December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

cypherpunks-e list problem - blank subject lines
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi, The remailer software used for the cypherpunks-j and cypherpunks-e mailing lists does not accept empty subject: lines. Until they can arrange a work-around it would behoove authors to be shure to include something in the subject: line of the header. FYI. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there | | be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves. | | | | -Alan Greenspan- | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http:// www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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Re: do NOT escrow communications keys
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > There may be patents on these technologies, too. > > Don't think so. It's simple enough technology. Take a look at 5493614 : Private signature and proof systems INVENTORS: Chaum; David, Sherman Oaks, CA 91403 ISSUED: Feb. 20, 1996 FILED: May 3 , 1994 ABSTRACT: Cryptographic methods and apparatus for forming (102) and verifying (103) private signatures and proofs (203,204, 207, and 209) are disclosed. Such a signature convinces the intended recipient that it is a valid undeniable or designated-confirmer signature. And such a proof convinces the intended recipient, just as any cryptographic proof. Even though the signatures and proofs are convincing to the intended recipient, they are not convincing to others who may obtain them. Unlike previously known techniques for convincing without transferring the ability to convince others, those disclosed here do not require interaction--a signature or proof can simply be sent as a single message. Because the intended recipient can forge the signatures and proofs, they are not convincing to others; but since only the intended recipient can forge them, they are convincing to the intended recipient. Exemplary embodiments use a cryptographic challenge value that is said to pivot on a trap-door function, in that the value can be manipulated by those with the corresponding trap-door information, and is believed impractical to manipulate without it.

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Re: PGP CAKware & IETF controlled Open-PGP standard
by William Allen Simpson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm getting a bit tired of the rants on this topic to the Open-PGP list. Yes, there are problems, but the whole purpose of IETF review is to find solutions to problems. The PGP staff have some ideas on how business message recovery can be done. It seems there is a business need. It seems that they have thought about it, and made some effort toward implementation. What annoys me is that the PGP formats are now supposed to be "open", yet no proposed formats for this new "feature" have been documented for our review, and other folks' suggestions for a better K-of-N mechanism have been ignored. We don't even have the current formats. When will the PGP 5.0 internet-draft be ready for review? There is already a PGP 5.0 separation between signing and communication keys; why not have separate message storage keys? Why not have a K-of-N system for BMR? Why have a communication enforcement filter, when the only usage is supposed to be for recovering archival storage? Let us decide _what_ the goals are, _how_ to solve the problems, and _then_ decide the protocol details and formats to match the solution. WSimpson(a)UMich.edu Key fingerprint = 17 40 5E 67 15 6F 31 26 DD 0D B9 9B 6A 15 2C 32

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Get Paid To Advertise!
by business＠mail.t-1net.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hello! If you would like to find out how you can get paid to advertise your own product, service or business on the Internet, please reply to <megamoneymakers(a)mail.t-1net.com> and type 'info' in the subject line. If this has been sent to you in error, please accept my apology and reply to the forementioned address and type 'remove' in the subject line to be taken off my mailing list.

