- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: Unix passwd-cracker online?
by ScottMorris 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:27 AM 8/17/96 -0700, you wrote: >On Fri, 16 Aug 1996, Carlos L. Mariscal may have written: > >> person has obtained a specific password by entering the desired >> adresses'passord on a submnit form in a Web page. >[deletia] >> never have it if there really is such, but this came to my mind when i read >> the posts on the plate-numbers-in-Oregon polemica. I would appreciate > >Somehow I have a hard time believing this to be true. I run crack, a >password searching program that uses a dictionary as its base, on my >/etc/passwd regularly to locate any users with easily guessed entries. >With ultra fast crypt (UFC), the fastest crypt() replacement I can find, I >can run through about 9700 passwords per second on this P6-150. >[snip] You of course are assuming they are using a Unix box. I commonly offload the etc/passwd file to my pc (p-100) and run Crackerjack against the file. With a single username a 5 meg wordlist will run in about 30 seconds (mileage will vary). The concept is certainly interesting and is another case for good passwords. Of course you need to get the password file first which is another story for another group. >Sorry, I don't think this is feasable, or possible. While I believe this is possible feasable is another story. >(Please do correct my calculations if errors are detected, especially if >the corrected numbers make this possible.. it's getting late at night, and >my mind is fogging up, so these calculations/estimates/wild guesses may be >off more than usual. It does sound like an interesting project to >undertake, if it were possible, but not on my equipment!) > > >-- ** NOTE NEW KEY ** As of 08/28/95! Old key 0x2902B621 COMPROMISED! >William Ono <wmono(a)direct.ca> PGP Key: F3F716BD > fingerprint = A8 0D B9 0F 40 A7 D6 64 B3 00 04 74 FD A7 12 C9 = fingerprint >PGP-encrypted mail welcome! "640k ought to be enough ----- Scott L. Morris Systems Security Consultant smorri59(a)icubed.net Data Forensics Finger smorri59(a)ally.ios.com for my pgp public key.

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Re: Mailing list liability (fwd)
by Greg Broiles 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:13 PM 11/9/96 -0600, Jim Choate wrote: >> From markm@gak Sat Nov 9 21:03:24 1996 >> Note that none of these say anything about any commercial service being held >> liable for defamatory statements because the service cancelled a user's >> account or prevented a user from posting in certain areas. I really don't >> see why you consider unsubscribing someone from a mailing list the equivalent >> of monitoring posts and exercising editorial control. > >It is exactly editorial control because it prevents, a priori, submissions by >Vulis under that account. He is FORCED to resort to other means. That is >what the courts will see, it is what the jury will see, and it is what will >eventualy sink the list, and place its operator under financial burden for >years. This is inaccurate. Vulis is still sending posts to the list and they are distributed to subscribers. You seem to have assumed that submissions are only accepted from subscribers. This assumption is wrong. >I joined this list under my own volition, I agreed to no review by the list >operator at any time. I did not agree to not hurt his feelings with my >comments or views. I did not agree to agree with the operator of the list. >I did not agree to make him feel warm and fuzzy inside. I agreed to NOTHING >other than my permission for him to put your submissions in my email box. I have a very hard time seeing a contract here - I don't think there was anything close to a "meeting of the minds" to the terms you seem to imagine, nor do I see any consideration. As you've indicated above, you took on no obligations - which suggests that your relationship to the list owner is not that of a party to a contract, but as a recipient of a gift. The donor of a gift (or series of gifts) is free to stop giving at their whim. > The >only way I can be removed from this list and not open the operator up to >legal consequences is by my own volition or the total cessation of this list. >This applies to every member subscribed so long as their is no proviso posted >at subscription time. I disagree strongly. I also strongly disagree that there was/is any contract between Gilmore and list subscribers or authors. And I strongly disagree with your ideas about posting notices and the "default" situation where notices aren't posted. I think that you're mixing up your analyses re defamation and contract (they are **not** the same thing). I also think you're using contract-style language to describe obligations apparently imposed by law, which is misleading. Further, I'm