December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

FC97: PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE PROGRAM
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Financial Cryptography '97 February 24-28 1997, Anguilla, BWI PRELIMINARY PROGRAM General Information: Financial Cryptography '97 (FC97) is a new conference on the security of digital financial transactions. The first meeting will be held on the island of Anguilla in the British West Indies on February 24-28, 1997. FC97 aims to bring together persons involved in both the financial and data security fields to foster cooperation and exchange of ideas. Original papers were solicited on all aspects of financial data security and digital commerce in general. Program Committee: Matthew Franklin, AT&T Laboratories--Research, Murray Hill, NJ, USA Michael Froomkin, U. Miami School of Law, Coral Gables, FL, USA Rafael Hirschfeld (Program Chair), CWI, Amsterdam, The Netherlands Arjen Lenstra, Citibank, New York, NY, USA Mark Manasse, Digital Equipment Corporation, Palo Alto, CA, USA Kevin McCurley, Sandia Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM, USA Charles Merrill, McCarter & English, Newark, NJ, USA Clifford Neuman, Information Sciences Institute, Marina del Rey, CA, USA Sholom Rosen, Citibank, New York, NY, USA Israel Sendrovic, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York, NY, USA Preliminary Conference Program for FC97: Monday 24 February 1997 830 -- 905 Anonymity Control in E-Cash Systems George Davida (University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, WI, USA), Yair Frankel (Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM, USA), Yiannis Tsiounis (Northeastern University, Boston, MA, USA), Moti Yung (CertCo, New York, NY, USA) 905 -- 940 How to Make Personalized Web Browsing Simple, Secure, and Anonymous Eran Gabber, Phil Gibbons, Yossi Matias, Alain Mayer (Bell Laboratories, Lucent Technologies) 940 -- 1015 An Anonymous Networking Infrastructure and Virtual Intranets Jim McCoy (Electric Communities, Cupertino, CA, USA) 1015 -- 1045 Coffee Break 1045 -- 1120 Unlinkable Serial Transactions Paul F. Syverson (Naval Research Laboratory, Washington, DC, USA), Stuart G. Stubblebine (AT&T Labs--Research, Murray Hill, NJ, USA), David M. Goldschlag (Naval Research Laboratory, Washington, DC, USA) 1120 -- 1155 Efficient Electronic Cash with Restricted Privacy Cristian Radu, Rene Govaerts, Joos Vandewalle (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Leuven, Belgium) 1155 -- 1230 The SPEED Cipher Yuliang Zheng (Monash University, Melbourne, Australia) Tuesday 25 February 1997 830 -- 930 Invited Speaker To Be Announced 930 -- 1005 Smart Cards and Superhighways The technology-driven denationalisation of money David G.W. Birch, Neil A. McEvoy (Hyperion, Surrey, England) 1005 -- 1045 Coffee Break 1045 -- 1120 Fault Induction Attacks, Tamper Resistance, and Hostile Reverse Engineering in Perspective David P. Maher (AT&T Labs--Research, Murray Hill, NJ, USA) 1120 -- 1155 Some Critical Remarks on "Dynamic Data Authentication" as specified in EMV '96 Louis C. Guillou (CCETT, Cesson-Sevigne, France) 1155 -- 1230 Single-chip implementation of a cryptosystem for financial applications Nikolaus Lange (SICAN Braunschweig GmbH, Braunschweig, Germany) Wednesday 26 February 1997 830 -- 930 Invited Speaker Ronald Rivest (MIT Lab for Computer Science, Cambridge, MA, USA) 930 -- 1005 Cyberbanking and Privacy: The Contracts Model Peter P. Swire (Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, USA) 1005 -- 1045 Coffee Break 1045 -- 1120 SVP: a Flexible Micropayment Scheme Jacques Stern, Serge Vaudenay (Ecole Normale Superieure, Paris, France) 1120 -- 1155 An efficient micropayment system based on probabilistic polling Stanislaw Jarecki (MIT Lab for Computer Science, Cambridge, MA, USA), Andrew Odlyzko (AT&T Labs--Research, Murray Hill, NJ, USA) 1155 -- 1230 On the continuum between on-line and off-line e-cash systems - I Yacov Yacobi (Microsoft, Redmond, WA, USA) Thursday 27 February 1997 830 -- 905 Auditable Metering with Lightweight Security Matthew K. Franklin, Dahlia Malkhi (AT&T Labs--Research, Murray Hill, NJ, USA) 905 -- 940 Applying Anti-Trust Policies to Increase Trust in a Versatile E-Money System Markus Jakobsson (UCSD, La Jolla, CA, USA), Moti Yung (BTEC/CertCo, New York, NY, USA) 940 -- 1015 Towards Multiple-payment Schemes for Digital Money H. Pagnia, R. Jansen (University of Darmstadt, Darmstadt, Germany) 1015 -- 