December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

"Root Canal" questions
by gtoal＠an-teallach.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In article <00541.2835966052.614(a)washofc.cpsr.org> dsobel(a)washofc.cpsr.org writes: > "Root Canal" questions > BTW, anyone have ideas about that name!? Having just been through this procedure (UK National Health, $70), I can tell you - It's all about *Deep Drilling*. Presumably for data, in this case. And it hurts. G -- Personal mail to gtoal(a)gtoal.com (I read it in the evenings) Business mail to gtoal(a)an-teallach.com (Be careful with the spelling!) Faxes to An Teallach Limited: +44 31 662 4678 Voice: +44 31 668 1550 x212

2 1

DC-Nets
by tcmay＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Jim McCoy has asked me about the DC-Nets references I have cited. Here they are. The seminal Chaum articles are not cited--the main one has been posted to this List more than once. Clearly the Eurocrypt '89 book is the one to get. If your library does not carry it, Springer-Verlag (1-800-SPRINGE) can ship it (and please don't write to me asking for the ISBN!). Also, "Computer Literacy Bookstore" in Sunnyvale (408 area code) usually has a bunch of these Proceedings in various years and can also ship. Disruption is the main problem addressed in these papers. Given the malicious disruption we've seen on our List lately, it is of course a very real problem. Even more so if and when DC-Nets get deployed and some agents/entities seek to automate the disruption process (a likely prospect, given the way they work). A reminder to you all, even though I am not myself working on DC-Nets (trying to program them in Mathematica is pointless, I think), that there are several groups currently interested in DC-Nets: * Jim McCoy and the Austing group (I think they run the DC-Net mailing list...I'm on too many mailing lists, so I skipped this one) * Henry Strickland (Strick) is interested, has plans, and is putting together his crypto toolkit in TCL. * Yanek Martinson, of whom little has been hear lately, was once hot on doing this, and even got a basic DC-Net running. Anyway, here are some important references: - J. N. E. Bos and H den Boer, "Detecting Disrupters in the DC Protocol," Eurocrypt '89, pp. 320327. - M. Waidner and B. Pfitzmann. "The Dining Cryptographers in the Disco," Eurocrypt '89, p. 690. - A. Pfitzmann and M. Waidner, "Networks without User Observability," Computers and Security 6 (No 2, April 1987), pp. 158-166. - B. Pfitzmann and A. Pfitzmann, "How to Break the Direct RSA-Implementation of Mixes," Eurocrypt '89, pp. 373-381. (In case you're curious, the Pfitzmanns are husband and wife.) - J. N. E. Bos, "Disruption and Synchronization in Untraceable Sending," in "Practical Privacy," the 1992 Ph.D. thesis of Bos. Technische Universiteit Eindhoven (Netherlands). (This little book is not published, in purchasable form. The relevant chapter was included in the Xeroxed handout at the first Cypherpunks meeting. You might be able to get the book by contacting Eindhoven directly.) --Tim -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.

1 0

Re: Destroying data
by Jef Poskanzer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>1) Thermite is extreamly hard to ignite, so requires an igniter. Most > home made igniters are extreamly unstable (do you really want the thing > off accidently (bump it, static charge, RF energy, etc)? KNO3+sugar works fine. >2) 50:50 mix of AL and iron oxide will probably work, but best to look up > a really ballenced % for the best mix. btw: was that by volume or > weight?, there is a slight difference :) By weight. >3) in general, the finer the powder, the better. ball mill it if you can. The iron oxide you get from ceramics supply places is plenty fine enough. DO NOT ball mill the aluminum, it can explode. If you're not a minor, chem supply places should be willing to sell you 200-mesh Al, which works fine. >7) don't tamp it! - it needs that O2 between the flakes of powder. Not as far as I know. Personally I'd rather use some sort of cryptographic file system, with the key stored in volatile memory. Connect the power switch to your perimeter sensors and you're safe. Thermite sounds macho but the reality is messy and dangerous. Do you really want to risk a false alarm? --- Jef

3 2

Re: LD Admits he is S.Boxx (oops!)
by cfrye＠ciis.mitre.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Kudos to Mike Ingle for his diligent record keeping and powers of observation. As much as I like the computational solution for these problems, there's no substitute for documenting a mistake that blows somebody's cover. Curtis D. Frye cfrye(a)ciis.mitre.org "If you think I speak for MITRE, I'll tell you how much they pay me and make you feel foolish."

