December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: remailer spam throttle
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > That's a good idea, but it'll take up a lot of disk space at the > > machine running the remailer. Right now, remailers that provide > > latency don't keep an e-mail for more than about 12 hours. Once > > you start keeping them around for a few days (a reasonable grace > > period for a first-time user), it's a lot more disk space. > > How 'bout this: > > There is (as we all know) a newsgroup for anonymous messages, Simply > encrypt the message with one half of a public key pair, and send the other > to the individual with a message saying that there is a message waiting > for you on alt.anonymous.messages with a subject of ^CHojnafy&Ys9. This is > the key to decrypt the first level. If you do not have access to usenet, > you can get the message from www.dejanews.com &etc. I don't like this for only one reason: you'll be wasting disk space at thousands of usenet sites. I happen to think that alt.anonymous. messages is a really wasteful communications channel. If it were used for all the traffic now caried by the remailers, many syadmins would stop carrying it (a lot of useless traffic). I would have if I had carried it. :-) Also it's not fair to assume that everyone with access to e-mail can also get web or usenet. One example that's still fairly common in a user on a corporate computer behind a firewall. > The encryption by the endpoint remailer is not intended to > supply complete privacy, but rather to provide an additional level of > protection for those who don't encrypt to begin with. If the key is generated by the remailer, then a LEA might go on a fishing expedition trying to figure how the key was generated and whether they can generate the same key again. It's safer not to generate random keys. > This has the benefit of (1) not dumping the email into a persons > mail box, so they don't get "spam" they don't want. (2) getting possibly > illegal material off the remailer machine as quickly as possible (well, > off the remailer portion anyway, if the news spool is on the same machine, > that is a different legal battle) and (3) disassocating the sender and > receiver a little more. These are all good things; I just wish they could be accomplished in a less wasteful manner. To replicate a file at thousands of usenet servers which can only be decrypted by one person is, in my opinion, selfish net-abuse. --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

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Re: remailer spam throttle
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk writes: > > > Well, they can compile the list of addresses off of USENET postings and > > > such and then compute the hashes of the compiled names and identify > > > those that are on the anon acceptance list. Not that it completely > > > invalidates the idea, but certainly it is a problem. > > If a time delay isn`t a problem a remailer could operate on the list > with a MAC, if someone wants to find out if a name is on the list > they submit a request to the remailer operator who daily executes a > batch job using a (memorised) key to verify the hashes against one > another. > > Of course this gives no protection against the scenario of a law > enforecement agency or shady TLA comprised of men in long black > trenchcoats demanding the operator reveal the key to the MAC. I > suppose there is always "I have forgotten the key, officer"..... ;-) Yes. The remailer should contain as little "interesting" information as possible at any given time, even if it's encrypted. > > X sends 1000 copies of child porn/seditious libel to 100 people believed no > > to be using remailers right now. The remailer keeps the 100 e-mails onits > > hard disk and e-mails each receipient a ping, inviting them to agree to the > > disclaimer terms and to retrieve their anonymous e-mail. The first recipie > > to retrieve the e-mail gets upset and contacts the feds. The feds figure, > > remailer still has the 99 other e-mails and the information on who's suppos > > to receive them in its queue; why not seize it and take a look. > > A possible solution to this is to set a time limit, say 24 hours on > how long a proposed recipient may take to respond to a request for > permission to send the mail. The remailer then sends the mail > simultaneously to all those who agreed, those who declined to accept > the mail or failed to repond are removed from the recipient list. *If* the remailer keeps the e-mail until the recipient agrees to the disclaimer and fetches it, then the timeout period should be longer than 24 hours. Not everyone checks their e-mail every 24 hours. E.g., sometimes I'm away and don't check it for 3 or 4 days. A friend of mine checks hers once or twice a week because she doesn't get much. Of course I'm advocating something more draconian - discard the e-mail at once if the recipent isn't known and e-mail them how they can get their mail next time. --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