1045 Coffee Break 1045 -- 1120 Legal Issues in Cryptography Edward J. Radlo (Fenwick & West LLP, Palo Alto, CA, USA) 1120 -- 1230 Panel Discussion Legal Issues of Digital Signatures Michael Froomkin (University of Miami School of Law, Miami, FL, USA), Charles Merrill (McCarter & English, Newark, NJ, USA), Benjamin Wright (Dallas, TX, USA) Friday 28 February 1997 830 -- 930 Invited Speaker To Be Announced 930 -- 1005 The Gateway Security Model in the Java Electronic Commerce Framework Theodore Goldstein (Sun Microsystems Laboratories/Javasoft) 1005 -- 1045 Coffee Break 1045 -- 1120 Highly Scalable On-line Payments Via Task Decoupling David William Kravitz (CertCo LLC, Albuquerque, NM, USA) 1120 -- 1155 GUMP; Grand Unified Meta-Protocols Recipes for Simple, Standards-based Financial Cryptography Barbara Fox, Brian Beckman (Microsoft, Redmond, WA, USA) 1155 -- 1230 Secure Network Communications and Secure Store & Forward Mechanisms with SAP R/3 Bernhard Esslinger (SAP AG, Walldorf, Germany) The conference will run from 8:30 AM to 12:30 PM, for five days, February 24-28 1997. Breakfast provided at the conference. The conference organizers have left the afternoon and evenings open for corporate sponsored events, for networking, and for recreational activities on the resort island of Anguilla. Participants are encouraged to bring their families. Workshop: A 40-hour workshop, intended for anyone with commercial software development experience who wants hands-on familiarity with the issues and technology of financial cryptography, is planned in conjunction with FC97, to be held during the week preceding the conference. For more information on the workshop, please see the URL http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~iang/fc97/workshop.html . For workshop registration, see the URL http://www.offshore.com.ai/fc97/ . Venue: The InterIsland Hotel is a small 14-room guesthouse and a large, comfortable 150 seat conference facility with additional space for a small 10-booth exhibition. The Inter-Island is on Road Bay, near Sandy Ground Village, in the South Hill section of Anguilla. The conference, workshop, and exhibition will have TCP/IP internet access. The rooms at the InterIsland itself have sold out, but there are many other hotels and guesthouses on Anguilla, and shuttle service to the conference will be available. Air Transportation and Hotels: Air travel to Anguilla is typically done through either San Juan or St. Thomas for US flights, or St. Maarten/Martin for flights from Europe and the US. Anguillan import duties are not imposed on hardware or software which will leave the island again. There are no other taxes -- or cryptography import/export restrictions -- on Anguilla. Hotels range from spartan to luxurious, and more information about hotels on Anquilla can be obtained from your travel agent, or at the URL http://www.offshore.com.ai/fc97/ . General Chairs: Robert Hettinga, Shipwright/e$, Boston, MA, USA; rah(a)shipwright.com Vincent Cate, Offshore Information Services, Anguilla, BWI; vince(a)offshore.com.ai Conference, Exhibits, and Sponsorship Manager: Julie Rackliffe, Boston, MA, USA; rackliffe(a)tcm.org Workshop Leader: Ian Goldberg, Berkeley, CA, USA; iang(a)cs.berkeley.edu Registration: You can register and pay for conference admission on the World Wide Web at the URL http://www.offshore.com.ai/fc97/ . The cost of the FC97 Conference is US$1,000. Booths for the exhibition start at US$5,000 and include two conference tickets. For more information about exhibit space, contact Julie Rackliffe, rackliffe(a)tcm.org . Sponsorship opportunities for FC97 are still available. The cost of the workshop is US$5000, and includes meals but not lodging. You can register for the workshop, which runs the week prior to the conference, at the URL <http:/www.offshore.com.ai/fc97> Financial Cryptography '97 is held in cooperation with the International Association for Cryptologic Research. It is sponsored by: The Journal for Internet Banking and Commerce <http://www.arraydev.com/commerce/JIBC/> Offshore Information Services <http://www.offshore.com.ai/> e$ <http://www.shipwright.com/rah/> C2NET <http://www.c2.net/> See Your Name Here <mailto: rackliffe(a)tcm.org> ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "The cost of anything is the foregone alternative" -- Walter Johnson The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/rah/ FC97: Anguilla, anyone? http://www.ai/fc97/ "If *you* don't go to FC97, *I* don't go to FC97"