3 2

BAY AREA: Schneier Book gone from Cody's
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

(If we had a newsgroup instead of a mailing list, I could send this to ba.cypherpunks instead) I got their last one about 5pm Sunday; when I went to the information desk to ask if they had it, the clerk's response was along the lines of "Cryptography - oh, the blue one? It's been really selling hot - we just got tehm in this morning and you're getting the last one." Bill

1 0

All our eggs in one basket?
by an41418＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- As cryptography and cryptographic techniques are developed, we tend to put more and more trust in them. It is probably not a bad idea to step back from time to time and ask ourselves if the risks are still reasonable. There is no better example of this than digital cash. Many techniques have been proposed for this as for other applications. It is usually not long before someone finds a critical flaw in the various implementations under consideration. The consequences are usually a loss of confidentiality or embarassments. For example, in the early days of Julf's remailer people came up with surprizing new ways to defeat it, and the consequences were that some identities were revealed and we all marvelled at how this hole had escaped us until that point. Digital cash is another ball game. Before any scheme is adopted we need total confidence in the security of the cryptographic algorithms, protocols, and implementation details. We need a risk analysis to tell us exactly what will happen if two principals collaborate or the bank cheats etc... Schemes such as Chaum's are provocative, but what if 2 years after a digital cash scheme is implemented, someone publishes an easy way to defeat it or cheat? The consequenes could be total chaos. Think of the mental poker problem. A solution was given that seems reasonable. However, someone showed that by taking certain properties of the encryption technique, a bit of information could be learned that would compromise the integrity of the system. In mental poker, no big deal, we stop playing poker. What would happen if your bank suddenly told you that it had no proof that you really had an account there? Wonderer -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3 iQBVAgUBLOkFlx1kTJuroDD9AQEnpgH9GNMpcbjnwDzoNFdhPw5wTBdUQolvCAxk r643e/qOjnnlsL99IazAhCnTucRbaOm/v50HcwPcP2698UYWAX1GTg== =Ud6i -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)anon.penet.fi. Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized, and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)anon.penet.fi.

1 0

Re: The Courtesies of Cypherpunks
by owen＠autodesk.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Before I start I wish to express that on many occasions Perry has earned my utmost respect, and that the sarcasm I express here is not offered as flame bait, but as an expressions of the ironic nature of this affair. as such it migrates from *wry* comments on Perrys post into a more general rant. > From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger(a)lehman.com> > Look, everyone -- Is this a command, a request, a plea, or a futile gesture? > Detweiler is a seriously disturbed individual. In your opinion. No matter how common that opinion may be amongst other participants, stating such as *fact*, only opens pandoras box that much further. > Sending him mail saying > "what the hell are you doing -- you're nuts" isn't going to do any > good. Isn't going to what? Good in whose opinion? relative statements with open ended conjecture dangling unspecified but none the less qualified negations of hypothetical scenarios are doing some good? > Crazy people don't think they are crazy. Ignoring his rantings > works a whole lot better than any other strategy. towards what end, assuming that all share the same goal? > I only mailbombed him because he was sending me unsolicited personal > mail and wouldn't stop. Otherwise I ignore him, and I advise others to > do the same. Do you dump your nose-goblin collection into the neighbors mailbox if their dog shits on your front stoop? doing so would be a federal crime would it not? Mailbombing is considered an anti-social act by everyone I know whose ever been the recipient of one. Blaiming your actions on the other guy is just a version of a *He started it* argument, something I find to be more common to adolescents and mental inferiors. Not the kind of thing I usually see from bright people like you Perry! phade to more general rant................................... I am finding this situation most enlightening myself. It directly parallels the situation that I outlined regarding the electronic version of Fag bashers in the queer newsgroups, and the subsequent e-terrorism that has been perpetrated against myself and other admitted homo-sek-shuals who don't take any shit from homo-haters. Larry has simply created a campaign against a different un-natural lifestyle choice, the perverted and obviously criminal desire to remain anonymous. (thats satire BTW) Showing us how to harangue your target with the techniques of mindless prejudged bigotry, and how they usually only engender more of the same. (ala *my mind is made up, don't confuse me with facts) It reminds me of some things I've seen all too often in other corners of the matrix; the subsequent flame wars that ensue from the use of inflamatory terms, (in this case the spoof word. Made more poignant due to the similarity to the british slang word poof.) the inevitable escalation of miscommunication that occurs between people who are talking *at* each other rather than with each other, the reality that electronic freedom still requires some forms of accountability, the fantasy that anonymity makes you free, the irony that those who expand their gripes against individuals as foolish campaigns against whole groups of individuals, are engaged in destroying the very freedoms they claim to be defending. (kinda like sawing off the limb your sitting on, to keep others from sitting next to you!) and that ultimately the only punishment available to an online personality for transgression is exclusion. (so far) ................. To those who wrote to me a while back, telling me to get a thicker skin, and learn to deal with it. I can now say, just get over it. To those who didn't understand the logistics of gaining concensus regarding how to deal with such situations, I am eagerly awaiting your guidance to show me how its done. I think this issue points out the need to develop systems that foster a better quality of communication in a medium that hampers quality at the expense of ease-o-use. I think that examining this situation as an example of a much wider problem will illuminate some of the points I tried to make some months ago. It is my opinion that the situation regarding the use of anonymous systems to harrass and terrorise queers on the net is a laboratory for the study of this issue. Ignore it at your peril IMNSHO. And I think that if any group of people on the net is qualified and capable of dealing inteligent solutions out, this is the group. I think you gotta widen your focus and recognise the broad issues before you narrow in on the specifics, I don't think that solutions to the issues involved can be integrated at the end of a patch-work quilt of solutions that only get implemented after the fact. In short Detweiler isn't the problem, he has merely provided you with some examples to chew on. So go ahead, chase him away, perhaps the next case will not be one that just involves simple neurosis, perhaps it will be full blown psychosis and e-terrorists like we have experienced in the queerer corners of the matrix. (as if this one isn't pretty odd ;-) LUX ./. owen

1 0

Quotable Quotes
by an12070＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

who was the cypherpunk who said, ``Cypherpunks, It's such a feeling of raw power over lesser intelligences''? I can't remember. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)anon.penet.fi. Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized, and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)anon.penet.fi.

