December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

A Number Theory Problem....
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There is a desert which is 1000 miles across. There is a camel who can carry 1000 bananas maximum. The camel eats 1 banana per mile travelled. The camel has a total of 3000 bananas to begin with. What is the maximum number of bananas that the camel can get across to the other side uneaten? ____________________________________________________________________ The seeker is a finder. Ancient Persian Proverb The Armadillo Group ,::////;::-. James Choate Austin, Tx /:'///// ``::>/|/ ravage(a)ssz.com www.ssz.com .', |||| `/( e\ 512-451-7087 -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- -------------------------------------------------------------------- A: 533

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Re: Why do we need remailers, anyway?
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Reeza! wrote: > > ... the First Adulterer/Purjurer, you question why I > call him this > No, I'm questioning why you're telling *me* about it. -- an anonymous AOL32 user

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Re: propose: `cypherpunks license' (Re: Wanted: Twofish source code)
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Richard, you seem to be missing one of the major reasons behind the little schism developing here. You say that proprietary software developers shouldn't expect the GNU project to help them for nothing in return. Thing is, Cypherpunks *want* to help with crypto -- even if those we help make proprietary software, and even if we get nothing for our help -- and if GNU folks don't do that, well, we just won't be GNU folks. (More generally (and more abrasively), we'd like to make a license suited to our goals -- meaning one promoting placement of easy-to-use cryptography wherever it can be useful (including (gasp) in proprietary software) and discouraging the spread of incompetently-done, weak, or escrowed crypto -- and the GNU GPL just isn't it) By the way, regarding the GNU GPL's interaction with export regs: In general, the fact that action A is illegal does not mean you must include a requirement in your distribution terms not to do A. ... I agree that what you say is correct and, logically, should apply to crypto regs*, but in practice, failing to include the requirement you mention is asking for trouble. Ask Cypherpunks if you want to know more about that, as I believe elaboration in this post would draw <ahem>s from our beloved retromoderator. * Logically, crypto regs shouldn't even exist in a marginally free society, but, again, this is deep in <ahem> territory.

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Ozeafood.com - Update and Special Offer
by Adam Yared 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Netsurfer Digest: Vol. 04, #29
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text From: editor-bounce(a)netsurf.com Date: Fri, 2 Oct 1998 19:22:38 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: smtp2.zocalo.net: editor set sender to editor-bounce(a)netsurf.com using -f Subject: Netsurfer Digest: Vol. 04, #29 Mime-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk NETSURFER DIGEST More Signal, Less Noise Volume 04, Issue 29 Wednesday, September 30, 1998 <snip> BREAKING SURF Credit Card Data Compromised at Online Auction Sites Mark Dodd owns AuctionWatch, a neat auction site information center. He was running searches on the major search engines and by sheer accident uncovered a security hole in some software used by many of the online auction houses. It's a big one, too. If the auction site misconfigures its software, and apparently many do, the first happy hacker to come along can steal its customers' credit card numbers and addresses. Mark went to CNet with the story, which warned many of the affected sites of the potential havoc and scooped up a good story in the process. Remember, the safety of your credit card data is only as good as the security savvy of the webmaster guarding it. AuctionWatch: <http://www.auctionwatch.com/> http://www.auctionwatch.com/ CNet: <http://www.news.com/SpecialFeatures/0,5,26760,00.html> http://www.news.com/SpecialFeatures/0,5,26760,00.html <http://adex3.flycast.com/server/socket/127.0.0.1:2800/click/NetsurferDigest… ernetnews/123456> New Hacker Tactic: Slow, Coordinated Attacks from Multiple Locations A clever new twist in the evolutionary arms race between hackers and online security forces gives us an excuse to bring you this fascinating Web site. Hackers, it seems, have discovered herding behavior. Their latest tactic is to coordinate probes and attacks against online sites from a large number of separate machines and over a long period of time. By limiting probes to rates as low as two per hour and dispersing their sources, hackers can probe beneath current security software's threshold of detection. The Navy Cooperative Intrusion Detection Evaluation and Response team (CIDER) just released a report on the technique. The CIDER site is also worth visiting for information on security and intrusion detection software projects, notably a database comparing commercial and government tools. Cool spook stuff. CIDER: <http://www.nswc.navy.mil/ISSEC/CID/> http://www.nswc.navy.mil/ISSEC/CID/ Report: <http://www.nswc.navy.mil/ISSEC/CID/co-ordinated_analysis.txt> http://www.nswc.navy.mil/ISSEC/CID/co-ordinated_analysis.txt <snip> CONTACT AND SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION Netsurfer Digest Home Page: Subscribe, Unsubscribe: Frequently Asked Questions: Submission of Newsworthy Items: Letters to the Editor: Advertiser and Sponsor Inquiries: Netsurfer Communications: <http://www.netsurf.com/nsd/>http://www.netsurf.com/nsd/ <http://www.netsurf.com/nsd/subscribe.html>http://www.netsurf.com/nsd/subscribe. html <http://www.netsurf.com/nsd/ndfaq.html>http://www.netsurf.com/nsd/ndfaq.html <mailto:pressroom@netsurf.com>pressroom(a)netsurf.com <mailto:editor@netsurf.com>editor(a)netsurf.com <mailto:sales@netsurf.com>sales(a)netsurf.com <http://www.netsurf.com/>http://www.netsurf.com/ CREDITS Publisher: Arthur Bebak Editor: Lawrence Nyveen Contributing Editor: Production Manager: Bill Woodcock Copy Editor: Elvi Dalgaard Netsurfer Communications, Inc. President: Arthur Bebak Vice President: S.M. Lieu Writers and Netsurfers: Sue Abbott Regan Avery Kirsty Brooks Judith David Joanne Eglash Lisa Hamilton Jay Mills Elizabeth Rollins Kenneth Schulze NETSURFER DIGEST © 1998 Netsurfer Communications, Inc. All rights reserved. NETSURFER DIGEST is a trademark of Netsurfer Communications, Inc. --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)philodox.com> Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism <http://www.philodox.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Re: A Number Theory Problem
by Michael Motyka 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> There is a desert which is 1000 miles across. There is a camel who can carry > 1000 bananas maximum. The camel eats 1 banana per mile travelled. The camel > has a total of 3000 bananas to begin with. What is the maximum number of > bananas that the camel can get across to the other side uneaten? My camels don't understand/can't eat fractional bananas. My first camel put 2000 bananas at 200 miles then 1001 bananas at 533 miles then left 1 banana at mile 533 and sprinted for home, arriving with 533 bananas My second camel put 2000 bananas at 200 miles then 1001 bananas at 533 miles then ate 1 banana at mile 533 and found the energy to move the 1000 bananas to mile 534 and sprinted for home, arriving with 534 bananas My third camel put 2000 bananas at 200 miles then 1001 bananas at 533 miles then ate 1 banana at mile 533 and found the energy to move the 1000 bananas to mile 534 and sprinted for home, arriving with 535 bananas figuring he'd pay for his last mile with credit. My fourth camel, the biggest strongest camel, was already waiting at the destination and charged each of the other camels a 50% banana tax, rounded up to the nearest banana, plus a 10 banana collection fee and left with 832 bananas and didn't have to do anything but paperwork while the other camels were now short of bananas and had to find a new way to get more bananas. Mike

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2 books of potential interest...
