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Robert Fisk on Suicide Bombers (fwd)
by !Dr. Joe Baptista 14 Sep '01

14 Sep '01

Email: Nader Hashemi <nader.hashemi(a)utoronto.ca> Date: Thu, 13 Sep 2001 22:55:23 -0400 Title: Robert Fisk on Suicide Bombers TEXT: The Independent Thursday, September 13, 2001 They can run and they can hide. Suicide bombers are here to stay By Robert Fisk Not long before the Second World War, Stanley Baldwin, who was Britain's Prime Minister, warned that "the bomber will always get through". Today, we can argue that the suicide bomber will always get through. Maybe not all of them. We may never know how many other hijackers failed to board domestic flights in the United States on Tuesday morning, but enough to produce carnage on an awesome, incomprehensive scale. Yet still we have not begun to address this phenomenon. The suicide bomber is here to stay. It is an exclusive weapon that belongs to "them" not us, and no military power appears able to deal with this phenomenon. Partly because of the suicide bomber, the Israelis fled Lebanon. Specifically because of a suicide bomber, the Americans fled Lebanon 17 years earlier. I still remember Vice-President George Bush, now George Bush Senior, visibly moved amid the ruins of the US Marine base in Beirut, where 241 American servicemen had just been slaughtered. "We are not going to let a bunch of insidious terrorist cowards, shake the foreign policy of the United States," he told us. "Foreign policy is not going to be dictated or changed by terror." A few months later, the Marines upped sticks and ran away from Lebanon, "redeployed" to their ships offshore. Not long ago, I was chatting to an Indian soldier, a veteran of Delhi's involvement in the Sri Lanka war now serving with the UN in southern Lebanon. How did the Tamil suicide bombers compare those of the Lebanese Hizbollah I asked him? The soldier raised his eyebrows. "The Hizbollah has nothing on those guys," he said. "Just think, they all carry a suicide capsule. I told my soldiers to drive at 100 miles an hour on the roads of Sri Lanka in case one of them hurled himself into the jeep." The Hizbollah may take their inspiration from the martyrdom of the prophet Hussain, and the Palestinian suicide bombers may take theirs from the Hizbollah. But there is no military answer to this. As long as "our" side will risk but not give its lives (cost-free war, after all, was partly an American invention) the suicide bomber is the other side's nuclear weapon. That desperate, pitiful phone call from the passenger on her way to her doom in the Boeing 767 crash on the Pentagon told her husband that the hijackers held knives and box-cutters. Knives and box-cutters; that's all you need now to inflict a crashing physical defeat on a superpower. That and a plane with a heavy fuel load. But the suicide bomber does not conform to a set of identical characteristics. Many of the callow Palestinian youths blowing themselves to bits, with, more often than not, the most innocent of Israelis, have little or no formal education. They have poor knowledge of the Koran but a powerful sense of fury, despair and self-righteousness to propel them. The Hizbollah suicide bombers were more deeply versed in the Koran, older, often with years of imprisonment to steel them in the hours before their immolation. Tuesday's suicide bombers created a precedent. If there were at least four on each aircraft, this means 16 men decided to kill themselves at the same time. Did they all know each other? Unlikely. Or did one of them know all the rest? For sure, they were educated. If the Boeing which hit the Pentagon was being flown by men with knives (presumably, the other three aircraft were too) then these were suicide bombers with a good working knowledge of the fly-by-wire instrument panel of one of the world's most sophisticated aircraft. I found it oddly revealing when, a few hours later, an American reporter quizzed me about my conviction that these men must have made "dummy runs", must have travelled the same American Airlines and United Airlines scheduled flights many times. They would have to do that at least to check the X-ray security apparatus at airports. How many crew, the average passenger manifest, the average delays on departure times. They needed to see if the cabin crew locked the flight deck door. In my experience on US domestic flights this is rare. Savage, cruel these men were, but also, it seems, educated. Like so many of our politicians who provide us with the same tired old promises about hunting down the guilty and, Mr Blair's contribution yesterday, "dismantle the machine of terror". But this misses the point. If the machinery is composed of knives and box-cutters, Mr Blair is after the wrong target. Just as President Ronald Reagan was in the hours before he ordered the bombing of Libya in 1986. "He can run, but he can't hide," he said of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi. But Colonel Gaddafi could hide, and he is still with us. Instead of searching for more rogue states, President George W Bush's reference to those who stand behind the bombers opens the way for more cruise missiles aimed at Iraq or Afghanistan, or wherever he thinks the "godfathers of terrorism may be". The Americans might do better to find out who taught these vicious men to fly a Boeing 767. Which Middle East airlines train their pilots for this aircraft? Indeed which nations are generous in their pilot-training schemes for Third World countries? I recall one of Iran's best post-revolutionary helicopter pilots telling me he was given a full course on the Bell Augusta (the Vietnam-era gunship) by the Pakistan air force, which itself paid retired American pilots to teach them. And if Osama bin Laden is behind the New York massacre, it's worth remembering one of his aims: not just to evict the US from the Middle East but to overthrow the Arab regimes loyal to Washington. Saudi Arabia was top of the list when I last spoke to him, but President Hosni Mubarak's Egypt and Jordan, ruled by King Abdullah II, were among his other enemies. He would keep talking about how the Muslims of these nations would rise up against their corrupt rulers. A slaughter by the US in retaliation for the New York and Washington bloodbaths might just move the Arab masses from stubborn docility to the point of detonation. Within the region, the suicide bomber is now admired. Not because he is a mass killer but because something invincible, something untouchable, something that has always dictated the rules without taking responsibility for the results, has now proved vulnerable. It was the same when the first suicide bombers struck in Lebanon. The Lebanese could scarcely believe that Israeli soldiers could die on this scale. The Israeli army of song and legend had been brought low. So, too, the reaction when the symbols of America's pride and power were struck. The vile, if small, Palestinian "celebrations" were a symptom of this, albeit unrepresentative. They matched the "bomb Baghdad into the Dark Ages" rhetoric we heard from the American public a decade ago. In the Middle East, Arabs now fear America will strike them without waiting for proof, or act on the most flimsy of evidence. For it is as well to remember how the US responded to the 1983 Marine bombings. The battleship USS New Jersey fired its automobile-sized shells into the Chouf Mountains, killing a couple of Syrian soldiers and erasing half a village. The arrival of US naval craft off the American East Coast yesterday was a ghostly replay of this impotent event. But to this day, the Americans have never discovered the identity of the man who drove a truck-load of explosives into the Beirut Marine compound. That was in another country, in another time. Today's suicide bombers are a different breed. Nurtured in whatever despair or misery or perhaps even privilege, in 2001, the suicide bomber came of age.

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Beyond Government by Harry Reid (List of global libertarian/free market organizations)
by Jim Choate 14 Sep '01

14 Sep '01

http://www.atlantic.net/~dwatney/reid/reid55.htm -- -- ____________________________________________________________________ natsugusa ya...tsuwamonodomo ga...yume no ato summer grass...those mighty warriors'...dream-tracks Matsuo Basho The Armadillo Group ,::////;::-. James Choate Austin, Tx /:'///// ``::>/|/ ravage(a)ssz.com www.ssz.com .', |||| `/( e\ 512-451-7087 -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- --------------------------------------------------------------------

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Feds: Atlanta May Have Been Target
by Jim Choate 14 Sep '01

14 Sep '01

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/aponline/20010914/aponline182531_000.h… -- -- ____________________________________________________________________ natsugusa ya...tsuwamonodomo ga...yume no ato summer grass...those mighty warriors'...dream-tracks Matsuo Basho The Armadillo Group ,::////;::-. James Choate Austin, Tx /:'///// ``::>/|/ ravage(a)ssz.com www.ssz.com .', |||| `/( e\ 512-451-7087 -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- --------------------------------------------------------------------

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MATT DRUDGE // DRUDGE REPORT 2000� - German police confirm Iranian deportee phoned warnings
by Jim Choate 14 Sep '01

14 Sep '01

http://www.drudgereport.com/flash3.htm -- -- ____________________________________________________________________ natsugusa ya...tsuwamonodomo ga...yume no ato summer grass...those mighty warriors'...dream-tracks Matsuo Basho The Armadillo Group ,::////;::-. James Choate Austin, Tx /:'///// ``::>/|/ ravage(a)ssz.com www.ssz.com .', |||| `/( e\ 512-451-7087 -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- --------------------------------------------------------------------

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Slashdot | Net Taps Without Warrants?
by Jim Choate 14 Sep '01

14 Sep '01

http://slashdot.org/yro/01/09/14/211241.shtml -- -- ____________________________________________________________________ natsugusa ya...tsuwamonodomo ga...yume no ato summer grass...those mighty warriors'...dream-tracks Matsuo Basho The Armadillo Group ,::////;::-. James Choate Austin, Tx /:'///// ``::>/|/ ravage(a)ssz.com www.ssz.com .', |||| `/( e\ 512-451-7087 -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- --------------------------------------------------------------------

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suicide terrorism
by Ciamac Moallemi 14 Sep '01

