- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Mandatory Voluntary Self-Ratings
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 9:31 PM 5/7/96, Joseph M. Reagle Jr. wrote: >thought police, or concerned but ignorant parents/congressmen. If >self-labeling worked (which I see few cases in which it wouldn't) I can't >see the concerned but ignorant being unhappy. Rather they'd be a bit better Regarding this "(which I see few cases in which it wouldn't)" point, I have a different view. Should "voluntary self-criticism" become widespread, I expect to rate all of my posts as suitable for children of all ages, suitable for hypersensitive feminists, suitable for Jews and Gentiles alike, and so on. Regardless of whether I'm advocating post-birth abortions or forced encheferation of Muslim girls. Then we'll see what happens. (This is an old debate, here and on the Cyberia-l list, to wit, what happens when people/perverts/libertarians choose to subvert the voluntary ratings by deliberately mis-rating their stuff? Or what if they genuinely believe, a la NAMBLA, that youngsters should be exposed to certain things?) I believe the whole debate about PICs-type ratings and other "voluntary self-labeling" has taken us astray. I don't see calls for authors to voluntarily self-rate their print works, nor do I see calls for newspapers to have articles rated. Nor speech in general. However, the drumbeat of "V-Chip" advocacy is now spilling over into cyberspace. I say it's a waste of our time to even be thinking or worrying about how to implement an infrastructure for ratings. In fact, building such an infrastructure could make later imposition of "mandatory voluntary ratings" (Orwell would be unsurprised) a greater likelihood. --Tim May THE X-ON CONGRESS: INDECENT COMMENT ON AN INDECENT SUBJECT, by Steve Russell, American Reporter Correspondent....You motherfuckers in Congress have dropped over the edge of the earth this time... "the sorriest bunch of cocksuckers ever to sell out the First Amendment" or suggesting that "the only reason to run for Congress these days is to suck the lobbyists' dicks and fuck the people who sent you there," ....any more than I care for the language you shitheads have forced me to use in this essay...Let's talk about this fucking indecent language bullshit.

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MD5 weaknesses
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Perry Metzger posted a note to coderpunks about >A paper by Hans Dobbertin dated May 2 in private circulation has found >an easy method for generating collisions (not pseudocollisions as was >done in previous work) in the MD5 compression function. I was told >that this was public information. And somebody provided a URL to http://www.cs.ucsd.edu/users/bsy/dobbertin.ps The coderpunks discussion has been titled Re: Favorate flavor of hash? for which I suppose there are alternative interpretations :-) # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com, +1-415-442-2215 # goodtimes signature virus innoculation

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Re: Complaints about spam are TRUE theft of services
by Ross Wright 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On or About 19 Mar 98 at 15:31, Ian Briggs wrote: > >Spam is not crime, it's commerce. Shut up and hit that delete key, > > you fucktard. > > Its not commerce, its collect calls and fuck you. Fax bombing is > illegal. > > Unsolicitated e-mail of this nature will eventually also be. Is that *really* what you want? >> Not because its "dangerous" to the internet, there are a lot more > dangerous issues facing todays Internet, because organized ISP have > enough power to tell cluless lawmakers it is. Again, I ask: "Is that *REALLY* what you want?" You want stupid congressmen and women to make new laws about spam??? Are you nuts? *Really*, you want them sticking their small minds into the internet? *REALLY*?????? You and all your "organized ISP" brothers should just shut up and hit the delete keys, you bunch of fucktards. Thanks. =-=-=-=-=-=- Ross Wright King Media: Bulk Sales of Software Media and Duplication Services http://ross.adnetsol.com Voice: (408) 259-2795

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hacktic.nl is down!!
by Jim Byrd 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I just heard on IRC channel #scientology from Karen Spaink that hacktic.nl will be down as of 5/20 because of pressure from Scientology. I don't have any more details yet.

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ENIGMA
by Carl Ellison 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From: danmec(a)inet.uni-c.dk >Date: Wed, 08 May 1996 13:05:24 +0200 >Subject: ENIGMA >To: cme(a)ACM.ORG > >X-Personal_name: Rag > >You may be interested in knowing that a 4 rotor U-boot ENIGMA is up for sale >at Sotheby's in London 30th May. > +--------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Carl M. Ellison cme(a)acm.org http://www.clark.net/pub/cme | | PGP: E0414C79B5AF36750217BC1A57386478 & 61E2DE7FCB9D7984E9C8048BA63221A2 | | "Officer, officer, arrest that man! He's whistling a dirty song." | +---------------------------------------------- Jean Ellison (aka Mother) -+