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COO_kin
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

1-29-97. NYP: GAK-czar cooks key hooks. FBI cooks lab books. ----- COO_kin

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Re: Last nail for US crypto export policy?
by Steven Bellovin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

It is dangerously naive to label this success the ``last nail for US crypto export policy''. Everyone concerned with this issue, from the NSA to the FBI to anyone who wants to use crypto, understands this and accepts it. 40-bit keys are good for protection against casual snooping, and nothing more -- and no one is going to claim that you need supercomputers to crack them. In fact, I assert that the U.S. government is *happy* about these results -- because it's going to push folks towards wanting stronger crypto for export. The only problem, of course, is the terms under which such code can be exported... I'll go further -- in my opinion, the only reason the government doesn't want DES to fall just yet is that alternatives aren't ready. That is, the banks and financial institutions, and for that matter the government agencies, have not converted to 3DES or Clipper or what have you, and can't do so on short notice; the commercial products they need just aren't ready yet. No one wants to risk a loss of confidence in the financial system. Two years from now, though, when some key escrow products are ready, it may be a different story.

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Re: AltaVista sprouts a hole ...
by Rich Graves 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Yes, I mentioned that here and in comp.org.eff.talk a couple weeks ago. No need to turn images off. Just tell AltaVista you want text-only: http://altavista.digital.com/cgi-bin/query?pg=&text=yes You may also find the text-only page a hell of a lot faster. -rich

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Re: Fighting the cybercensor. (fwd)
by Toto 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

snow wrote: > > Phill wrote: > > I'm a philosophical anarchist and I don't consider the state to have > > "rights" over its "subjects", nor do I believe in the pure ideology of > > property you do. > > Its worth noting that the origin of property is theft. In the case of the > BULLSHIT. BULL FUCKING SHIT. The origin of property is labor. Claiming > that _my_ property is the result of ME stealing, and hence what I OWN belongs > to the community IS theft. "All your private property, is target for your enemies." Jefferson Airplane

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Re: Getting into MIT is impossible
by Rich Graves 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

ichudov(a)algebra.com wrote: > > can any kind soul tell me, what are the SAT scores needed to be in > the top 10%, top 1%, and top 0.1% of all the students who take these > tests? I'm not sure what this has to do with, well, anything, but here goes. Scores from before April 1995 are not comparable to scores today because the method of scoring has changed to recenter the distribution. The 99th percentile starts at 1440 for women and 1490 for men. Full stats at http://www.collegeboard.org/sat/html/topsrs29.html Please note that this is for "college-bound seniors." It's not a stat that applies to the general population (i.e., 1490+ is the top 1% of the elite 30% or so that go to college), and it doesn't include people who were satisfied with the score they got the beginning of their junior year, and didn't take it again (i.e., me). I don't know about MIT, but I'd think that their numbers would be even higher than those for Stanford, because MIT doesn't recruit football players. Some of Stanford's numbers are at http://www-portfolio.stanford.edu/105549 MIT and the like aren't impossible. Fucking elitist, yes. Worth it? Probably, though two of my closest and most intelligent friends have no college degrees at all. Of course, they had to earn people's respect, whereas I had people recruiting me based largely on the fact that I still had a pulse five years after taking the SAT. What counts is what people want you to do five years after that. -rich

