December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: joy of export, h/ware
by Michael Motyka 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>>What type of attack was used in the famous test? Known plaintext? It >>gets a bit tougher in the real world doesn't it? > > Not really. > Even if you don't know what you're looking for? Help me out with that one. > * PGPfone on a very fast cpu plus fast link is still less pleasant > than a noisy cordless (no pun intended). > You trust PGPfone on commercial HW enough to do your spy work with it? A system with dedicated audio compression ( http://www.dspg.com/ e.g. ) and a modem could probably be used to establish a secure, full-duplex link over the POTS. A microP, possibly with a small gate array to accel the crypto, would be able to handle the rest of job. Actually a pretty simple product. It could even use your dial-up account and be your internet phone. I know it has been done. I just won't be happy 'til it's in 50 million homes. > * We'd never take encryption hardware through the same path as modems, > would we? First used between companies, then used for remote access, > eventually you can't buy a bloody machine without one. Getting > cheaper, faster, closer to the motherboard, taken for granted by > applications. Ever seen a 300 baud, 40 lb modem, cost probably $3000 > in 1970 dollars? > Yes, I have. Fortunately encryption HW will not have to go through that sort of process. The frontier has been tamed, there are freeways everywhere - all you have to do is pick a lot and build. IOW - that 300 baud modem if done from scratch now would cost nowhere near $3000/unit. > The final level of deployment is when garage-door-openers, car > remotes, and childrens' toys (e.g., radio controlled cars) use > encryption chips... or chips with encryption, anyway. > The time is ripe. > The outside encrypting unit should also perform NAT, otherwise > the PC (doing the tunnelling) can broadcast traffic ('trap and trace' > in the pots world) info. > Clueless again! What is 'NAT'? > Email is so low-bandwidth that software suffices. > Absolutely. The issue there is more one of trustworthy HW and SW. Back to WINTEL/MICROSNORT. Again, !barf!.

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Wassenaar Addendum
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Caspar Bowden in the UK says by telephone that a Wassenaar spokesman told him today that the WA org will issue next week a detailed "template" which specifies terms of the recent agreement to control encryption. It will go well beyond what has been heretofore generally agreed to by the member states under which there was a good bit of latitude for each to determine its own policy. This is an unprecedented united front by the members, and the paper will be a first for detailed export controls issued by the Wassenaar org rather than by each nation. When ready it will be put on the Wassenaar Web site: http://www.wassenaar.org. We've made a request to DoC for elaboration of the press release yesterday which featured David Aarons' general claims, but no response yet. The USG may not comment until the WA paper is issued. Caspar posted a capsule of his infor on UK Crypto: From: "Caspar Bowden" <cb(a)fipr.org> To: <ukcrypto(a)maillist.ox.ac.uk> Subject: News from Wassenaar Secretariat Date: Fri, 4 Dec 1998 16:23:58 -0000 Message-ID: <000101be1fa2$9da127e0$dc77e4d4@cpsb> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 (Normal) X-MSMail-Priority: Normal Just talked to Dirk Weicke, Senior Adviser to Wassenaar Organisation. (Tel:+43 1 516360) No written details will be issued until next week, but gist is: *) No alteration to question of whether Wassenaar covers intangible exports. Up to signatory states to interpret and legislate. *) mass-market software, symmetric key length limited to 56-bits *) software generally available, but with other restrictive tests on end-user re-configurability, symmetric key length limited to 64-bits *) Assymetric key lengths (not sure how relates to above) limited to: RSA & Digital logarithm: 512 bits Elliptic curve : 112 bits -- Caspar Bowden http://www.fipr.org Director, Foundation for Information Policy Research Tel: +44(0)171 354 2333 Fax: +44(0)171 827 6534 ----------

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Re: Streams, Voice, and Sensitive Dependence
by Jim Gillogly 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"Lee Davis"<lee.davis(a)thomasmore.edu> skribis: > In any case, there has been a lot of recent work in dynamic systems (Chaos), > especially in the fast computations of Julia Sets. Has anyone seen a paper on > exploiting the sensitive dependance in these systems for pseudorandom number > generation? A number of attempts have been made to apply chaos to cryptosystems. The two that I've broken suffered from the same fault: although it's difficult to find the precise starting point (key) due to sensitive dependence, chaotic systems are by definition non-random, and have preferred orbits. If the cryptanalyst finds an orbit that's close to the one used by the actual key, the stream is mostly the same; this is good enough to hone the attack for the next pass. I'm not saying chaos has no applications in cryptography; only that the applications are not obvious. -- Jim Gillogly Trewesday, 14 Foreyule S.R. 1998, 19:37 12.19.5.13.7, 6 Manik 20 Ceh, Sixth Lord of Night

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Re: Mixmaster client 4 the Mac OS?
