December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: [ZOG] MARXIST COHEN WANTS 'CURTAILED FREEDOM': CALL TO ARMS WANTED
by Rebel Remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

* Defense secretary calls for even more preventive measures. * * Terrorism is escalating to the point that Americans soon may have to choose * between civil liberties and more intrusive means of protection. Defense * Secretary William S. Cohen says. * * The nation's defense chief told the Army Times he once considered the * chilling specter of armored vehicles surrounding civilian hotels or * government buildings to block out terrorists as strictly an overseas * phenomenon. But no longer. Heavy shit ...and now it begins

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Re: PGP 5.5 available outside US
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Lucky Green wrote: > > It seems that unknown Cypherpunks have yet again shown their disrespect of > US export laws by exporting the latest version of PGP. The Windows version > of PGP 5.5 is now available for your downloading pleasure at > ftp://ftp.replay.com/pub/crypto/incoming/PGP55.zip No it is not!

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Request For Cash: TruthMailer services at dev.null
by TruthMailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The TruthMailer service at dev.null has become very unpopular. So unpopular, in fact, that we are now approaching limitations in what our abuse department can handle. The great outrage this weekend and subsequent delays in spamming various mailing lists are the result of this. For our immediate needs, we could sure use some more DRUGS, ALCOHOL, and BROADS. If a million people could donate $1,000 apiece, this would be great. If one million people donate $100,000 apiece, we can buy Micro$oft. Anonymous snail mail with anonymous cash (US dollars or money order) would be appreciated. If you want to be acknowledged as a donor on our arrest sheets, we can do that too. The address to send to is: Electronic Forgery Foundation Box 281, Bienfait, Saskatchewan CANADA S0C 0M0 A thousand bucks or whatever you can afford. We'll take drug, alcohol and loose women donations, too. Contact Louis J. Freeh <toto(a)sk.sympatico.ca> if you have something to donate. It might be a sting operation, but I'm not sure; Louis will know. PCP DustMan / Home Drug Lab for Molecular Structure and Design For an anti-reality drug recipe, send me mail with subject "Hi(gh)". Append "+realitysucks" to my abusername to ensure entrapment. Decryption is too important to leave to the recipient--Louis J. Freeh O "I'm from BassMasters, and I'm here to help you." |/------o -\______|___/- | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~|~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | |/ <}+++< *===================================================================* To unsuscribive or scrivibe send a message of UNSCRIVE or SUBRIVE to the email address _fuck_you_morons_(a)whitehouse.gov

