December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Sweeps Week in Portland
by nobody＠huge.cajones.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

News from the Beirut of the West: The FBI, in cooperation with the Portland police and the TV show "Cops" is ending a six month survelence project of downtown Portland. Tonight, armed with large books containing pictures of suspects, they have congregated in the center of town arresting all of those caught in their video web. Over the last 6-8 hours they have been arresting hundreds of suspects in the downtown area. The arrests are a "show of force" in the downtown area. The police used to watch over the people. Now they are watching the people. Expect to see similar activity in the town where you live. "Be seeing you!" DonutMonger #666

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NIST Crypto Notices
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Two May 13 Federal Register notices by NIST: NIST is planning to develop a FIPS for Public-Key Based Cryptographic Key Agreement and Exchange. This notice solicits comments regarding techniques for consideration specifically including RSA, Diffie-Hellman, and Elliptic Curve techniques. This standard will be for use in designing and implementing public-key based key agreement and exchange systems which Federal departments and agencies operate or which are operated for them under contract. More than one algorithm may be specified, consistent with sound security practices, to enable Federal departments and agencies enhanced flexibility in the design, implementation, and use of cryptographic systems. http://jya.com/nist051397.txt (6K) NIST is planning to develop a proposed revision to Federal Information Processing Standard 186, Digital Signature Standard. This revision would specify additional public-key based digital signature algorithms (in addition to the Digital Signature Algorithm [DSA]) for use in designing and implementing public-key based signature systems which Federal departments and agencies operate or which are operated for them under contract. The purpose of the revision will be to enable Federal departments and agencies greater flexibility, consistent with sound security practices, in the design, implementation, and use of public-key based digital signature systems. http://jya.com/dss-rev.txt (6K)

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Re: Pedophile Russ Allberry continues to flame Steve Boursy
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

kibo <kibo(a)thecia.net> writes: > > [DrG - if you want to follow up, please dig up the original article, not > > my repose - thank you] > > > O.K., I will chop all of the header befor I post it, but this Russ Allbery Thanks!! > is becoming the biggest problem on usenet, since he supports Tim Skirvin. > I think it is time for Russ to grow up and deal with the Net like a man. > > Time for him to become a child molester. Well - if you want to say you heard that he's a child molester or that he sounds like one, no decent ISP will have a problem. :-) I think it would be fun to get Russ back on this list. > > By the way, has anyone had a chance to verify whether Stan Kalisch who work > > for the educational testing services is our net.acquaintance? Thanks. > > > > Yes, I called them at that number, and and boss called me back. Great - is he or isn't he the same person as skalisch@crl?? Thanks > All Russ has to do is say the word, and Tim Skirvin will stop his > shit. Russ Allbery is just as responsible for the Skirvin shit as > Timmy boy himself is. > > Time to rip Russ Allbery a new asshole... Maybe we should get Tim Skirvin on this list. :-) --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

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(rumor) US TV host canned over comments
by nobody＠huge.cajones.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Can anyone confirm for me that a US talk show host was canned for airing her thoughts on the aid package for Iran's earthquake victims? I heard "Only bad people and terrorists live there. If I had my way I'd drop an atomic bomb on Tehran." Anyone?

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Re: SAFE vote and cutting crypto-deals, report from House Judiciary
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 10:16:06 -0400 From: "Shabbir J. Safdar" <shabbir(a)vtw.org> To: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com>, fight-censorship(a)vorlon.mit.edu Subject: Re: SAFE vote and cutting crypto-deals, report from House Judiciary At 9:11 PM -0700 5/14/97, Declan McCullagh wrote: >* The heinous section of the law that would create > broad new Federal felonies for some uses of crypto was > replaced. The amendment, offered by Rep. Delahunt > and adopted unanimously includes eight hurdles: > > "Any person who, in the commission of a felony under > a criminal statute of the United States, knowingly > and willfully encrypts incriminating information > relating to that felony with the intent to conceal > such information for the purposes of avoiding > detection by law enforcement agencies or > prosecution..." > > It's a solid improvement, but this language still has > no business becoming law. Problem is, nobody seems to > have the balls to stand up and yank it. Delahunt, > the amendment's sponsor, said the bill without the > amendment "could have a chilling effect on the > development and use of encryption." He added: "I > recognize that some supporters of this amendment would > like that this section be removed altogether." But it > doesn't seem likely. I'm more than a little surprised at your take on this amendment. This exact language wasn't created by Representatives who don't know better, it was created, shopped, and marketed to the hill by the folks at the ACLU (Don Haines) and EPIC. In response to concerns from the net, they coordinated the letter from many groups to Goodlatte about the criminal provision which just about everyone signed onto. Then, EPIC and the ACLU worked out the language above, and got it passed verbatim in response to the concerns of the net community. They did a great job here and really deserve a lot of kudos. Why are you slighting their work? -S