1 0

Info on L.Detweiler
by Graham Toal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In article <9311151727.AA17924(a)illuminati.IO.COM> cman(a)io.com "Douglas Barnes" writes: > Here's some info folks might appreciate (all numbers area code > 303, unless otherwise noted): Oh for christ's sake, knock it off! If the poor bastard really is going through a paranoid phase (and I'll bet there more of us on this list who've been there than would care to admit it) this is just the sort of thing to push him over the edge. If you can't ignore him, install procmail and put him in your killfile. If you escalate this into a petty netwar, just think how hard it's going to be for him when he finally starts to get over it. Would _you_ want to be in that position? I suppose someone posting from a site called 'Illuminati' thinks this is all very funny. I don't. Neither would you if you were above the age of 14. G -- Personal mail to gtoal(a)gtoal.com (I read it in the evenings) Business mail to gtoal(a)an-teallach.com (Be careful with the spelling!) Faxes to An Teallach Limited: +44 31 662 4678 Voice: +44 31 668 1550 x212

3 2

Duking it out for the decoder ring
by VACCINIA＠UNCVX1.OIT.UNC.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Once again encryption is on the minds of the business community. In the Nov. 22 issue of business week, Carl Ellison is highlighted along with Whitfield Diffie in an article which asserts that those of us once considered paranoid are soon to be considered prescient. Excerpts from the article: >When executives at Stratus headquarters hold teleconferences with the >company's with San Jose (Calif.) engineering center or other offices, >Ellison insists that their words and video be encrypted. He *even* (emphasis >mine) encodes routine electronic mail...Some coworkers call Ellison paranoid. I will venture to say that paranoid (in this context) will soon be synonymous with cautious. >Cryptography is absolutely essential to any kind of electronic business >communication", says Price Waterhouse partner Douglas Kalish. >While AT&T, a big government supplier, has agreed to put clipper in its >secure phones, many companies simply don't trust the governments promises >not to snoop illegally. It would be interesting if the gov't ended up with a cryptography system that has a back door and everyone else had a secure system. Fun with reversal of fortune. Finally, Whitfield Diffie's quote, "Clipper is the most rancid idea to come along in quite some time". As the pendulum swings further toward freedom to encrypt, it's going to take ever more of us to keep it there. Teach anyone who will learn so the pendulum rests on many shoulders. Also here is my Cypherpunks ID Key, I swear that it belongs to the nym my mom gave me and who signed this message, when a better verification method presents itself I will avail myself of it. Scott G. Morham !The First, Vaccinia(a)uncvx1.oit.unc.edu ! Second PGP Public Keys by Request ! and Third Levels ! of Information Storage and Retrieval !DNA, ! Biological Neural Nets, ! Cyberspace - -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.3a mQCNAizKBaAAAAEEANxU5ykmCxvPdC+zKUg99WH7u1/yyVsImtXJClRMvjcPtQ+2 2ilzsjn7wPz//fmKnJkN7dbqSbMy0cUF78+fI8iMsdAOTdO/MpfjNmRylF7sb7aM Fn4DxIBENsJrdLnnLJ9pDWFmVEOUZ+S+n8Thi+mvRovEAcmbhT2paOMjHHAhAAUR tBhTR00gPEN5cGhlcnB1bmtzIElEIEtleT6JAJUCBRAsyzBcnN9G4AhMxxkBAaao A/9primmEtNa2wpNH06dLIkUeTinPFRSnMSb/DG3w+k4NmWLfTsqkG9JwDQx7xeh 4vbf8CiU+JZ31M8ndSdgD5iBnHFiqbzDrxyRn+Vq0Ypj8q4fdxli3YWdEgJa7joT /xrVKAZ9oPEonFOSvcujGbSpazCSEP2UoNMEgzWWNJ4Px7QkU2NvdHQgRy4gTW9y aGFtIDxDeXBoZXJwdW5rcyBJRCBLZXk+ =IyPi - -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLOWmiD2paOMjHHAhAQFFGQQAvkHnjWkLtRxSKR9jmiUD1NwWocsOyqjR ewuXN2HuwWYmH8lmiSEKTovT2vUp6GjNLfbtQ0fTlxmbwYp0dxZ4mw7BZJWPCLBp vOiDWJSg3o5QNtYkL0kdxjxMYbl8sc4dbNR5vulWE0tB4PHgJXPxwW4+p9/YkLwP oih4XErLStk= =hCwP -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

2 1