14 Sep '01

I'm not sure about his prescriptive suggestions, but the following article provides a good historical and psychological summary of suicide terrorism. The Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka provide an interesting example--suicide bombers not driven by religious fanaticism but rather from the observation that suicide attacks are effective. <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/issue_SeptOct_2001/sprinzak.html> Rational Fanatics (This article was originally published in the September/October 2000 issue of Foreign Policy. ) What makes suicide bombers tick? While most of the world sees them as lone zealots, they are, in fact, pawns of large terrorist networks that wage calculated psychological warfare. Contrary to popular belief, suicide bombers can be stopped-but only if governments pay more attention to their methods and motivations. By Ehud Sprinzak October 23, 1983, was one of the most horrific days in the history of modern terrorism. Two massive explosions destroyed the barracks of the U.S. and French contingents of the multinational peacekeeping force in Beirut, Lebanon, killing 241 American servicemen and 58 French paratroopers. Both explosions were carried out by Muslim extremists who drove to the heart of the target area and detonated bombs with no intention of escaping. Subsequent suicide attacks against Israeli and U.S. targets in Lebanon and Kuwait made it clear that a new type of killing had entered the repertoire of modern terrorism: a suicide operation in which the success of the attack depends on the death of the perpetrator. This tactic stunned security experts. Two centuries of experience suggested that terrorists, though ready to risk their lives, wished to live after the terrorist act in order to benefit from its accomplishments. But this new terrorism defied that belief. It seemed qualitatively different, appearing almost supernatural, extremely lethal, and impossible to stop. Within six months, French and U.S. Presidents François Mitterrand and Ronald Reagan pulled their troops out of Lebanon-a tacit admission that the new terrorism rendered all known counterterrorist measures useless. Government officials erected concrete barriers around the White House and sealed the Pentagon's underground bus tunnels. Nobody was reassured. As Time magazine skeptically observed in 1983: "No security expert thinks such defensive measures will stop a determined Islamic terrorist who expects to join Allah by killing some Americans." Whereas the press lost no time in labeling these bombers irrational zealots, terrorism specialists offered a more nuanced appraisal, arguing that suicide terrorism has inherent tactical advantages over "conventional" terrorism: It is a simple and low-cost operation (requiring no escape routes or complicated rescue operations); it guarantees mass casualties and extensive damage (since the suicide bomber can choose the exact time, location, and circumstances of the attack); there is no fear that interrogated terrorists will surrender important information (because their deaths are certain); and it has an immense impact on the public and the media (due to the overwhelming sense of helplessness). Dr. Ramadan Shalah, secretary- general of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, summarized the chilling logic of the new terror tactic: "Our enemy possesses the most sophisticated weapons in the world and its army is trained to a very high standard. . . . We have nothing with which to repel killing and thuggery against us except the weapon of martyrdom. It is easy and costs us only our lives. . . human bombs cannot be defeated, not even by nuclear bombs." The prevalence of suicide terrorism during the last two decades testifies to its gruesome effectiveness [see table on opposite page]. It has formed a vital part of several terror campaigns, including Hezbollah's successful operation against the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in the mid-1980s, the 1994-96 Hamas bus bombings aimed at stopping the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and the 1995-99 Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) struggle against Turkey. The formation of special suicide units within the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) army in Sri Lanka has added an atrocious dimension to the civil war on that devastated island. In addition to killing hundreds of civilians, soldiers, and high-ranking officers since 1987, LTTE suicide terrorists have assassinated two heads of state: Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi of India in 1991 and President Ranasinghe Premadasa of Sri Lanka in 1993. Sri Lanka's current president, Chandrika Kumaratunga, recently lost sight in one eye following an assassination attempt that killed at least 24 people. The simultaneous 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, which took the lives of nearly 300 civilians, were a brutal reprise of the 1983 tragedies in Lebanon. Almost 20 years after its stunning modern debut, suicide terrorism continues to carry the image of the "ultimate" terror weapon. But is this tactic as unstoppable as it seems? The experiences of the last two decades have yielded important insights into the true nature of suicide bombers-insights that demystify their motivations and strategies, expose their vulnerabilities, and suggest ways to defeat what a senior State Department official once called a "frightening" problem to which there are "no answers." Average, Everyday Martyrs A long view of history reveals that suicide terrorism existed many years before "truck bombs" became part of the global vernacular. As early as the 11th century, the Assassins, Muslim fighters living in northern Persia, adopted suicide terrorism as a strategy to advance the cause of Islam. In the 18th century the Muslim communities of the Malabar Coast in India, Atjeh in Sumatra, and Mindanao and Sulu in the southern Philippines resorted to suicide attacks when faced with European colonial repression. These perpetrators never perceived their deaths as suicide. Rather, they saw them as acts of martyrdom in the name of the community and for the glory of God. Moreover, suicide terrorism, both ancient and modern, is not merely the product of religious fervor, Islamic or otherwise. Martha Crenshaw, a leading terrorism scholar at Wesleyan University, argues that the mind-set of a suicide bomber is no different from those of Tibetan self-immolators, Irish political prisoners ready to die in a hunger strike, or dedicated terrorists worldwide who wish to live after an operation but know their chances of survival are negligible. Seen in this light, suicide terrorism loses its demonic uniqueness. It is merely one type of martyrdom venerated by certain cultures or religious traditions but rejected by others who favor different modes of supreme sacrifice. Acts of martyrdom vary not only by culture, but also by specific circumstances. Tel Aviv University psychologist Ariel Merari has conducted the most comprehensive study of individuals who commit acts of suicide terrorism. After profiling more than 50 Muslim suicide bombers serving in Hezbollah, Amal, and secular pro-Syrian organizations in Lebanon, as well as Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Israel, he concluded that there is no single psychological or demographic profile of suicide terrorists. His findings suggest that intense struggles produce several types of people with the potential willingness to sacrifice themselves for a cause [see sidebar on page 70]. Furthermore, Merari maintains that no organization can create a person's basic readiness to die. The task of recruiters is not to produce but rather to identify this predisposition in candidates and reinforce it. Recruiters will often exploit religious beliefs when indoctrinating would-be bombers, using their subjects' faith in a reward in paradise to strengthen and solidify preexisting sacrificial motives. But other powerful motives reinforce tendencies toward martyrdom, including patriotism, hatred of the enemy, and a profound sense of victimization. Since suicide terrorism is an organizational phenomenon, the struggle against it cannot be conducted on an individual level. Although profiling suicide bombers may be a fascinating academic challenge, it is less relevant in the real-world struggle against them than understanding the modus operandi and mind-set of terrorist leaders who would never consider killing themselves, but opt for suicide terrorism as a result of cold reasoning. The Care and Feeding of a Suicide Bomber A suicide terrorist is almost always the last link in a long organizational chain that involves numerous actors. Once the decision to launch a suicide attack has been made, its implementation requires at least six separate operations: target selection, intelligence gathering, recruitment, physical and "spiritual" training, preparation of explosives, and transportation of the suicide bombers to the target area. Such a mission often involves dozens of terrorists and accomplices who have no intention of committing suicide, but without whom no suicide operation could take place. A careful survey of all the organizations that have resorted to suicide terrorism since 1983 suggests that the most meaningful distinction among them involves the degree to which suicide bombing is institutionalized. At the simplest level are groups that neither practice suicide terrorism on a regular basis nor approve of its use as a tactic. Local members or affiliates of such organizations, however, may initiate it on their own for a variety of reasons, such as imitating the glorious acts of others, responding to a perception of enormous humiliation and distress, avenging the murder of comrades and relatives, or being presented with a special opportunity to strike. Within such a context, it is important to take into account what might be called "pre-suicide terrorism." Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad suicide operations in Israel during the 1990s were preceded by a wave of knifings in the late 1980s. These attackers never planned an escape route and were often killed on the spot. The knifings did not involve any known organization and were mostly spontaneous. But they expressed a collective mood among young Palestinians of jihad (holy war) against Israel that helped create an atmosphere for the institutionalized suicide terrorism of the next decade. Many terrorist groups are skeptical of suicide terrorism's strategic value but resort to this tactic in exceptional circumstances. Within this category are the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania (allegedly executed by Osama bin Laden's Qaida organization) and similar irregular attacks conducted over the years by the Egyptian Islamic Group, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the Kuwaiti Dawa, and the Algerian Armed Islamic Group, among others. Such suicide bombings, though carefully planned, are irregular and unsystematic. At another level are groups that formally adopt suicide terrorism as a temporary strategy. The leaders of these movements obtain (or grant) ideological or theological legitimization for its use, recruit and train volunteers, and then send them into action with a specific objective in mind. The most spectacular operations of Hezbollah between 1983 and 1985, of Hamas between 1994 and 1996, and of the PKK between 1995 and 1999 fall within this category. More recently, Chechen rebels suddenly launched a campaign of suicide bombings following nine months of inconclusive fighting against the Russian military; one of the first bombers, a cousin of noted rebel leader Arbi Barayev, had reportedly declared: "I am going willingly to my death in the name of Allah and the freedom of the Chechen people." In such cases, the institutionalization of suicide terrorism has been temporary and conditional. Leaders who opt for this type of terrorism are usually moved by an intense sense of crisis, a conviction in the effectiveness of this new tactic, endorsement by the religious or ideological establishment, and the enthusiastic support of their community. At the same time, they are fully aware of the changeable nature of these conditions and of the potential costs associated with suicide terrorism (such as devastating military retaliation). They consequently have little difficulty in suspending suicide bombing or calling it off entirely. A case in point is Hezbollah's decision to begin suicide bombings in 1983. It is known today that several leaders of the organization were extremely uneasy about the practice. Insisting that Islam does not approve of believers taking their own lives, clerics such as Sheikh Fadlallah raised legal objections and were unwilling to allow the use of this new tactic. However, suicide terrorism became so effective in driving foreigners out of Lebanon that there was no motivation to stop it. The result was theological hair splitting that characterized suicide bombers as exceptional soldiers who risked their lives in a holy war. But following the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in 1985 and the decreasing effectiveness of this tactic, Hezbollah's clerics ordered the end of systematic suicide bombing. The organization's fighters were instructed to protect their lives and continue the struggle against the Zionists through conventional guerrilla methods. Only rarely, and on an irregular basis, has Hezbollah allowed suicide bombing since. It is not exactly clear when the commanders of Hamas decided to turn their anti-Israel suicide attacks into a strategic struggle against the peace process. Their campaign, started haphazardly in 1992 against Israeli military and settler targets in the occupied territories, failed to produce glaring results. The 1994 Hebron Massacre, when Israeli doctor Baruch Goldstein murdered 29 praying Palestinians, changed everything. Determined to avenge the deaths of their countrymen, Hamas operators resorted to suicide bus bombings inside Israeli cities. In a matter of weeks, the new wave of terrorism had eroded Israel's collective confidence in the peace process and had played right into the hands of extremist Hamas clerics who opposed negotiations with Israel. Yet, in 1995 these attacks suddenly came to a complete halt. Several factors convinced Hamas leaders to back off: the growing Palestinian resentment against the costs of the bus bombings (expressed in massive Israeli economic sanctions), the increasing cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian security services, and the effectiveness of Israeli counterterrorism. Ironically, Israel unintentionally pushed the organization to resume the bus bombings when, in 1996, then Prime Minister Shimon Peres ordered the assassination of Yehiya Ayash (known as "the Engineer") -a Hamas operative who masterminded many of the previous suicide bombings. Humiliated and angered, Hamas temporarily resumed bus bombings in Israel. A series of three successful attacks by Hamas and one by the Palestinian Islamic Jihad changed Israel's political mood about the peace process and led to the 1996 electoral defeat of Peres and his pro-peace government. In the cases of Hezbollah and Hamas, no permanent suicide units were formed, and bombers were recruited and trained on an ad hoc, conditional basis. But, in rare instances, some organizations adopt suicide terrorism as a legitimate and permanent strategy, harkening back to the Japanese kamikaze pilots of the Second World War. Currently, the Sri Lankan Tamil Tigers are the only example of this phenomenon. The "Black Tigers" launched their first attack in July 1987, and since then suicide bombings have become an enduring feature of the LTTE's ruthless struggle. During the last 13 years, 171 attacks have killed hundreds of civilians and soldiers and wounded thousands more. The assassinations of two heads of state, political leaders, and high-ranking military officers have made it clear that no politician or public figure is immune to these attacks. The Black Tigers constitute the most significant proof that suicide terrorism is not merely a religious phenomenon and that under certain extreme political and psychological circumstances secular volunteers are fully capable of martyrdom. The Tamil suicide bombers are not the product of a religious cult, but rather a cult of personality: Velupillai Prabhakaran, the brutal and charismatic LTTE leader who initiated the practice, appears to have been greatly influenced by the spectacular successes of Hezbollah in Lebanon. Fiercely determined to fight the repressive Sinhalese government until the Tamils achieve independence, Prabhakaran created the suicide units largely by the strength of his personality and his unlimited control of the organization. The formation of the Black Tigers was greatly facilitated by an early practice of the organization's members: Since the early 1980s, all LTTE fighters-male and female alike-have been required to carry potassium cyanide capsules. A standard LTTE order makes it unequivocally clear that soldiers are to consume the capsule's contents if capture is imminent. The LTTE suicide units are essentially an extension of the organization's general culture of supreme martyrdom; the passage from ordinary combat soldier to suicide bomber is a short and tragic journey. Making Suicide Terrorists Pay The perceived strength of suicide bombers is that they are lone, irrational fanatics who cannot be deterred. The actual weakness of suicide bombers is that they are nothing more than the instruments of terrorist leaders who expect their organizations to gain tangible benefits from this shocking tactic. The key to countering suicide bombers, therefore, is to make terrorist organizations aware that this decision will incur painful costs. While no simple formula for countering suicide terrorism exists, the experiences of the last two decades suggest two complementary political and operational strategies. Organizations only implement suicide terrorism systematically if their community (and, in some cases, a foreign client state) approves of its use. Thus, political and economic sanctions against the terrorists' community, combined with effective coercive diplomacy against their foreign patrons, may help reduce or end suicide terrorism. The problem with political counterterrorism, however, is that it takes a long time to implement and the results are never certain. The Taliban in Afghanistan, for instance, continue to host Osama bin Laden (who was indicted by the United States in November 1998 for the bombings of the two U.S. embassies in East Africa) despite international sanctions, a unanimously adopted United Nations Security Council Resolution demanding that he stand trial, and a threat from the United States that the Taliban will be held responsible for any terrorist acts undertaken while Bin Laden is under their protection. The leaders of organizations that resort to suicide terrorism are evidently ready to take great risks. Consequently, the political battle against suicide bombers must always be enhanced by an aggressive operational campaign. Governments do not have to invent entirely new tactics when waging a war against suicide terrorists. Instead, they must adapt and intensify existing counterterrorism strategies to exploit the vulnerabilities of suicide bombers. The Achilles' heel of suicide terrorists is that they are part of a large, operational infrastructure. It may not be possible to profile and apprehend would-be suicide bombers, but once it has been established that an organization has resolved to use suicide terrorism, security services can strike against the commanders and field officers who recruit and train the assailants and then plan the attacks. This counterterrorism effort calls for the formation of effective networks of informers, the constant monitoring of potential collaborators, and close cooperation among international intelligence services. Counterterrorist operatives must apply consistent pressure on the terrorist infrastructure through harassment and attacks. They must also seek ways to cut off the terrorists' sources of funding by depriving organizations of their financial resources (such as international bank accounts or "front" businesses). Regardless of the presence or absence of hard evidence for planned operations, it is essential to put potential terrorists on the run. The physical protection of potential target areas is another essential tactic. The idea of erecting concrete barriers against a martyr driving a truck loaded with tons of explosives might strike some as ludicrously inadequate. But such physical protection serves two essential objectives: It reduces the effect of the suicide bombing if and when the terrorist hits the target area, and it serves as a deterrent against potential suicide strikes. For the terrorist field officers, who may never know when they will be caught or killed, each suicide squad is precious. When faced with highly protected areas, they are unlikely to send squads into action. Roadblocks, guards at special checkpoints, inspection teams in public places, and the use of dogs and artificial sniffing devices may drive suicide terrorism down significantly. Such security measures also reassure the public. Governments must never forget that terrorism constitutes a form of psychological warfare, and that suicide terrorism is the ultimate expression of this struggle. Terrorism must always be fought psychologically-a battle that often takes place in the minds of ordinary people. Even if governments do not have an immediate operational solution to suicide terrorism, they must convince their citizens that they are not sitting ducks and that the authorities are doing everything they can to protect them. Ordinary people should, in fact, be informed that psychological warfare is being waged against them. Free people who are told that they are being subjected to psychological manipulation are likely to develop strong terrorism antibodies. In fighting suicide bombers, it is important not to succumb to the idea that they are ready to do anything and lose everything. This is the same sort of simplistic reasoning that has fueled the widespread hysteria over terrorists acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The perception that terrorists are undeterrable fanatics who are willing to kill millions indiscriminately just to sow fear and chaos belies the reality that they are cold, rational killers who employ violence to achieve specific political objectives. Whereas the threat of WMD terrorism is little more than overheated rhetoric, suicide bombing remains a devastating form of terrorism whose complete demise is unlikely in the 21st century. The ongoing political instability in the Middle East, Russia, and South Asia-including Iran, Afghanistan, Chechnya, and possibly India and Pakistan-suggests that these regions will continue to be high-risk areas, with irregular suicide bombings occasionally extending to other parts of the globe. But the present understanding of the high costs of suicide terrorism and the growing cooperation among intelligence services worldwide gives credence to the hope that in the future only desperate organizations of losers will try to use this tactic on a systematic basis. Ehud Sprinzak is dean of the Lauder School of Government, Policy, and Diplomacy at the Interdisciplinary Center in Herzliya, Israel. <http://xent.com/mailman/listinfo/fork> ************************************************************************** Subscribe to Freematt's Alerts: Pro-Individual Rights Issues Send a blank message to: freematt(a)coil.com with the words subscribe FA on the subject line. List is private and moderated (7-30 messages per week) Matthew Gaylor, (614) 313-5722 ICQ: 106212065 Archived at http://groups.yahoo.com/group/fa/ **************************************************************************