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hello, I was in Bookstop a while ago and noticed two books that could be of potential interest. The first I didn't buy, "We were soldiers once....and young", about the Ia Drang valley incident in Nov. of 65 (I had stated it was in '64 in the discussion about "The Best and Brightest"). It is written from notes and interviews with the survivors apparently. For those who are interested in the issues that were involved in the Vietnam War it may be of some use. The Law Enforcement Handbook D. Rowland, J. Bailey ISBN 1-56619-471-7 $6.98 (in the cheap books section) Looks to discuss a majority of police proceedures and details the items of interest to police officers in performing their duty. ____________________________________________________________________ The seeker is a finder. Ancient Persian Proverb The Armadillo Group ,::////;::-. James Choate Austin, Tx /:'///// ``::>/|/ ravage(a)ssz.com www.ssz.com .', |||| `/( e\ 512-451-7087 -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- --------------------------------------------------------------------

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IP: Wired News: Report of military personnel medical records hackis FALSE
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Delivered-To: ignition-point(a)majordomo.pobox.com From: Bridget973(a)aol.com Date: Fri, 2 Oct 1998 22:10:54 EDT To: ignition-point(a)majordomo.pobox.com Mime-Version: 1.0 Subject: IP: Wired News: Report of military personnel medical records hack is FALSE Sender: owner-ignition-point(a)majordomo.pobox.com Precedence: list Reply-To: Bridget973(a)aol.com http://www.wired.com/news/news/technology/story/15372.html Pentagon Takes Back Hack Wired News Report 7:45 p.m. 1.Oct.98.PDT The US Department of Defense said Thursday last week's report of crackers penetrating military Web sites and altering soldiers' medical files were inaccurate. Instead, a "Red Team" of American military computer experts carried out a simulated attack designed to test the security of the Pentagon's computer networks, said a spokeswoman for the Defense Department. "The simulated attack is part of the recent exercises to assess the danger to unclassified material, such as personnel records," Suzan Hansen said Thursday. The confusion arose last week, when Money told the Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association Conference that crackers had accessed a medical database in the southeastern United States and changed blood types in soldiers' records. Hansen said that Money was merely referring to a Red Team exercise, not a real cyberattack. At the conference, Money reportedly said that the Red Team exercise prompted the Pentagon to develop a more restrictive security policy on the type of information that will be stored in military computers connected to the Internet. -- bridget973(a)aol.com Black Helicopters on the Horizon: http://members.xoom.com/bridget973 ********************************************** To subscribe or unsubscribe, email: majordomo(a)majordomo.pobox.com with the message: (un)subscribe ignition-point email@address ********************************************** www.telepath.com/believer ********************************************** --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)philodox.com> Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism <http://www.philodox.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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DBS, Privacy, Money Laundering nonsense.
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Long-time DCSBers will remember Unicorn's talk on money laundering to us a few years ago... This more recent rant of his on the Digital Bearer Settlement list is about the best articulation of his position that I've seen him write. Cheers, Bob Hettinga --- begin forwarded text From: "Black Unicorn" <unicorn(a)schloss.li> To: <tboyle(a)rosehill.net>, "dbs" <dbs(a)philodox.com> Subject: DBS, Privacy, Money Laundering nonsense. Date: Fri, 13 Nov 1998 22:57:51 -0600 Keywords: dbs MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Priority: 3 (Normal) X-MSMail-Priority: Normal Importance: Normal X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V4.72.2106.4 Sender: <dbs(a)philodox.com> Precedence: Bulk List-Subscribe: <mailto:requests@philodox.com?subject=subscribe%20dbs> X-Web-Archive: http://www.philodox.com/dbs-archive/ tboyle(a)rosehill.net comments: [...] > But I simply cannot comprehend the breadth of the agreement > on this dbs conference, and depth of conviction, that DBS money > should be designed with the **deliberate objective** of being > untraceable, for purposes of law enforcement or taxation. In the case of some DBS advocates you are overstating the matter. In the case of others, vastly understating it. > I have a lot of respect for you guys' intellect but I think > you're wrong on two fundamental points: > > 1. Rule of law. Money laundering is a critical piece in > organized crime. The democratic countries have banking laws. > Do you think these laws should be followed, or NOT? (Scurrying > of feet as all the DBS readers avoid answering.) Well let's examine this. The view that all democratic countries have banking laws really begs the question. "What are the differences between said laws." I can tell you with solid authority, they are many. I've often repeated this story here and elsewhere. It's all a matter of public record. Set the way-back-machine to just after Reagan has entered office. Ole