December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Textual Analysis of Spam
by Mark Grant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm currently writing a spam-filter and bouncing messages based on header information and keyword counts. This gets about 80% of the spam, but also gives about 1% false positives. Has anyone done any more sophisticated analysis of spam text than this? I can't find anything on the Web. Mark

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Entrepreneur's Candy Store
by MailMan＠mail1.access.digex.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

You're about to discover that not *everything* that lands in your e-mail box is a scheme. If you've been thinking about making a lasting change in your financial destiny, you owe it to yourself to get the FREE facts, at: http://www.windansea.com [x] The *truth* about your financial security, schemes and scams [x] How Safe is Your Job? Take our revealing CyberQuiz and find out [x] EntrepreneURLs: Packed with valuable links, resources and articles [x] Internet Marketing Strategies of the Pros [x] Get your own 3D Home Page [x] And Much More! _/_/_/_/ What the Experts Say _/_/_/_/ " You will be astonished!" --Brian Tracy, best-selling author of MAXIMUM ACHIEVEMENT and THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SUCCESS "Goes much deeper than it's competition." --OPPORTUNITY Magazine "Based on tried and true strategies, that, for the most part, the experts have kept secret." --Author Anthony Trupiano, in THE BEST DEALS IN AMERICA TODAY "Literally shouts professionalism in every sense of that over-used term." --Stew Caverly, STEW'S REVIEWS _/_/_/_/_/ THE KITCHEN TABLE MILLIONAIRE Online _/_/_/_/_/ Check It Out Now, at: http://www.windansea.com ***NOTE*** While we are proponents of sending legitimate information to targeted recipients by e-mail, if this message has reached you in error, please accept our sincere apologies, and kindly send a reply with "Remove" in the subject to be excluded from future contact.

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Re: [ADMINISTRATIVIUM] BBN
by nobody＠huge.cajones.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

If Internet is the `information highway', then Tim Mayhem is the roadside litter in the gutter. ' ' ' ' ^-O-O-^ -ooO--U--Ooo- Tim Mayhem

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New USG Privacy Initiative
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Administration has issued today for public comment a major new paper on privacy: "Options for Promoting Privacy on the National Information Infrastructure" Opening paragraphs: This Options Paper explores the growing public concern about personal information privacy. The paper describes the status of electronic data protection and fair information practices in the United States today, beginning with a discussion of the Principles for providing and using personal information issued by the Information Infrastructure Task Force in 1995. It then provides an overview of new information technologies, which shows that personal information is currently collected, shared, aggregated, and disseminated at a rate and to a degree unthinkable just a few years ago. Government is no longer the sole possessor of extensive amounts of personal information about U.S. citizens; in recent years the acquisition of personal information by the private sector has increased dramatically. We next consider in more detail the laws and policies affecting information privacy in four specific areas: government records, communications, medical records, and the consumer market. This examination reveals that information privacy policy in the United States consists of various laws, regulations and practices, woven together to produce privacy protection that varies from sector to sector. Sometimes the results make sense, and sometimes they do not. The degree of protection accorded to personal information may depend on the data delivery mechanism rather than on the type of information at issue. Moreover, information privacy protection efforts in the United States are generally reactive rather than proactive: both the public and the private sector adopt policies in response to celebrated incidents of nonconsensual disclosure involving readily discernable harm. Sometimes this approach leaves holes in the fabric of privacy protection. We then turn to the core question: in the context of the GII, what is the best mechanism to implement fair information practices that balance the needs of government, commerce, and individuals, keeping in mind both our interest in the free flow of information and in the protection of information privacy? At one end of the spectrum there is support for an entirely market-based response. At the other end of the spectrum, we are encouraged to regulate fair information practices across all sectors of the economy. In between these poles lie a myriad of options. In response to public concern, both government and private industry seem to be taking a harder look at privacy issues. As government and consumers become more aware of the GII's data collection, analysis and distribution capabilities, demand could foster a robust, competitive market for privacy protection. This raises the intriguing possibility that privacy could emerge as a market commodity in the Information Age. We recognize ongoing efforts to enhance industry self regulation to carry out the IITF Privacy Principles. We also discuss ways this self regulation might be enforced, and discuss a number of ways that government could facilitate development of a privacy market. We then consider a number of options that involve creation of a federal privacy entity. We discuss some of the many forms that such an entity could take and consider the advantages and disadvantages of the various choices. We also consider the functions that such an entity might perform, as well as various options for locating a privacy entity within the federal government. This paper presents a host of options for government and private sector action. Our ultimate goal is to identify the means to maintain an optimal balance between personal privacy and freedom of information in the digital environment. The next step is to receive and respond to public comment on the report in order to develop consensus regarding the appropriate allocation of public and private sector responsibility for implementation of fair information practices. --------- http://www.iitf.nist.gov/ipc/privacy.htm (216K) We've mirrored it at: http://jya.com/privacy.htm

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Accounts payable
by nobody＠huge.cajones.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Here, Timothy C[unt] Mayonnaise descends into total inanity. He should have a cold shower and/or a Turkish coffee. /////// \-oo-/ Timothy C[unt] Mayonnaise \--/ \/

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NII Privacy Paper Notice
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

See today's Federal Register notice for the NII Privacy Paper: http://jya.com/omb042897.txt It gives the cut-off date for comments, where to send them and background of the paper.

