December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Fancy a drink?
by Shift Control 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This week, in the Pub Issue of Shift Control... "Some pretty scary things are happening to British pubs - apparently in the name of pleasing women. Rat and Parrot, Slug and Lettuce, All Bar One, Wetherspoons - they all signify the general white collarisation of the pub with blonde wood and windows where the cheap repro mahogany and frosted glass should be." - Kate Spicer wonders what's wrong with the good ol' local. "Some London pub crawls have their origins in history (the Jack the Ripper pub crawl) or literature (the Sherlock Holmes pub crawl), while others are just a desperate attempt to justify a booze-up (the Monopoly board pub crawl). But the greatest of all is the Circle Line pub crawl. It has no discernible beginning and no discernible end. All that's certain is that the Circle Line has 27 stations, and somewhere near the exit of each of these is a pub." - Paul Robinson takes on the ultimate pub challenge. "Nowadays even boozing and chatting have gone hi-tech. And while electric toothbrushes caught on and talking cars are here to stay, is there really any justification for the virtual pub?" - Rebecca Fox asks if online boozers have really lost the pub spirit. Plus the Shift Control quiz: How wild are you... about pubs? Shift Control: serving a full measure of delights, NOW, at http://www.shiftcontrol.com ___________________________________________________________ Shift Control is produced by the Guardian's New Media Lab with help from Boddingtons and Stella Artois Dry To unsubscribe from this mailing list, send e-mail to shiftcontrol-request(a)nml.guardian.co.uk with the following text in the body of the mail message: unsubscribe

1 0

urban environment visualization systems
by ulf＠fitug.de 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

http://www.nttc.edu/solicitations/sbir/dod972/darpa972.txt DARPA SB972-068 TITLE: Multi-Platform Real-Time 3-D Visualization System Urban Environments and 3-D Terrain Imagery KEY TECHNOLOGY AREA: Computing and Software OBJECTIVE: Create a cross-platform (PC, Mac, Sun, SGI, etc.) real-time 3-D visualization system capable of visualizing ultra-high resolution urban environments immersed in global unlimited 3-D terrain imagery simultaneously. DESCRIPTION: Most high performance visualization systems are currently limited to high-end graphics deskside work stations costing in excess of $100K. The low-cost of high performance dedicated graphics hardware for personal computers and low-end work stations has made it possible to create a cross-platform system that can visualize virtually infinite amounts of high-resolution data in real-time. Along with the enabling hardware, a highly integrated software system that can effectively utilize the hardware with advanced graphics and data handling technologies needs to be developed. Today, this capability only exists on costly, difficult to use, and inflexible high-end systems. An advanced system is required to: 1) Visualize unlimited amounts of terrain and structure data in urban environments (e.g., large cities and military compounds containing complex structures) in real-time; 2) Implement state-of-the-art rendering and data processing techniques to provide the best possible performance for all types of data; and, 3) Run on a wide variety of systems ranging from high-end graphics work stations to standard PCs with dedicated graphics hardware. PHASE I: Define the visualization system to be developed, requirements, software architecture, high-level design, technical approaches, tradeoffs, and enhancements over current approaches and existing tools. Demonstrate proof-of-concepts on at least two different graphics platforms. PHASE II: Produce a prototype implementation of the system. Demonstrate capability on at least three different graphics platforms (high and low-end systems). PHASE III DUAL USE APPLICATIONS: The emergence of low-cost 3-D hardware for the PC platform has made practical the application of 3-D terrain and building visualization technology to address a variety of problems such as building physical security analysis (counterterrorism), urban planning, forestry management, geographic information systems, and architectural visualization. This program could greatly enhance the capability of businesses (located abroad or in the United States) and government agencies to conduct analysis of threats from terrorism or crime and to assist them in taking prudent measures to reduce their risks of terrorist or criminal attack. Portable visualization of urban settings enables any user to view their organization/businesses in a manner useful to identifying risks from bombs, sniping, or other security threats, and taking appropriate protective measures.

