December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

dithering, repudiable steganography
by jel＠sutro.SFSU.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

REPUDIABLE STEGANOGRAPHY I have a book (unfortunately not with me now) describing the format of data on music CDs. It seems that there is a kind of objectionable, heard noise in digital recordings called granulation noise. This is peculiar to digital; analog recording doesn't have this problem. Granulation noise manifests itself at low amplitudes, when the signal being represented is just at the resolution of the digital sampling. For example, if the signal is a sinusoid with a peak-to-peak amplitude represented by just a little greater than one bit difference in each sample. The problem is, the sampled sinusoid sounds just like a square wave when it is played back. Input, the signal: +--------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 | | xxx xxx | xx xx xx xx | x x x x 1 | x x x x | x x x x | x x x x | x x x x 0 +x-----------------x-----------------x-----------------x-------------- | x x x | x x x | x x x -1 | x x x x | x x x x | xx xx xx xx | xxx xxx -2 | +--------------------------------------------------------------------- Output, the digitized, sampled signal: +--------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 | | | | xxxxxxxxxxx 1 | xxxxxxxxxxx | | | 0 +xxxx-----------xxxx-----------------xxxx-----------xxxx-------------- | | | -1 | xxxx xxxx xxxx | | | -2 | xxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxx +--------------------------------------------------------------------- This introduces (would introduce) lots of strong harmonics, making a very quiet flute, say, sound very unflutelike. The people who make commercial CDs get around this problem with a technique called dithering. They add to each sample a number from {-2, -1, 0, 1 2}, picked randomly. I.e., they randomly scramble the low few bits of each sample. The interesting thing about this is that, while it obviously degrades the signal, the result sounds better to human ears! It solves the problem of granulation noise. (The noisy flute sounds better than the clear but mangled squarewave thing the flute sounds like through the granulation noise). Of course there is something like 93 db dynamic range on a CD, so the dither hardly makes a dent in the usual sound quality -- it's only there to solve the granulation noise problem, which is only a problem at very low signal strengths. The only requirement for the dither bits is that they be such that they sound random, like noise. But any random source of bits with this property would work just as well for dithering. In particular, let's suppose you have an encrypted file, represented as a sequence of symbols, each of which has exactly 5 values it can assume. Musically, this would sound exactly like noise :-) . So *this* file could be used to dither an audiofile, instead of the "real" random values currently used. I guess what I really mean to say is that this insures that the low bit in a dithered file is *really* random; hence could be replaced with a bit from your encrypted file. Moreover, such a dithered audio file has some nice steganographic properties. 1) Repudiability. Under the assumption that the encrypted file cannot be cracked without the possession of the key to the file (which the owner of the steganographically-injected audio file has but claims ignorance of), the dither *really does* look like genuine, random dither. She can claim that the file is in fact a recording of the minutes of the last cypherpunks meeting, or a 3 hour concert that she taped off the radio, and no TLA can prove otherwise. Usually, a steganographically hidden datum (a microdot, invisible ink, etc.) doesn't have this property. 2) Zero storage requirements. This follows from 1), really. If you hide data in the unused parts of the last blocks on disk in a disk file, or in a hidden partition, the secrecy of the data (the "steganographic integrity"?) depends on the enemy not knowing or suspecting the existence of the data. PROBLEMS: You wouldn't be able to hide anything in your private copy of Michael Jackson's Thriller; the enemy could simply compare your copy with the standard copy, making the differences (the hidden file) stand out. Unless you were Warner Brothers, in which case you could just steganographically-inject ALL copys of Thriller with the secret file. This would make storage of the hidden file trivial. You could get a copy from the nearest Wherehouse. [I don't know if W.B in fact publishes Thriller; it's just an example] I wonder if CD pulishers know that they could make some money on the side by hiding data for people in their thousands of CDs? Anyway, while I don't know the format for DAT, I suspect there is some point where the sound signal is dithered to mask the granulation noise, and at this point Alice with information to hide could inject her file. Do digital pictures employ dithering to prevent aliasing? I think so. --John. jel(a)sutro.sfsu.edu

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soundfile stego
by jel＠sutro.SFSU.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