not aware of any law which would impose the obligations you imagine. If you've got better information, perhaps you'd be kind enough to post a citation so the rest of us can catch up with you. The case summaries you posted don't support your conclusion. The only one that's even in the neighborhood is Stratton-Oakmont; which, as I pointed out before, is appreciably different factually (the degree of control was much greater, the forum was advertised as a controlled one, and the defendant inspected the message before it was made public), did not receive further scrutiny at an appellate level, and has been criticized by commentators and scholars as being poorly reasoned. Stratton-Oakmont is a poor case to rely upon. As far as I can tell, you're basing your legal conclusion on the depth and quality of your feelings about this issue, which is always a mistake. Finally (and dispositively), the entire field of liability for "publishers" of online information was changed by the Communications Decency Act. See <http://www.gdf.com/lb4-1.htm#N3> for more. But this discussion reminds me of the unproductive discussions that various legal-minded folks (myself included) have had with Jim Bell from time to time. And I try not to spend time on unproductive pursuits. So I am not going to write more about this. I've offered my analysis, and readers can & will give it whatever weight they think it merits. If I don't respond to your messages, it's not because I don't think you're wrong, it's because I don't think saying it over & over helps anyone. Mike Godwin has written and thought a lot about liability for defamation in the online service provider context. I recommend his work to people who want to learn more. It's clear that you think John Gilmore did the wrong thing when he excluded Vulis. The notion that a relatively inflexible and harsh liability scheme awaits system operators who wander into some form of content control can be an attractive one. I don't blame you for liking that idea. But your conclusion is not supported by case law nor traditional theories of contract, tort, or property law. The result you want (any content control = duty to inspect every message = harsh result) might be a good one but it is not the state of the law today. If you're getting your legal information from computer media or mass media you're probably getting partially incorrect information or interpretation. -- Greg Broiles | "In this court, appellant and respondent are the gbroiles(a)netbox.com | same person. Each party has filed a brief." http://www.io.com/~gbroiles | Lodi v. Lodi, 173 Cal.App.3d 628, 219 Cal. | Rptr. 116 (3rd Dist, 1985)

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17 Dec '03

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Trust
by James Morris 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm just wondering if anyone else finds it particularly odd that while Australia is prepared to commit SAS troops, medical and intelligence personnel to a possible strike against Iraq, the US government still doesn't seem to trust us enough to use US developed cryptography products with adequate security. - James. -- James Morris <jmorris(a)intercode.com.au>

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Re: Crypto Exports, Europe, and Conspiracy Theories
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 4:12 AM 1/25/96, Michael Froomkin wrote: >On Wed, 24 Jan 1996, Timothy C. May wrote: >[...] >> >> Specifically, I believe--though obviously cannot prove, given the nature of >> time--that a cryptographically strong version of Netscape developed outside >> the borders of the U.S. would not be freely importable into the U.S. I > >Nope. Nope. Nope. Nope. Donuts to dollars that it's freely importable. First of all let me say that I take no offense at Michael's "Nope. Nope. Nope. Nope." opening. This is the kind of interesting debate we need to have! But let me address a specific question first: >> don't know what form such a law would take, to answer the point raised in >> another post by Peter Junger. Nor am I saying either State or NSA passes >> the laws...the ITARs have worked largely because they have never been >> challenged; if they were to be successfully challenged and stricken, as >> even some folks inside the NSA think is likely if tested in a proper case, >> then a Four Horseman-scared Congress will likely step in with some >> restrictions. >[...] > >OK, Tim, what am I missing? How will Enhanced-crypto-Netscape match >remailers for their ability to keep TLAs up at night? Once one has good encrypted links, including access to a variety of offshore sites, remailers cannot be stopped. The TLAs may not like them, and the courts may rule that a remailer site is strictly liable for misdeeds which impinge on its remailers (I'm not convinced this is so, but no matter), but