December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

LJFLJF
by Six 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Lying Nazi Fuck Freeh wrote: > Subject: Freeh letter to NYT > [From www.nytimes.com, Oct. 16, 1997] > > To the Editor: > > "An Attack on Privacy Rights" > (editorial, Oct. 3) > argues that the approach to encryption that the law enforcement > community is advocating has somehow "put the need to eavesdrop > on criminals above the privacy rights of ordinary Americans." > Nothing could be further from the truth. How about the fact that you are the director of an organization that actively sought to sabatoge the civil rights movement by, among other things, encouraging Martin Luther King to commit suicide? Is that close enough to the truth for you? > You fail to mention that the same court-ordered, judicially > approved procedures that now apply to wiretaps and electronic > data searches would also apply to our ability to obtain > decryption keys or information. No they wouldn't you lying, scumbag, Nazi piece of shit. You are *already* doing these things without *any* type of legal authority to justify your criminal actions, and will continue to do so? > Encryption that cannot be deciphered > regardless of the number of court orders or new technologies > obtained by the police will devastate our ability to fight crime > and prevent terrorism. Right. You can't find airplanes containing tons of drugs, you can't keep drugs from being sold on the streets and in schoolyards, you claim to have a list of all of these *known* pedophiles, but yet they are all running free, even though you know about them. This, despite all of the fascist, unconstitutional powers you have stolen from the citizen's right to freedom and privacy. Yet you have the fucking nerve to suggest that giving LEA's the ability to monitor all of our private communications, at will, is going to stop crime. Buy a fucking clue, shit for brains. All of the parts of the Constituion you have trampled underfoot, claiming you needed this to fight drug dealers, has resulted in the lowest street prices for heroin in decades. I'll make you a deal. If you can get the street price of a gram of cocaine up to $300.00 a gram, using your current fascist, unconstitutional powers, I'll support you getting the rest of the citizens' rights under your jackboots. > It will nullify the ability to carry out > court-authorized searches and seizures of criminal communication > and electronic evidence. No. It will nullify the ability to carry out UN-authorized searches and seizures of non-criminal communications. > We are not wedded to any particular > solution, but feel that some workable solution can be found to > insure that law enforcement can gain immediate access to the > plaintext of encrypted criminal communication or electronic data > that we have lawfully seized. Are the keys to the privacy of every living being on earth going to be kept on the FBI computer system that was hacked, the CIA computer system that was hacked, the DOJ computer system that was hacked...? So that corporations know whether to support your plans for Government Access to Korporate bungholes, would you please publicize a list of *which* corporations you have defrauded and brought to financial ruin by accessing and manipulating their financial data and assets because you disagree with their actions? How about a list of the corporations that you plan to do this to in the future? Oh...never mind. I forgot that today's allies are tomorrow's enemies, and vice-versa, so I guess that *any* corporation could be a future target of government attack. How do you brazen, Nazi cocksuckers find the audacity to announce to God and everybody that you are fucking over people and nations around the world by inserting bad mechanical parts into the supply system, trashing the finances of individuals and companies around the world that you have a hard-on for (today), that Swinestein has put the vote on encryption issues that the citizens gave her, into *your* hands, and then tell the citizens they can expect to be more 'secure' if they give you dictatorial powers over all of their communications and data? Who will be in control of access to the whole world's communications and data? Will it be the FBI guy who just went to jail for destroying evidence and perverting justice? Will it be the DOJ people who ruined the INSLAW corporation in order to STEAL their software? Or the DOJ people who subverted justice by defying our elected leaders in Congress during their investigation? Tell us, Lying Jackoff Fuck Louis J. Freeh... *Which* of the LEA officials who commit criminal acts and subvert justice in the US will be in charge of access to the citizen's right to privacy and freedom from fascist search and seizure. Bonus Question: "How many bodies does it take to spell, 'I *TOLD* you I was crazy!" Bonus Prize: 1 Freeh Bullet 6ualdv8 ~~~~~~~ > LOUIS J. FREEH > Dir., Federal Bureau of Investigation > Washington, Oct. 10, 1997 > > ---------------------------------------------------------------- > > How can he say this with a straight face? > > >In fact, what we proposed requires two orders from a judge > >before we proceed, not just one as now required. > > The DOJ proposal, sect 302, says: > > (A) A Key Recovery Agent, whether or not registered by the Secretary > under this Act, shall disclose recovery information stored by a person: > (1) ...; or > (2) to a law enforcement or national security government agency > upon receipt of written authorization in a form to be specified by > the Attorney General. > > It also contradicts his final sentence: > > >... some workable solution can be found to insure that law enforcement can > >gain immediate access to the plaintext of encrypted criminal communication > >or electronic data that we have lawfully seized. > > The term "immediate access" means without having to goto a judge. > > Roger

