December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Trademarking CypherSpace???
by jim＠mentat.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

An AltaVista search for "cypherspace" pulls up a Tim May rant on The Coming Police State dated 9 Mar 1994 on the topic, so it's at least 3.5 yrs old. Good historical reading, by the way... dates back to the Clipper era. Don't you hate it when the pessimists are right all the time? Jim Gillogly

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Re:New PGP "Everything the FBI ever dreamed of"
by jf_avon＠citenet.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Date: Sat, 04 Oct 1997 03:35:12 -0500 > To: "George F. Mayhew" <mayhem(a)globaldialog.com>, > Robert Hettinga <rah(a)shipwright.com> > From: Black Unicorn <unicorn(a)schloss.li> > Subject: Re:New PGP "Everything the FBI ever dreamed of" > At 10:58 PM 10/3/97 -0500, George F. Mayhew wrote: > >I think PGP, Inc. has seen the need for corporations to monitor their > >transactions at all levels, and responded with a simple, effective > … [View More] >method that keeps the core applications from becoming compromised, and > >thus less secure. As a private user, this doesn't bother me in the > >least. > > You know, you're right. Transactions at all levels on corporate property > can put the corporation at risk. As a private user, this doesn't bother me > in the least either. I think a simple effective method to prevent > potential liability might be to put video cameras in the restrooms on > corporate facilities. God knows what silliness goes on in there which > might get the company in trouble. Mandatory drug tests? Absolutely. > Seems to me that this is essential. Can't have recreational drug users > hanging around can me. By the way, alchohol is considered a drug by the > company. We'll be screening for that starting Monday. AIDS carriers? We > need to know. Never know when this might cause the corporation > embarassment, or, god forbid, liability. What if the local CPR expert > didn't know that Bill had the HIV virus and tried to preform CPR? Can you > imagine the potential liability? God, what about something more > communicable like TB? No, can't have that. We need access to all our > employee's medical records. Absolutely. > God you frighten me. Unicorn, as usual, you twist words like nobody but you (and a zillions politicians) can. You forget the fact that the association between a company and an individual is voluntary. As long as all the tests and surveillance done by the company is known by the employee, it can do anything it wants. Only, you are also free to find another employer. And in the old days of paper correspondence, what prevented a company to give five years of a given employee's correspondence to the FBI? As a business owner, I wouldn't put cameras in the bathrooms, but I would certainly *require* that an encrypting software be decypherable by the top management. Encryption is an envelope. Sometimes, it is justified that management open suspicious enveloppes. As long as a behaviour doesn't impair work performance, there is no reason to pick on it. And personnally, I'd maybe keep somebody with impaired work capabilities but negociate a pay reduction instead of firing him/her. He is free to find work somewhere. This is *NOT* coercion. Your thing about the cops having access to info is an entirely different story. If the company doesn't have the balls or the strenght to resist bullish tactics, then, it is their problems. The employee should simply have evaluated earlier if the company would sell him out to the first spook and choose to work for somebody else. What you seemed to imply when you wrote that precisionless paragraph is that, in the end, key escrow by the owners of the company and computer system is dangerous. But to the company, not having the possibility to decrypt the data they *own* and are liable for is even more dangerous. The data generated on company's time and pay is property of the company. There is no coercion. Everybody is free to act, find another employee or keep him, find another job or keep it. Period. Ciao jfa P.S. For which one of three-letter organization do you work Unicorn? -- Jean-Francois Avon, Pierrefonds(Montreal) QC Canada DePompadour, Societe d'Importation Ltee Finest of Limoges porcelain and crystal JFA Technologies, R&D consultants physicists and engineers, LabView programing. PGP encryption keys at: http://w3.citenet.net/users/jf_avon http://bs.mit.edu:8001/pks-toplev.html ID# C58ADD0D : 529645E8205A8A5E F87CC86FAEFEF891 ID# 5B51964D : 152ACCBCD4A481B0 254011193237822C [View Less]

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Re: Unicorn an NSA agent? WAS: New PGP "Everything the FBI ever dre
by Lucky Green 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:41 PM 10/5/97 -0500, jf_avon(a)citenet.net wrote: >Unicorn wrote: > >> borderline activity. It's hardly a settled point. That you are so quick >> to advocate corporate ownership of potentially private e-mail out of hand >> and without argument tells us much about your real position, Mr. >> Moscaritolo. Three words: "Expectation of Privacy." I missed the original post, but here are my $0.02. I encrypt all outgoing encrypted work email to my own key as … [View More]