what do U.S. courts have to say about Dutch remailer sites? What will the Fifth Circuit be able to do to hactic.nl? Or chains of remailers that pass through Norway, Japan, Estonia, Italy, and Lower Slobovia? We've already got that with PGP, of course, so it's to some extent moot. All of the mentions recently about strong crypto built into Netscape, Mosaic, AOL, etc., have to do with the _popularity_ and _ease of use_ issues, not the existence proof. That is, having strong crypto built in to Netscape will not give us a capability we don't already have, just give it to more people and more conveniently. Back to the issue of remailers and anonymous servers as choke points. I agree. These are the real threats to traffic analysis, which is of course why I have so emphasized them in my own writings for so many years!! I take it as a given that no remailer services will operate for profit, publically, and with support built in to Netscape, at least not openly and identifiably within the U.S....it is too controversial. (I don't mean that most of the remailers are not U.S., now, I mean after the heat gets turned up, after the next "Oklahoma City bomber" is found to have been communicating with remailers! An awful lot of remailer sites will vanish overnight. In act, evidence that remailers are being used may be manufactured.) Fortunately, and I keep coming back to this, the beauty of PGP is that the encryption is in the text blocks within mailers, browsers, etc., and little or no hooks to external programs are needed. (We often moan about this, and wish for PGP 3.0 or 4.0 to have all kinds of hooks, but there is a certain elegance about a text-block-centric program, with hooks made later on an ad hoc basis....it is so terribly difficult to control what's in a text block that suppression of PGP is very hard.) --Tim May Boycott espionage-enabled software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Microsoft's CryptoAPI - thoughts?
by rickt＠psisa.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

What does everyone think about this? Perhaps I already missed the boat, but I just found out about it. How would international apps work? Would a data file encrypted with an app compiled with a US-only CSP (cryptographic service provider) be able to be loaded by a European equivalent app? [Info can be found at: http://www.microsoft.com/intdev/inttech/cryptapi.htm] -- rickt(a)psa.pencom.com egalitarian, philosopher, unix cowboy, '68 chevy pickup hacker

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"Ryan McDonald" <datahaven@hotmail.com>: Fwd:
by feen4＠juno.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Re: Sabotaging Australian Involvement in Bill's War
by Information Security 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Date: Thu, 12 Feb 1998 18:45:38 -0800 > To: James Morris <jmorris(a)intercode.com.au>, cypherpunks(a)toad.com > From: Tim May <tcmay(a)got.net> > Subject: Sabotaging Australian Involvement in Bill's War > > At 5:01 PM -0800 2/12/98, James Morris wrote: > >I'm just wondering if anyone else finds it particularly odd that while > >Australia is prepared to commit SAS troops, medical and intelligence > >personnel to a possible strike against Iraq, the US government still > >doesn't seem to trust us enough to use US developed cryptography > >products with adequate security. > > It's not at all odd. > > In the New World Order, you Aussies are children. As children, your role is > to die in wars like Viet Nam and the Gulf, under orders from the New World > Reichsfuhrer. > > And like the American children sent to die in wars at age 18, but too young > to either vote or drink alchohol, children cannot be allowed to possess > dangerous crypto tools which might let them deviate from parental wishes. > > (Seriously... The Aussies are obligated by treaty for the crypto/spying stuff. We Americans spy on all your domestic traffic by treaty. You can also request specifically targeted AU-domestic information from our personnel manning in AU the spy equipment, and we hand it to them. That's what the UKUSA (pronounced you-koo-za) agreement is all about: none of your people have broken any domestic spy laws. The British provide that service for us in Fort Meade, VA, we provide that service to the British in Menwith Hill... The EU recently declared the NSA was performing massive EU-domestic spying: that's how we have access. (It also confirms the entire massive US-domestic NSA spying claim of the Cryptography Manifesto) There has been a stunning lack of outrage to the EU statement: I'd have thought USA-based privacy groups and reporters would jump all over it. # "Moynihan Says U.S. Killed His Anti-Spy Measure" # By Irvin Molotsky, The New York Times, September 11, 1985 # # Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan charged that the CIA and State