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suicide terrorism
by Ciamac Moallemi 14 Sep '01

14 Sep '01

I'm not sure about his prescriptive suggestions, but the following article provides a good historical and psychological summary of suicide terrorism. The Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka provide an interesting example--suicide bombers not driven by religious fanaticism but rather from the observation that suicide attacks are effective. <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/issue_SeptOct_2001/sprinzak.html> Rational Fanatics (This article was originally published in the September/October 2000 issue of Foreign Policy. ) What makes suicide bombers tick? While most of the world sees them as lone zealots, they are, in fact, pawns of large terrorist networks that wage calculated psychological warfare. Contrary to popular belief, suicide bombers can be stopped-but only if governments pay more attention to their methods and motivations. By Ehud Sprinzak October 23, 1983, was one of the most horrific days in the history of modern terrorism. Two massive explosions destroyed the barracks of the U.S. and French contingents of the multinational peacekeeping force in Beirut, Lebanon, killing 241 American servicemen and 58 French paratroopers. Both explosions were carried out by Muslim extremists who drove to the heart of the target area and detonated bombs with no intention of escaping. Subsequent suicide attacks against Israeli and U.S. targets in Lebanon and Kuwait made it clear that a new type of killing had entered the repertoire of modern terrorism: a suicide operation in which the success of the attack depends on the death of the perpetrator. This tactic stunned security experts. Two centuries of experience suggested that terrorists, though ready to risk their lives, wished to live after the terrorist act in order to benefit from its accomplishments. But this new terrorism defied that belief. It seemed qualitatively different, appearing almost supernatural, extremely lethal, and impossible to stop. Within six months, French and U.S. Presidents François Mitterrand and Ronald Reagan pulled their troops out of Lebanon-a tacit admission that the new terrorism rendered all known counterterrorist measures useless. Government officials erected concrete barriers around the White House and sealed the Pentagon's underground bus tunnels. Nobody was reassured. As Time magazine skeptically observed in 1983: "No security expert thinks such defensive measures will stop a determined Islamic terrorist who expects to join Allah by killing some Americans." Whereas the press lost no time in labeling these bombers irrational zealots, terrorism specialists offered a more nuanced appraisal, arguing that suicide terrorism has inherent tactical advantages over "conventional" terrorism: It is a simple and low-cost operation (requiring no escape routes or complicated rescue operations); it guarantees mass casualties and extensive damage (since the suicide bomber can choose the exact time, location, and circumstances of the attack); there is no fear that interrogated terrorists will surrender important information (because their deaths are certain); and it has an immense impact on the public and the media (due to the overwhelming sense of helplessness). Dr. Ramadan Shalah, secretary- general of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, summarized the chilling logic of the new terror tactic: "Our enemy possesses the most sophisticated weapons in the world and its army is trained to a very high standard. . . . We have nothing with which to repel killing and thuggery against us except the weapon of martyrdom. It is easy and costs us only our lives. . . human bombs cannot be defeated, not even by nuclear bombs." The prevalence of suicide terrorism during the last two decades testifies to its gruesome effectiveness [see table on opposite page]. It has formed a vital part of several terror campaigns, including Hezbollah's successful operation against the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in the mid-1980s, the 1994-96 Hamas bus bombings aimed at stopping the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and the 1995-99 Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) struggle against Turkey. The formation of special suicide units within the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) army in Sri Lanka has added an atrocious dimension to the civil war on that devastated island. In addition to killing hundreds of civilians, soldiers, and high-ranking officers since 1987, LTTE suicide terrorists have assassinated two heads of state: Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi of India in 1991 and President Ranasinghe Premadasa of Sri Lanka in 1993. Sri Lanka's current president, Chandrika Kumaratunga, recently lost sight in one eye following an assassination attempt that killed at least 24 people. The simultaneous 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, which took the lives of nearly 300 civilians, were a brutal reprise of the 1983 tragedies in Lebanon. Almost 20 years after its stunning modern debut, suicide terrorism continues to carry the image of the "ultimate" terror weapon. But is this tactic as unstoppable as it seems? The experiences of the last two decades have yielded important insights into the true nature of suicide bombers-insights that demystify their motivations and strategies, expose their vulnerabilities, and suggest ways to defeat what a senior State Department official once called a "frightening" problem to which there are "no answers." Average, Everyday Martyrs A long view of history reveals that suicide terrorism existed many years before "truck bombs" became part of the global vernacular. As early as the 11th century, the Assassins, Muslim fighters living in northern Persia, adopted suicide terrorism as a strategy to advance the cause of Islam. In the 18th century the Muslim communities of the Malabar Coast in India, Atjeh in Sumatra, and Mindanao and Sulu in the southern Philippines resorted to suicide attacks when faced with European colonial repression. These perpetrators never perceived their deaths as suicide. Rather, they saw them as acts of martyrdom in the name of the community and for the glory of God. Moreover, suicide terrorism, both ancient and modern, is not merely the product of religious fervor, Islamic or otherwise. Martha Crenshaw, a leading terrorism scholar at Wesleyan University, argues that the mind-set of a suicide bomber is no different from those of Tibetan self-immolators, Irish political prisoners ready to die in a hunger strike, or dedicated terrorists worldwide who wish to live after an operation but know their chances of survival are negligible. Seen in this light, suicide terrorism loses its demonic uniqueness. It is merely one type of martyrdom venerated by certain cultures or religious traditions but rejected by others who favor different modes of supreme sacrifice. Acts of martyrdom vary not only by culture, but also by specific circumstances. Tel Aviv University psychologist Ariel Merari has conducted the most comprehensive study of individuals who commit acts of suicide terrorism. After profiling more than 50 Muslim suicide bombers serving in Hezbollah, Amal, and secular pro-Syrian organizations in Lebanon, as well as Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Israel, he concluded that there is no single psychological or demographic profile of suicide terrorists. His findings suggest that intense struggles produce several types of people with the potential willingness to sacrifice themselves for a cause [see sidebar on page 70]. Furthermore, Merari maintains that no organization can create a person's basic readiness to die. The task of recruiters is not to produce but rather to identify this predisposition in candidates and reinforce it. Recruiters will often exploit religious beliefs when indoctrinating would-be bombers, using their subjects' faith in a reward in paradise to strengthen and solidify preexisting sacrificial motives. But other powerful motives reinforce tendencies toward martyrdom, including patriotism, hatred of the enemy, and a profound sense of victimization. Since suicide terrorism is an organizational phenomenon, the struggle against it cannot be conducted on an individual level. Although profiling suicide bombers may be a fascinating academic challenge, it is less relevant in the real-world struggle against them than understanding the modus operandi and mind-set of terrorist leaders who would never consider killing themselves, but opt for suicide terrorism as a result of cold reasoning. The Care and Feeding of a Suicide Bomber A suicide terrorist is almost always the last link in a long organizational chain that involves numerous actors. Once the decision to launch a suicide attack has been made, its implementation requires at least six separate operations: target selection, intelligence gathering, recruitment, physical and "spiritual" training, preparation of explosives, and transportation of the suicide bombers to the target area. Such a mission often involves dozens of terrorists and accomplices who have no intention of committing suicide, but without whom no suicide operation could take place. A careful survey of all the organizations that have resorted to suicide terrorism since 1983 suggests that the most meaningful distinction among them involves the degree to which suicide bombing is institutionalized. At the simplest level are groups that neither practice suicide terrorism on a regular basis nor approve of its use as a tactic. Local members or affiliates of such organizations, however, may initiate it on their own for a variety of reasons, such as imitating the glorious acts of others, responding to a perception of enormous humiliation and distress, avenging the murder of comrades and relatives, or being presented with a special opportunity to strike. Within such a context, it is important to take into account what might be called "pre-suicide terrorism." Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad suicide operations in Israel during the 1990s were preceded by a wave of knifings in the late 1980s. These attackers never planned an escape route and were often killed on the spot. The knifings did not involve any known organization and were mostly spontaneous. But they expressed a collective mood among young Palestinians of jihad (holy war) against Israel that helped create an atmosphere for the institutionalized suicide terrorism of the next decade. Many terrorist groups are skeptical of suicide terrorism's strategic value but resort to this tactic in exceptional circumstances. Within this category are the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania (allegedly executed by Osama bin Laden's Qaida organization) and similar irregular attacks conducted over the years by the Egyptian Islamic Group, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the Kuwaiti Dawa, and the Algerian Armed Islamic Group, among others. Such suicide bombings, though carefully planned, are irregular and unsystematic. At another level are groups that formally adopt suicide terrorism as a temporary strategy. The leaders of these movements obtain (or grant) ideological or theological legitimization for its use, recruit and train volunteers, and then send them into action with a specific objective in mind. The most spectacular operations of Hezbollah between 1983 and 1985, of Hamas between 1994 and 1996, and of the PKK between 1995 and 1999 fall within this category. More recently, Chechen rebels suddenly launched a campaign of suicide bombings following nine months of inconclusive fighting against the Russian military; one of the first bombers, a cousin of noted rebel leader Arbi Barayev, had reportedly declared: "I am going willingly to my death in the name of Allah and the freedom of the Chechen people." In such cases, the institutionalization of suicide terrorism has been temporary and conditional. Leaders who opt for this type of terrorism are usually moved by an intense sense of crisis, a conviction in the effectiveness of this new tactic, endorsement by the religious or ideological establishment, and the enthusiastic support of their community. At the same time, they are fully aware of the changeable nature of these conditions and of the potential costs associated with suicide terrorism (such as devastating military retaliation). They consequently have little difficulty in suspending suicide bombing or calling it off entirely. A case in point is Hezbollah's decision to begin suicide bombings in 1983. It is known today that several leaders of the organization were extremely uneasy about the practice. Insisting that Islam does not approve of believers taking their own lives, clerics such as Sheikh Fadlallah raised legal objections and were unwilling to allow the use of this new tactic. However, suicide terrorism became so effective in driving foreigners out of Lebanon that there was no motivation to stop it. The result was theological hair splitting that characterized suicide bombers as exceptional soldiers who risked their lives in a holy war. But following the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in 1985 and the decreasing effectiveness of this tactic, Hezbollah's clerics ordered the end of systematic suicide bombing. The organization's fighters were instructed to protect their lives and continue the struggle against the Zionists through conventional guerrilla methods. Only rarely, and on an irregular basis, has Hezbollah allowed suicide bombing since. It is not exactly clear when the commanders of Hamas decided to turn their anti-Israel suicide attacks into a strategic struggle against the peace process. Their campaign, started haphazardly in 1992 against Israeli military and settler targets in the occupied territories, failed to produce glaring results. The 1994 Hebron Massacre, when Israeli doctor Baruch Goldstein murdered 29 praying Palestinians, changed everything. Determined to avenge the deaths of their countrymen, Hamas operators resorted to suicide bus bombings inside Israeli cities. In a matter of weeks, the new wave of terrorism had eroded Israel's collective confidence in the peace process and had played right into the hands of extremist Hamas clerics who opposed negotiations with Israel. Yet, in 1995 these attacks suddenly came to a complete halt. Several factors convinced Hamas leaders to back off: the growing Palestinian resentment against the costs of the bus bombings (expressed in massive Israeli economic sanctions), the increasing cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian security services, and the effectiveness of Israeli counterterrorism. Ironically, Israel unintentionally pushed the organization to resume the bus bombings when, in 1996, then Prime Minister Shimon Peres ordered the assassination of Yehiya Ayash (known as "the Engineer") -a Hamas operative who masterminded many of the previous suicide bombings. Humiliated and angered, Hamas temporarily resumed bus bombings in Israel. A series of three successful attacks by Hamas and one by the Palestinian Islamic Jihad changed Israel's political mood about the peace process and led to the 1996 electoral defeat of Peres and his pro-peace government. In the cases of Hezbollah and Hamas, no permanent suicide units were formed, and bombers were recruited and trained on an ad hoc, conditional basis. But, in rare instances, some organizations adopt suicide terrorism as a legitimate and permanent strategy, harkening back to the Japanese kamikaze pilots of the Second World War. Currently, the Sri Lankan Tamil Tigers are the only example of this phenomenon. The "Black Tigers" launched their first attack in July 1987, and since then suicide bombings have become an enduring feature of the LTTE's ruthless struggle. During the last 13 years, 171 attacks have killed hundreds of civilians and soldiers and wounded thousands more. The assassinations of two heads of state, political leaders, and high-ranking military officers have made it clear that no politician or public figure is immune to these attacks. The Black Tigers constitute the most significant proof that suicide terrorism is not merely a religious phenomenon and that under certain extreme political and psychological circumstances secular volunteers are fully capable of martyrdom. The Tamil suicide bombers are not the product of a religious cult, but rather a cult of personality: Velupillai Prabhakaran, the brutal and charismatic LTTE leader who initiated the practice, appears to have been greatly influenced by the spectacular successes of Hezbollah in Lebanon. Fiercely determined to fight the repressive Sinhalese government until the Tamils achieve independence, Prabhakaran created the suicide units largely by the strength of his personality and his unlimited control of the organization. The formation of the Black Tigers was greatly facilitated by an early practice of the organization's members: Since the early 1980s, all LTTE fighters-male and female alike-have been required to carry potassium cyanide capsules. A standard LTTE order makes it unequivocally clear that soldiers are to consume the capsule's contents if capture is imminent. The LTTE suicide units are essentially an extension of the organization's general culture of supreme martyrdom; the passage from ordinary combat soldier to suicide bomber is a short and tragic journey. Making Suicide Terrorists Pay The perceived strength of suicide bombers is that they are lone, irrational fanatics who cannot be deterred. The actual weakness of suicide bombers is that they are nothing more than the instruments of terrorist leaders who expect their organizations to gain tangible benefits from this shocking tactic. The key to countering suicide bombers, therefore, is to make terrorist organizations aware that this decision will incur painful costs. While no simple formula for countering suicide terrorism exists, the experiences of the last two decades suggest two complementary political and operational strategies. Organizations only implement suicide terrorism systematically if their community (and, in some cases, a foreign client state) approves of its use. Thus, political and economic sanctions against the terrorists' community, combined with effective coercive diplomacy against their foreign patrons, may help reduce or end suicide terrorism. The problem with political counterterrorism, however, is that it takes a long time to implement and the results are never certain. The Taliban in Afghanistan, for instance, continue to host Osama bin Laden (who was indicted by the United States in November 1998 for the bombings of the two U.S. embassies in East Africa) despite international sanctions, a unanimously adopted United Nations Security Council Resolution demanding that he stand trial, and a threat from the United States that the Taliban will be held responsible for any terrorist acts undertaken while Bin Laden is under their protection. The leaders of organizations that resort to suicide terrorism are evidently ready to take great risks. Consequently, the political battle against suicide bombers must always be enhanced by an aggressive operational campaign. Governments do not have to invent entirely new tactics when waging a war against suicide terrorists. Instead, they must adapt and intensify existing counterterrorism strategies to exploit the vulnerabilities of suicide bombers. The Achilles' heel of suicide terrorists is that they are part of a large, operational infrastructure. It may not be possible to profile and apprehend would-be suicide bombers, but once it has been established that an organization has resolved to use suicide terrorism, security services can strike against the commanders and field officers who recruit and train the assailants and then plan the attacks. This counterterrorism effort calls for the formation of effective networks of informers, the constant monitoring of potential collaborators, and close cooperation among international intelligence services. Counterterrorist operatives must apply consistent pressure on the terrorist infrastructure through harassment and attacks. They must also seek ways to cut off the terrorists' sources of funding by depriving organizations of their financial resources (such as international bank accounts or "front" businesses). Regardless of the presence or absence of hard evidence for planned operations, it is essential to put potential terrorists on the run. The physical protection of potential target areas is another essential tactic. The idea of erecting concrete barriers against a martyr driving a truck loaded with tons of explosives might strike some as ludicrously inadequate. But such physical protection serves two essential objectives: It reduces the effect of the suicide bombing if and when the terrorist hits the target area, and it serves as a deterrent against potential suicide strikes. For the terrorist field officers, who may never know when they will be caught or killed, each suicide squad is precious. When faced with highly protected areas, they are unlikely to send squads into action. Roadblocks, guards at special checkpoints, inspection teams in public places, and the use of dogs and artificial sniffing devices may drive suicide terrorism down significantly. Such security measures also reassure the public. Governments must never forget that terrorism constitutes a form of psychological warfare, and that suicide terrorism is the ultimate expression of this struggle. Terrorism must always be fought psychologically-a battle that often takes place in the minds of ordinary people. Even if governments do not have an immediate operational solution to suicide terrorism, they must convince their citizens that they are not sitting ducks and that the authorities are doing everything they can to protect them. Ordinary people should, in fact, be informed that psychological warfare is being waged against them. Free people who are told that they are being subjected to psychological manipulation are likely to develop strong terrorism antibodies. In fighting suicide bombers, it is important not to succumb to the idea that they are ready to do anything and lose everything. This is the same sort of simplistic reasoning that has fueled the widespread hysteria over terrorists acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The perception that terrorists are undeterrable fanatics who are willing to kill millions indiscriminately just to sow fear and chaos belies the reality that they are cold, rational killers who employ violence to achieve specific political objectives. Whereas the threat of WMD terrorism is little more than overheated rhetoric, suicide bombing remains a devastating form of terrorism whose complete demise is unlikely in the 21st century. The ongoing political instability in the Middle East, Russia, and South Asia-including Iran, Afghanistan, Chechnya, and possibly India and Pakistan-suggests that these regions will continue to be high-risk areas, with irregular suicide bombings occasionally extending to other parts of the globe. But the present understanding of the high costs of suicide terrorism and the growing cooperation among intelligence services worldwide gives credence to the hope that in the future only desperate organizations of losers will try to use this tactic on a systematic basis. Ehud Sprinzak is dean of the Lauder School of Government, Policy, and Diplomacy at the Interdisciplinary Center in Herzliya, Israel. <http://xent.com/mailman/listinfo/fork> ************************************************************************** Subscribe to Freematt's Alerts: Pro-Individual Rights Issues Send a blank message to: freematt(a)coil.com with the words subscribe FA on the subject line. List is private and moderated (7-30 messages per week) Matthew Gaylor, (614) 313-5722 ICQ: 106212065 Archived at http://groups.yahoo.com/group/fa/ **************************************************************************