Ron began to crack down on tax evasion and in particular offshore havens. Taxes would be cut, it was reasoned, but only if loopholes were filled and evaders rooted out. (Those of us old enough to remember might even recall nodding at the sense of it). This policy was particular hard on certain Caribbean nations. This was the time of operation Tradewinds (search for it in the congressional record) and other IRS black projects where the IRS actually violated local law to spy on foreign banks even going so far as to drug guards, steal the briefcases of banking executives, perform unwarranted searches, bribe foreign officials and all manner of nonsense to root out tax evaders which might also be U.S. citizens. For a long while there was a project which opened and Xeroxed all the incoming mail at JFK which appeared to originate from offshore havens. This wasn't in the 50's mind you, but the 80s. It was acts like these which prompted the Swiss to strengthen their banking secrecy during the Second World War. Just another day in the park in the U.S. Just recently this year Mexico nearly indicted several U.S. law officials for breaking Mexican law during the investigation of several Mexican banks. Clearly the practice hasn't abated much in the last 15 years.. (Note also that today all these methods (except for drugging guards maybe) have their legal equivalents in the United States, which is in itself a powerful statement). This continued for some time back when Ron was at the helm until the United States finally began to threaten to revoke the U.S. charters of certain banks it considered uncooperative. At this point a visitor, unannounced, flew into D.C. and literally dropped by the White House with no press coverage or fanfare at all in the late evening. That visitor was Margaret Thatcher and she proceeded to explain to Ron over the course of a few hours that if he kept it up many of the British Protectorates would literally have their economies crippled. Literally overnight the matter was dropped and the offshore centers left to quietly continue their business. So much for democratic countries with universal ideas about banking law, or the rule of "law and order" in banking regulation. This is but one example. So: Rule of Law - means little in the global-political scheme of things Democratic Countries Have Banking Laws - none of which are consistent or consistently applied Money Laundering is a Key Piece of Organized Crime - This begs a definition of Money Laundering. "Concealing the proceeds of a criminal act" sounds legitimate, but consider that it has been held to apply to a store clerk who sold food stamps for cash and deposited the proceeds in his personal (non-anonymous) checking account: Indicted in Federal Court for Money Laundering with a maximum possible term of 35 years. (This is a prosecutorial tactic to get a guilty plea to the basic theft charge). Consider also that third parties often take it on the chin with the wide definition currently applied. Case in point: Ma and Pa travel agency innocently accepts a deposit from notorious attorney of drug dealer. Their entire holding account is seized including the deposits of some 700 other potential travelers. After 7 years of fighting the seizure, the money is finally returned, without interest. (Effectively halfing the value of the funds). The business is ruined, its reputation in tatters. Ma and Pa fight it out in bankruptcy, lose their house, most of their retirement proceeds, etc. In the process this case sets the precedent that any amount of illicit funds ($1) deposited in any size account ($500 million) will render the entire account liable to seizure and permit it to be held in lieu of forfeiture hearings. That can go on for 7 years or so. Money which is "laundered" has its title literally revert to the U.S. Treasury. This means third parties who innocently accept these funds are liable for their return, even if they are passed on in the course of business. Beginning to seem silly? Money laundering is an invented offense. It's definition in the United States has grown so broad so as to be laughable, if not so frightening. Do not think that these are isolated incidents. So, money laundering in its commonly understood sense might be key to organized crime, but what passes for money laundering in the United States has little to do with it. Myth: Money Laundering laws have a serious impact on organized crime. This is increasingly nonsense. The United States spends close to $22,000.00 to seize $1.00 of illicit funds. Money Laundering today is extremely sophisticated and enforcement doesn't catch the drug dealers, it catches professional money launderers. Today if you are a drug lord you drop $30 million in cash with a professional launderer who cuts you a "clean" check for 85% of that figure or so on the spot and takes the risk of laundering the funds on his own. Myth: Money Laundering can be detected accurately and effectively and leads to drug and organized crime convictions. Nonsense. Assume for sake of argument that you could detect 99% of fraudulent transactions with the measures in place (entirely impossible) and that your false positive rate was only 1% (also entirely impossible). SWIFT alone processes $2 trillion per day. That's on the order of $600 trillion per year, just in SWIFT. (Add another $1.3 billion for CHIPS and $989 million for Fedwire daily. Oh, don't forget the foreign exchange markets, oh and NYSE, oh and NASDAQ, oh and international letters of credit, oh and...) The most sinister