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PGP 5.0: What were they thinking? (revisited)
by lcs Mixmaster Remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>On Thu, 30 Oct 1997, Anonymous wrote: > >> >> Where can I find a copy of PGP 5.0 which handles this "SHA1" hash extension, >> and the new forced incompatabilities? I'm looking for a Linux distribution. >> All I've found are Windoze versions, really old betas which break >> *everything* which calls PGP from a script or command line, and betas which >> have a lame expired timebomb in them. Source is prefered for obvious reasons. > >http://www.pgpi.com/ I went and took a look at this. They've broken the PGP functionality into several different psuedo-binaries which are just symlinks which point to the same binary. Invoking just 'pgp' gives this: >PGP is now invoked from different executables for different operations: > >pgpe Encrypt (including Encrypt/Sign) >pgps Sign >pgpv Verify/Decrypt >pgpk Key management >pgpo PGP 2.6.2 command-line simulator (not yet implemented) > >See each application's respective man page or the general PGP documentation >for more information. Now this, of course, breaks all matter of things. Some of this may be wrong, so feel free to correct it: Phil releases PGP. It rapidly becomes a standard for personal privacy and is used all over the world. Various versions come about including several international versions. Finally PGP 5.0 is released. It uses a completely new scheme, including DH keys. The Windows version purposefully excludes RSA key generation, in effect forcing people to generate DH keys. There is no UNIX version released. Weeks or months later, after incompatabilities were introduced into the system, UNIX versions begin to filter out. Instead of keeping command line compatability so scripts and programs which call PGP still work, they decide to break the functions up into several different invocations, all of which point to the same binary anyway. The README-BIN file for the "beta 11" Linux distribution says: >Rest assured, we WILL be releasing a source Unix distribution. >Unfortunately, licensing and export issues make this difficult; the >beta process for Linux will be completed on a binary basis. We >understand the difficulty this causes, and will be working to find a >solution in the future. They also take the liberty of coding in a timebomb: $ ./pgp This beta evaluation version of PGP has expired. $ pwd <censored>/pgp50b11-linux-i386/apps/pgp "lnx-b11" is the version currently handed out by http://www.pgpi.com, by the way. The "PGP 5.0 beta for Linux Intel (US version)" selection on their download page leads to a link to: ftp://ftp.ifi.uio.no/pub/pgp/5.0/usa_only/linux/PGP50-lnx-b11.tgz The current source distribution from that site is b8a. One of the README files from that reads: >Welcome to the PGP beta test program! > >Before reporting any bugs, please check the pgp(1) man page to ensure >that they are not already known. > >Bugs should be reported on the beta test web page at: > > http://beta.pgp.com/ However when one goes to http://beta.pgp.com they're confronted with a legal agreement. Of course the link to it from the front page won't work in Lynx 2.7.1 because it uses something called an "https" link, so the user has to type in the URL manually as "http://www.pgp.com/beta/license.cgi". After reading this license and agreeing to it, the user is allowed to reach the "BetaWeb" page. However the "public bug reports" link yields this: > Sorry, the bug report form is not available yet. > Please be patient as we get things ready. > > Please see the PGP BetaWeb for further information, or contact the > Beta Manager with specific questions. > > For now, please use the "Back" button in your browser to return to the > previous page. So maybe you can at least get whatever the current beta is and hope it works, right? Wrong. "PGP Personal v5.5.1 BetaHome"'s "Beta Software & ReadMe Download Button" wants a user name and password, but it's doubtful they have a UNIX distribution in there anyway considering the rest of this mess. Well, at least maybe the user can suggest a new "feature" for PGP 6 and that feature be "Release a source distribution which when installed doesn't break anything which calls PGP," right? Wrong. You have to have a username and password for that too. Well, obviously they want you to register as a "Registered PGP Beta Tester" to get this clearance. However "Beta Registration" yields: > Sorry, we are not currently accepting new beta testers. > We will be shortly, however, so please check back if you are interested. > > Please see the PGP BetaWeb for further information, or contact the >Beta Manager with specific questions. > For now, please use the "Back" button in your browser to return to the > previous page. And of course my 2.6.3i breaks on this "Hash: SHA1" stuff. So correct me if I'm wrong but the way I see it is like this: A new version of PGP was released. It was incompatable with previous versions. They release a Windows version but don't release a version which works under UNIX. Of course Windows users now start using the "latest and greatest," sending messages and keys all over the place which are completely incompatable with the version of PGP everybody else is using. They claim to be working on a UNIX version, granted, but that should have been released at the same time as the Windows version and *AFTER* there was an international version of PGP 5.0 available. Their UNIX version of PGP 5.0 also seems to be completely incompatable with anything which calls PGP from a script or program. In addition their UNIX versions are purposefully crippled so that they don't work after a certain time period, don't provide an override for this that I can see, and they insist on releasing binary-only distributions for Linux which prevents people from commenting that out. They have no method to get new up to date versions, nor do they have a method to report bugs like they say they do. Further the "PGP50-lnx-b11-6126098-1.src.rpm" contains the *BINARY* distribution, *not* the source. I've also been informed that PGP 5.0 encrypts to the CMR key without even bothering to ask and there's no way to override that short of hacking the key record. What the hell are these people thinking? Did they get into bed with Microsoft to try to get people to say "screw this" and go use Windows?

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pgp5.5 = clipper
by Adam Back 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There are some remarkable similarities between pgp5.5 and the hugely unpopular original clipper chip design. Both encrypt the communication key so it can be snooped by third parties thus creating a backdoor. I suspect that part of the reason there has been less outcry over pgp5.5 than for clipper is that people have a high regard for PGP Inc, and allow this to lull their fears -- "if PGP Inc have done it, it can't be evil." This is really insidious, and it is reprehensible for PGP Inc to use their reputation capital to give clipper like systems a positive spin. pgp5.5 is basically a software implementation of clipper: In PGP the backdoor is the second crypto recipient -- the message key encrypted to the CMRK (Corporate Message Recovery Key) as requested by the ARR (Additional Recipient Request); in clipper the backdoor is the LEAF (Law Enforcement Access Field). Both systems make attempts to enforce the presense of this backdoor field: PGP Inc's policy enforcer can be configured to bounce mail not encrypted to the corporate backdoor key; in Clipper it is the checksum included in the LEAF which allows the receiving chip to reject LEAFs which have been tampered with. Both systems are "optional" -- you don't have to use clipper chips, they will be "voluntary" (or so the politicians claim), and governments aren't currently using the backdoor feature of pgp5.5, and PGP Inc argue this won't happen (we'll see how this works out). Both systems can be bypassed in very analogous ways: They can both be bypassed by super encrypting traffic. With pgp5.5 the sender can send garbage in the CMRK encrypted field; with clipper Matt Blaze found you could brute force the checksum and send garbage in the LEAF field. Both systems can be improved to make them harder to bypass, something one suspects may happen if too many people routinely bypass them, and law enforcement views this as a problem (which they surely will if their snooping attempts are foiled -- don't forget Freeh is already on record calling for mandatory key escrow, and outlawing of non-escrowed crypto). Clipper can be made harder to bypass by increasing the size of the checksum. pgp5.5 can be made harder to bypass by using binding cryptography (allows untrusted agents to be deputised as policemen in ensuring the same key is included inside the CMRK field as in the recipients PKE field). It is easy for the government snoop to detect cheating with either system -- they attempt to decrypt the traffic, and find the LEAF/CMRK field is tampered with, or find the contained message is super encrypted. One suspects that an additional 5 year sentence will be given to people who are detected tampering with snoop fields. (This is not far fetched I don't think -- already we have heard proposals for 5 year additional sentencing for "use of encryption in a crime". If non-escrowed encryption is outlawed, surely this is the logical next step on the part of Freeh, and cohorts). PGP Inc cries: "oh but we have to meet corporate user requirements". For corporate disaster recovery of stored data? For corporate message snooping? For either requirement many of us have documented far less dangerous techniques to enable corporate message snooping, and storage recovery. Techniques which aren't likely to be adopted by governments as their snooping architecture. PGP should fix this quickly before the reputational damage is increased by more government statements about the usefulness of pgp5.5. and CMR. Adam -- Now officially an EAR violation... Have *you* exported RSA today? --> http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/ print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<> )]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<J]dsJxp"|dc`