You know, you don't have to think of somehow modifying a file pointwise in the time domain. How about this, to stego a sound file: Do an FFT of the *entire* file. Assuming the file is two hours = 7200 seconds, the frequency res of the transformed file will be about 140 microhertz. Pick a band that humans don't usually pay much conscious attention to when they hear music; say 18 KHz through 19.5 KHz. Replace the low bit in each of these frequency space samples (there are 1500 / 0.000140 ~= 1E7 such samples) with the stego data. Inverse transform the modified, frequency space representation of the file back into the time domain, and voila! I suspect you would not be able to tell the difference from the original with your naked ears. But this is not repudiable; I suspect the spectrum of the file would look artificial. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Also, I am told that humans have a tough time identifying the phase of the frequency components of the sounds they identify. So one could hide date in the phase relationships among the frequency components of, say, recorded speech.

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Fedworld BBS Info
by jkyser＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Somewhat off topic, but for those of you interested in government information, there is a BBS called FEDWORLD which has gateways into 100+ federal BBS systems. It can be reached via telnet to fedworld.gov. Following is a list of the federal systems that can be reached through the gateway: 2:ALF (USDA) :National Agricultural Library BBS 3:ALIX (Lib of Congress) :Automated Library Information eXchange 4:BOM-BBN(Dept of Interior):Bureau of Mines-Bulletin Board Network 5:ISM-SIS (IRS) :ISM Support Info System 6:CIC-BBS (GSA) :Consumer Information Center 7:CLU-IN (EPA) :Superfund Data and Information 8:CPO-BBS (Census) :Lists open jobs at the Census Dept 9:CRS-BBS (Dept of Justice):Amer. With Disabilities Act Info 10:Computer Security (NIST) :Computer Sys Lab Computer Security BBS 11:DCBBS (DC Govt) :DC Government Information 12:DMIE (NIST/CSL) :NIST/CSL Data Management Information 13:EBB (Dept of Commerce) :Economic data and information 14:ELISA System (DoD) :DoD Export License Tracking System 15:GSA/IRM BBS (GSA) :Information Resources Management Issues 16:EPUB (Dept of Energy) :Energy information and data 17:FDA's BBS (FDA) :FDA info and policies 18:FDA/DMMS (FDA) :PMA, IDE, 510k & guidance documents 19:FERC-CIPS BBS(Dof Energy):Fed Energy Regulatory Commission 20:FEBBS (Fed Highway Admin):FHWA information and data 21:FRBBS (NIST) :FRBBS - Info on Fire Research 22:FEDERAL BBS (GPO) :GPO and Govt Data (Fee Based) 23:OSS-BBS (GSA) :GSA On-line Schedules System 24:Eximbank BBS :Export/Import Bank data and info. 25:JAG-NET (U.S. Navy) :Navy Judge Advocate General 26:Labor News(Dept of Labor):Dept of Labor information and files 27:Megawatt 1(DofEnergy) :Information on energy and DoE 28:NADAP (US Navy) :Navy Drug and Alcohol Abuse Prevention 29:NAVTASC (US Navy) :NAVCOMTELSTA Washington DC 30:EHSC-DDS :Army Engineering & Housing 31:NDB-BBS(Dept of Agricul) :Human Nutrition Information Service 32:NSSDC\NASA\Goddard :The NASA NODIS Locator System. 33:1040 BBS (IRS) :Electronic Tax Filing Information 34:SBB-BB (Treasury) :Surety Bond Branch, Circular 570 35:OIS (Bureau of Prisons) :US Bureau of Prison employees 36:SBIR-BBS (NASA) :NASA Small Business Innovation Research 37:WTIE-BBS (EPA) :Wastewater Treatment Info Exchange 38:QED-BBS (USGS) :Quick Epicenter Determ and EQ data 39:SALEMDUG-BBS (FEMA) :State and local FEMA user groups 40:SBA On Line (SBA) :SBA Information and data (9600 bps) 41:SBA On Line (SBA) :SBA Information & Data (2400 bps) 42:SBAI-BBS (SBA) :Small Bus. Admin internal BBS 43:Sample Weather Data (NWS):Sample data from Fee Based System 44:OPM Mainstreet :OPM - Job Info, Personnel Guidance 45:TELENEWS(Dept of Energy) :Data and info on Fossil fuels 46:USA-GPCS BBS (US Army) :Army Info System Software 47:USCS-BBS (Customs) :Customs and Exchange Rate Data & Info 48:USGS-BBS (USGS) :Geological Survey BBS/CD-ROM Info 49:NLPBB (Navy) :CNO's Navy Leadership Policy BB 50:FMS-BBS (U.S. Treas) :Inventory management data & programs 51:OASH-BBS (HHS) :Health & AIDS Information & Reports 52:FEDIX :Links Fed Data to Higher Education 53:DASC-ZE(Def Log Agency) :PC Info and files 54:GPSIC (Coast Guard) :GPS, Loran & Omega Info/status 55:NGCR-BBS (US Navy) :Next Generation Computer Resources Stan 56:PPIC-BBS (EPA) :Pollu. Preven, Clean Product, Ozone 57:Gulfline (EPA&NOAA) :Gulf Coast Pollution Information 58:FAA Safety Exchange (FAA):Small Plane Safety Reports & info 59:NTIS QuikSERVICE (NTIS) :Order NTIS Documents Online 60:LC News Service (LOC) :Library of Congress News Service 61:STIS (NSF) :Science & Technology Information System 62:MI-BBS (DoE) :DoE Minority Impact Bulletin Board 63:TECH SPECS (NRC) :Technical Specifications Improvement Pr 64:Census-BEA (Census) :Census BEA Electronic Forum 65:IHS-BBS (HHS) :Indian Health Service BBS 66:NOAA-ESDD (NOAA) :NOAA Environmental Services Data Direct 67:Offshore-BBS (Interior) :Off Shore Oil & Gas Data 68:TQM-BBS (T. Glenn) :Total Quality Management 69:NIDR Online (NIH) :Nat. Institute of Dental Research 70:NIHGL (NIH) :Nat. Inst. of Health Grant Line BBS 71:PayPerNet #1 (OPM) :Fed. Pay & Performance Management BBS 72:PayPerNet #2 (OPM) :Fed. Pay & Performance Management 73:CASUCOM (GSA) :Interagency Shared Services/Resources 74:ATTIC (EPA) :Alternative Treatment Tech Info Center 75:NCJRS-BBS (DofJustice) :National Criminal Justice Reference Sy 76:DRIPSS (EPA) :Drinking Water Info Processing Support 77:PIM BBS (EPA) :Pesticide Information Network 78:SWICH BBS (EPA&SWANA) :Solid Waste Management 79:NPS-BBS (EPA) :Nonpoint Source Program BBS 80:OEA BBS (DofInterior) :Interior's Off of Environment. Affairs 81:Metro-Net (US Army) :Army Morale, Welfare, and Recreation 82:CABB (Dof State) :Passport Info/ Travel Alerts 83:BUPERS Access (US Navy) :Navy Personnel Information 84:FCC-State Link (FCC) :FCC daily digest & carrier stats/report 85:HUD-N&E BB (HUD) :HUD News & Events BB. Press Releases 87:FREND #1 (Natl Archives) :Fed. Register Electronic News Delivery 88:FREND #2 (Natl Archives) :Fed. Register Electronic News Delivery 89:NHS-BBS (HHS) :National Head Start BBS 90:WSCA-BBS (Dof Labor) :Board of Wage & Service Contract Appeal 91:TEBBS (OGE) :Office of Government Ethics BBS 92:HSETC MD (U.S. Navy) :Naval Health Sci Edu & Training Command 93:PPCUG/RDAMIS (DoD) :Pentagon Users Group BBS 95:CBEE (Coast Guard) :Coast Guard On-Line Magazine & News 96:ATD BBS (FAA) :Air Transport Div. BBS 97:ATOS-BBS (FAA) :Air Traffic Operations Service BBS 98:AEE BBS (FAA) :FAA Office of Environment & Energy 99:OCA BBS (PRC) :Postal Rate Commission/Consumer Advocat 100:GEMI (GSA) :GSA Electronic Management Information 101:Airports BBS #1 (FAA) :Airport operators and designers 102:EnviroNET (NASA) :Space Environment Information Service 103:FAA HQ BBS (FAA) :FAA Headquarters BBS 104:IRS-SOI (IRS) :Public Taxpayer Statistical Information 105:ARA-BBS (FAA) :Aviation Rulemaking Advisory BBS 106:IIAC BBS (US Army) :Integration & Analysis Center BBS 108:ACF-BBS (HHS) :Admin. for Children and Families 109:NTIA-BBS (Dof Commerce) :Radio Freq. Management Issues 110:ED Board (Dept of Ed) :Dept of Ed Grant & Contract Info 111:BHPr-BBS (HHS) :Medical & Health Services Information 112:Marine Data BBS (NOAA) :Marine Databases & Files 113:Call-ERS BBS (USDA) :Agriculture Economic Research Info 114:Call ERS (USDA) :Economic Research Line Service Line 2 115:ABLE INFORM (Dof Ed) :Disability & Rehab Data & Info 116:PTO-BBS (PTO) :Patent and Trademark Office BBS 117:PerManNet (Dof State) :US Agency for International Development 118:Quick Facts! (NIAAA/HHS) :Alcohol Abuse & Alcoholism Information 123:IBNS/OMPAT BBS (DoD) :Military Performance Assessement 124:EDOS (DC Crt Appeals) :US Court of Appeals, District of Columb 125:RSA-BBS (RSA) :Rehabilitation Services Administration 126:FRESBB (GSA) :Federal Real Estate Sales Bulletin Boar 128:NCUA BBS (NCUA) :National Credit Union Administration 129:NBCI-BBS (USDA) :Natl Biological Control Institute 130:OECI-BBS (DOC&DoD) :Defense Conversion Information -- Jeff Kyser PGP 2.3 public key available via finger jkyser(a)netcom.com " "