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For Adults Only!!
by biy71＠ix.netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Re: 6502 ML programming (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Fri, 10 Oct 1997 21:18:16 -0700 > From: Jonathan Wienke <JonWienk(a)ix.netcom.com> > Subject: Re: 6502 ML programming > for my 128! Unfortunately, nobody seems to publish such a book for PC's, > but I digress.) Actualy there are several sources for schematics and such for PC's. As to the basic BIOS functions and such, plenty of PC assembly books go into that to some detail. The one I use and refer to is: IBM PC Assembler Language and Programming Peter Abel ISBN 0-13-448143-7 Some other references you might want to get from IBM (800-426-7282) are: PC Hardware Maintenance Service (PC, XT, AT, PPC) Part No. 6280087 $244.00 PC Hardware Maintenance Reference Part No. 6280088 $187.00 Hardware Interface Technical Reference Part No. 85F1646 $63.00 BIOS Interface Technical Reference Part No. 04G3283 $55.00 Note: contact your BIOS manufacturer and they should be more than willing to sell you the technical manual for their BIOS. They ain't cheap. Also contact: Annabooks 11848 Barnardo Plaza Ct., #102 San Diego, CA 92128-2417 619-673-0870 800-462-1042 619-673-1432 fax IBM Technical Directory PO Box 2009 Racine, WI 53404 414-633-8108 800-426-7282 ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there | | be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves. | | | | -Alan Greenspan- | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http:// www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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non-transferable & designated verifier signatures
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Adam Back: > The application you describe could be catered for very well by a third > type of signature called a designated verifier signature. AKA patent number 5373558 : Desinated-confirmer signature systems INVENTORS: Chaum; David, Sherman Oaks, CA 91403 > Non-transferable signatures on the other hand work by being made > forgeable by the recipient. That way it is essentially the recipients > word against the senders. However there is some transferable proof > there: there is proof that _one_ of you wrote it. Not clear how much privacy this buys you. If one party sues the other, it's some protection. But if both parties are hauled into court and accused of some crime, it's going to be clear enough which party sent the mail. Yes, technically it could have been forged by the other party, but people have been convicted on evidence a lot shakier than this. > Also you could clearly cope with the arbitrator situation without > resorting to DV signatures; non-transferable signatures would be > enough, if you sent a signed message to Alice, and a detached > signature to your abitrator. If you want to later use the abitrator, > you send the body of the message to the arbitrator. He calculates the > hash of the message, and is then able to use the detatched > non-transferable signature to verify your claim. But he can't > demonstrate this to other people. One disadvantage is that the > arbitrator could team up with you and make that two peoples words > against one. You might see that as an advantage, but Alice won't. An > arbitrator which indulged in this kind of behaviour may lose > reputation. Sounds complicated. It will be years before the legal system is able to handle these subtleties. Ordinary digital signatures are challenging enough. > One way to do this for some kinds of situations is for each party to > setup a atomic transfer where they give each other the ability to > cause a penalty to be extracted from both of them. Torn ecash? > Say they are engaging in some business worth $100. Alice is > performing some programming task for Bob. > If Bob is satisfied with the software he gives Alice the $100. If he > is not he incurs a $50 loss himself which goes to charity, and Alice > does also. In doing this he doesn't get the software. But Alice is > penalised, and it is better than losing $100. With torn ecash, Bob withdraws $100 from his account, but in such a way that Alice has some crucial information needed to unblind it. If they can't come to a meeting of the minds, Bob is out the $100 and Alice is out the time she spent on the project. This removes much of the incentive each has to cheat the other, and gives them an incentive to cooperate.