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No Subject
by Georg Uphoff 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Georg Josef UphoffStud.iur.<A href="mailto:georg.uphoff@uni-konstanz.de">georg.uphoff(a)uni-konstanz.de <FONT color=#000000 face=Garamond size=4><<<<<<<PGP-KEY(S) ON REQUEST>>>>>>>>

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Location of PGP 5.0
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Where can I find a copy of PGP 5.0 which handles this "SHA1" hash extension, and the new forced incompatabilities? I'm looking for a Linux distribution. All I've found are Windoze versions, really old betas which break *everything* which calls PGP from a script or command line, and betas which have a lame expired timebomb in them. Source is prefered for obvious reasons. Any ideas? (Yes, I'm in the U.S.)

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Re: [ZOG] MARXIST COHEN WANTS 'CURTAILED FREEDOM': CALL TO ARMSWANTED
by Tim May 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 8:20 PM -0700 10/29/97, Igor Chudov @ home wrote: >* Terrorism is escalating to the point that Americans soon may have to choose >* between civil liberties and more intrusive means of protection. Defense >* Secretary William S. Cohen says. And no doubt this means GMR for all crypto. And if we say "No thanks" to the no-knock searches, the street friskings, the "Papierren, bitte??" travel restrictions, what then? Not much of a choice, eh? The spinmeisters are laying the groundwork for martial law. Just what we've been hearing about for years. Get ready. --Tim May The Feds have shown their hand: they want a ban on domestic cryptography ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, ComSec 3DES: 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^2,976,221 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: rescue Mrs Allen from the Feds (Re: Tim's worst nightmare.,..)
by Secret Squirrel 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >Attila T. Hun <attila(a)hun.org> writes: >> Mrs. Allen, 51, has attracted the sympathy of many neighbors, and >> her case has become a rallying point for those who compare it to >> Ruby Ridge and Waco as an example of overzealous law enforcement. >> >> she needs more than sympathy, she needs some action! > >I'm wondering ... surely all those militia types are watching this >case -- wouldn't it be a real coo to intervene and rescue Mrs Allen >:-) > >Let's talk tactics ... how would you disable the Feds without killing >Mrs Allen -- helicopter and nerve gas -- well organised get away? Question: Are the Feds involved, or is it just the State of Illinois? If the Feds really are involved, what possible justification do they have? The best way to help Mrs. Allen is to find ways for her to communicate with the civilized world. Maybe use a model airplane deliver a CB? Or a spread spectrum radio? Monty Cantsin Editor in Chief Smile Magazine http://www.neoism.org/squares/smile_index.html http://www.neoism.org/squares/cantsin_10.htm -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBNFaN+5aWtjSmRH/5AQGvDwf8CswVCjME+ISU3Mw/8BqChhkpZnNs7hor 0hHJZ/TgtkCcEKJCL8tTD+SgMhFTXRHVPVQRBUQ2flk/bYUsDQF/UJ/D0RhK/0yX 6M0ErILUmVIo9Qn1PJzRebMYdobzIo+Td0gqB5ET4kswGZphd+Oa9KBq20FHhXxr /uXz2ED0BaVCGLK+Fg3rmxiMg5OFWMzhjESTBkM0X9jhjFIQqqA+yniLkfDRoau6 yNonHOklxf/+VoxhD9mz8KtWc7r0AaHi05bjBJCzUpp4t14NuO1Bk9zUbhgkNIps cjAd3MVPAdpTVpw0okw2Z4SR4xV/E++Hap9e0Sf9mNB7oKiRB4v75g== =bbsb -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: PGP Employee on MKR
by mark＠unicorn.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I wrote: > stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com wrote: > > > Not true - you can't implement CMR without a mail enforcer unless > > you can stop your employees from using non-CMR versions of PGP, > > which is nearly impossible. > > No, you can't enforce corporate snooping without a mail enforcer. You can > meet the corporate demands which PGP claim to be supporting without a > mail enforcer. There's a difference. Actually, that's not entirely true. My suggested CMR replacement will work happily with non-CMR versions of PGP; they would simply encrypt to the default key, regardless of whether that was a group key or an individual's key. Hence the corporation can choose how non-CMR versions will interact by choosing whether to make the group key or the individual key the default choice. This even gives users an incentive to upgrade, rather than the current disincentive to downgrade to snoopware. Of course it still doesn't enforce snooping, since you could just seperate the individual key from the default group key and encrypt to that. Mark

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