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Sender: loki(a)sirius.infonex.com Date: Fri, 4 Dec 1998 10:08:01 -0800 To: Robert Hettinga <rah(a)shipwright.com>, mac-crypto(a)vmeng.com From: Lance Cottrell <loki(a)infonex.com> Subject: Re: Mixmaster client 4 the Mac OS? Sender: <mac-crypto(a)vmeng.com> Precedence: Bulk Several people have offered, but none have produced a fully functional version. -Lance At 8:53 PM -0500 12/3/98, Robert Hettinga wrote: >--- begin forwarded text > > >Date: Fri, 4 Dec 1998 01:42:19 +0100 >From: Anonymous <nobody(a)replay.com> >Comments: This message did not originate from the Sender address above. > It was remailed automatically by anonymizing remailer software. > Please report problems or inappropriate use to the > remailer administrator at <abuse(a)replay.com>. >Subject: Mixmaster client 4 the Mac OS? >To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com >Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)cyberpass.net >Precedence: first-class >Reply-To: Anonymous <nobody(a)replay.com> >X-Loop: cypherpunks(a)cyberpass.net > >I heard sometime last summer that the mixmaster client was being ported to >the Mac. Does anyone know the status of this project? > >--- end forwarded text > > >----------------- >Robert A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)philodox.com> >Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism <http://www.philodox.com/> >44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA >"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, >[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to >experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' ---------------------------------------------------------- Lance Cottrell loki(a)infonex.com PGP 2.6 key available by finger or server. http://www.infonex.com/~loki/ "Love is a snowmobile racing across the tundra. Suddenly it flips over, pinning you underneath. At night the ice weasels come." --Nietzsche ---------------------------------------------------------- --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)philodox.com> Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism <http://www.philodox.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Re: joy of export, h/ware
by Jim Gillogly 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>>> What type of attack was used in the famous test? Known plaintext? It >>> gets a bit tougher in the real world doesn't it? >> >> Not really. Michael Motyka <mmotyka(a)lsil.com> skribis: > Even if you don't know what you're looking for? Help me out with that > one. The question was "in the real world": in this case, as opposed to artificial challenges, you often (or normally) do have access to known or chosen plaintext. This can involve expected headers ("\nSubject: " somewhere near the beginning of a message has a good chance of giving you a 64-bit block), standard plaintext (". The " is a perennial favorite), or known C idioms ("#include <stdio.h>\n") can all be tried. The EFF hardware is set up to look for various kinds of patterns. For example, it can check the high bit on the recovered plaintext, to see whether the result is ASCII. This is certainly the easiest way to get in if you're breaking normal uncompressed messages or source code. If it's compressed, you still may be OK -- most compression packages put magic file identifiers at the beginning, and some have guessable trees there. If you're breaking a transaction stream it's likely to be even easier, with the standard headers, even if you don't go to the trouble of injecting your own know transaction into the stream. -- Jim Gillogly Trewesday, 14 Foreyule S.R. 1998, 20:22 12.19.5.13.7, 6 Manik 20 Ceh, Sixth Lord of Night

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No Subject
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Citibank in drug cash probe GAO report slams bank for secretly moving millions in alleged drug money December 4, 1998: 10:56 a.m. ET http://cnnfn.com/worldbiz/9812/04/citibank/ Citigroup's Dimon resigns - Nov. 02, 1998 Citibank Buys Into Microsoft-Supported E-Billing Venture - Sep. 14, 1998 General Accounting Office Citibank NEW YORK (CNNfn) - Citibank secretly transferred up to $100 million in alleged drug money for the brother of the former Mexican president and violated its own internal controls on money laundering, the General Accounting Office said Friday. The GAO charged in a report that the second-largest U.S. bank facilitated "a money-managing system that disguised the origin, destination and beneficial owner of the funds." The report, entitled "Raul Salinas, Citibank and Alleged Money Laundering," could lead to congressional hearings against Citibank in the new year. Salinas is the eldest brother of Carlos Salinas de Gortari, who served as Mexican president between 1988 and 1994. There have been repeated rumors that Salinas was linked to drug lords. But according to the report, Citibank's private banking unit asked Salinas few questions when approached by him in 1992. As a mid-level government employee, Salinas earned less