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Re: SAFE vote and cutting crypto-deals, report from House Judiciary
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 07:26:23 -0700 (PDT) From: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> To: "Shabbir J. Safdar" <shabbir(a)vtw.org> Cc: fight-censorship(a)vorlon.mit.edu Subject: Re: SAFE vote and cutting crypto-deals, report from House Judiciary Shabbir, You're mistaken. I'm not "slighting their work" -- I called it a "solid improvement." Yeah, I know who shopped this around. I spoke with David and Don about this last week, and didn't write about it then for fear of jeopardizing their negotiations. And come on, you're "more than a little surprised" by my take? Give me a break. My position now is consistent with my position before -- and comes as no surprise. Reread my previous posts. But you're missing the point: this whole "crypto in a crime" section should not be in this bill in the first place. The new portion is much better than the old, but it still has no business being law. -Declan On Thu, 15 May 1997, Shabbir J. Safdar wrote: > At 9:11 PM -0700 5/14/97, Declan McCullagh wrote: > > >* The heinous section of the law that would create > > broad new Federal felonies for some uses of crypto was > > replaced. The amendment, offered by Rep. Delahunt > > and adopted unanimously includes eight hurdles: > > > > "Any person who, in the commission of a felony under > > a criminal statute of the United States, knowingly > > and willfully encrypts incriminating information > > relating to that felony with the intent to conceal > > such information for the purposes of avoiding > > detection by law enforcement agencies or > > prosecution..." > > > > It's a solid improvement, but this language still has > > no business becoming law. Problem is, nobody seems to > > have the balls to stand up and yank it. Delahunt, > > the amendment's sponsor, said the bill without the > > amendment "could have a chilling effect on the > > development and use of encryption." He added: "I > > recognize that some supporters of this amendment would > > like that this section be removed altogether." But it > > doesn't seem likely. > > I'm more than a little surprised at your take on this amendment. This > exact language wasn't created by Representatives who don't know better, it > was created, shopped, and marketed to the hill by the folks at the ACLU > (Don Haines) and EPIC. In response to concerns from the net, they > coordinated the letter from many groups to Goodlatte about the criminal > provision which just about everyone signed onto. > > Then, EPIC and the ACLU worked out the language above, and got it passed > verbatim in response to the concerns of the net community. They did a > great job here and really deserve a lot of kudos. Why are you slighting > their work? > > -S

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Re: SAFE vote and cutting crypto-deals, report from House Judiciary
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 10:59:23 -0400 From: Barry Steinhardt <barrys(a)aclu.org> To: "Shabbir J. Safdar" <shabbir(a)vtw.org>, Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> Cc: fight-censorship(a)vorlon.mit.edu Subject: Re: SAFE vote and cutting crypto-deals, report from House Judiciary Declan and Shabbir, I thought it might be helpful to your dialouge to give you the ACLU's current views about SAFE. The language significantly limiting the criminalization provision was indeed drafted by EPIC and the ACLU. Don Haines and Dave Sobel did a great The language was an improvement , but it doesn't belong in the bill and we are still lobbying to have the criminalization provision removed. All of us in the cyber liberties community need to watch this legislation very carefully. It could easily get much worse as a "compromise" is reached with the Administration. In the end,the bill could be laden with amendments on issues like key recovery that defeat our purpose of making strong and secure encryption generally available. At some point, we may need to say that no bill is better than a bad bill. At 10:32 AM 5/15/97 -0400, Shabbir J. Safdar wrote: >At 7:26 AM -0700 5/15/97, Declan McCullagh wrote: >>Shabbir, >> >>You're mistaken. I'm not "slighting their work" -- I called it a "solid >>improvement." >> >>Yeah, I know who shopped this around. I spoke with David and Don about >>this last week, and didn't write about it then for fear of jeopardizing >>their negotiations. > >Then why didn't you give them credit for it in the story? They should be >lauded for writing this amendment which is a solid improvement. EPIC and >ACLU did great work, and deserve more credit in your story than you gave >them. > >-S > > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------ Barry Steinhardt Barrys(a)aclu.org Associate Director 212 944-9800 ext 614 (v) American Civil Liberties Union 212 354-5290 (fax) 132 West 43 Street NYC 10036 **** PGP Key available at: http://www.aclu.org/about/pgpkeys.html **** Visit the ACLU Web Site http://www.aclu.org ACLU can be found on AOL at Keyword ACLU ACLU Supports the Global Internet Liberty Campaign (GILC) http://www.gilc.org