1 0

Re: McVeigh Sentence
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Tue, 17 Jun 1997, William H. Geiger III wrote: > "There needs to be lifeguards at the shallow end of the gene pool" Who said that originally? Can I borrow it?

1 0

Free investment information!
by 77574525＠msn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

DON NOT CLICK REPLY, IT WILL NOT WORK, USE LINKS LISTED BELOW IN MESSAGE Natural gas futures contracts on the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) have hit record high levels for the past two years in the winter months. But why? The answer lies in the simple economic principle of supply and demand. Winter brings with it colder temperatures and an increased demand for Natural Gas. Also, "just-in-time" inventory management practices have been adopted widely in the energy industry. Corporate attempts to cut costs of stockpiling have led to lower supplies. That was the past; what does the future hold? No one can answer that question with absolute certainty. However, key indicators appear to be pointing to another significant move in the price of Natural Gas going into the winter months. First, demand for Natural Gas has been increased by the U.S. adding over 1.5 million new Natural Gas heating units in 1996. Second, the American Gas Association reported that supplies in underground storage are only at 38% of the total nationwide capacity. Illustrating the point made earlier about the Corporations trying to keep costs of stockpiling low to possibly boost earnings for stockholders. What is the profit potential? An investment of $5,000 and a $.50 realized gain in the value of your Natural Gas options could return as much $25,000. How realistic is it that the price of Natural Gas will move $.50? The average seasonal price increase over the last seven years of trading Natural Gas futures contracts has been $1.44. The smallest seasonal move was $.51 and the largest move $2.86. How do I receive my free information on the Natural Gas and other futures markets? Very easily; just send an email to nmp123(a)lostvegas.com including : *Name *Address *Phone *Best time to call (No packages can be sent without this information and please place Natural Gas in the subject or body of the message.) A Series-3 registered broker will call to confirm the request for information. All brokers are registered with and regulated by the National Futures Assoc.(NFA) and the Commodities Futures Trading Commission(CFTC). Please only serious inquiries. Past performance is not necessarily indicative of future results. You could lose part or all of your investment. However, when purchasing options your risk is predetermined to the amount you invest. Commissions and fees will impact the total amount returned to the client. Options do not move dollar for dollar with the underlying futures contract until expiration date. If you would like to be removed from our mailing list please send an email to: nmp123(a)lostvegas.com. Please place remove in the subject or body of the letter.

1 0

Re: Degaussing
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> That reminds me... I have some old drives I need to take down to the > shooting range. (I want to make them an example to the other drives...) > > Sounds like a Cypherpunk project to me. ]:> Unerased data is a cancer! Only 50 Megatons of nuclear disinfectant can cure it! Lock and load!

1 0

AAAS Anonymity Project
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Mime-Version: 1.0 Date: Thu, 3 Jul 1997 10:32:01 -0400 Reply-To: Law & Policy of Computer Communications <CYBERIA-L(a)LISTSERV.AOL.COM> Sender: Law & Policy of Computer Communications <CYBERIA-L(a)LISTSERV.AOL.COM> From: EGEHMAN <egehman(a)AAAS.ORG> Subject: AAAS Anonymity Project To: CYBERIA-L(a)LISTSERV.AOL.COM The Scientific Freedom, Responsibility, and Law Program of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) is conducting an on-line survey to learn more about the uses of anonymity and pseudonymity on the Internet. The survey, together with a series of focus group meetings and an invitational conference, is part of a project being funded by the National Science Foundation. The project will generate a set of criteria describing the contexts in which anonymous and pseudonymous communications are desirable, permissible, or undesirable, and a set of guidelines for the use of anonymous and pseudonymous communications in those situations where their use is to be encouraged or at least tolerated. Please visit the Project website to learn more about this timely project and tell us about your experiences with anonymity or pseudonymity: http://www.aaas.org/spp/anon. Founded in 1848, the AAAS is a nonprofit scientific society dedicated to the advancement of scientific and technological excellence, and to the public's understanding of science and technology. AAAS is the world's largest federation of scientific and engineering societies, with nearly 300 affiliates. In addition, AAAS has a membership of more than 143,000 scientists, engineers, science educators, policymakers, and interested citizens dedicated to scientific and technological progress in service to society. AAAS is the publisher of the prestigious, peer-reviewed, weekly journal, SCIENCE. Project on Anonymous Communications on the Internet Directorate for Science & Policy Programs American Association for the Advancement of Science 1200 New York Avenue, NW, Washington, DC, 20005 Tel: 202 326 6600 Fax: 202 289 4950 E-mail: anonspp(a)aaas.org URL: http://www.aaas.org/spp/anon --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/