Department # had killed a measure he had introduced aimed at protecting American # citizens from having their telephone conversations intercepted by foreign # agents in this country. # # The Senator's bill would have made telephone call interception by foreign # agents illegal and would have provided for their expulsion. # # The Chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence opposed the measure # as unnecessary and could lead to disclosing "sensitive intelligence # sources." British wiretappers at the helm of the NSA's domestic spy-fest. You are "secondary" parties to the treaty...low on the totem pole. See the Cryptography Manifesto at: http://www.erols.com/paulwolf/cointelpro/cointel.htm (scroll down once there). Here is the Australian section... You'll have to purchase the "Project L.U.C.I.D." book for more details [that I snipped] from the Australian "National Surveillance" report. Snipped: some Australian politicians chased around trying to find out what the NSA was doing, then reversing themselves ("nothing's happening.."). I have to admit, it wasn't until I read this Australian report that I realized most of NASA's space shots were military. ---guy ****************************************************************************** Australian ECHELON Spotted ---------- ------- ------- * http://www.texemarrs.com, Living Truth Ministries 800/234-9673 Texe Marrs and his organization are big on the "Anti-Christ" aspects of all the technology the UKUSA governments have deployed to monitor people. I am just glad he knows the Beast when he sees it, that it is Evil (without the people involved necessarily being evil in intent: agreed!) and that unless we do something soon, it will be too late: Earth will become Hell. His book-jacket bio: Texe Marrs was a career U.S. Air Force officer (retired). He commanded communications-electronics and engineering units around the globe. * "Project L.U.C.I.D.", by Texe Marrs, 1996, ISBN 1-884302-02-5 * * Appendix 2: World Surveillance Headquarters * * The report that follows, originally entitled "National Surveillance", was * written by Australia's Peter Sawer and published in Inside News (P.O. Box * 311, Maleny, Queensland 4552, Australia). It first came to my attention * when it was printed in the U.S. by LtCol Archibald E. Robert's Bulletin, * the newsletter of the highly respected Committee to Restore the Constitu- * tion (P.O. Box 986, Fort Collins, Colorado 80522). * * The article caused a flurry of activity and a round of vigorous denials, * admissions, coverups, and more denials by Australian political leaders. * * The article contends that (1) America's National Security Agency (NSA) * is the world surveillance headquarters, and (2) Australia has it's own * secret "computer center", linked with the NSA via satellite, which * illegally watches over Australia's citizenry. Article snippets... capitalization by the original authors... * On a fateful fall day in America, on November 4th, 1952, a new United * States government agency quietly was brought into existence through * presidential decree. * * The birth of the National Security Agency on that day so long ago * heralded the beginning of the world's most sophisticated and all * encompassing surveillance system, and the beginnings of the greatest * threat to individual liberty and freedom not only in Australia, but * the entire planet will ever see. * * The NSA grew out of the post war "Signals Intelligence" section of the * U.S. War Department. It is unique amongst government organizations in * America, and indeed most other countries, in that there are NO specified * or defined limits to its powers. * * The NSA can (and does) do just about whatever it wants, whenever, and * wherever it wants. Although little known in both the U.S. and elsewhere, * the NSA is quite literally the most powerful organization in the world. * * Not limited by any law, and answerable only to the U.S. National Security * Council through COMSEC, the NSA now controls an information and * surveillance network around the globe that even Orwell, in his novel * "1984", could not have imagined. * * Most people believe that the current "computer age" grew out of either * the space program or the nuclear weapons race; it did not. * * ALL significant advances in computer technology over the last thirty * years, from the very beginnings of IBM, through to the super computers * of today, have been for the NSA. In fact, the world's very first super * computer, the awe-inspiring CRAY, was built to specification for the * NSA, and installed in their headquarters in 1976. * * The entire twentieth century of development of computer technology has * been the result of the NSA's unquenchable thirst for ever bigger, ever * faster machines on which to collect, collate, and cross-reference data * on hundreds of