1 0

suicide terrorism
by Ciamac Moallemi 14 Sep '01

14 Sep '01

I'm not sure about his prescriptive suggestions, but the following article provides a good historical and psychological summary of suicide terrorism. The Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka provide an interesting example--suicide bombers not driven by religious fanaticism but rather from the observation that suicide attacks are effective. <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/issue_SeptOct_2001/sprinzak.html> Rational Fanatics (This article was originally published in the September/October 2000 issue of Foreign Policy. ) What makes suicide bombers tick? While most of the world sees them as lone zealots, they are, in fact, pawns of large terrorist networks that wage calculated psychological warfare. Contrary to popular belief, suicide bombers can be stopped-but only if governments pay more attention to their methods and motivations. By Ehud Sprinzak October 23, 1983, was one of the most horrific days in the history of modern terrorism. Two massive explosions destroyed the barracks of the U.S. and French contingents of the multinational peacekeeping force in Beirut, Lebanon, killing 241 American servicemen and 58 French paratroopers. Both explosions were carried out by Muslim extremists who drove to the heart of the target area and detonated bombs with no intention of escaping. Subsequent suicide attacks against Israeli and U.S. targets in Lebanon and Kuwait made it clear that a new type of killing had entered the repertoire of modern terrorism: a suicide operation in which the success of the attack depends on the death of the perpetrator. This tactic stunned security experts. Two centuries of experience suggested that terrorists, though ready to risk their lives, wished to live after the terrorist act in order to benefit from its accomplishments. But this new terrorism defied that belief. It seemed qualitatively different, appearing almost supernatural, extremely lethal, and impossible to stop. Within six months, French and U.S. Presidents François Mitterrand and Ronald Reagan pulled their troops out of Lebanon-a tacit admission that the new terrorism rendered all known counterterrorist measures useless. Government officials erected concrete barriers around the White House and sealed the Pentagon's underground bus tunnels. Nobody was reassured. As Time magazine skeptically observed in 1983: "No security expert thinks such defensive measures will stop a determined Islamic terrorist who expects to join Allah by killing some Americans." Whereas the press lost no time in labeling these bombers irrational zealots, terrorism specialists offered a more nuanced appraisal, arguing that suicide terrorism has inherent tactical advantages over "conventional" terrorism: It is a simple and low-cost operation (requiring no escape routes or complicated rescue operations); it guarantees mass casualties and extensive damage (since the suicide bomber can choose the exact time, location, and circumstances of the attack); there is no fear that interrogated terrorists will surrender important information (because their deaths are certain); and it has an immense impact on the public and the media (due to the overwhelming sense of helplessness). Dr. Ramadan Shalah, secretary- general of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, summarized the chilling logic of the new terror tactic: "Our enemy possesses the most sophisticated weapons in the world and its army is trained to a very high standard. . . . We have nothing with which to repel killing and thuggery against us except the weapon of martyrdom. It is easy and costs us only our lives. . . human bombs cannot be defeated, not even by nuclear bombs." The prevalence of suicide terrorism during the last two decades testifies to its gruesome effectiveness [see table on opposite page]. It has formed a vital part of several terror campaigns, including Hezbollah's successful operation against the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in the mid-1980s, the 1994-96 Hamas bus bombings aimed at stopping the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and the 1995-99 Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) struggle against Turkey. The formation of special suicide units within the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) army in Sri Lanka has added an atrocious dimension to the civil war on that devastated island. In addition to killing hundreds of civilians, soldiers, and high-ranking officers since 1987, LTTE suicide terrorists have assassinated two heads of state: Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi of India in 1991 and President Ranasinghe Premadasa of Sri Lanka in 1993. Sri Lanka's current president, Chandrika Kumaratunga, recently lost sight in one eye following an assassination attempt that killed at least 24 people. The simultaneous 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, which took the lives of nearly 300 civilians, were a brutal reprise of the 1983 tragedies in Lebanon. Almost 20 years after its stunning modern debut, suicide terrorism continues to carry the image of the "ultimate" terror weapon. But is this tactic as unstoppable as it seems? The experiences of the last two decades have yielded important insights into the true nature of suicide bombers-insights that demystify their motivations and strategies, expose their vulnerabilities, and suggest ways to defeat what a senior State Department official once called a "frightening" problem to which there are "no answers." Average, Everyday Martyrs A long view of history reveals that suicide terrorism existed many years before "truck bombs" became part of the global vernacular. As early as the 11th century, the Assassins, Muslim fighters living in northern Persia, adopted suicide terrorism as a strategy to advance the cause of Islam. In the 18th century the Muslim communities of the Malabar Coast in India, Atjeh in Sumatra, and Mindanao and Sulu in the southern Philippines resorted to suicide attacks when faced with European colonial repression. These perpetrators never perceived their deaths as suicide. Rather, they saw them as acts of martyrdom in the name of the community and for the glory of God. Moreover, suicide terrorism, both ancient and modern, is not merely the product of religious fervor, Islamic or otherwise. Martha Crenshaw, a leading terrorism scholar at Wesleyan University, argues that the mind-set of a suicide bomber is no different from those of Tibetan self-immolators, Irish political prisoners ready to die in a hunger strike, or dedicated terrorists worldwide who wish to live after an operation but know their chances of survival are negligible. Seen in this light, suicide terrorism loses its demonic uniqueness. It is merely one type of martyrdom venerated by certain cultures or religious traditions but rejected by others who favor different modes of supreme sacrifice. Acts of martyrdom vary not only by culture, but also by specific circumstances. Tel Aviv University psychologist Ariel Merari has conducted the most comprehensive study of individuals who commit acts of suicide terrorism. After profiling more than 50 Muslim suicide bombers serving in Hezbollah, Amal, and secular pro-Syrian organizations in Lebanon, as well as Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Israel, he concluded that there is no single psychological or demographic profile of suicide terrorists. His findings suggest that intense struggles produce several types of people with the potential willingness to sacrifice themselves for a cause [see sidebar on page 70]. Furthermore, Merari maintains that no organization can create a person's basic readiness to die. The task of recruiters is not to produce but rather to identify this predisposition in candidates and reinforce it. Recruiters will often exploit religious beliefs when indoctrinating would-be bombers, using their subjects' faith in a reward in paradise to strengthen and solidify preexisting sacrificial motives. But other powerful motives reinforce tendencies toward martyrdom, including patriotism, hatred of the enemy, and a profound sense of victimization. Since suicide terrorism is an organizational phenomenon, the struggle against it cannot be conducted on an individual level. Although profiling suicide bombers may be a fascinating academic challenge, it is less relevant in the real-world struggle against them than understanding the modus operandi and mind-set of terrorist leaders who would never consider killing themselves, but opt for suicide terrorism as a result of cold reasoning. The Care and Feeding of a Suicide Bomber A suicide terrorist is almost always the last link in a long organizational chain that involves numerous actors. Once the decision to launch a suicide attack has been made, its implementation requires at least six separate operations: target selection, intelligence gathering, recruitment, physical and "spiritual" training, preparation of explosives, and transportation of the suicide bombers to the target area. Such a mission often involves dozens of terrorists and accomplices who have no intention of committing suicide, but without whom no suicide operation could take place. A careful survey of all the organizations that have resorted to suicide terrorism since 1983 suggests that the most meaningful distinction among them involves the degree to which suicide bombing is institutionalized. At the simplest level are groups that neither practice suicide terrorism on a regular basis nor approve of its use as a tactic. Local members or affiliates of such organizations, however, may initiate it on their own for a variety of reasons, such as imitating the glorious acts of others, responding to a perception of enormous humiliation and distress, avenging the murder of comrades and relatives, or being presented with a special opportunity to strike. Within such a context, it is important to take into account what might be called "pre-suicide terrorism." Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad suicide operations in Israel during the 1990s were preceded by a wave of knifings in the late 1980s. These attackers never planned an escape route and were often killed on the spot. The knifings did not involve any known organization and were mostly spontaneous. But they expressed a collective mood among young Palestinians of jihad (holy war) against Israel that helped create an atmosphere for the institutionalized suicide terrorism of the next decade. Many terrorist groups are skeptical of suicide terrorism's strategic value but resort to this tactic in exceptional circumstances. Within this category are the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania (allegedly executed by Osama bin Laden's Qaida organization) and similar irregular attacks conducted over the years by the Egyptian Islamic Group, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the Kuwaiti Dawa, and the Algerian Armed Islamic Group, among others. Such suicide bombings, though carefully planned, are irregular and unsystematic. At another level are groups that formally adopt suicide terrorism as a temporary strategy. The leaders of these movements obtain (or grant) ideological or theological legitimization for its use, recruit and train volunteers, and then send them into action with a specific objective in mind. The most spectacular operations of Hezbollah between 1983 and 1985, of Hamas between 1994 and 1996, and of the PKK between 1995 and 1999 fall within this category. More recently, Chechen rebels suddenly launched a campaign of suicide bombings following nine months of inconclusive fighting against the Russian military; one of the first bombers, a cousin of noted rebel leader Arbi Barayev, had reportedly declared: "I am going willingly to my death in the name of Allah and the freedom of the Chechen people." In such cases, the institutionalization of suicide terrorism has been temporary and conditional. Leaders who opt for this type of