3 2

Walk the Talk.
by empower＠murlin.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sadly, 99.9 percent of all unsolicited e-mail *is* junk. But sometimes you find a jewel in the septic tank. We walk the talk. Discover an extensive selection of cutting edge information, free links and tools to help you empower your life with health, wealth and prosperity, including: ===> How to Turn Your Ideas Into Income Without Schemes ===> FREE articles and inside information ===> "EntrepreneURLs": dozens of valuable links, resources and contacts ===> "ResponsEmail" Marketing System ===> Hot Lists And much more. <><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><> " You will be astonished!" --Brian Tracy, best-selling author of MAXIMUM ACHIEVEMENT and THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SUCCESS "Goes much deeper than it's competition." --OPPORTUNITY Magazine "Based on tried and true strategies, that, for the most part, the experts have kept secret." --Author Anthony Trupiano, in THE BEST DEALS IN AMERICA TODAY <><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><> Find out for yourself. Just point and click: http://www.windansea1.com

1 0

ISP signatures on outgoing mail
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Anyone heard of a proposal for ISPs to automatically sign outgoing mail headers? Problem has been that spammers send email by one path but forge a reply-to or from address at another location. Most recent case is hotmail, which got blocked by netcom over a spam attack. Actually mail didn't come from hotmail, was forged to look like it came from there. Same thing has happened to remailers. They need a standard for which headers to sign, then a dig sig can be included in the headers to check that a message came from where it claims.

4 3

ISP signatures on outgoing mail
by Ryan Anderson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Thu, 3 Jul 1997, Anonymous wrote: > They need a standard for which headers to sign, then a dig sig can be > included in the headers to check that a message came from where it > claims. this doesn't seem to help solve the problem very much. The way SMTP works right now, spammers can frequently just connect to somebodies SMTP server, drop off a load of e-mail, and let their server handle it. (identical to how the ISPs customers drop off mail) All we get out of this is a way to blame those who sign their mail and get slammed by a spammer. Funny, this wouldn't seem to hurt remailers all that much. You'd basically guarantee that, yes, the mail really did come from the anonymous remailer. :-) ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Ryan Anderson - <Pug Majere> "Who knows, even the horse might sing" Wayne State University - CULMA "May you live in interesting times.." randerso(a)ece.eng.wayne.edu Ohio = VYI of the USA PGP Fingerprint - 7E 8E C6 54 96 AC D9 57 E4 F8 AE 9C 10 7E 78 C9 -----------------------------------------------------------------------