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California AB3320 Regulating Internet Sales - Speier
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

ftp://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/bill/asm/ab_3301-3350/ab_3320_bill_960502_amend ed_asm Jackie Speier's at it again! Now she's proposing AB3320, a bill to regulate sales of goods and services to protect consumers on the Internet. It's in its third revision, and much improved, but still obviously doesn't get it - the bill talks a lot about physical delivery of services or tangible goods (use or copying of information appears to fall through the rather wide cracks here) and providing written notices and toll-free telephone numbers, not quite realizing that an electronic mail address would do fine. The original bill was a proposal to require computer BBSs that charge for their services to register with the State at a cost of $50. It was marked up into a hybrid bill, and then into current form. I'm not sure what Assemblymember Speier is trying to accomplish, but she's clearly thrashing around trying to define it and do _something_ helpful to consumers. Those of you in her district may wish to get in touch with her and help her understand the Net and electronic commerce and international connectivity and such. Alternatively, if your Senator or Assemblymember is on the committee, you may want to talk to him/her. Here's the current bill status, according to leginfo. MEASURE : A.B. No. 3320 AUTHOR(S) : Speier. TOPIC : Telephone, mail order, and catalog sales: Internet. HOUSE LOCATION : ASM +LAST AMENDED DATE : 05/02/96 LAST HIST. ACT. DATE: 05/06/96 LAST HIST. ACTION : Re-referred to Com. on C.P.,G.E. & E.D. COMM. LOCATION : ASM CONSUMER PRO., GOVT. EFFICIENCY, ECON. DEVELOPMENT COMM. ACTION DATE : 05/07/96 COMM. ACTION : Do pass as amended. COMM. VOTE SUMMARY : Ayes: 09 Noes: 00 PASS 31 DAYS IN PRINT : 03/26/96 TITLE : An act to amend Section 17538 of the Business and Professions Code, relating to sales. ======= Here's a quote some of you privacy supporters may enjoy.... (The {- -} and {+ +} are some kind of addition/deletion markup.) =============== (d) Any {- person -} {+ vendor +} subject to this section who uses the Internet to conduct sales or leases of goods or services shall provide {- an -} {+ a conspicuous +} on-screen notice that discloses the procedures for resolving billing, sales, and service disputes, including the {- person's -} {+ vendor's +} return policy, {- and -} the address where the {- person -} {+ vendor +} may be contacted {+ , and a toll-free telephone number or other cost-free method to communicate the buyer's request for a full refund. Any vendor conducting business from an electronic e-mail or other electronic address shall disclose the legal name and address of that business in writing on any transaction form provided to the buyer +}

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Penet-style web remailer?
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

As a result of scanning through the Nando Times' (http://www.nando.net/nt/) Infotech section, I came across a piece on email with the following address: http://noah.pair.com/anon.html. It appears to be sort of a penet-style anonymous remailer, only without return messages. Anyone know anything else about it? Of course, given the number of web interfaces to fully anonymous remailers, I wouldn't encourage anyone to use it. -Allen

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Internet/Obscenity Legal Gathering in NYC
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I haven't seen this announcement reposted to this mailing list, and I think it's of sufficient interest to warrant reposting: Newsgroups: misc.legal,alt.censorship,misc.legal.moderated,talk.politics,alt.privacy From: ra(a)panix.com (Ron Abramson) Subject: Free program on net censorship in NYC Message-ID: <Dr1vDJ.Cr8(a)world.std.com> Date: Mon, 6 May 1996 17:49:08 GMT Announcement: Free Program On Net Censorship in New York City, May 22 at 7:30 P.M. -------------------------------------------- THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN CYBERSPACE: Regulating the On-Line Dissemination of "Indecent Material" This program will address the issue of the First Amendment as applied to the Internet and On-line services. Special focus will be given to the new federal law which is intended to regulate the dissemination of "Indecent Material" via these mediums. The Association of the Bar of the City of New York 42 W 44TH Street, New York, New York (Bet. 5th and 6th Avenues) (212) 382-6600 Wednesday, May 22, 1996, 7:30 till 9 P.M. Moderator: CHARLES R. NESSON Weld Professor of Law, Harvard law School Panelists: ROBERT FLORES Senior Trial Attorney, Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section, U.S. Department of Justice MICHAEL GODWIN General Counsel, Electronic Frontier Foundation STEPHEN M. HEATON General Counsel, Compuserve, Inc. NORMAN REDLICH Wachtell, Lipton Rosen & Katz, former Dean, New York University School of Law BRUCE TAYLOR President and Chief Counsel, National Center for Children and Families Co-sponsored by: Committee on Computer Law, Joseph P. Zammit, Chair Committee on Lectures and Continuing Education, Normal L. Green, Chair Members of the Association, their guests and all other interested persons are invited to attend. No fees or reservations are required. --- Dr. Dimitri Vulis Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