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Been tried before?
by Andrew Wiggin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I had an idea for a key system using graphics files. Has that been tried before? The basic idea was to use a graphics file with a color depth of 24-bit or higher. Then, using the rgb values of, say, every prime pixel (i.e. the first pixel, then the second....then the seventh, then the eleventh) or something like that to create a stream of numbers the feed into the cipher which would be highly erratic. A similar looking picture would not work, as the rgb values would be (I assume) hard to guess, and even if you came close, you would have to get the right order. If you used a graphics file format similar to PNG, for instance, you could even include alpha channels. Am I just shooting my mouth off, or does this sound like something that would work? I'm wondering if this has been tried before and if it would be worth programming out. --Drew ______________________________________________________ Get Your Private, Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com

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Re: Security flaws introduced by "other readers" in CMR
by Greg Broiles 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Adam Back writes: >You have a dual concern: you are trying to protect against big brother >and against little brother. At the technical level, is there a meaningful difference between the brothers? Aren't we really talking about third-party access to communications, and second-party access to stored data ... with the "brother" distinction being one made at a social/political level, as a judgement about the legitimacy of the access or the size of the actor, rather than the character of the access? -- Greg Broiles | US crypto export control policy in a nutshell: gbroiles(a)netbox.com | Export jobs, not crypto. http://www.io.com/~gbroiles | http://www.parrhesia.com

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No Subject
by Mix 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Timmy C. Mayonnaise carries a turd in his wallet for identification purposes. n ___ n H /. .\ H Timmy C. Mayonnaise nHnn . nnHn <U U/ o \U U> / /\___/\ \

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Re: OUBAKAYAROU!! (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Fri, 17 Oct 1997 18:25:39 -0700 > From: Bill Stewart <stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com> > Subject: Re: OUBAKAYAROU!! > > Meanwhile, there is a cypherpunks-j(a)htp.org, in Japanese, > and there's probably still a cypherpunks-e(a)htp.org in English, > though the last time I checked it, it had been > mostly a mirror for the cypherpunks list with almost no independent content, > and its mail gateway broke badly and splattered all over its subscribers. What is your problem Bill regarding cypherpunks-e you've made accussatory comments regarding that list a couple of times now? It is simply another member of the CDR just like SSZ or algebra.com - is your claim that each of these has their own indipendant content? If so, catch a clue and realize they don't unless their broke somehow and quit forwarding. If somebody on cypherpunks-e submits something it gets gatewayed through SSZ (and hopefuly others by now) just like traffic from one of the other member remailers. I wanted to gateway cypherpunks-j as well but we decided folks might get confused if there were something other than english on here. And considering both the -e and -j are in Japan, new, and relatively unadvertised does it really suprise you that they don't have a lot of English based traffic from that end? You must be the one(s) who keeps subscribing and unsubscribing to the 3 US remailers from a variety of (forged?) aliases in the hopes of carrying on the 'moderation experiment' meme. Or perhaps your hope is to catch one of us down and claim we're filtering because the traffic didn't show up from three different sources. I can't speak for the other CDR operators but I can say that SSZ cache's all mail originating on this end and sends it out to the other remailer sites as soon as we come back online. So nothing gets missed from SSZ. My internet provider is supposed to be cache'ing incoming mail to SSZ if we go down and I hope the other remailers also cache their mail as well. If not, oh well, I 'm not going to miss any sleep over it. Just in case you missed it the other day, I believe Igor has started gatewaying a new remailer as well because I saw a 'Test' message from a cypherpunks mailing list I didn't recognize as one of the known remailer hosts. If so that means we're at 5 remailers in the network. One of them in Japan, which meets at least one of our goals to get a remailer node outside the US. This is a GOOD thing. My offer to gateway the CDR to any site that requests the subscription stands. So, if you are operating a remailer with only a single feed point and that point is not currently SSZ please send me email and I'll add your site to my re-send list. As to cypherpunks-e, one of the other CDR sites should consider adding them to their re-send/subscription list. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there | | be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves. | | | | -Alan Greenspan- | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http:// www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________| ps Regarding SSZ's downtime yesterday, at this point don't have a clue why the system crashed without warning and then cored when it came back up. Once I got home and did a hard reboot it has worked without a glitch. Though we still have intermittent droppages of the ISDN link lasting 1-5 minutes. I have turned in another trouble call to SWBT in the hopes of them fixing it. That makes the 5th ISDN trouble ticket in 4 weeks. I think SWBT gets lonely if I don't call them at least once a week or else their field folks really have forgotten how to write...