terrorism are usually moved by an intense sense of crisis, a conviction in the effectiveness of this new tactic, endorsement by the religious or ideological establishment, and the enthusiastic support of their community. At the same time, they are fully aware of the changeable nature of these conditions and of the potential costs associated with suicide terrorism (such as devastating military retaliation). They consequently have little difficulty in suspending suicide bombing or calling it off entirely. A case in point is Hezbollah's decision to begin suicide bombings in 1983. It is known today that several leaders of the organization were extremely uneasy about the practice. Insisting that Islam does not approve of believers taking their own lives, clerics such as Sheikh Fadlallah raised legal objections and were unwilling to allow the use of this new tactic. However, suicide terrorism became so effective in driving foreigners out of Lebanon that there was no motivation to stop it. The result was theological hair splitting that characterized suicide bombers as exceptional soldiers who risked their lives in a holy war. But following the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in 1985 and the decreasing effectiveness of this tactic, Hezbollah's clerics ordered the end of systematic suicide bombing. The organization's fighters were instructed to protect their lives and continue the struggle against the Zionists through conventional guerrilla methods. Only rarely, and on an irregular basis, has Hezbollah allowed suicide bombing since. It is not exactly clear when the commanders of Hamas decided to turn their anti-Israel suicide attacks into a strategic struggle against the peace process. Their campaign, started haphazardly in 1992 against Israeli military and settler targets in the occupied territories, failed to produce glaring results. The 1994 Hebron Massacre, when Israeli doctor Baruch Goldstein murdered 29 praying Palestinians, changed everything. Determined to avenge the deaths of their countrymen, Hamas operators resorted to suicide bus bombings inside Israeli cities. In a matter of weeks, the new wave of terrorism had eroded Israel's collective confidence in the peace process and had played right into the hands of extremist Hamas clerics who opposed negotiations with Israel. Yet, in 1995 these attacks suddenly came to a complete halt. Several factors convinced Hamas leaders to back off: the growing Palestinian resentment against the costs of the bus bombings (expressed in massive Israeli economic sanctions), the increasing cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian security services, and the effectiveness of Israeli counterterrorism. Ironically, Israel unintentionally pushed the organization to resume the bus bombings when, in 1996, then Prime Minister Shimon Peres ordered the assassination of Yehiya Ayash (known as "the Engineer") -a Hamas operative who masterminded many of the previous suicide bombings. Humiliated and angered, Hamas temporarily resumed bus bombings in Israel. A series of three successful attacks by Hamas and one by the Palestinian Islamic Jihad changed Israel's political mood about the peace process and led to the 1996 electoral defeat of Peres and his pro-peace government. In the cases of Hezbollah and Hamas, no permanent suicide units were formed, and bombers were recruited and trained on an ad hoc, conditional basis. But, in rare instances, some organizations adopt suicide terrorism as a legitimate and permanent strategy, harkening back to the Japanese kamikaze pilots of the Second World War. Currently, the Sri Lankan Tamil Tigers are the only example of this phenomenon. The "Black Tigers" launched their first attack in July 1987, and since then suicide bombings have become an enduring feature of the LTTE's ruthless struggle. During the last 13 years, 171 attacks have killed hundreds of civilians and soldiers and wounded thousands more. The assassinations of two heads of state, political leaders, and high-ranking military officers have made it clear that no politician or public figure is immune to these attacks. The Black Tigers constitute the most significant proof that suicide terrorism is not merely a religious phenomenon and that under certain extreme political and psychological circumstances secular volunteers are fully capable of martyrdom. The Tamil suicide bombers are not the product of a religious cult, but rather a cult of personality: Velupillai Prabhakaran, the brutal and charismatic LTTE leader who initiated the practice, appears to have been greatly influenced by the spectacular successes of Hezbollah in Lebanon. Fiercely determined to fight the repressive Sinhalese government until the Tamils achieve independence, Prabhakaran created the suicide units largely by the strength of his personality and his unlimited control of the organization. The formation of the Black Tigers was greatly facilitated by an early practice of the organization's members: Since the early 1980s, all LTTE fighters-male and female alike-have been required to carry potassium cyanide capsules. A standard LTTE order makes it unequivocally clear that soldiers are to consume the capsule's contents if capture is imminent. The LTTE suicide units are essentially an extension of the organization's general culture of supreme martyrdom; the passage from ordinary combat soldier to suicide bomber is a short and tragic journey. Making Suicide Terrorists Pay The perceived strength of suicide bombers is that they are lone, irrational fanatics who cannot be deterred. The actual weakness of suicide bombers is that they are nothing more than the instruments of terrorist leaders who expect their organizations to gain tangible benefits from this shocking tactic. The key to countering suicide bombers, therefore, is to make terrorist organizations aware that this decision will incur painful costs. While no simple formula for countering suicide terrorism exists, the experiences of the last two decades suggest two complementary political and operational strategies. Organizations only implement suicide terrorism systematically if their community (and, in some cases, a foreign client state) approves of its use. Thus, political and economic sanctions against the terrorists' community, combined with effective coercive diplomacy against their foreign patrons, may help reduce or end suicide terrorism. The problem with political counterterrorism, however, is that it takes a long time to implement and the results are never certain. The Taliban in Afghanistan, for instance, continue to host Osama bin Laden (who was indicted by the United States in November 1998 for the bombings of the two U.S. embassies in East Africa) despite international sanctions, a unanimously adopted United Nations Security Council Resolution demanding that he stand trial, and a threat from the United States that the Taliban will be held responsible for any terrorist acts undertaken while Bin Laden is under their protection. The leaders of organizations that resort to suicide terrorism are evidently ready to take great risks. Consequently, the political battle against suicide bombers must always be enhanced by an aggressive operational campaign. Governments do not have to invent entirely new tactics when waging a war against suicide terrorists. Instead, they must adapt and intensify existing counterterrorism strategies to exploit the vulnerabilities of suicide bombers. The Achilles' heel of suicide terrorists is that they are part of a large, operational infrastructure. It may not be possible to profile and apprehend would-be suicide bombers, but once it has been established that an organization has resolved to use suicide terrorism, security services can strike against the commanders and field officers who recruit and train the assailants and then plan the attacks. This counterterrorism effort calls for the formation of effective networks of informers, the constant monitoring of potential collaborators, and close cooperation among international intelligence services. Counterterrorist operatives must apply consistent pressure on the terrorist infrastructure through harassment and attacks. They must also seek ways to cut off the terrorists' sources of funding by depriving organizations of their financial resources (such as international bank accounts or "front" businesses). Regardless of the presence or absence of hard evidence for planned operations, it is essential to put potential terrorists on the run. The physical protection of potential target areas is another essential tactic. The idea of erecting concrete barriers against a martyr driving a truck loaded with tons of explosives might strike some as ludicrously inadequate. But such physical protection serves two essential objectives: It reduces the effect of the suicide bombing if and when the terrorist hits the target area, and it serves as a deterrent against potential suicide strikes. For the terrorist field officers, who may never know when they will be caught or killed, each suicide squad is precious. When faced with highly protected areas, they are unlikely to send squads into action. Roadblocks, guards at special checkpoints, inspection teams in public places, and the use of dogs and artificial sniffing devices may drive suicide terrorism down significantly. Such security measures also reassure the public. Governments must never forget that terrorism constitutes a form of psychological warfare, and that suicide terrorism is the ultimate expression of this struggle. Terrorism must always be fought psychologically-a battle that often takes place in the minds of ordinary people. Even if governments do not have an immediate operational solution to suicide terrorism, they must convince their citizens that they are not sitting ducks and that the authorities are doing everything they can to protect them. Ordinary people should, in fact, be informed that psychological warfare is being waged against them. Free people who are told that they are being subjected to psychological manipulation are likely to develop strong terrorism antibodies. In fighting suicide bombers, it is important not to succumb to the idea that they are ready to do anything and lose everything. This is the same sort of simplistic reasoning that has fueled the widespread hysteria over terrorists acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The perception that terrorists are undeterrable fanatics who are willing to kill millions indiscriminately just to sow fear and chaos belies the reality that they are cold, rational killers who employ violence to achieve specific political objectives. Whereas the threat of WMD terrorism is little more than overheated rhetoric, suicide bombing remains a devastating form of terrorism whose complete demise is unlikely in the 21st century. The ongoing political instability in the Middle East, Russia, and South Asia-including Iran, Afghanistan, Chechnya, and possibly India and Pakistan-suggests that these regions will continue to be high-risk areas, with irregular suicide bombings occasionally extending to other parts of the globe. But the present understanding of the high costs of suicide terrorism and the growing cooperation among intelligence services worldwide gives credence to the hope that in the future only desperate organizations of losers will try to use this tactic on a systematic basis. Ehud Sprinzak is dean of the Lauder School of Government, Policy, and Diplomacy at the Interdisciplinary Center in Herzliya, Israel. <http://xent.com/mailman/listinfo/fork> ************************************************************************** Subscribe to Freematt's Alerts: Pro-Individual Rights Issues Send a blank message to: freematt(a)coil.com with the words subscribe FA on the subject line. List is private and moderated (7-30 messages per week) Matthew Gaylor, (614) 313-5722 ICQ: 106212065 Archived at http://groups.yahoo.com/group/fa/ **************************************************************************