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FW: Anonymous Remailers
by Roger J. Jones 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 5:17 AM -0800 5/14/97, Roger J. Jones wrote: >Why is it that some who are very concerned about their personal privacy >utilize anonymous remailers that: > >1) Log all of their mail messages? Tim May Responded With chained, multiply-encrypted messages, logs are ineffective unless all of the links in the chain collude to trace messages. While this is certainly possible, it seems unlikely. Roger J Jones Responded Several of you have suggested as Tim has that the chain of remailers is secure. I suggest that the statement is only true to the extent that one wants to trace back a particular message. On the other hand, if one wants to find the source of postings to anonymous remailers and has skilled access to the Internet the task is quite simple and does not even require attacking the remailers. Of course, one could break the chain by having the remailers call each other outside of the Internet, but then of course the phone records would disclose the connection. Then again, one could hard wire a private connection between two remailers outside of both the Internet and the phone system but even this connection would be disclosed through reasonable traffic analysis. Of course, the simple fact that even encrypted streams need to include the ultimate destination of the message makes content analysis easier and weakens the encryption. Then again, all of this is a lot of work. Social Engineering and pure bribery would more likely be the most efficient and effective solution. Roger J Jones wrote: >2) Are in many cases reputed to be run by foreign intelligence services? Tim May Responded This allegation was made by some clueless Washington think tank authors. They provided no evidence, only innuendo, and they were unwilling or unable to provide any further comments when queried by several Cypherpunks. And given that many or even most of the remailer operators are members of the various related Cypherpunks or Remailers Operators lists, and are known to various of us, the notion that most (or even many) remailers are run by intelligence agencies is absurd. At 9:48 AM -0800 5/14/97, Roger J. Jones wrote: I suggest that just because you chose to characterize the sources as "clueless Washington think tank authors" does not (as they say in Star Trek - The Next Generation) "make it so". The "allegation" that foreign governments actively participate in actions to violate personal privacy ("borrowing" laptops from traveling businesspeople, taping phones, etc.) are all documented in various places. Of course, they could all the result of a single psyop with excellent results. But I doubt it. Tim May Responded Your first point, using some kind of Star Trek lingo, is beyond comment. I provided a lot more context than your original point provided, and yet you seem to want even more documentation. Go back and read the archives for a discussion of this paper (hint: search on "remailers" ANDed with "SAIC." Pay particular attention to the critique of this paper by such folks as Raph Levien, and others. Anonymous Responded Yes, you are missing a lot. The bit about foreign inteligence agencies is almost certainly a canard created by one Strassman at a conference in Boston 2 years ago, then retracted. Anyway, if you use chaining, it's irrelevant. See <A HREF="http://www.law.miami.edu/~froomkin/articles/ocean.htm"> http://www.law.miami.edu/~froomkin/articles/ocean.htm </A> and <A HREF="http://www.law.miami.edu/~froomkin/articles/arbitr.htm"> http://www.law.miami.edu/~froomkin/articles/arbitr.htm </A> for the gory details. Roger J Jones Responded Given that several of you have suggested that the "foreign agent" theory is a hoax I suggest that this does not give me much faith either. What we have is the classic case that it difficult if not impossible to prove the non-existence of anything. For example, presume that one could identify every real owner of every remailer in the Internet universe. Have we proved anything? Not really. Because in the time it has taken to prove the case, a new remailer could have been created. Or the remailer that one thinks is secure could be down with a different remailer operating as an IT spoof. Or, after checking with the owner of the "safe" remailer the owner becomes subject to the normal desires of life (fear, greed, power, etc.) and "turns." The existence of both type one and type two errors prevents even an exhaustive search from being fully satisfied. Roger J Jones wrote >Do they really trust the owner of the remailer? (Unless of course, it is >their remailer?) I seem to be missing something. Roger J Jones wrote further...... So, chaining does not seem to be a secure solution. It just makes the process more difficult, but not impossible. The non-existance of "agents" who would operate a remailer for purposes other than protecting security can not be proven. I still seem to be missing something.........

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Re: Difference in terms
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Lutz Donnerhacke <lutz(a)as-node.jena.thur.de>writes: >> key recovery is if I can get my key >> key escrow is if you can get my key "Key Escrow" was "We want your keys". "Software Key Escrow" was "OK, Clipper was a loser, but we want your keys" "Public Key Infrastructure" was "Here, have some keys" "Trusted Third Party" was "Hey, trust us, we want your keys" "Key Recovery" is "OK, that didn't work, but we still want your keys" # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp # (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies. Thanks.)

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TEXTO - Text steganography
by nobody＠huge.cajones.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

------------------------------------ TEXTO - Text steganography ------------------------------------ Texto is a rudimentary text steganography program which transforms uuencoded or pgp ascii-armoured ascii data into English sentences. Texto text files look like something between mad libs and bad poetry, (although they do sometimes contain deep cosmic truths) and should be close enough to normal english to get past simple-minded mail scanners and to entertain readers of talk.bizarre. ------------- Perhaphs this explains why, when I tried it, it signed Paul Bradley's name to the output. _Mr._ Nobody to _you_, pal.

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