than $200,00 a year. But between 1992 and 1994 he moved more than $90 million through Citibank accounts. Checks worth millions of dollars were taken by hand to Citibank Mexico by Salinas' wife Paulina. The money then was moved to Switzerland through a complex series of international transactions. Starting in mid-1992, the GAO said, "Citibank actions assisted Mr. Salinas with these transfers and effectively disguised the funds' source and destination, thus breaking the funds' paper trail." Citibank has its own "know-your-customer" procedures, which it failed to follow in the Salinas case, the GAO said. It was only after Salinas was charged with murder in 1995 that Citibank investigated the source of funds. Even then, according to a bank representative, "Citibank New York's Mexican division believed that all of Mr. Salinas' funds had been obtained legally, with a large portion resulting from the sale of a construction company he owned," the report states. "However, Citibank reportedly knew no details about the construction company, including its name, who had purchased it, or the amount of money generated by its sale." GAO investigators also criticize the bank for establishing a Cayman Islands trust to disguise the source and destination of Salinas' money. Salinas has denied any wrongdoing, saying that the money came from Mexican industrialists who wanted him to establish an investment fund. Citibank said in a statement the report "contains gross errors of fact and interpretation" and "ignores recent progress in strengthened law and industry procedures which Citibank strongly supports in keeping with our commitment to combat money laundering, to comply with the letter and spirit of related laws and to continually strengthen our procedures everywhere we operate." Spokesman Dick Howe added, "We have looked into the matter ourselves and have found that neither the company nor any employee has violated the law. We're cooperating fully with law enforcement authorities." The GAO said it was unable to determine whether Citibank broke U.S. money laundering laws. But the Justice Department also is investigating the company's actions. No law specifically requires banks to know their customers, but money laundering -- concealing the source of funds obtained from illegal activity including drug sales -- is illegal. Salinas is in prison, being tried for murder. Citibank is now part of Citigroup (C) following its merger with Travelers.

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Re: Streams, Voice, and Sensitive Dependence
by Michael Motyka 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> It is my understanding that the PGP algorithm is primarily intended > as a block cypher. Therefore, wouldn't an Outer Block stream cypher > be more effective for phone conversations? Both solutions require > hardware for a practical (tolerably noiseless) implementation, so > there's nothing to be gained by streaming data into a block format. > Unless you have a really fast ( 1 Mbit / s? ) data connection you're going to want to do some voice compression. The algorithms I've seen break the audio into discrete time frames and (de)compress frame by frame. As a point of reference say about 16 bytes for every 33 msec of voice. Quality roughly follows data rate, of course. This makes a block cipher seem not so unreasonable. Block cipher or stream cipher, either way you're going to have to introduce a latency of _at_least_ a couple of frames to allow for resends or deliberate out-of-order frame transmission. This makes the block cipher look like the better choice. I think that using HW voice compression and a 33.6 modem you could get a full duplex secure conversation over POTS with a latency in the 0.1 - 0.3 second range and a direct cost in the vicinity of $100. With a reasonably quick microP any encryption method could probably be done as SW. This is not a particularly difficult device to build. Any fine US citizens want to build some prototypes? Mike

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RE: Wassenaar Statement
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text From: "Phillip Hallam-Baker" <hallam(a)ai.mit.edu> To: "Robert Hettinga" <rah(a)shipwright.com>, <dcsb(a)ai.mit.edu> Subject: RE: Wassenaar Statement Date: Fri, 4 Dec 1998 18:02:40 -0500 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Priority: 3 (Normal) X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V4.72.2106.4 Importance: Normal We have seen this type of press release before. Uncle Sam goes off to a conference and returns to state that the rest of the world has committed to its position - only to find out later that the rest of the world did not. Anyone remembe the time the crypto Tzar went off to the European Association (a non binding talking shop) and got a similar 'undertaking'. It is more likely that the Wassenaar statement reflects what went on at the meeting. But even then most countries in Europe have a democratic process in which decisions are made by elected representatives and not by beaureacrats at closed treaty