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suicide terrorism
by Ciamac Moallemi 14 Sep '01

14 Sep '01

I'm not sure about his prescriptive suggestions, but the following article provides a good historical and psychological summary of suicide terrorism. The Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka provide an interesting example--suicide bombers not driven by religious fanaticism but rather from the observation that suicide attacks are effective. <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/issue_SeptOct_2001/sprinzak.html> Rational Fanatics (This article was originally published in the September/October 2000 issue of Foreign Policy. ) What makes suicide bombers tick? While most of the world sees them as lone zealots, they are, in fact, pawns of large terrorist networks that wage calculated psychological warfare. Contrary to popular belief, suicide bombers can be stopped-but only if governments pay more attention to their methods and motivations. By Ehud Sprinzak October 23, 1983, was one of the most horrific days in the history of modern terrorism. Two massive explosions destroyed the barracks of the U.S. and French contingents of the multinational peacekeeping force in Beirut, Lebanon, killing 241 American servicemen and 58 French paratroopers. Both explosions were carried out by Muslim extremists who drove to the heart of the target area and detonated bombs with no intention of escaping. Subsequent suicide attacks against Israeli and U.S. targets in Lebanon and Kuwait made it clear that a new type of killing had entered the repertoire of modern terrorism: a suicide operation in which the success of the attack depends on the death of the perpetrator. This tactic stunned security experts. Two centuries of experience suggested that terrorists, though ready to risk their lives, wished to live after the terrorist act in order to benefit from its accomplishments. But this new terrorism defied that belief. It seemed qualitatively different, appearing almost supernatural, extremely lethal, and impossible to stop. Within six months, French and U.S. Presidents François Mitterrand and Ronald Reagan pulled their troops out of Lebanon-a tacit admission that the new terrorism rendered all known counterterrorist measures useless. Government officials erected concrete barriers around the White House and sealed the Pentagon's underground bus tunnels. Nobody was reassured. As Time magazine skeptically observed in 1983: "No security expert thinks such defensive measures will stop a determined Islamic terrorist who expects to join Allah by killing some Americans." Whereas the press lost no time in labeling these bombers irrational zealots, terrorism specialists offered a more nuanced appraisal, arguing that suicide terrorism has inherent tactical advantages over "conventional" terrorism: It is a simple and low-cost operation (requiring no escape routes or complicated rescue operations); it guarantees mass casualties and extensive damage (since the suicide bomber can choose the exact time, location, and circumstances of the attack); there is no fear that interrogated terrorists will surrender important information (because their deaths are certain); and it has an immense impact on the public and the media (due to the overwhelming sense of helplessness). Dr. Ramadan Shalah, secretary- general of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, summarized the chilling logic of the new terror tactic: "Our enemy possesses the most sophisticated weapons in the world and its army is trained to a very high standard. . . . We have nothing with which to repel killing and thuggery against us except the weapon of martyrdom. It is easy and costs us only our lives. . . human bombs cannot be defeated, not even by nuclear bombs." The prevalence of suicide terrorism during the last two decades testifies to its gruesome effectiveness [see table on opposite page]. It has formed a vital part of several terror campaigns, including Hezbollah's successful operation against the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in the mid-1980s, the 1994-96 Hamas bus bombings aimed at stopping the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and the 1995-99 Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) struggle against Turkey. The formation of special suicide units within the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) army in Sri Lanka has added an atrocious dimension to the civil war on that devastated island. In addition to killing hundreds of civilians, soldiers, and high-ranking officers since 1987, LTTE suicide terrorists have assassinated two heads of state: Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi of India in 1991 and President Ranasinghe Premadasa of Sri Lanka in 1993. Sri Lanka's current president, Chandrika Kumaratunga, recently lost sight in one eye following an assassination attempt that killed at least 24 people. The simultaneous 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, which took the lives of nearly 300 civilians, were a brutal reprise of the 1983 tragedies in Lebanon. Almost 20 years after its stunning modern debut, suicide terrorism continues to carry the image of the "ultimate" terror weapon. But is this tactic as unstoppable as it seems? The experiences of the last two decades have yielded important insights into the true nature of suicide bombers-insights that demystify their motivations and strategies, expose their vulnerabilities, and suggest ways to defeat what a senior State Department official once called a "frightening" problem to which there are "no answers." Average, Everyday Martyrs A long view of history reveals that suicide terrorism existed many years before "truck bombs" became part of the global vernacular. As early as the 11th century, the Assassins, Muslim fighters living in northern Persia, adopted suicide terrorism as a strategy to advance the cause of Islam. In the 18th century the Muslim communities of the Malabar Coast in India, Atjeh in Sumatra, and Mindanao and Sulu in the southern Philippines resorted to suicide attacks when faced with European colonial repression. These perpetrators never perceived their deaths as suicide. Rather, they saw them as acts of martyrdom in the name of the community and for the glory of God. Moreover, suicide terrorism, both ancient and modern, is not merely the product of religious fervor, Islamic or otherwise. Martha Crenshaw, a leading terrorism scholar at Wesleyan University, argues that the mind-set of a suicide bomber is no different from those of Tibetan self-immolators, Irish political prisoners ready to die in a hunger strike, or dedicated terrorists worldwide who wish to live after an operation but know their chances of survival are negligible. Seen in this light, suicide terrorism loses its demonic uniqueness. It is merely one type of martyrdom venerated by certain cultures or religious traditions but rejected by others who favor different modes of supreme sacrifice. Acts of martyrdom vary not only by culture, but also by specific circumstances. Tel Aviv University psychologist Ariel Merari has conducted the most comprehensive study of individuals who commit acts of suicide terrorism. After profiling more than 50 Muslim suicide bombers serving in Hezbollah, Amal, and secular pro-Syrian organizations in Lebanon, as well as Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Israel, he concluded that there is no single psychological or demographic profile of suicide terrorists. His findings suggest that intense struggles produce several types of people with the potential willingness to sacrifice themselves for a cause [see sidebar on page 70]. Furthermore, Merari maintains that no organization can create a person's basic readiness to die. The task of recruiters is not to produce but rather to identify this predisposition in candidates and reinforce it. Recruiters will often exploit religious beliefs when indoctrinating would-be bombers, using their subjects' faith in a reward in paradise to strengthen and solidify preexisting sacrificial motives. But other powerful motives reinforce tendencies toward martyrdom, including patriotism, hatred of the enemy, and a profound sense of victimization. Since suicide terrorism is an organizational phenomenon, the struggle against it cannot be conducted on an individual level. Although profiling suicide bombers may be a fascinating academic challenge, it is less relevant in the real-world struggle against them than understanding the modus operandi and mind-set of terrorist leaders who would never consider killing themselves, but opt for suicide terrorism as a result of cold reasoning. The Care and Feeding of a Suicide Bomber A suicide terrorist is almost always the last link in a long organizational chain that involves numerous actors. Once the decision to launch a suicide attack has been made, its implementation requires at least six separate operations: target selection, intelligence gathering, recruitment, physical and "spiritual" training, preparation of explosives, and transportation of the suicide bombers to the target area. Such a mission often involves dozens of terrorists and accomplices who have no intention of committing suicide, but without whom no suicide operation could take place. A careful survey of all the organizations that have resorted to suicide terrorism since 1983 suggests that the most meaningful distinction among them involves the degree to which suicide bombing is institutionalized. At the simplest level are groups that neither practice suicide terrorism on a regular basis nor approve of its use as a tactic. Local members or affiliates of such organizations, however, may initiate it on their own for a variety of reasons, such as imitating the glorious acts of others, responding to a perception of enormous humiliation and distress, avenging the murder of comrades and relatives, or being presented with a special opportunity to strike. Within such a context, it is important to take into account what might be called "pre-suicide terrorism." Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad suicide operations in Israel during the 1990s were preceded by a wave of knifings in the late 1980s. These attackers never planned an escape route and were often killed on the spot. The knifings did not involve any known organization and were mostly spontaneous. But they expressed a collective mood among young Palestinians of jihad (holy war) against Israel that helped create an atmosphere for the institutionalized suicide terrorism of the next decade. Many terrorist groups are skeptical of suicide terrorism's strategic value but resort to this tactic in exceptional circumstances. Within this category are the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania (allegedly executed by Osama bin Laden's Qaida organization) and similar irregular attacks conducted over the years by the Egyptian Islamic Group, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the Kuwaiti Dawa, and the Algerian Armed Islamic Group, among others. Such suicide bombings, though carefully planned, are irregular and unsystematic. At another level are groups that formally adopt suicide terrorism as a temporary strategy. The leaders of these movements obtain (or grant) ideological or theological legitimization for its use, recruit and train volunteers, and then send them into action with a specific objective in mind. The most spectacular operations of Hezbollah between 1983 and 1985, of Hamas between 1994 and 1996, and of the PKK between 1995 and 1999 fall within this category. More recently, Chechen rebels suddenly launched a campaign of suicide bombings following nine months of inconclusive fighting against the Russian military; one of the first bombers, a cousin of noted rebel leader Arbi Barayev, had reportedly declared: "I am going willingly to my death in the name of Allah and the freedom of the Chechen people." In such cases, the institutionalization of suicide terrorism has been temporary and conditional. Leaders who opt for this type of terrorism are usually moved by an intense sense of crisis, a conviction in