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Signing Keys for Nyms and Digibank Users
by an5877＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > If I remember right, none of these people puts a PGP Key ID or fingerprint > in their posting signatures, so I don't have that clue available - > that would increase my confidence a lot. But I still couldn't be sure. Suppose one were an anon(a)penet.fi subscriber, and that one were strict in digitally signing all messages, and that one's public key were available from the PGP public key servers, and that one conducted affairs in this way for a lengthy period. Would the confluence of the Email identification in the digitally signed message with the identity on the PGP public key along with the presumption of good identity management on the Finnish remailer be of sufficient weight to convince you to sign one's PGP public key? Would existing signatures on a PGP public key influence your decision? DEADBEAT <na5877(a)anon.penet.fi> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQBFAgUBLPxHnvFZTpBW/B35AQF68AF+LqDXWrjntXqW0bqgdIETD+aOddCAvJIA J02n5sreNbTv/1beDYpL1vQiA/3vHZOl =MH5W -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)anon.penet.fi. Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized, and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)anon.penet.fi.

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NSA Insecure Remailers?
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A >probably only the NSA and some defense agency we haven't A >yet heard of are actually performing this analysis right now. But A >given the declining price of storage media, even saving everything on A >magnetic media and paying $1000/gig, it only costs about US$8.7 million A >to keep a year's worth of traffic headers around (media cost). A > A >So what? So what indeed. Why oh why do we waste so much time seeking systems that are mathematically unbreakable. You don't need mathematically unbreakable systems to have a free market on the nets. It costs a minimum of $50K to start a federal criminal prosecution (that is if the perp is inside the US). This means that the feds can only afford a few tens of thousands a year. When you add incarceration costs it quickly becomes very difficult. This being the case, they are dependent on your obedience for law enforcement success. Like any predator, the government must gain more energy from the kill than it expends on the hunt. Otherwise it weakens and dies. Did you know that fewer than 1000 people are convicted of federal tax evasion every year. Your obedience is in turn dependent on your view of whether or not obedience is right and on your fear of punishment. Quite apart from computer networks both the ideology of obedience and the fear of punishment have been declining. Net society further weakens both of these factors. The consensual hallucination that is rule by others seems more threadbare every year. The DDR border guards had the machine guns to fire on the crowds at the Berlin Wall on 10 Nov 1989. It was not mechanical failure or a magic shield that prevented them from firing. It was simply because a change had occurred in the minds of the citizenry (and in their own minds). Sure the feds can nuke your house. Would that gain them anything? It would cost more than it was worth. What they can't do is sit down next to every person on earth (or on the nets) and intimidate them. In the past it didn't matter because almost everyone was a peasant bound to the soil. As you keep piling technology and market opportunities (choices) on individuals, their power increases. Governance of others is hard enough when those governed are weak. It rapidly becomes impossible as they gain strength. Today and in the future, those who "move like Gods through cyberspace" will be much harder to control particularly since such controls will depend not on guns but on them convincing us that we are not free. DCF "They would not leave him alone." -- The first line of what relevant work of fiction? --- WinQwk 2.0b#1165