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$1,000,000 For Christmas
by emailing＠tnlb.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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ISDN status - Intermittent (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: >From ravage(a)ssz.com Sat Oct 18 09:57:09 1997 From: Jim Choate <ravage(a)ssz.com> Message-Id: <199710181457.JAA02252(a)einstein.ssz.com> Subject: ISDN status - Intermittent To: users(a)ssz.com (SSZ User Mail List) Date: Sat, 18 Oct 1997 09:57:08 -0500 (CDT) X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.4 PL23] Content-Type: text Content-Length: 1548 Hi, Just talked to SWBT and they apparently show the ISDN line as disconnected. Upon further digging at my request they determined that indeed there had been some sort of cable throw yesterday. They issued me a trouble ticket number and will check the line. Considering the intermittent nature of the drop my suspicion is a bad punch-down. If this is so we should see the line stabalize sometime this afternoon. More as I learn it. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there | | be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves. | | | | -Alan Greenspan- | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http:// www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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Very important ! global minutes?
by newsglob＠tnlb.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Re: Is PGP still private?
by Kent Crispin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Sat, Oct 18, 1997 at 08:48:56AM +0100, Adam Back wrote: > > Jon Callas <jon(a)pgp.com> writes: [...] > > My reasoning is this: as PGP Inc can not justify expense on such > developments, my CDR proposal would be much safer for them to > implement because it requires no steganography support, or other > privacy patches to provide protection against abuse of the software > for uses other than PGP Inc's designers intentions. You keep talking as if your CDR proposal is other than vaporware. So far as I have seen you don't have a proposal, you have a wish. [...] > > You are in error. The only time that you are forced to use CMR is when (1) > > you share the CMRK with the other party AND (2) the strict flag is set. In > > all other cases, you can opt-out, on a message-by-message basis. [...] > However I simply posit that if you live in a scenario where everyone > you would like to communicate is forced to operate under your > combination: for example the local laws state all businesses and ISPs > insisting that they use pgp5.5 policy enforcer and turn on strict > flag. > > This possibility seems to be being discounted as unrealistic, or at > least as being optional, because you can by pass it. It does seem rather unrealistic. It would essentially involve replacing the entire email infrastructure, at a significant cost, and a rather sweeping suite of further laws that restrict the use of encryption to only PGP, forbid me running sendmail on my linux box, etc, etc > I can not see that being able to by pass it helps you in my scenario > if a) you will be detected when you do bypass it because the law > enforcers will discover they can't recover plaintext; This implies a law against using any other form of crypto, period. If such a law is passable the exemption for PGP's protocol will really be immaterial. That is, Yes, under an extremely draconian regieme, extremely draconian things are possible. "Tinpotdictatorsville" is not a useful counterexample, because the TPD can mandate anything, including no use of crypto at all. > and b) you have > a "choice" of not being able to communicate with anyone, because in > practical terms you have a need to communicate. Implies that *all* other forms of communication have been outlawed. Completely unrealistic. Adam, it is a complete and utter waste of time to debate this. What would *not* be a waste of time would be more concrete proposals. Whether PGP implements something is a separate question -- I would like to get back to the question of designing a better email encryption system. Your reencryption scheme fails because of the management of the short term encryption keys, among other things. Here's another approach I will toss out, without thinking through: How about formalizing superencryption, or tunneling? That is, treat CMR traffic as a transport medium for messages that are themselves already encrypted. The "key" idea here is to allow layering of non CMR traffic over CMR traffic. All the code for both is obviously already in PGP, with a little glue and perhaps some minor protocol mods... -- Kent Crispin "No reason to get excited", kent(a)songbird.com the thief he kindly spoke... PGP fingerprint: B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44 61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65 55 http://songbird.com/kent/pgp_key.html

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Junger Motion and Brief
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thanks to Peter Junger et al we offer his latest Motion for Summary Judgment and Supporting Brief outlined in the Thursday press release: http://jya.com/pdj4.htm (88K)

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