the effectiveness of this new tactic, endorsement by the religious or ideological establishment, and the enthusiastic support of their community. At the same time, they are fully aware of the changeable nature of these conditions and of the potential costs associated with suicide terrorism (such as devastating military retaliation). They consequently have little difficulty in suspending suicide bombing or calling it off entirely. A case in point is Hezbollah's decision to begin suicide bombings in 1983. It is known today that several leaders of the organization were extremely uneasy about the practice. Insisting that Islam does not approve of believers taking their own lives, clerics such as Sheikh Fadlallah raised legal objections and were unwilling to allow the use of this new tactic. However, suicide terrorism became so effective in driving foreigners out of Lebanon that there was no motivation to stop it. The result was theological hair splitting that characterized suicide bombers as exceptional soldiers who risked their lives in a holy war. But following the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in 1985 and the decreasing effectiveness of this tactic, Hezbollah's clerics ordered the end of systematic suicide bombing. The organization's fighters were instructed to protect their lives and continue the struggle against the Zionists through conventional guerrilla methods. Only rarely, and on an irregular basis, has Hezbollah allowed suicide bombing since. It is not exactly clear when the commanders of Hamas decided to turn their anti-Israel suicide attacks into a strategic struggle against the peace process. Their campaign, started haphazardly in 1992 against Israeli military and settler targets in the occupied territories, failed to produce glaring results. The 1994 Hebron Massacre, when Israeli doctor Baruch Goldstein murdered 29 praying Palestinians, changed everything. Determined to avenge the deaths of their countrymen, Hamas operators resorted to suicide bus bombings inside Israeli cities. In a matter of weeks, the new wave of terrorism had eroded Israel's collective confidence in the peace process and had played right into the hands of extremist Hamas clerics who opposed negotiations with Israel. Yet, in 1995 these attacks suddenly came to a complete halt. Several factors convinced Hamas leaders to back off: the growing Palestinian resentment against the costs of the bus bombings (expressed in massive Israeli economic sanctions), the increasing cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian security services, and the effectiveness of Israeli counterterrorism. Ironically, Israel unintentionally pushed the organization to resume the bus bombings when, in 1996, then Prime Minister Shimon Peres ordered the assassination of Yehiya Ayash (known as "the Engineer") -a Hamas operative who masterminded many of the previous suicide bombings. Humiliated and angered, Hamas temporarily resumed bus bombings in Israel. A series of three successful attacks by Hamas and one by the Palestinian Islamic Jihad changed Israel's political mood about the peace process and led to the 1996 electoral defeat of Peres and his pro-peace government. In the cases of Hezbollah and Hamas, no permanent suicide units were formed, and bombers were recruited and trained on an ad hoc, conditional basis. But, in rare instances, some organizations adopt suicide terrorism as a legitimate and permanent strategy, harkening back to the Japanese kamikaze pilots of the Second World War. Currently, the Sri Lankan Tamil Tigers are the only example of this phenomenon. The "Black Tigers" launched their first attack in July 1987, and since then suicide bombings have become an enduring feature of the LTTE's ruthless struggle. During the last 13 years, 171 attacks have killed hundreds of civilians and soldiers and wounded thousands more. The assassinations of two heads of state, political leaders, and high-ranking military officers have made it clear that no politician or public figure is immune to these attacks. The Black Tigers constitute the most significant proof that suicide terrorism is not merely a religious phenomenon and that under certain extreme political and psychological circumstances secular volunteers are fully capable of martyrdom. The Tamil suicide bombers are not the product of a religious cult, but rather a cult of personality: Velupillai Prabhakaran, the brutal and charismatic LTTE leader who initiated the practice, appears to have been greatly influenced by the spectacular successes of Hezbollah in Lebanon. Fiercely determined to fight the repressive Sinhalese government until the Tamils achieve independence, Prabhakaran created the suicide units largely by the strength of his personality and his unlimited control of the organization. The formation of the Black Tigers was greatly facilitated by an early practice of the organization's members: Since the early 1980s, all LTTE fighters-male and female alike-have been required to carry potassium cyanide capsules. A standard LTTE order makes it unequivocally clear that soldiers are to consume the capsule's contents if capture is imminent. The LTTE suicide units are essentially an extension of the organization's general culture of supreme martyrdom; the passage from ordinary combat soldier to suicide bomber is a short and tragic journey. Making Suicide Terrorists Pay The perceived strength of suicide bombers is that they are lone, irrational fanatics who cannot be deterred. The actual weakness of suicide bombers is that they are nothing more than the instruments of terrorist leaders who expect their organizations to gain tangible benefits from this shocking tactic. The key to countering suicide bombers, therefore, is to make terrorist organizations aware that this decision will incur painful costs. While no simple formula for countering suicide terrorism exists, the experiences of the last two decades suggest two complementary political and operational strategies. Organizations only implement suicide terrorism systematically if their community (and, in some cases, a foreign client state) approves of its use. Thus, political and economic sanctions against the terrorists' community, combined with effective coercive diplomacy against their foreign patrons, may help reduce or end suicide terrorism. The problem with political counterterrorism, however, is that it takes a long time to implement and the results are never certain. The Taliban in Afghanistan, for instance, continue to host Osama bin Laden (who was indicted by the United States in November 1998 for the bombings of the two U.S. embassies in East Africa) despite international sanctions, a unanimously adopted United Nations Security Council Resolution demanding that he stand trial, and a threat from the United States that the Taliban will be held responsible for any terrorist acts undertaken while Bin Laden is under their protection. The leaders of organizations that resort to suicide terrorism are evidently ready to take great risks. Consequently, the political battle against suicide bombers must always be enhanced by an aggressive operational campaign. Governments do not have to invent entirely new tactics when waging a war against suicide terrorists. Instead, they must adapt and intensify existing counterterrorism strategies to exploit the vulnerabilities of suicide bombers. The Achilles' heel of suicide terrorists is that they are part of a large, operational infrastructure. It may not be possible to profile and apprehend would-be suicide bombers, but once it has been established that an organization has resolved to use suicide terrorism, security services can strike against the commanders and field officers who recruit and train the assailants and then plan the attacks. This counterterrorism effort calls for the formation of effective networks of informers, the constant monitoring of potential collaborators, and close cooperation among international intelligence services. Counterterrorist operatives must apply consistent pressure on the terrorist infrastructure through harassment and attacks. They must also seek ways to cut off the terrorists' sources of funding by depriving organizations of their financial resources (such as international bank accounts or "front" businesses). Regardless of the presence or absence of hard evidence for planned operations, it is essential to put potential terrorists on the run. The physical protection of potential target areas is another essential tactic. The idea of erecting concrete barriers against a martyr driving a truck loaded with tons of explosives might strike some as ludicrously inadequate. But such physical protection serves two essential objectives: It reduces the effect of the suicide bombing if and when the terrorist hits the target area, and it serves as a deterrent against potential suicide strikes. For the terrorist field officers, who may never know when they will be caught or killed, each suicide squad is precious. When faced with highly protected areas, they are unlikely to send squads into action. Roadblocks, guards at special checkpoints, inspection teams in public places, and the use of dogs and artificial sniffing devices may drive suicide terrorism down significantly. Such security measures also reassure the public. Governments must never forget that terrorism constitutes a form of psychological warfare, and that suicide terrorism is the ultimate expression of this struggle. Terrorism must always be fought psychologically-a battle that often takes place in the minds of ordinary people. Even if governments do not have an immediate operational solution to suicide terrorism, they must convince their citizens that they are not sitting ducks and that the authorities are doing everything they can to protect them. Ordinary people should, in fact, be informed that psychological warfare is being waged against them. Free people who are told that they are being subjected to psychological manipulation are likely to develop strong terrorism antibodies. In fighting suicide bombers, it is important not to succumb to the idea that they are ready to do anything and lose everything. This is the same sort of simplistic reasoning that has fueled the widespread hysteria over terrorists acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The perception that terrorists are undeterrable fanatics who are willing to kill millions indiscriminately just to sow fear and chaos belies the reality that they are cold, rational killers who employ violence to achieve specific political objectives. Whereas the threat of WMD terrorism is little more than overheated rhetoric, suicide bombing remains a devastating form of terrorism whose complete demise is unlikely in the 21st century. The ongoing political instability in the Middle East, Russia, and South Asia-including Iran, Afghanistan, Chechnya, and possibly India and Pakistan-suggests that these regions will continue to be high-risk areas, with irregular suicide bombings occasionally extending to other parts of the globe. But the present understanding of the high costs of suicide terrorism and the growing cooperation among intelligence services worldwide gives credence to the hope that in the future only desperate organizations of losers will try to use this tactic on a systematic basis. Ehud Sprinzak is dean of the Lauder School of Government, Policy, and Diplomacy at the Interdisciplinary Center in Herzliya, Israel. <http://xent.com/mailman/listinfo/fork> ************************************************************************** Subscribe to Freematt's Alerts: Pro-Individual Rights Issues Send a blank message to: freematt(a)coil.com with the words subscribe FA on the subject line. List is private and moderated (7-30 messages per week) Matthew Gaylor, (614) 313-5722 ICQ: 106212065 Archived at http://groups.yahoo.com/group/fa/ **************************************************************************

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NO RUSH TO WAR!/O'Reilly Factor/FOX/13Sept2001 .. Prof. Boyle, Mr. Sam Husseini Discussions with Bill O'Reilly (fwd)
by !Dr. Joe Baptista 14 Sep '01