estimates of the global criminal economy (primarily drug money) run around $400 billion per year. Your false positives will identify $6 trillion in naughty funds that are actually pure just in SWIFT. Your correct hits will identify $396 billion in naughty funds in all systems worldwide. In this example you will have 15 times as many false hits as correct hits ignoring the lionshare of world financial systems. This is under the very best of circumstances. It's a losing game.. It's a game only the mathematically challenged or politically motivated will play. In fact, money laundering is a tack on offense that is brought to bear after an arrest on other charges has been made. The number of cases that originate with a money laundering investigation is vanishingly small. The payment system today eats up over 1.5% of the GNP primarily because of nonsense regulations like CTR's and other transaction reporting requirements which can cost up to $15 per transaction and (as we see above) have little if any effect on professional money laundering. Given these numbers the degree of "fraud" in the world financial system is far better than in the credit card system, which has pretty much reached equilibrium. (Fraud accounts for about 5% of credit card costs. Customer service accounts for about 15%). > There is a certain logic in the notion of having a legislative > process and laws. Our laws in the U.S. weren't written by > angels up in heaven, but they are better than some other places. In the case of money laundering regulation I should say almost _no_ other places. > If DBS participants advocate that money laundering laws are > not to be followed, I'm sorry but YOU GUYS have the burden > of logically arguing your position. So shut up and quit > raggin' on *me* about it. I would just like to see them applied with rationality. It's fairly clear that that's too much to ask of the United States. Interestingly enough it's typically multi-party systems of government that have a balanced approach to money laundering. Perhaps this is because grandstanding with things like "the war on drugs" isn't as effective outside of a two party system. Sheds new light on your comment about democracies and banking regulations. Some jurisdictions get along quite well without the nonsense perpetrated in the United States. Like Switzerland. Switzerland has one of the nicest things in a cash economy I have seen. A freely circulated 1000CHF note. It's worth about $750. (The United States phased out $500 bills long ago to deal with laundering). In Switzerland you can drop a 1000CHF note at a restaurant and no one bats an eye. In the U.S. you cant take a cab home from the International Terminal unless you have something smaller than a $50. Somehow Switzerland has manage to survive without looting in the streets and rampant crime. Luxembourg is in a similar situation. I tried to purchase a car some years ago outside of D.C. with cash. Completely legitimate transaction. No interest nonsense for me to worry about. No waiting for the car while the check clears. Simple. Right? The dealership called the police, convinced they were striking a blow against drug dealers. It's really gone too far. > 2. Practicality. Without at least a fig leaf of cooperation > with banking authorities and other police, DBS will not be > permitted. Transactions denominated in DBS won't be enforceable > in courts, and fraud won't be a crime. Reporting fraud in DBS > deal would be like reporting a fraud in purchase of heroin. Practicality? Of course any student of political science will understand that where government enforcement of contracts fails or falls short, organized crime tends to move in. Reporting fraud in the purchase of heroin to the right enforcement cartel tends to be much more effective in rendering results than U.S. courts I'd wager. Clearly, the United States would not benefit by forcing DBS underground. Several jurisdictions will permit DBS and enforce it. (I'm involved in the legislative process for one such law in a European jurisdiction now). If you believe that DBS should be outlawed then you must agree that cash should be outlawed. There is effectively no difference but velocity. > The principal reason for failure of electronic money, other > than cards used in physical establishments, is you can't trust > the seller to send you the goods. That's why everybody is > using credit cards, and bearing the 2-3% charge for "insurance". > > You guys seem to think untraceable DBS will be accepted, if > only a good enough encryption algorithm can be found???? 1% of the GNP. Instant 1% growth for changing a system of clearing. Think about that for awhile. > I think your ideas have a fatal, logical weakness. Without > any practical means to verify who got your money, or even > a legal *right* to enforce a contract, what good is dbs? > It's not even money. It's more like a coupon or something. What you are missing is that all your arguments apply equally to cash. Why is cash used if this is so? Prove to me that you just gave me six $100 bills. You are, "without any practical means to verify who got your money or even a legal *right* to enforce a contract" if the transaction is larger than $500. If only we could be rid of this pesky cash would could eliminate organized crime forever. --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)philodox.com> Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism <http://www.philodox.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Re: DBS, Privacy, Money Laundering nonsense.