negotiations. Just as the munitions acts under which the ITAR crypto regulations are purported to be made clearly do not provide the executive with the powers claimed, neither do most of the European enabling acts for COCOM. Nor in a parliamentary system is it quite so easy for the executive to perform Zimmerman type persecutions. If the same tactics had been used in the UK the Home secretary would have faced political consequences for the failure of the prosecution. The Matrix Churchill affair played a significant part in the collapse of the Major government in the UK. I doubt Straw would be keen on a repeat. The UK DTI proposals requiring GAK as a condition of CA licensing may appear to meet the Freeh objectives but since there is no proposal to make licensing a requirement of doing business the result is most likely to be nobody becomes a 'licensed CA'. There is a legitimate business need for key recovery but nobody offering those services is going to want access to the customer's private keys. Doing so would be akin to keeping triffids as pets. It is not necessary to keep actual private keys to achieve the objective of controlling access to the private keys. Phill --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)philodox.com> Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism <http://www.philodox.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Re: FC: So far, I think Mr. Aarons' Wassenaar statement is disinformation
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Date: Fri, 4 Dec 1998 18:19:58 -0500 (EST) From: Peter F Cassidy <pcassidy(a)world.std.com> To: Robert Hettinga <rah(a)shipwright.com> Cc: dcsb(a)ai.mit.edu Subject: Re: FC: So far, I think Mr. Aarons' Wassenaar statement is disinformation Mime-Version: 1.0 Sender: bounce-dcsb(a)ai.mit.edu Precedence: bulk Reply-To: Peter F Cassidy <pcassidy(a)world.std.com> Friends, In e-mail exchanges with EC ministers and government ministers in W. European nations that I have had about Aarons one thing is consistent. All seemed to be shocked and dismayed at his ability to report out facts to the press in the US and to the Clinton Administration that have little to do with actual events. It would not surprise any of them if Aarons' unilaterally declared a 33 nation crypto-control agreement that was based entirely on his baroque misunderstanding of the facts. PFC On Fri, 4 Dec 1998, Robert Hettinga wrote: > > --- begin forwarded text > > > X-Sender: declan(a)mail.well.com > Date: Fri, 04 Dec 1998 15:29:29 -0500 > To: politech(a)vorlon.mit.edu > From: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> > Subject: FC: So far, I think Mr. Aarons' Wassenaar statement is > disinformation > Mime-Version: 1.0 > Sender: owner-politech(a)vorlon.mit.edu > Reply-To: declan(a)well.com > X-Loop: politech(a)vorlon.mit.edu > X-URL: Politech is at http://www.well.com/~declan/politech/ > > [John is basing his analysis below on what's been posted on the Wassenaar > site so far, and these kinds of documents aren't always put online > immediately. That said, if Ambassador Aaron is talking about the online > documents and John's analysis is correct, the Clinton administration is > going beyond mere spin: it is trying to deliberately deceive. --Declan] > > ********* > > Subject: So far, I think Mr. Aarons' Wassenaar statement is disinformation > > Date: Fri, 04 Dec 1998 10:55:00 -0800 > From: John Gilmore <gnu(a)toad.com> > > I have not found a single confirmation of the Aarons statement that > the 33 Wassenaar countries have agreed to change the exemption for > mass market crypto software. (The NY Times and Reuters stories both > quote Ambassador Aarons.) > > This lack of confirmation includes the Wassenaar Arrangement statement > itself, which merely says: > > The amendments to the lists included elimination of coverage of > commonly available civil telecommunications equipment as well > as the modernisation of encryption controls to keep pace with > developing technology and electronic commerce, while also being > mindful of security interests. > > http://www.wassenaar.org/docs/press_4.html > > The Wassenaar Arrangement works by consensus; any member can block the > adoption of any item merely by voting against it. The policy Aarons > announced is directly contradictory to the recently reaffirmed > government policies of Finland and Ireland. In addition, Canada and > Germany have recently stated strong pro-crypto positions (while > waffling on the particular issue of the treatment of PD and MM > software). > > The Wassenaar Arrangement also states: > > This arrangement will not be directed against > any state or group of states and will not impede > bona fide civil transactions. > > To the extent that there is any attempt in the Agreement to control > mass market or public domain crypto software, such a provision > would clearly contradict this limitation written into the Arrangement. > The Arrangement is for military goods -- not for civilian goods. > PGP and other civilian crypto tools are not military by any stretch > of the imagination. It's hard to