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Re: Unicorn an NSA agent? WAS: New PGP "Everything the FBI ever dre
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[I'm not on cypherpunks anymore, anyone there who wants to put me through the wringer without having to endure my response might not want to CC: me.] At 10:41 PM 10/5/97 -0500, jf_avon(a)citenet.net wrote: >Unicorn wrote: > >> borderline activity. It's hardly a settled point. That you are so quick >> to advocate corporate ownership of potentially private e-mail out of hand >> and without argument tells us much about your real position, Mr. >> Moscaritolo. … [View More]Three words: "Expectation of Privacy." > >Unicorn, > >In that piece of knowledge smashing, just as you do in most >of your posts, you again mixed up things to make sure that everybody >end up knowing less than when they started. > >It is peoples like you that ended up with using Expectation of >Privacy out of it's rightfull context. Apart from various rulings of >various judges that probably smoked various herbs, can you please >tell me how anybody can rightfully expect privacy when everything >that permits them to exchange information is *owned* by somebody else >and that the use of this equipment is there *only* for the activities >of the owner of the equipment? Remember when the phone company used to lease you your phone? Surely that doesn't make the data that goes over the phone their property? If my doctor calls me at work with the results of a critical test, you believe that data is no longer private? I hope not. You think whatever goes on in a rental car I drive is the property of the rental company? That if some company rented the car they are entitled to read whatever papers I have in there? What about a hotel? A leased apartment? A restraunt back room? I challenge the "ownership gives the owner the right to all that occurs or is produced on or in the property" premise because it is just not a valid one, legally or (in my opinion) ethically. >If it weren't of the business, the >damn computer wouldn't be there. I know of many companies, consulting, law firms, accounting firms, in which employees own their own machines, laptops for example, or PDAs. Even where this is not the case, I still resist the premise that ownership of a computer translates to ownership of all the data thereon. I'm sure hackers would love it if they got title to all the data they download. Unfortunately for this position it just doesn't work that way, nor should it. I suppose ISPs could take the position that encrypted data on their systems must also be encrypted with the ISPs root key. Are you telling me you'd not have a problem with that because the ISP owns all the data on its systems? >And beside, the employee is not >paid to chat with friends, he's paid to work. If he doesn't want to >work, just fine, but not on the company's pay... Actually, most large modern firms I'm familiar with approve of and expect some degree of personal business to be transacted in the work place. Some even state this explicitly in their corporate policies and define the level of personal business that is appropriate. Never have I seen one which insists that no personal business of any kind is to be tolerated. I doubt such a firm would have a reasonable retention rate either. >Somehow, you basic premises always blows my mind. I think that you >are a *very* dangerous person. I think I might take that as a compliment coming from someone who advocates the kind of data ownership views that you seem to. I hope to be thought of as dangerous by those kind of entities. >I've been watching you for almost >three years over Cypherpunks and e$-etc and other forums. >Virtually *all* of your posts have this >blow-up-their-basic-premises-and-let-them-with-nothing-but-confusion >style. Blame law school. If my position on this issue makes me some kind of troublemaker, you better point the same finger at Schneier, who (if quoted accurately) shares my view. >Your style shows intelligence and skill in the way you do >it, which rules out idiocy on your part. So, clearly, you have >an agenda I do. Unimparied privacy for individuals in all contexts. Now tell me how PGP5.5 contributes to that cause, particularly in the current political climate. The timing looks extremely suspect to me. Challenging the premise that corporates own the flesh and mind of every employee within the walls of their facilities doesn't really strike me as something pro-estlablishment or bearing the hallmarks of some sinister plot, unless perhaps one is on a law-enforcement or far right corporate-facist spectrum. P2, the italian corporate-facist movement, held similar views after the second world war, so your ideas are not new. My view is, however, that this is the wrong way for the world to progress. If beliving that employees don't sell their souls to large corporations because they accept their paychecks is evil, call me evil. At the same time I beleve that companies don't tell their soul to a given government just because they do business on a given "soil." This strikes me as consistant. Perhaps you will disagree. >I cannot help but having the nagging feeling that you're on some >three-letter agency payroll because you have the uncanny habit of >disrupting and diverting some important discussion. If correcting legal errors, highlighting the flaws in basic premises and pointing out general gaps in logic, which is what I think I've been doing for the many years I've been poking around on c'punks an elsewhere, is disrupting and diverting, perhaps the "important discussions" are on the wrong tact. Glazing over the messy details of any policy, which seems to be what your "disrupting and diverting some important discussion" clause is advocating, is a rather sly tactic really. "If all these privacy extremists would just shut up about the details of our plan, we could get something done without diversion and distraction." Sound familiar? Always look at those calling for silence with suspicion. >I always wanted >to killfile you but always refrained to do so just to be able to read >the last finely crafted basic premises-smashing abomination. Actually, I don't even usually proofread my stuff. I'm pleased it gives you the impression of some fine craftsmanship, or bears the indications of some grand conspiracy, but in reality its off the top of my head. The consistancy you see is probably because I don't waiver in my principles when it comes to privacy. >So, again, which of the three-letter agency sends you a paycheck? Clearly, any answer I deliver to this question only harms me. I've seen this trick before. >Or are you doing is only for a secret decoration? What kind of decoration? Are you offering me one? (Aside from "Snide Asshole Lawyer of the Year" or something I mean). [View Less]

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Internet Kiosk New Revenue For ISP
by netpecker＠freemanchester.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Attention Internet Service Provides. NetPecker Inc. is now making a limited time offering for distributors of following equipment NetPecker VM4100 a free standing Internet terminal / kiosk ideal for shopping malls, hotel lobbies, restaurants, etc. Advertise your Internet service and collect cash at the same time. Cash and informational terminal / kiosk now available. Purchase lease options. Retail starting price $4995.00. Benefits: New revenues, leverage your infrastructure, increased name … [View More]

