he killed Polly Klass. Not speaking for Intergraph| Why wasn't he in jail? Why's he still alive? -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLQ8vPyA78To+806NAQEdhgQAjm6DkMBN+S9UTgN1bSPruCVcFOQS1Rer wmqjAYQITvSWNMVanV9x852BbM4JMo6cWrbrN6ArUzBd1LBf5uE/3kzeMzTM4Nbn 2u+NRl64AzBo84BXH/MBjU7g1G9e98Qb/HrrMKvPeC3BpZhiF3vW+vwYu2lBp2vM l+v0ReWcGQc= =drlP -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
participants (3)
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jim@bilbo.suite.com -
paul@poboy.b17c.ingr.com -
sdw@meaddata.com