millions of honest, law-abiding, and totally unsuspecting * individuals. And not only in America, but in many other countries as * well. Including, as we shall see, Australia. [ "The Rise of the Computer State", David Burnham, 1984 p134: ...the technical advances that were occurring did so not entirely by chance. The computers' ability to acquire, organize, store and retrieve huge amounts of data was an essential factor leading to the broad definition of intelligence that was fostered by the National Security Agency and its godfather, the National Security Council. Computer research was supported by NSA in a major way by secret research dollars. Thomas C. Reed, Director of the Pentagon's Telecommunications, Command and Control System, referring to domestic intercity telephone microwave radio trunks, said in 1975, "Modern computer techniques make it possible to sort through that traffic and find target conversations easily." p126-127: Since the wiretap law barred the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs from installing a tap on New York City's Grand Central Station pay phones, bureau head John Ingersoll asked the NSA for help. Within a few months the spy agency was sorting through all the conversations it was already acquiring for general intelligence purposes. Of course, the technicians were required to acquire, monitor, and discard a large number of calls made by people with no connection with the cocaine business in South American cities. But so pleased was Mr. Ingersoll with the tips he was getting from the dragnet monitoring that he ultimately persuaded the NSA to monitor simultaneously nineteen other U.S. communication hubs. ] * "Project L.U.C.I.D.", continued... * * Fort Meade is the hub of an information gathering octopus whose tentacles * reach out to the four corners of the earth. * * The principal means of communicating this information is by the National * Aeronautical and Space Administration (NASA) satellite communications * system, which most people erroneously think exists primarily for the * space program. * * It does not. * * The satellites, indeed NASA and the entire American Space Program, exist * largely to supply the NSA with its telecommunications system. That is why * the bulk of its operations are officially declared 'secret'. This * ultimate 'Big Brother' machine even has an official name 'Project * Platform'. [ "The Puzzle Palace": all these computer systems are linked together under Project Platform. The first Cray went to the NSA. p138 ] * Although the NSA was officially formed in 1952, it grew out of an * International Agreement signed in 1947. Officially termed the "UKUSA * PACT," this was an agreement between Britain, the U.S.A., Canada, New * Zealand, Australia and the NATO countries. * * The UKUSA PACT was, quite simply and bluntly, an agreement between these * countries to collect and collate information on their respective citizens * and to share this information with each other and pass on to Fort Meade. * * On March 9th 1977, the Leader of the Opposition, Mr. Bill Hayden, asked * "questions on notice" on the subject. On April 19, Prime Minister Malcom * Fraser, declined to answer the questions, "in the interests of national * security." * * The first clue of the Australian Headquarters of PROJECT PLATFORM appeared * in 1975. Then, as today, government undertakings involving expenditure * over a certain amount must be presented to a Senate body, the Joint * Parliamentary Accounts Committee (JPAC). In 1975 JPAC was asked to * examine and approve finance for the construction of a new building in * Deakin, a leafy suburb of Canberra. * * This quite massive building was to be constructed behind an existing, much * smaller one, which, until then, had been known to the public only as the * "Deakin Telephone Exchange." * * That it was not, and never had been, simply a "telephone exchange" finally * came to light in the 1975 JPAC Approval Report, when it admitted that the * existing building had a comprehensive basement which housed NASA's micro- * wave communications headquarters in Australia. Part of the justification * of the "need" for the new, much larger building, was that by 1980, it was * expected that NASA would run out of room in their existing home. * * Apart from NASA, it is now admitted that Deakin houses the National * Computer Headquarters for, amongst others, the Australian Defense * Department, the Australian Taxation Office, the Department of Social * Security, the Commonwealth Department of Education, and the Department * of Transport and Communications. * * Both Tax and Social Security are, in turn, directly linked to Medicare. * In fact, the Department of Health used Social Security's computer * facilities there until their own were completed. * * A small, but highly significant, part of the building is, in