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Re: East German Collapse (Was: Fighting the cybercensor
by Rich Graves 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hallam-Baker wrote: > > One point I had forgotten. The demonstration took place > on the 50th anniversary of Kristallnacht. This is one explanation > as to why the border guards did not attempt to open fire with > firearms or attempt to break up the demonstration with tear gas. I think the timing was a coincidence. (And I'm told that Kristallnacht wasn't well advertised in East Germany; especially after the Soviets sided the United Arab Republic, the official story was that Hitler had been exterminating good Communists, not Jews.) While the final week was pretty spectacular, the demonstrations and defections had been building for months, as you say: > The mass defections were taking place at their peak at a rate of > tens of thousands in a day. Something like a quarter of the youth > between 18 and 25 had defected. Bill if anything understates this > point. I wasn't there, but an East German friend of mine was 20 when the wall came down. He was doing his compulsory military service at the time. Even in early 1987, as he was being interviewed by the Stasi concerning the direction the state would allow him to take his life, he says he felt no real fear telling them, up front, "Sure, I'll carry a gun, and I'll go where you tell me to go, but I will not hurt anyone." They gave him a gun and put him on the front, where he waved to his friends as they walked across the border. I think a lot of the border guards were like Thomas. > I think that the spending into bankrupcy thesis might be argued for > the case of the USSR and more plausibly the US. The problem is that > I don't think that the military spending in either case bore any > relation to need, to the threat from the other side or to any > rational determination. I think both budgets simply increased to > the limit that the economies could support and beyond. > > There is a similar problem in the third world today. Many third world > countries spend more on arms than they do on health or education. > Much of the alledged "foreign aid" is in fact subsidies for this > trade. The arms are primarily to suppress internal dissent. There > are plenty of governments left in need of similar reform. Yeah, yeah. Economics has soomething to do with it. But I think it comes down to "Sure, I'll carry a gun, and I'll go where you tell me to go, but I will not hurt anyone." Ideas matter. -rich

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Re: Fighting the cybercensor. (fwd)
by Kent Crispin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

snow allegedly said: > > Phill wrote: > > I'm a philosophical anarchist and I don't consider the state to have > > "rights" over its "subjects", nor do I believe in the pure ideology of > > property you do. > > > > Its worth noting that the origin of property is theft. In the case of the > > BULLSHIT. BULL FUCKING SHIT. The origin of property is labor. Claiming > that _my_ property is the result of ME stealing, and hence what I OWN belongs > to the community IS theft. He was making a slightly more subtle point, I believe, though fallacious just the same. It is clear that "ownership" or "property rights" are constructs of society. That is, property rights are rights conferred on the individual by the society. For example, if society determines that you don't own your house, then you don't own it. Contrariwise, if you are alone on a desert island you "own" whatever you say you own, since at that point you are a society of one -- you want the Milky Way -- it's yours -- you just grant yourself full rights and title to it. So the origin of property isn't theft, and it isn't labor -- it's whatever society says it is. Of course, "society" is not a monolith, and it may be at odds with itself. > I work, and as the result of that work something is > created. That something is MINE to do with as I will. If I choose to sell that > work for money, that money is mine. If I trade that money for shoes, those > shoes are mine. THere is no theft involved. Possession of objects like shoes is of no consequence -- they aren't the kind of propert that is at issue. Land is the fundamental property item. Arguably every piece of land in the world has been stolen from someone at one time or another. > > controllers of China literally so since they stole most of their "property" > > from the previous rulers. > > They "won" it in combat. Therefore, if I beat you over the head with a crowbar and take your shoes, it is not theft, but merely the spoils of war. That's convenient for those with big crowbars. > The people of china obviously prefered new > government to the old one, or they would have prevented the takeover. What a crock. Obviously, by your reasoning, every murder victim must secretly have preferred death, otherwise they would have prevented it. > > I believe that the relationship between a state and individual is > > a much more complex one than the slavish subjection model > > you propose. In this I am in agreement with practically every > > philosopher since Locke. > > Practically every philosopher since Locke has recieved their education > at a Government or "Elite" sponsored school, and made their livings the same > way. I'm not claiming conspiracy here, but those that feed at the trough > aren't going to insult it overmuch. Like you, for example? You are feeding at the trough of society just as much as anyone else. You wouldn't be on the net, otherwise. But I agree, citing "every philosopher since Locke" is bogus. -- Kent Crispin "No reason to get excited", kent@songbird.com,kc@llnl.gov the thief he kindly spoke... PGP fingerprint: 5A 16 DA 04 31 33 40 1E 87 DA 29 02 97 A3 46 2F