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No Subject
by shiatan＠workline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

F <shiatan(a)workline.com> R <cypherpunks(a)toad.com> (remote destination) X - Start Received: by soi.hyperchat.com id 017b00 at Mon, 06 Oct 1997 13:59:36 -600 (Mountain Daylight Time) Message-ID: <34394257.1CF8(a)workline.com> Date: Mon, 06 Oct 1997 15:56:07 -0400 From: shiatan <shiatan(a)workline.com> X-Mailer: Mozilla 3.01 (Win95; I) MIME-Version: 1.0 To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Subject: Re: Zip drive security... Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-… [View More]

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Sameer Parekh and C2Net offer a $50,000 reward for the killing of Zionist Vulis
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Allah akbar! God is great! Sameer Parekh and C2Net have placed a $50,000 contract on the life of the miserable Zionist Dimitri Vulis residing at: 67-67 Burns St Forest Hills, NY 11375 U.S. of A. Sameer Parekh is the official supplier of cryprographic software to the Palestine Liberation Organization and Hamas. Death to the Zionist aggressors! Death to Vulis! God is great!

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Re: New PGP "Everything the FBI ever dreamed of"
by Bill Frantz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 9:52 AM -0700 10/3/97, Robert Hettinga wrote: >Comments? > >From: Martin Minow <minow(a)apple.com> >"The new version also includes some of the most sophisticated techniques >for enforcing this policy through the corporation. The most novel may be a >new version of software controlling a company's SMTP server, the machine >that acts as the central mailroom for a corporation. PGP provides a >software agent that will read all of the mail to make sure that it … [View More]

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Re: Sameer Parekh and C2Net offer a $50,000 reward for the killing of Zionist Vulis
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Anonymous wrote: > Allah akbar! God is great! Sameer Parekh and C2Net have placed a $50,000 > contract on the life of the miserable Zionist Dimitri Vulis residing at: > 67-67 Burns St > Forest Hills, NY 11375 > U.S. of A. > Sameer Parekh is the official supplier of cryprographic software to the > Palestine Liberation Organization and Hamas. This would explain the "Infidel Inside!" sticker on the Stronghold software packaging. > Death to the Zionist aggressors! … [View More]

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Transmission Management
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Lucky Green wrote: >And PGP's Policy Enforcer has another side to it: have you ever >forgotten to encrypt email that should have been encrypted? I >have. With the Policy Enforcer installed, that can't happen. Which >may well save big hassles in the future. (This feature is independent of the GAK aspects of the product.) It's probably a good idea to set up your mailer so that it discourages transmission of unencrypted mail. This could be as … [View More]simple as a sequence of questions: "Do you want to do this?", "Do you really want to do this?", and "Are you absolutely one hundred percent sure that it is a good idea to put this message on tape at Fort Meade for eternity?" But, you could make more amusing warnings. For example, the mailer could convert your message into a front page article for the New York Times and show you what it will look like. Agencies which handle encrypted communications typically track every message sent. We should do the same thing. Most people probably do this in an informal way, but really slick tools for doing this would have their uses. This is especially true when managing an identity. Not only would it be nice to track every transmission in a nice easy to assess way, but also track exactly how it was transmitted, the precise time of transmission, and the remailers used to deliver it. This raw information would be neat to have, but it wouldn't get really useful without an analysis tool. For instance, you could see how much your identity depends on the security of certain remailers. If you use one remailer in your chains a lot, you might want to have something which warns you that you are becoming overly dependent on that remailer. Or, you might want to run "what if" scenarios to see if you would be vulnerable if a particular set of remailers were compromised. If the analysis tool were really good, it would hunt for weaknesses based on known remailer attacks. And, naturally, for proper identity management it would be important to keep a running score for the odds that each identity were compromised and by which threats. Monty Cantsin Editor in Chief Smile Magazine http://www.neoism.org/squares/smile_index.html http://www.neoism.org/squares/cantsin_10.html -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBNDh0V5aWtjSmRH/5AQFyFwf+OhIbig7B/njU1yTlDdIuBHs3jpYyH6Ol /+Cjk9X2MbFkYGec3vm8muf1alGI/8ZH+NV73cXry1rN8FqdIY/eoJX5OoRhTQpa ajQFNnSaufbY2xgx45o7S+jFCFGaasInjsvl7q78iH8JL2seXgG3t7HNsK/SZOqD lZynyUqCaVssiSTkDHiZx72TUPJbhUCOvkoKdiy5evQlN7PPyKNmajB9INbzin7z qKqfyyHyFR+Gu618IojassyZ9wuEzbjMStTRMf8TGOo8yJWaH0+W7KX9JHVF3Zdv EjINSw7EBxMAOk83AY9YP0nuLJnwaEoloKifX6D+MmQ+Jx9Js2ocuA== =HUZ7 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- [View Less]

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