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Re: PGP CAKware & IETF controlled Open-PGP standard
by William H. Geiger III 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In <6661.wsimpson(a)greendragon.com>, on 10/10/97 at 10, "William Allen Simpson" <wsimpson(a)greendragon.com> said: >I'm getting a bit tired of the rants on this topic to the Open-PGP list. >Yes, there are problems, but the whole purpose of IETF review is to find >solutions to problems. I agree, I think the political debates can be better handled on the CP list rather than here. In that light I have created a PGP 5.5 digest that covers the various threads on this topic from the CP list, the open PGP list and the PGP Users lists (for the neswgroups you are on your own). I will also provide a daily digest as long as these threads continue (cut-off time 5pm central time zone). Anyone wishing to receive a copy let me know (digest, daily, or both). >The PGP staff have some ideas on how business message recovery can be >done. It seems there is a business need. It seems that they have >thought about it, and made some effort toward implementation. >What annoys me is that the PGP formats are now supposed to be "open", yet >no proposed formats for this new "feature" have been documented for our >review, and other folks' suggestions for a better K-of-N mechanism have >been ignored. >We don't even have the current formats. When will the PGP 5.0 >internet-draft be ready for review? >There is already a PGP 5.0 separation between signing and >communication keys; why not have separate message storage keys? >Why not have a K-of-N system for BMR? >Why have a communication enforcement filter, when the only usage is >supposed to be for recovering archival storage? >Let us decide _what_ the goals are, _how_ to solve the problems, and >_then_ decide the protocol details and formats to match the solution. An excellent suggestion. Perhaps you could detail your ideals on these areas so we can work on them. - -- - --------------------------------------------------------------- William H. Geiger III http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii Geiger Consulting Cooking With Warp 4.0 Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail. OS/2 PGP 2.6.3a at: http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii/pgpmr2.html - --------------------------------------------------------------- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3a Charset: cp850 Comment: Registered_User_E-Secure_v1.1b1_ES000000 iQCVAwUBND8W+o9Co1n+aLhhAQEW2wP/Ya18Xh44vRqsy/5uhPLeprw8C9z+MgWE MOdoRrKq8BvkCA9qoCEpm6bmFajR18IcvkEE1rurEV69yehpi0/YfYOQ4adntiEd xTIQ8OLpQ6DMion7FauBb9Y1/XeKef/jOqddlM4qmgUswpkzMA7RMdaHoL7yrLI+ jGjJnD6qmKk= =KxW9 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Defeating MITM with Eric's Secure Phone
by John Kelsey 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- [ To: Cryptography, cypherpunks ## Date: 10/10/97 ## Subject: Re: Defeating MITM with Eric's Secure Phone ] >Date: Thu, 9 Oct 1997 21:02:53 -0700 >From: Bill Frantz <frantz(a)netcom.com> >Subject: Re: Defeating MITM with Eric's Secure Phone >Cc: cryptography(a)c2.net, cypherpunks(a)Algebra.COM I wrote (and Bill commented on): >> 1. Exchange PGP-encrypted e-mail establishing a set of >> sixteen different words, labeled for 0..f in each direction. >> Thus: >> >> 0. Dilbert 1. Alpha 2. Cable 3. Swordsman ... f. Marxist >> >> Now, the checksum reading is very hard to spoof. Suppose I >> get 0x33f. I say ``My checksum is Swordsman Swordsman >> Marxist, or 33f.'' Bill responded with some nice reasoning: >Assume that the contents of the paper are secret between >Alice and Bob. When Alice calls Bob, she reads the word >coresponding to the first digit of the checksum. Either >Mallory is in the middle or he isn't. If he isn't, no >problem. The word list remains secure. >If he is in the middle, he has 15 chances in 16 of being >caught on the first exchange. He only survives if the first >digit of the Alice-Mallory connection is the same as the >first digit of the Mallory-Bob connection. He now knows the >word for one value and can continue to play 1 out of 16 >times. This is *almost* right. We need to add one more thing, though: 1. Alice calls Mallory, thinking she's calling Bob. She reads the first three digits to him. He makes the connection fall apart. At the same time, Mallory calls Bob, pretending to be Alice, and causes the connection to fall apart at the same time. 2. Alice calls Bob again, re-establishes their connection, and talks to him. Both seem to have had the same thing happen, so it's believeable that it was just noise on the line. (Where I am, this isn't so uncommon that it would imply an active attack.) 3. Mallory now knows three of these words in the dictionary. He lies low for the next few calls before trying the same trick again, until he learns most or all the dictionary entries. This implies a couple of things: First, Alice and Bob ought to be suspiscious of line noise that conveniently clobbers them during reading of checksums. Second, Alice and Bob shouldn't keep the same 16-word dictionary forever. If they change it once a week, this may be enough to make the attack I describe above unworkable. Note that this all works only when the phones/dictionaries are used only by single users. I also made a poorly-thought-through comment about using 6-digit hex secrets, and adding or XORing them into the checksums. This is vulnerable to a trivial attack, of course. The thing is, this doesn't need to be as complex or cryptographically secure as a hash function or MAC, because of the way it's used. We can probably also expect one-day-only keys for this application. I can think of dozens of things that *ought* to work here, and still be strong enough to resist the limited possible attacks, but I can't seem to convince myself of the security of any that are simple enough to use with a calculator. If I settled on one, it would be New checksum = (((old checksum * C0) mod P)+ C1) mod 2^{64}. where P is a random 64-bit prime, C0 is a random 64-bit number between 0 and P-1 inclusive, and C1 is a random 64-bit number. If P,C0, and C1 are all unknown, I *think* that's secure. An attacker given the high-order half of this doesn't seem to have the information needed to guess its low-order half on a different checksum, nor to reliably learn the value of P. This is essentially the IBC-Hash message authentication code, which is provably secure if the key is used once. I can't see a way that this could be attacked in this application, given one-time use of the keys. Can anyone else? (I may be missing something obvious again.) >BTW - I really like John's idea of doing another exchange >later in the conversation. Perhaps something like, "You >know, I was dancing the Foxtrot with my wife 9 days ago at >5AM." I wish I could claim this, but it's been around for a while. Didn't some of the PGPphone people come up with this idea? (Or was it users of older, government-issued secure phones?) >Bill Frantz | Internal surveillance | Periwinkle -- Consulting >(408)356-8506 | helped make the USSR the | 16345 Englewood Ave. >frantz(a)netcom.com | nation it is today. | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA --John Kelsey, Counterpane Systems, kelsey(a)counterpane.com PGP 2.6 fingerprint = 4FE2 F421 100F BB0A 03D1 FE06 A435 7E36 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBND8+LUHx57Ag8goBAQHgCAQA1a6JjY0CMymvvXkWC8L8xOkyy2oosmQU rJAGtN9pYOdv+fyxSwEu4Mh03jjbcmQ1YBKkkD5CVfrhIYN93FGMZq9tVT+hIVCE 04/ki48Os1AitU/vZI94GlJlajhssSPy0R9fcPbFtR96KAw8csuFICtX2quwBK6a +SkkfLZgaKc= =vGOh -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --John Kelsey, Counterpane Systems, kelsey(a)counterpane.com PGP 2.6 fingerprint = 4FE2 F421 100F BB0A 03D1 FE06 A435 7E36