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Re: Transitive trust
by Steve Reid 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Submitted for your (dis)approval... -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > And beliefs are in some sense what we are really talking about. There is no > simple scalar quantity called "trust" (at least not one I can imagine), but > different agents will have different beliefs about different things. One > set of beliefs about signatures on keys has a lot of similarities to the > "web of trust." In fact, imagine this "diminishing wavefront of belief" [butchered for brevity] > Can this be more mechanized? Can numbers be attached, and perhaps > propagated? (I mentioned "diminishing wavefront of belief," because > implicit in this viewpoint, inevitably (and rightly, I think), is the > notion that "distant relations" have low probabilities of belief, all other > things being equal. I think we need to make a distinction between belief in identity and trust in competence. Currently, signing a key *only* means that you believe that the person is who they say they are. It should also be possible to state that you believe a person is competent enough to use proper care when signing other keys. Obviously, you wouldn't competence-sign someone's key unless you've known them for quite some time. The "competence web-of-trust" would grow very slowly. This competence-web-of-trust would have to remain tightly-knit, as you wouldn't want to trust anyone more than a couple links down the chain. While the web-of-competence would grow slowly, this small group of people could identity-sign a lot of keys. I know this might sound a bit like a hierarchical structure of trusted people (which it *could* be) it's really more like a web, and anyone could create their own web-of-competence, and the webs could eventually be linked together. Creating a web-of-competence would take a long time, and a lot of effort. But, signing could actually become a paid service, which would give people incentive to gain trust (by being paranoid when it comes to key signing). The most widely trusted people could charge significant amounts of money for the time needed to verify a person's credentials. Of course, there aren't currently many people out there worth paying an arm and a leg to get them to sign your key, but I could see people paying $5-$500 to have their key identity-signed by someone like PRZ. Having a key competence-signed by someone like PRZ would obviously cost a lot more than identity-signing, since it would take a lot more time to gain that much trust. It would not be unlike paying for an education, and with identity-signings being worth $5-$500 or more, it could be a worthwhile investment. Having a key competence-signed by more than one person would increase the value of your key, and once there are a couple good signatures on your key, other people would be more willing to competence-sign it, because there would be less risk involved (risk to their reputation). There would probably have to be more than one level of competence signing. It should be possible to say "I trust this person to use care when identity-signing other keys", and it should also be possible to say "I trust this person to use care when competence-signing other keys". That second type of signature would be *very* valuable, and it would be necessary to have that and possibly even higher levels of trust in order to make the web-of-competance a reasonably large size. When you sign a key, you are placing your reputation on the line, so you must be certain that the level of trust you're placing is appropriate. But what happens when someone goes rogue and ignores credentials, and signs keys of anyone who is willing to pay the price? You would regret signing the rogue person's key. So, IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO REVOKE TRUST, in order to protect your own reputation. PGP currently only allows a person to revoke their own key. Most people would revoke their key if it were stolen, to protect their own reputation. However, some people may be unwilling or unable to revoke their own key, and if you signed that key, your reputation may be affected. Clearly, it should be possible to remove your signature from someone's key. Revoking trust has it's own little problem: Some people might accept cash and sign a key, then revoke the trust in the key, keeping the cash. Easily fixed: the people who have signed the con man's key could revoke the trust in that key, bringing an abrupt end to the con man's key-signing days. What it all comes down to is reputation. Protect your reputation, and you could make a living on your reputation alone. ====================================================================== | Steve Reid - SysAdmin & Pres, EDM Web (http://www.edmweb.com/) | | Email: steve(a)edmweb.com Home Page: http://www.edmweb.com/steve/ | | PGP (2048/9F317269) Fingerprint: 11C89D1CD67287E6 8C09EC52443F8830 | | -- Disclaimer: JMHO, YMMV, IANAL. -- | ====================================================================:) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3ia Charset: noconv iQEVAwUBMZEckdtVWdufMXJpAQFSwAgAnhCALlQdfyYJ+Cp3WSXqMiOLG8ubtFJB jUWyXyd3T0u8RxwraIq4emxW4HZZNMBNKet4rZzkA9VqAZ3+p9337jUS6XBuE56V IRLhQy80TyrqwQVpSKXXOmPlZdmhzAF/OJE4LZF4gMh5RIANFTUXzBkVSJ8FsB1C KXjgzk1E+5hdQ0FrwaAc9LIrq6UokhO7pIKb5tlmntXHhtDm+yLpm5QvrCxwnBad 3KlxAtWvQYVQTb5a9bhgnFXVRDjh/lQ1bxncJ1ap1oJP0E6nMfHq282G8UxnrUuY qyksNGJDgWElExzXKntdyqP+bOiIn4jwVyjBcrBZS9V3GxWOPZz4ew== =Z66X -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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"Architectural considerations for cryptanalytic hardware" paper on the web
by Ian Goldberg 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- For anyone who was interested in Dave's and my hardware project (Architectural considerations for cryptanalytic hardware), it's done (thank goodness). You're free to check it out at http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~iang/isaac/hardware/ in either HTML or PostScript. Thanks to cypherpunks Eric Hughes and Bruce Koball, and to Altera people Clive McCarthy and Stephen Smith. - Ian "...pray for an 'A' for us..." -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMZE64UZRiTErSPb1AQHczwP+IF47Zg4VpecVFj+ei0AAr2h9ZVTV01nb lsUXAwWpKla2LJ+sJGrSQmpu0Sd/wkIIGeTWnbCLiR+d4pdbKN2nwfHp6evjzEnw luWWeuCFq51L0AViBGyu2r11IiAPGGIXWclb8dqqjL1YLtnJ/CCXXRbSGbJ7YdqO 6GBAMv13IgA= =5IGV -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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