fact, * occupied by Telecom. This is the part that contains the networking * junctions for the optical-fiber lines leased by the banks for their * "Electronic Funds Transfer System" (EFTS). ALL financial transactions * for the banks pass through there via subsidiary company, "Funds * Transfers Services Pty Ltd." (FTS) * The New York Times INTERNATIONAL Wednesday, May 21, 1997 * by Clyde H. Farnsworth, Woomera, Australia. * * As Darth Vader's Death Star is blown to bits in the newly remastered "Star * Wars" at the local theater, the audience of Australian and American Air * Force personnel, and squadrons of their children, lets out a whoop. As the * lights go on, everyone is beaming. * [snip] * * Pine Gap employs nearly 1,000 people, mainly from the CIA and the U.S. * National Reconnaissance Office. * * It is the ground station for a U.S. satellite network that intercepts * telephone, radio, data links and other communications around the world. Worldwide telephone interception. ******************************************************************************

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Re: NSA advanced knowledge
by koontz＠MasPar.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In 1987 there were a series of papers given out as part of the package to CCEP vendors (or prospective vendors): The Secure Data Network System: An Overview (NSA) By: Gary L. Tater Edmund G. Kerut SDNS Products in the Type II Environment (contains refer to 1987 paper) John Linn BBN Communications Corporation (need for easy Key Management) Cambridge, Massachusetts SDNS Services and Architecture Ruth Nelson Electronic Defense Communications Directorate GTE Government Systems Corporation 77 A Street Needham, MA 02194 .... Key Management -------------- The heart of SDNS is the Firefly keying system, which is based on public key en- cryption. Each terminal has a unique Fire- fly key which is bound together with a non-forgeable certificate. The certificate identifies the terminal and specifies its security-relevent characteristics. Two SDNS terminals desiring to communicate ex- change certificates and keying information (the Firefly excange) and make access con- trol decisions based on the identifying in- formation. The exchange generates a traf- fic key which is unique to the two terminals and which is new for that key ex- change. If communication is permissible, the terminals then negotiate the communca- tions parameters for use of the traffic key. ... SP4: A Transport Encapsulation Security Protocol Dennis Branstad, National Bureau of Standards Joy Dorman, Digital Equipment Corporation Russell Housley, Xerox Corporation James Randall, International Business Machines Corporation Access Control Within SDNS by Edward R. Sheehan Analytics Incorporated 9821 Broken Land Parkway Columbia, Maryland 21046 None of these contained any dates except the 1987 paper reference ------------------------------------------------------------------ This is the earliest reference I know of to government public key cryptography, and I was under the impression this was where the reference in Gus Simmons book came from.

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Guilt by Association?
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 2:49 AM 1/25/96, Alan Olsen wrote: >This is a problem with the web of trust in general. It is known as "Guilt >by Association". > >Person X commits treasonable act A. All of the persons who are signed on to >his key could be considered to be co-conspirators. The same applies to >nyms. The difficulty with prosecuting nyms is finding the link to the real >world individual. Anyone associated with him/her/it will be considered to >be guilty by reason of key signage or a way of determining who the real >person is... .... >I guess we are stuck with the "Web of Guilt"... Although I disagree with many things the U.S. government has declared unlawful, and think we are on the wrong track in many ways, I don't see any evidence for a "web of guilt." I could have signed the keys of Timothy McVeigh, O.J. Simpson, and Hilary Clinton, and yet this would not cause any prosecutor to indict me, per se. (Brian Davis, do you disagree?) Obviously if one of these persons I was known to have associated with, to the point of signing their keys, were under investigation, then some detectives might follow up some leads to find out who I was. This is ordinary detective work, not guilt by association. Key-signing is overrated, in my view. It is just an affidavit from someone that they think a person is related to a key. I've signed a few keys (not many, and don't ask me to!), and I've never once asked for any form of state-sanctioned ID. --Tim May Boycott espionage-enabled software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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