14 Sep '01

Source: Direct Submission Email: "Boyle, Francis" <FBOYLE(a)LAW.UIUC.EDU> Date: Fri, 14 Sep 2001 08:32:53 -0500 Title: NO RUSH TO WAR!/O'Reilly Factor/FOX/13Sept2001 TEXT: SHOW: THE O'REILLY FACTOR (20:29) September 13, 2001 Thursday Transcript # 091303cb.256 SECTION: News; Domestic HEADLINE: America Unites How Should the U.S. Bring Terrorists to Justice? GUESTS: Sam Husseini, Francis Boyle BYLINE: Bill O'Reilly THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED. O'REILLY: While most Americans are united in their support of President Bush and the desire to bring Osama bin Laden and other terrorists to justice, there are some differing voices. Joining us now from Washington is Sam Husseini, the former spokesman for the Arab Anti -- American Anti-Discrimination Committee, and from Urbana, Illinois, is Francis Boyle, an international law professor at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.......... .... O'REILLY: Cut his mike. All right, now, Mr. Boyle, Professor Boyle, let's have a little bit more of a rational discussion here. That was absurd. The United States now has to take action against certain segments in this world who we know have been harbouring people like Osama bin Laden. That's going to happen. How will you react to that? FRANCIS BOYLE, LAW PROFESSOR: Well, first I think you have to look at the law involved. Clearly what we have here, under United States domestic law and statutes, is an act of international terrorism that should be treated as such. It is not yet elevated to an act of war. For an act of war, we need proof that a foreign state actually ordered or launched an attack upon the United States of America. So far, we do not yet have that evidence. We could... O'REILLY: All right, now why are you, why are you, why are you taking this position when you know forces have attacked the United States. Now, maybe they don't have a country, but they are forces. They have attacked the United States, all right? Without warning, without provocation. Civilian targets. They've done everything that an act of war does. So, I'm saying that because we live in a different world now, where borders don't really matter, where terrorism is the weapon of choice, that you would declare war -- if I were President Bush, I would declare war on any hostile forces, notice those words, professor, hostile forces to the United States. I would have a blanket declaration of war so I could go in and kill those people. Would I be wrong? BOYLE: Well, Bill, so far you'll note Congress has been unwilling to declare war. And indeed, this matter is being debated right now. Right now, it appears that what they are seeking is not a full declaration of war, but only what we law professors call an imperfect declaration, which means a limited use of military force under the War Powers Resolution of 1973. Precisely for the problem that we don't know if any state was involved and we still do not know who was responsible for this undoubted terrorist attack upon the United States of America. O'REILLY: All right, but we have the secretary of state saying that Osama bin Laden now has been linked into and, you know, we don't have all the intelligence information, as President Bush said today. He's not going to give us, and he shouldn't, the people of America all the information that they have. But when the secretary of state gets up and says, look, we know this guy was involved to some extent, I believe him. And he's a wanted man, professor. He's been wanted for eight years. The Clinton administration didn't have the heart to get him and in the first few months the Bush administration didn't either. We now know, and you just heard the FBI agent say that Afghanistan has been involved for years harbouring and training these kinds of people. Certainly, Afghanistan, Syria, Libya, Iran, Iraq, those five countries, certainly have been hostile to the United States and given safe harbour to these terrorists. That's a fact. BOYLE: Well, let me point out, the secretary of state was very careful in the words he used. He said Osama bin Laden was a suspect. He did not accuse him. And, again, under these circumstances... O'REILLY: No, he didn't use the word suspect. He used another word. BOYLE: The account I read in, just off the wire service, said suspect. But let me continue my point. Under these circumstances, where we have 5,000 Americans dead and we could have many more Americans killed in a conflict, we have to be very careful, Congress and the American people and the president, in not to over-escalate the rhetoric, here. We have to look at this very rationally. This is a democracy. We have a right to see what the evidence is and proceed in a very slow and deliberate manner. O'REILLY: No, we don't. We do not, as a republic, we don't have the right to see what the evidence is if the evidence is of a national security situation, as you know. Now, I'm trusting my government to do the right thing, here. I am trusting. But I think it's beyond a doubt right now, beyond a reasonable doubt, which is, as you know, a court of law standard, that there are at least five, North Korea you could put in to, six states in the world that have harboured continually these terrorists. Now, we know that this was a well-coordinated effort. Our initial intelligence shows that some of the people that have been arrested have ties to Osama bin Laden. We know, as you just heard the FBI agent say, that the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center was tied in to a guy who knew bin Laden. So, bin Laden -- I agree with you, that you don't want to be a hothead. You don't want to overreact. You don't want to lob a missile at the pharmaceutical plant in the Sudan, which was terrible, and that was the one good point, or fair point, that Mr. Husseini made, you don't want to do that. But, on the other hand, professor, I think Americans are rightful, are right, to demand action against states that we know in the past have harboured these individuals and there's a warrant out for Osama bin Laden's arrest. So, if he is in Afghanistan, I would give that government a couple of days to hand him over, and if they did not, I'd go in. BOYLE: Well, again. The American people are right. We need to see the evidence. I remember people saying a generation ago, during the Vietnam war, I trusted my government. And I think people of my generation found out that that was wrong. We needed more evidence. O'REILLY: All right. Professor, let me stop you there, though. This is another point that Mr. Husseini tried to make. Just because the United States of America has made mistakes in the past, does not mean that we cannot defend ourselves now. This is a unique situation in history. We have now been attacked by forces without borders, OK? We've been attacked. And it hasn't been a military attack, it's been an attack on civilians. The reason, the sole reason a federal government exists is to protect the people of the United States. And as I said in my "Talking Points" memo, they haven't really done the job, for political reasons. But now's the time to correct those things. So, there's going to be a reckoning, Professor. You know it's going to happen. I know it's going to happen. And it's going to come down on Osama bin Laden first and maybe some of these rouge states later. Will you support that action? BOYLE: Before I support a war that will jeopardize the lives of tens of thousands of our servicemen and women, I want to see the evidence that we are relying on to justify this. So far, I do not see it. I see allegations. I see innuendo. I see winks and I see nods, but I do not see the evidence that you need under international law and the United States constitution so far to go to war. Maybe that evidence will be there, but it is not there now. My recommendation to Congress is to slow down, let's see what develops and let's see what this evidence is before we knowingly go out and not only kill large numbers of people, perhaps in Afghanistan and other countries, but undoubtedly in our own armed forces. 58,000 men of my generation will killed in Vietnam because of irresponsible behavior by the Johnson administration rushing that Tonkin Gulf resolution through Congress, exactly what we're seeing now. And we need to pull back and stop and think and ask the hard questions and demand to see the evidence first, before we march off to war. O'REILLY: All right, so it's not enough that people arrested in the bombings of the embassies in Africa testified in court that Osama bin Laden was behind and financed and coordinated those bombings. That evidence is not enough for you? BOYLE: Well, Africa is a very is a very different story than what happened in the World Trade Center. O'REILLY: No, it's not. He's wanted, he's wanted in the United States for the bombings of those two embassies. Is that evidence enough for you, professor, for the United States to go in and get this man? Is it enough? BOYLE: That, that matter was treated and handled as an act of international terrorism in accordance with the normal laws and procedures of the United States of America as a question of domestic and international law enforcement. And I am suggesting that is the way we need to proceed here... O'REILLY: Well, wait. You're dodging the question professor. BOYLE: ... unless we have evidence that... O'REILLY: Wait, professor. Professor. This is a no spin zone. Hold it. Hold it. Even out in Urbana Champagne, the no spin zone rules. You're dodging the question. There is an absolutely rock solid arrest warrant out for this man. Evidence in court, testimony by people who did the bombings that this man was behind it. Is that enough evidence for you to have the United States go in and get him now? Is it enough? BOYLE: The United States has been attempting to secure his extradition from Afghanistan. I support... O'REILLY: Yeah, that's long enough. BOYLE: I support that approach as international... O'REILLY: Come on already, I mean, eight years, we've been attempting to extradite this guy. Now's the time to tell the Afghans you've got 48 hours or 72 hours to turn him over. You don't turn him over, we're coming in and getting him. You try to stop us, and you're toast. Enough is enough, professor. BOYLE: That's vigilantism. It is not what the United States of America is supposed to stand for. We are supposed to stand... O'REILLY: No, what that is is protecting the country from terrorists who kill civilians. BOYLE: ... for rule of law. O'REILLY: It's not vigilantism. BOYLE: We are supposed to stand for rule of law, and that is clearly vigilantism. There is a Security Council, there is Congress, there are procedures and there are laws, and they are there to protect all of us here in the United States as well as... O'REILLY: So, you're telling me... BOYLE: ... as well as our servicemen and women. Look, Bill, if we allegedly, as you put it, go in, you are not going in, I am not going in. It's going to be young men and women serving in our armed forces... O'REILLY: And that's their job. To protect us. But, professor, let me, you know, what you're saying is, whoa, whoa, whoa, hold it. Hold it. Hold it. Hold it. B0YLE: ... with the constitution and the laws of the United States. O'REILLY: We're not violating any laws here, professor. No one is going to violate the law. There is going to be a state of war induced against states, states, terroristic states, who have attacked us. And what you're saying is, though, and correct me if I'm wrong, you're saying that even though there is a legitimate warrant out for Osama bin Laden's arrest, and even though most civilized nations would honor that warrant and turn him over to us, extradite him to us, the vast majority of nations on earth would do that, you still are opposed for the United States to demand that the Taliban government arrest this man and turn him over? You are opposed to that? BOYLE: During the Gulf War, President Bush's father, who has far more experience that the current president Bush, got a Security Council resolution authorizing the United States of America to use force to expel Iraq from Kuwait. Second, President Bush's father got a War Powers Authorization Resolution from Congress that gave him the constitutional authority to use military force to enforce that Security Council resolution. What I'm calling for here is the same adherence to international law and the United States constitution that the first President Bush adhered to in dealing with Iraq. O'REILLY: Well, you'll get that, professor. That's just a formality. There -- nobody on Capitol Hill right now, they're not going to -- there's no profile of courages up there anyway, usually. They're going to give President Bush what he wants. If he wants a War Powers Act, they're going to give it to him. He wants a declaration, they're going to give it to him. BOYLE: Actually, they're arguing about it right now... O'REILLY: They're going to give it to him. But I'm not interested in that, because it's going to happen. It's going to happen. BOYLE: The reports -- no, the reports I read was that this President Bush initially asked for a blank check, and Congress balked because they had been suckered once before... O'REILLY: All right, I'm not -- speculation is not what I'm in -- all right, professor. I don't want to speculate. I'm just going to say in my opinion he's going to have the authority to go in and get Osama bin Laden and his pals, wherever they are. He will get that authority, whether it takes a day or a week, he'll get it. And once he gets it, now, that's what I want to talk about here. Once he gets it, are you and others like you going to say, oh, no, we shouldn't do this, even though we have proof of the man's -- masterminded the bombings in Africa and the Cole,testimony in Yemen, are you going to still say, even after the authority is granted by Congress, which it will be, no, don't do it, let Afghanistan handle him? Are you going to still do that, professor? BOYLE: Second, like his father, his father also got authorization from the United States, the United Nations Security Council under chapter seven of the United Nations charter... O'REILLY: Oh, you want to go to U.N. now? You want the U.N. involved now. BOYLE: Is exactly what his father did... O'REILLY: So what? BOYLE: And that's exactly right. O'REILLY: His father made a huge mistake by not taking out Sadam Hussein when he could of. BOYLE: His father adhered to the required procedures under the United States constitution and the United Nations charter that is a treaty and the supreme law of our land. I expect the current President Bush to do exactly what his father did before he starts engaging in a massive military campaign in Iraq or against other countries... O'REILLY: All right, I don't know whether he's going to go -- I know he's not going to let the U.N. dictate. He might go for a consensus. He's already got it with Putin and all of our NATO allies, he's already go that. Whether he goes -- I think it would be a mistake to let -- empowering the U.N. in this situation. BOYLE: Then why did his father do this? O'REILLY: I'm going -- we're going to wrap this up with this. I'm going to give my last summation and then you can give yours, I'll give you the last word on it. This is a fugitive we're dealing with here. He has now been tied in by U.S. intelligence agencies, according to Attorney General Ashcroft and the secretary of state, tied into this horrendous bombing here in New York. The United States must make a response to this, and I am agreeing with you in a sense, it can't be a knee-jerk. It's got to be done in a methodical way. Congress will go along, they may debate it or whatever, but they will go along in either a War Powers, special War Powers Act or a declaration of war against forces hostile to the United States. Then they will go in and they will take him. This man you're looking at on the TV screen is a dead man. He should be a dead man. You don't do what he did and be allowed to walk around this earth. Now, I'm distressed, professor, by your reliance, reliance on the strict letter of propriety, when we've got 10,000 people laying in the street about 22 miles from me right now. I want deliberation. I want methodical discipline, but I also want action. We know who this guy is. We know the governments that are protecting him. We know the other rouge states that have terrorist camps there. They all have to be dealt with, in my opinion. I'll give you the last word. BOYLE: Sure, I agree with you, Bill. He is a fugitive from justice and this should be handled as a matter as other fugitives from justice of international law enforcement. If indeed there is evidence that a foreign state orchestrated and ordered an attack against the United States then clearly that is an act of war that should be dealt with as such... O'REILLY: What about harbouring? BOYLE: Right now... O'REILLY: Is harbouring an act of war? BOYLE: In my opinion, no. And under the current circumstances, I don't see it. O'REILLY: All right, professor. BOYLE: I think there is a distinction here. O'REILLY: OK, all right, wrap it up, if you would. BOYLE: I agree -- I agree that the -- if we go to war in a hasty manner here, we could see thousands of U.S. military personnel being killed without proper authorization by Congress or by the United Nations Security Council. O'REILLY: OK. BOYLE: Our founding fathers decided that the most awesome decision we would ever make would be to go to war, and we have to be very careful in making that decision. O'REILLY: All right, professor, I appreciate it very much. Thank you for your point of view. BOYLE: Thank you, Bill. Francis A. Boyle Law Building 504 E. Pennsylvania Ave. Champaign, IL 61820 USA 217-333-7954(voice) 217-244-1478(fax) fboyle(a)law.uiuc.edu

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