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Date: Sat, 14 Nov 1998 15:55:00 -0400 To: tboyle(a)rosehill.net Cc: dbs(a)philodox.com Subject: Re: DBS, Privacy, Money Laundering nonsense. Mime-Version: 1.0 From: Ryan Lackey <ryan(a)venona.com> Sender: <dbs(a)philodox.com> Precedence: Bulk List-Subscribe: <mailto:requests@philodox.com?subject=subscribe%20dbs> X-Web-Archive: http://www.philodox.com/dbs-archive/ Also Sprach Todd Boyle (tboyle(a)rosehill.net) > > * If thieves could hide the money they stole, there would be substantial > increase in frequency and severity of theft; I think this is definitely true. Particularly if it is *easy* to hide the money stolen, as criminals may be expert in a particular field of crime that is *not* financial -- it's already easy for a white-collar criminal to hide money, using the same skills used in white-collar crimes of other sorts, but not so easy for an armed robber. > * Reducing trackability of money increases the severity and frequency > of collusive crimes. Reducing trackability and improving the velocity of money *does* do this, but it's a side effect of the more important (and wider spread) effect of useful forms of money: increasing the severity and frequency of all kinds of collusion and cooperation! This is what money is for -- exchange. That criminal exchange uses DBS is just saying that criminal exchange is a form of exchange. > > In mean time, managing the out-of-control government sector is your civic > duty, to your less intelligent wives, Heh...I'd be afraid of saying this if I were married or ever planning to be :) On an archived list, no less... :) > > You need a coherent argument on this problem. You need measures within > the DBS technology itself, to address the need. Opponents of DBS will > raise all these demagogic arguments. You'll be hooted off the podium. This technology is layered (ooh, bad word to use in relation to money and payment systems :). I think you will agree with me that the correct place for financial restraints (particularly voluntary ones, for auditing purposes, which IMO are the most important -- it allows you to say you are doing something, specify how it can be measured, and then have it measured, rather than just having some vague after-the-fact threat of enforcement if they catch you) on digital token money is not at the following layers: * Sub-atomic layer * Atomic layer * Hardware layer * Network connection layer and you seem to be making the case that it doesn't belong at the human/legal layer. However, there are two layers in the middle: * application (core DBS protocols, etc.) and * presentation (graphical clients, etc.) I believe the correct place for any voluntary restraints on DBS money is not at the DBS protocol layer, but at a higher level. This can be built into the clients people choose to use for managing their money, generate auditing reports, etc. This provides people with the freedom to use clients tailored to their legal requirements -- a corporation's internal financial system should be far more complicated and constrained than my personal wallet -- and makes it relatively easy for everything to interoperate. You can even design things at the levels higher than the DBS level to escrow parts of coins with third parties, this requiring their participation or approval for any transaction -- sort of a "registered DBS system". If you believe taxes are a worthwhile thing, a government could mandage the use of such a system where the IRS was a party to each and every transaction. This would work perfectly well technically, and would not compromise the integrity of the protocols -- it's just a business decision on the part of an issuer of electronic cash. It's easy to see how this could work with insurance schemes, split control of coins, etc. --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)philodox.com> Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism <http://www.philodox.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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