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Cyclic codes
by nobody＠huge.cajones.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Given Timmy Mayo's propensity to molest little children, is it any surprise that the state of California wants to have him castrated? _ >@) Timmy Mayo (V(_ ^^\<

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)miron.vip.best.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"exon"} = "<remailer(a)remailer.nl.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"haystack"} = "<haystack(a)holy.cow.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"lucifer"} = "<lucifer(a)dhp.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek"; $remailer{"winsock"} = "<winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub reord"; $remailer{'nym'} = '<config(a)nym.alias.net> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"balls"} = "<remailer(a)huge.cajones.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"squirrel"} = "<mix(a)squirrel.owl.de> cpunk mix pgp pgponly hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"middle"} = "<middleman(a)jpunix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{'cyber'} = '<alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"dustbin"} = "<dustman(a)athensnet.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek mix reord middle"; $remailer{'weasel'} = '<config(a)weasel.owl.de> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"reno"} = "<middleman(a)cyberpass.net> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?"; $remailer{"wazoo"} = "<remailer(a)wazoo.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"shaman"} = "<remailer(a)lycaeum.org> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"hidden"} = "<remailer(a)hidden.net> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. remailer(a)crynwr.com is _not_ a remailer. There is no remailer at relay.com. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (cyber mix) (weasel squirrel) The alpha and nymrod nymservers are down due to abuse. However, you can use the nym or weasel (newnym style) nymservers. The cyber nymserver is quite reliable for outgoing mail (which is what's measured here), but is exhibiting serious reliability problems for incoming mail. The squirrel and winsock remailers accept PGP encrypted mail only. 403 Permission denied errors have been caused by a flaky disk on the Berkeley WWW server. This seems to be fixed now. The penet remailer is closed. Last update: Mon 28 Apr 97 6:45:41 PDT remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- hidden remailer(a)hidden.net +####*##+#*# 2:43 100.00% nym config(a)nym.alias.net #**#****+*#* 6:22 100.00% winsock winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net -.---------+ 3:46:09 99.97% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com -+.-+++++.-+ 4:43:57 99.95% cyber alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net ++++++++++* 34:08 99.93% balls remailer(a)huge.cajones.com #### .#*#### 4:06 99.89% weasel config(a)weasel.owl.de --+-+--+-++ 1:59:30 99.81% squirrel mix(a)squirrel.owl.de --+++--+-++ 1:58:54 99.78% reno middleman(a)cyberpass.net **-*+ +-+.-- 1:22:46 99.72% replay remailer(a)replay.com * *+ * **** 6:38 99.57% lucifer lucifer(a)dhp.com ++++++ +++++ 35:57 99.56% jam remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca ** * **** 11:25 89.98% extropia remail(a)miron.vip.best.com .- 20:55:08 19.68% exon remailer(a)remailer.nl.com # 1:06:10 18.60% dustbin dustman(a)athensnet.com - 2:47:22 7.22% shaman remailer(a)lycaeum.org 21:34 1.15% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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Re: Accounts payable
by nobody＠huge.cajones.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Date: Mon, 28 Apr 1997 From: Graham-John Bullers <real(a)freenet.edmonton.ab.ca> To: Huge Cajones Remailer <nobody(a)huge.cajones.com> Cc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Subject: Re: Accounts payable Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)sirius.infonex.com Reply-To: Graham-John Bullers <real(a)freenet.edmonton.ab.ca> On Mon, 28 Apr 1997, Huge Cajones Remailer wrote: I think Vulis needs each of us to send ten copies of this back to him. > Here, Timothy C[unt] Mayonnaise descends into total inanity. > He should have a cold shower and/or Graham-John Bullers. > > /////// > \-oo-/ Timothy C[unt] Mayonnaise > \--/ > \/ > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Graham-John Bullers Modulator of alt.2600.modulated ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ email : real(a)freenet.edmonton.ab.ca : ab756(a)freenet.toronto.on.ca ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ http://www.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca/~real/index.html ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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Corrected Printing of Applied Cryptography Now Available
by Bruce Schneier 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Wiley has finally published a corrected printing of Applied Cryptography, 2nd ed!!! They didn't correct everything, only changes that didn't affect page breaks. Still, I counted over 250 individual corrections. And under a dozen errors remaining. I'm thrilled that they finally did this. The fifth printing (or greater) is the corrected printing. To find what printing you own, turn to page iv (it's opposite the "Contents in Brief" page). The last line (under "Printed in the United States of America") is a series of numbers, counting down from 10. The lowest number is the printing. You have a fifth printing if your last line looks like: 10 9 8 7 6 5 If you want to buy a fifth printing, you have two options. One, you can go to a bookstore and find one. You can't ask the bookstore to buy a fifth printing; all he can do is order a copy of the book and hope for the best. I believe that the fourth printing is sold out (in softcover, at least), but I cannot be sure. The other option is to buy it from me. I have a large supply of fifth printings that I will sell at the usual 15% discount: softcover - $42.00 hardcover - $59.00 Postage is as follows: surface to US - $3.00 air to US - $5.00 Canada - $5.00 surface elsewhere - $5.00 Contact me if you want airmail overseas. It's expensive. Cheers, Bruce ************************************************************************ * Bruce Schneier 2,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,002,000, * Counterpane Systems 000,000,000,000,000,000,002,000,000,002,293 * schneier(a)counterpane.com The last prime number...alphabetically! * (612) 823-1098 Two vigintillion, two undecillion, two * 101 E Minnehaha Pkwy trillion, two thousand, two hundred and * Minneapolis, MN 55419 ninety three. * http://www.counterpane.com ************************************************************************

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