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"CYPHERPUNK CRIMINAL" t-shirts
by Stanton McCandlish 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The "CYPHERPUNK CRIMINAL" t-shirt project is now being handled by: Christian Void <cvoid(a)albemuth.tatertot.com> I've passed on all queries and "I want one!" messages to him, so no need to resend them. -- Stanton McCandlish mech(a)eff.org 1:109/1103 EFF Online Activist & SysOp O P E N P L A T F O R M C R Y P T O P O L I C Y O N L I N E R I G H T S N E T W O R K I N G V I R T U A L C U L T U R E I N F O : M E M B E R S H I P @ E F F . O R G

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Re: Factor Breakthru!
by peb＠PROCASE.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Factoring is only one method. Case in point: solving the game of Go has been proven to take exponential time *and* exponential space. An encryption algorithm based on it could potentially be very hard, although there are subtleties about trap doors and the cost of key generation and use... Paul E. Baclace peb(a)procase.com P.S.: I'm installing procmail over here...get version v2.91 (I fixed a segv in v2.61 [on SunOS] yesterday and should have just picked up the newer version first.)

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Re: Knights who say NII (
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

M >Government is not the only potential source of harm--private industry M >can be plenty harmful. Prove it. Sans guns there's not much private institutions can do. That's the problem with letting leftists hang around here. (Just kidding folks.) They're not worried about governments with nukes and centuries of a tradition of slaughtering millions of people but they are worried about private entities who've hardly killed anyone. Most NGO (non governmental organization) problems are actually misclassifications. Analysts confusing NGO+Government conspiracies with NGOs alone. I can live next to a Chevy dealer for 80 years without him sending armed men next door to my house to get me to buy a car. Bell Atlantic is a bad thing only because it used to have a government granted local loop monopoly. Since that monopoly is as dead as a doornail no matter what Bell Atlantic or the government thinks about the matter, BA (and indeed the government itself) are just market actors. As soon as we (and they) recognize their new status, we'll be better off. May you live in interesting times. DCF --- WinQwk 2.0b#1165

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EFF Op-Ed from the NY Tim
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

N >The amount of electronic material the superhighway can carry is N >dizzying compared to the relatively narrow range of broadcast TV and N >the limited number of cable channels. Properly constructed and N >regulated, it could be open to all who wish to speak, publish and N >communicate. How is it possible to prevent it with or without government action. Since the information superhighway will be carrying "phone calls" and since there will be absolutely no difference between "phone calls" and everything else on the system, "phone calls" can carry everything. If we don't like corporate offerings "phone calls" can be used to disseminate whatever we like. Phone and cable services were limited because they were government monopolies. The only way to assure that future networks don't suffer from these problems, is to eliminate government regulation/monopoly. The market smashed IBMs closed platform computer system without government help. There is no risk that Bell Atlantic could impose a closed network system unless the government helps it. To the contrary, I doubt if they would be able to do it even *with* government help. And another thing. I'm sick and tired of moaning about cost. Services are virtually free today and prices can go nowhere but down. There are homeless people on the streets of NY with Internet accounts. The hardware cost of a computer is essentially zero. What exactly is the fair market value of a Commodore Vic 20 and a Commodore 300 baud modem. I know I can get an XT+1200 baud modem + shareware comms program for circa $100 at any computer show in NJ. Once your local loop monopoly is broken, local phone service will be dirt cheap. Network Email connections via local BBS are cheap. AT&T Mail charges a big $3/month for an Email account (with 800 number). Most network services are reachable via Email gateways. The real prices of almost all open market goods have fallen dramatically since WWII. This has particularly been the case in telecoms and electronics. This decline will continue. We need market discipline not government discipline to open up network access. DCF --- WinQwk 2.0b#1165

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Who is this Detweiler guy anyway?
by an48848＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

As a fairly recent addition to this list, I'm unfamilliar with the history of cypherpunks. Can anyone enlighten me? Thanks. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)anon.penet.fi. Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized, and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)anon.penet.fi.

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