3 4

Re: PGP security problems?
by William H. Geiger III 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In <33BBCB54.2781(a)ai.mit.edu>, on 07/03/97 at 11:55 AM, Hallam-Baker <hallam(a)ai.mit.edu> said: >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >Hash: SHA1 >Robert A. Costner wrote: >> >> At 01:18 AM 7/3/97 EST, Carolyn Turbyfill (probably didn't) write: >> >The email forgeries using bogus PGP keys to give the appearance >> >that the messages are from PGP, Inc. and our employees are the >> >result of a sick, twisted mind. >> >> While a keyserver with no authentication has a very low barrier to entry >> for false authentication, the barrier is not that much higher for even a >> Verisign class three verification. I've continually said that the biggest >> problem with secure authentication is that secure authentication is not >> possible. >I don't think thats a reasonable assertion at all. PGP is positing that >they have an online identification technique. Verisign are asserting they >have performed a particular identification process and suggest that it is >sufficient for a particular purpose: >http://www.verisign.com/pr/pr_idfct.htm >Class 3 Digital IDs > Require personal presence or registered credentials > Used for e-banking, large-sum transactions and contract execution > Cost: $24/year for individuals, $290/year for entities/web servers >($75 per > year renewal) >If you are a bank or company that needs to depend on an identity inthis >circumastance the critical point is that you have a standardized level of >security. >In electronic commerce it is rarely the case that one needs to reduce >risk to zero. The question is whether you can quantify the risk you are >exposed to. Whether you can insure it. >> I hate to see people doing such things with keyservers and keys, but we all >> knew the problem existed. I wonder where the solution is. >The solution is to put trust attributes in the certificates. If you do an >email callback you state that that is the identification process you >used in the cert. >Two years back it would make sense to upgrade PGP certs to work in this >way. At this point however X.509v3 has become the standard, the most >commonly available form of email encryption is S/MIME which is built into >the default operating system from next year and comes with Communicator. >X509v3 may not be perfect but its there, it works and you can carry the >same information and construct the same trust relationships that PGP >supports. You can also construct other relationships. Looking at the >practice of using X509v3 with Outlook Express I found that the actual >mechanics of use were remarkably similar to PGP except that it was easy >to add in an entire trust domain such as my employer. >At this point I'm somewhat skeptical that a single vendor proprietary >solution should receive unquestioned support from cypherpunks on the >basis of history alone. The question is how to put cryptography on every >desk top on the planet. Bill Gates is a better aly in that fight than >Phil Z. >I think its rather silly for people to start complaining on this list >about the bad, bad, hackers. If we could trust people to be good we would >not need certificates or computer security at all. Making unspecified and >unsupported allegations against competitors seems to me to be a very bad >idea indeed. Phil what can I say except this is just BULL! Last time I looked the S/MIME & X509 v3 specs were not in a finished state. What I have seen of the specs I do not like. The sepcs are overly complex and fail to offer any added security over what can be obtained using PGP. Then we have GAK directly referenced and supported in the specs: >5.1 Binding Names and Keys >An S/MIME agent or some related administrative utility or function MUST >be capable of generating a certification request given a user's public >key and associated name information. In most cases, the user's public >key/private key pair will be generated simultaneously. However, there >are cases where the keying information may be generated by an external >process (such as when a key pair is generated on a cryptographic token >or by a "key recovery" service). Now lets add to this Netscapes support of weak crypto & their implementation of "policy tokens". Are these really the people you wish to trust with the future of crypto?? Are you willing to condem the world to Win95 & Communicator (2 of the bigest peices of crap I have ever seen passed of as comercial software). Phil Zimmerman has done more for putting STRONG crypto on every desktop than M$,N$,R$A or the rest ever have or ever will. Make no mistakes about it, our goal should be to put STRONG crypto on every desktop not just any weak peice of crap available. Weak crypto is worse than no crypto at all. - -- - --------------------------------------------------------------- William H. Geiger III http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii Geiger Consulting Cooking With Warp 4.0 Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail. OS/2 PGP 2.6.3a at: http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii/pgpmr2.html - --------------------------------------------------------------- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3a Charset: cp850 Comment: Registered_User_E-Secure_v1.1b1_ES000000 iQCVAwUBM7wJcY9Co1n+aLhhAQHL5AP+LHUhm9qzChoPIfZt3mClFCpk41Byx95D 0o/jxHBgyr1b4Xu96BiZXkNYn5Z/B7pXCyp8j5JU1nHs3een/n+Bg2V3gxZHK5hf dhAGyetvDHq1h9sxXtWi/3kVctJQN0dGH7TT7RRA46pG0CfIdn2LX/DbnI04COcf f3Xp+dve8wY= =PS/R -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0