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verisign_1.html
by Lynx_User＠linux.nycmetro.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Reuters New Media [ Yahoo | Write Us | Search | Info ] [ Index | News | World | Biz | Tech | Politic | Sport | Scoreboard | Entertain | Health ] _________________________________________________________________ Previous Story: Kodak Near Deal With Wang - Report Next Story: AT&T To Build Business Calling Base _________________________________________________________________ Tuesday January 28 9:52 AM EST VeriSign Commercializes New Encryption Standard SAN FRANCISCO - VeriSign, hoping to push some recent Internet encryption research into use, says it has begun commercializing several products based on new industry encryption standards. First it has taken the Secure Electronic Transactions (SET) standard developed last year by an industry group led by Visa and MasterCard and started online distribution of digital IDs based on SET to Visa customers. At a conference in San Francisco sponsored by RSA Data Security, VeriSign also demonstrated digital ID smart cards using a PC/SC standard to get access to Internet sites. In a partnership with Schlumberger, which also manufactures the smart cards, Litronic, which makes readers of smart cards, and Microsoft on whose Internet Explorer 3.0 browser the smart cards will work, VeriSign showed how the smart cards would be useful for providing secure access to restricted Internet sites, or for transactions on the Net. "We are starting to see the industry support this Visa- MasterCard initiative with a lot of product efforts," VeriSign Chief Executive Stratton Sclavos said about SET. Smart cards are credit card-shaped plastic cards that hold a microchip that endows them with computer intelligence and processing capabilities. As officials from VeriSign, Spyrus and others described here, an employee would use the smart card to get access from anywhere to a corporate network and have all the key personal information as if the computer was programmed for that person's use. Likewise, a consumer might use the smart card in many different sites to do Internet-based transactions from kiosks or ATMs and so on. Sclavos forecast that Internet transactions requiring security will gain consumer acceptance in 1998 or 1999. He said 1997 will be the year that security apparatus is installed or deployed by merchants, banks and other companies. Then once deployed, consumers will start using it about a year later. Security remains a key concern of consumers about electronic commerce and Internet transactions, he said. VeriSign also announced its so-called private label digital ID program in which it is making encryption products for large customer-oriented companies, like brokerage firms, to distribute to customers for access to online accounts. And it announced a new service for the Electronic Data Interchange market that allows EDI to take place over the Internet instead of proprietary networks. Mountain View, Calif-based VeriSign considers itself the leader in providing digital certification for Internet access and electronic commerce. It has issued digital IDs based on other encryption technology it developed to about 500,000 people and on 14,000 Web sites, it added. Copyright, Reuters Ltd. All rights reserved _________________________________________________________________ ________________________ ___________ Help _________________________________________________________________ Previous Story: Kodak Near Deal With Wang - Report Next Story: AT&T To Build Business Calling Base _________________________________________________________________ [ Index | News | World | Biz | Tech | Politic | Sport | Scoreboard | Entertain | Health ] _________________________________________________________________ Reuters Limited Questions or Comments

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Re: Best Computer School?
by Rich Graves 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Declan McCullagh wrote: > > Let me plug Carnegie Mellon University, which consistently ties with > MIT and one of them California schools for first place in computer > science. You must be joking. After all you've said about the school, you're recommending it? Isn't "Mr. L-18 Tag" the head of the department now? Anyway, our correspondent is asking the wrong question. There is no "best" school. If you want to be a brilliant programmer, I think you have to be born that way. If you want theory, you need to be specific about your research interests. If you want mass-marketable experience in Windoze, avoid the big-name schools, which tend to treat Windows with the respect is deserves. (At Stanford, despite having a very nice Paul Allen Center for Integrated Systems and a posh new Bill Gates Information Sciences building, all instruction is done in Think C or UNIX.) -rich

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