imagine that all 33 countries would > ignore this obvious problem, especially when it was pointed out to them > by concerted lobbying over the last several months. > > I also note that none of the statements are clear about exactly what > is affected. PGP, SSH, SSLEAY, Linux IPSEC, and many other crypto > tools are "public domain" rather than "mass market" software. The > General Software Note (originally from COCOM, and adopted bodily by > Wassenaar when it was formed) exempted both "public domain" and "mass > market" software from all controls. > > Finally, a companion paper released from Wassenaar yesterday shows a > clear concern by the body for human rights and fundamental freedoms: > http://www.wassenaar.org/docs/criteria.html: > > e. Is there a clearly identifiable risk that the weapons might > be used for the violation and suppression of human rights and > fundamental freedoms? > > (In this case if the the Aarons statement was true, Wassenaar itself > would be used for the violation and suppression of human rights and > fundamental freedoms. It's hard to see that the delegates would also > ignore this and vote to suppress human rights and freedoms.) > > So, I see two major probabilities here: > > * Either Aarons is lying, to see how much trouble this stirs up. > This would be taking a page from FBI Director Freeh, who > announced FBI support for domestic controls on crypto last year, > and was then disavowed by the Administration when a ruckus > resulted. > > * Or the NSA has cut a deal with these countries. Then the > question is: what did NSA offer in return? The usual trade > has been access to the flow of wiretaps (as in the UKUSA > agreement that gives Britain, NZ, Australia, and Canada access > to Echelon -- look who the strongest supporters of the US position > are). Another alternative is that they used wiretaps to > blackmail senior politicians in the recalcitrant countries. > (It happened in the US by J. Edgar Hoover for many years.) > > Do either of you have any info that would tend to confirm or deny > one of these theories? > > EFF and the GILC members are checking with various governments to > start to flesh out what *actually* happened. > > I should also note that developments like this are rather expectable. > Every time crypto policies get decided in a closed-door meeting where > the US government is invited, they get worse. Whenever crypto > policies are set in open meetings where the public and the press are > able to watch -- or even, god forbid, participate -- they get better. > The OECD meetings of a few years ago were intended to be the first, > but citizens and journalists swarmed the meeting site, buttonholed > delegates as they entered and left, and turned it into the second. We > should've done the same with this Wassenaar meeting. > > US civil libertarians are prying crypto policy decisions into the > light of day via the courts and the Freedom of Information Act. > Classified NSA/FBI testimony to Congress is getting declassified, and > then its obvious lies are easily rebutted by the public. > > The natural response of a bureacracy that is more concerned with its > own power to wiretap, than with making the right decisions for its > citizens, is to move its crypto maneuvering overseas into "diplomatic > meetings", held under cover of diplomatic secrecy, where they can lie > and twist arms with impunity. > > John > > > -------------------------------------------------------------------------- > POLITECH -- the moderated mailing list of politics and technology > To subscribe: send a message to majordomo(a)vorlon.mit.edu with this text: > subscribe politech > More information is at http://www.well.com/~declan/politech/ > -------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > --- end forwarded text > > > ----------------- > Robert A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)philodox.com> > Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism <http://www.philodox.com/> > 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA > "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, > [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to > experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' > > For help on using this list (especially unsubscribing), send a message to > "dcsb-request(a)ai.mit.edu" with one line of text: "help". > For help on using this list (especially unsubscribing), send a message to "dcsb-request(a)ai.mit.edu" with one line of text: "help". --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)philodox.com> Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism <http://www.philodox.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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PGP Disk
by Mixmaster 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Has anyone had the chance to try out the new McAfee PGP disk? It seems pretty straightforward, allowing for the creation of encrypted "drives" using the CAST algorithm. Is anyone aware of any security flaws with it?

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