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InfoWar Epilogue 1 / TEXT
by Monty Cantsin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- The True Story of the InterNet Part III InfoWar Final Frontier of the Digital Revolution Behind the ElectroMagnetic Curtain by TruthMonger <tm(a)dev.null> Copyright 1997 Pearl Publishing ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- InfoWar Table of Contents * Epilogue * Priscilla ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Epilogue ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- The sun was rising over the mountain peaks, crimson streaks of light streaming through the trees, striking the multi-colored falling leaves. As the tattered remnants of the Magic Circle slept soundly, after days of flight to the security of their last remaining hideaway, twin rays of light split the air in the cave above them, with silver leaves twisting lazily down from the skylight at its peak, turning to a blazing scarlet as they passed through the lower streak of light, like blood dripping off a chain saw This was a moment stranded in timenot abandoned, but suspended in the twilight which lay between the future and the pastbetween the beginning of time and the end of timeor vice-versa. A twinkling of time, wherein the sun was neither rising, nor settingmerely waiting for a whisper from the Tao before deciding which way to proceed in its journey toward eternity ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Priscilla Perhaps I look at life a bit differently from some of the remaining members of the Magic Circle, because I am a mother. That is probably why, of all Bubba's many stories of the characters in the legends surrounding the Magic Circle, I most enjoyed the ones concerning the Author and Bubba d'Shauneaux swapping stories about the Author's mother. My favorite remains the one of how she worked at a small newspaper, in a small town, at a time when it was unheard of for a woman to write a sports column. She simply took on a masculine nome-de-plume, put some obscure man's picture next to it on the column header, and proceeded to do exactly what she wanted to do. "To him who does what within him lies, God will not deny his grace." - Saint Augustine This is something that mothers instinctively understand, and their joy or heartache, if they have remained on a path with heart, is not from their children's success or status in the eyes of others, but in their child's own inner eye. Likewise in the Magic Circle. It's members recognize one another instantly, not from their outer appearances, but from an inner quality of being that is acquired only by being true to one's inherent soul-pattern and making choices that are in line with their true destiny in life. Bubba Rom Dos tells a story about the Author and d'Shauneaux I discussing members of the CypherPunks list. "Bianca was listening to them discuss whom on the list they would trust to vote for them. When they discussed Kent Crispin, the Author said, 'If he tried to cast my vote for me, I would be forced to kill him.' "d'Shauneaux asked the Author if he would trust Crispin to watch his back for him in the real world, and the Author replied, 'In a heartbeat.' "Bianca asked the Author, 'If he was your child, would you be proud of him?' and he replied, without hesitation, 'Yesbut I'd spank him, too.'" Cowboy once told me that he thought I had perhaps given one of the most astute definitions of the CypherPunks he had ever heard, and that it was a description that only a mother could give. I had told him that I thought they were "deranged saints with an attitude." I suspect that he was so grandly impressed with my description because it fit himself so well. As a child, I mean, of course (nod-nod, wink-wink;) The CypherPunks were an oddball assortment of scrappers and elitists, mathematicians, philosophers, physicists, lunatics and poetsad infinitum The CypherPunk mailing list, however, had a spirit of life about it, with even the most brutal of attacks usually having some basis of logic underpinning them. Meanness and pettiness were not the rule of the day and were seldom tolerated for long on the list without any one of a wide number of list members stepping in to give the originator an 'attitude adjustment.' Even in the midst of some of the CypherPunks' most ferocious of their legendary pissing contests, some poor bastard would shoot himself in the foot that he or she had put in their mouth, at which point the thread would often pause, like the Civil War hiatus wherein opposing sides would 'do lunch' and claim their dead, and everyone would join in soundly ridiculing the offending party before resuming their pissing party (or forgetting about it and moving on to less meaningful activities). After Vice-Admiral d'Shauneaux had taken over Pearl Harbor Computers, Inc., and had written the Epilogue to 'The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre' someone asked him what he liked most about the bizarre cryptographers he was following who had formed the CypherPunks mailing list. His cryptic reply was, "They're Troopers!" I asked Bubba once whether the Admiral was referring to the rumors that they were all double or triple agents of three-letter secret agencies of one sort or another, or to one of the Author's favorite musical groups, who sang, "We're here for a good time, not a long time, so have a good timethe sun doesn't shine every day." Bubba's answer was, "Both." If you are reading this, then I presume that the Trei Transponder is no longer functioning, and has transferred the InformEnergy from the Epilogue HydroCube which was meant only to be sent in the event that we were forced to abandon our last remaining safe house and beat feet to our mountain hideaway. No matter what your view of what the tattered remnants of a mythical group from the future have chosen to share with you, I hope and pray that you will learn as much from your future as we have from our past. You may not yet fully realize the full import of the story that you and we have woven together from what could have been, and what may yet be, but it will not be long before you will. Remember: "Patience comes to those who wait" ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- "The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre" "WebWorld & the Mythical Circle of Eunuchs" "InfoWar (Part III of 'The True Story of the InterNet') Soviet Union Sickle of Eunuchs Secret WebSite ----------------------------------------------------------------------------

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