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Re: remailer spam throttle
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Adam Back <aba(a)dcs.ex.ac.uk> writes: > Dimitri Vulis <dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com> writes: > > Adam Back <aba(a)dcs.ex.ac.uk> writes: > > > [encrypt the message and send the recipient the key, discard the > > > key, when they request the message they supply the key] > > > > That's a good idea, but it'll take up a lot of disk space at the > > machine running the remailer. Right now, remailers that provide > > latency don't keep an e-mail for more than about 12 hours. Once > > you start keeping them around for a few days (a reasonable grace > > period for a first-time user), it's a lot more disk space. > > "Disk is cheap." I just bought a 3.8Gb quantum for $300. That's 4 > times cheaper Gb/$ ratio than last disk I bought a year ago. I paid over $700 for a 2GB disk about 18 mos ago. Yes, disk prices are falling through floor - giving the lie to the scum that tries to control Usenet "spam" - but is it really worth it to have to maintain a huge spool space to support a remailer? If you really think you can afford a few GB of extra disk storage, start up a Usenet site of virtue. > 1Gb encrypted message pool? No problem. > > Don't have the resources for the 1Gb disk? Your ISP will be charging > you many times that for your leased line. > > If it's an issue charge postage to cover your storage and transmission > costs. > > However, I suppose if you're using an ISP shell account, and have no > leased line, you may have more space restrictions. It should be possible to run a remailer on an average $19.95/mo shell account. Most of them come with a disk quota of a couple of megabytes. I do think that keeping a lot of mail in the queue (more than is kept by the remailers that use latency now) would make such accounts unsuitable for remailers. > A better idea, (for both ISP shell account and leased line version) > would to send the recipient the encrypted data, you keep the key :-) > > (View it as a secret split where the parts happen to be different > size, you keep the small one). > > They send you the data and you decrypt, send it back and discard the > key. You could store 16 million keys on your 1Gb remailer spool > partition. That 16 million keys would represent 16 Gb of delivered > encrypted email. > > You could still cope with a fair number of messages in 1Mb remailer > key spool in your home file space on an ISP based shell account. > > I think this solves remailer resource objections. yes, this sort of solves the storage problem. Thinking how this might work... Alice's remailer gets an e-mail for Bob. Alice's remailer generates 2 pseudo-random numbers, K and L, and uses K to encrypt the message with a symmetric cryptoscheme. Alice's remailer sends the encrypted message and L to Bob with the following note: if you want to receive the key to decrypt this message, send back L and acknowledge the disclaimer. Alice's remailer retains the triple (K,L,Bob). Because it's small, it can be kept for a long time. If Bob sends back L, the remailer sends Bob K so he can read his message. I see a few problems with this. I'm sure it can be improved. 1. What if Bob is another remailer, unknown to Alice? 2. What if Bob doesn't have the program to decode his message? (It's fair to assume that everyone can fine PGP. It's not fair to assume that everyone can find e.g. triple DES.) 3. What if the LEA's decide that the collection of triples on Alice's computer is worth looking at, for instance, for the list of addresses. (OK, they could be encrypted probably.) 4. What if the LEA's decide to find out how K, L are generated? > You still have the problem of saturation of your network bandwidth. > You can probably encrypt (it's symmetric key, say IDEA) fast enough > for encryption overhead to be less of a problem than the saturation of > the bandwidth of your leased line. I think IDEA or triple DES would be fast enough for this. > Your other problem is user acceptance -- your average user may still > object to receiving Mb's of junk which while the contents don't offend > him (he can't read it), the sheer volume may annoy him. Given how some people react very negatively to what they consider "unsolicited e-mail", I think it might be a bad idea to send them large encrypted messages w/o confirming that they want them. But it's also a bad idea to keep an unknown's e-mail on the remailer. The only way out, IMO, is to *discard* an unknown's e-mail and to tell him what positive action he can take so future e-mails don't get discarded. And by the way: a remailer should probably keep a list of people who have been told about the need for a positive action, so they won't get duplicate notices more than every week or so. If X sends Y 10 e-mails and the remailer sends Y 10 identical notifications with the instructions how to enable receipt, Y might get justifiable upset. When Alice's remailer gets an e-mail for Bob, it should do something like: try to fetch Bob's public key from a well-run key server / \ success failure | | encrypt the e-mail discard the with bob's key and e-mail! pass it to Bob | was the form letter sent to Bob in the last 7 days? \ / no yes \ / exit send bob the form letter Wow, isn't that a perry flow chart. :-) ... > > Suppose a LEA wants to search the computer hosting the remailer. > > They come across a bunch of encrypted files. > > The operator has to convince the LEA that they don't have the means > > to decrypt the e-mails or even to figure out who they're from. > > Well you can't can you? It may be hard to prove a negative to a LEO who doesn't know what the hell you're talking about. You have a file in your spool that was encrypted with a key that your program generated, but now you no longer have the key? Well, tell us how the key was generated. ... > I agree with what you're saying that technological aptitude can > provide some metric of cluefullness. And that cluefullness usually > correlates with good net citizenly behaviour (eg understanding what a > remailer is, and not legally threatening, or setting the Feds on to > the human owner of a bot. > > However there exist quite a few counter examples: cluefull people who > do not use PGP, or consider it to be too much hassle (quite a lot of > them hang out on cypherpunks, and will actually object if you send > them encrypted email, even though spending most of their time on > cpunks arguing about the usefulness and essentiality of these tools > for privacy). Well - if generating and publishing a PGP key were a requirement to be able to receive anonymous e-mail, I'm sure they'd do it. Some people (like Dale) legitimately question certain uses of PGP, but I think in this case it's worth encouraging its use. > Also some journalists are pretty clueful (or useful to be able to send > information too, shall we say, journalists as a group having a bad > rep), and not many can handle PGP. Hmm - I'm sure John Markoff and even Declan can handle PGP. If, for example, Jon Schwartz can't handle PGP (and I don't know whether he can :-), then he doesn't deserve any anonymous tips. Free market in action. Later - thanks a lot for the extensive comments. --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

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[ANNOUNCEMENT] Cyclic codes
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Timmy `C' Mayonnaise sexually molests little children, farm animals, and inanimate objects. o-:^>___? Timmy `C' Mayonnaise `~~c--^c'

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Re: Microsoft ammunition
by Lucky Green 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:49 PM 3/28/97 -0800, Bill Frantz wrote: > Whether your personal files are stored on a >local disk or on a server doesn't matter. What matters is whether random >downloaded code (again, Java or ActiveX doesn't matter) can use your >authority to read/modify those files. The ActiveX model of, "It's signed >by XYZ Corp. Of course it's safe." is so much bullshit.* The Java >approach of running untrusted code in a safe box is better, but doing it by >validating the safety of object code requires trusting a large complex >verifier. JavaSoft has moved into the right direction. Their JECF is largely capabilities based and in fact, Java security in general in moving towards capabilities. That won't help you against attacks via the underlying insecure OS, such as Windows 95/NT, MacOS, or UN*X which the typical user will be running, but it is miles ahead of the initial sandbox model. >* See Norm Hardy's paper, "The Confused Deputy", which I believe is still >available through the EROS page at the University of Pennsylvania. I was a talk by Norm that made me see the light. Secure computing requires capabilities. And there is anecdotal evidence that it was Norm who indirectly pointed JavaSoft to the solution to their leaking sandbox problem. Time for my usual plug: if you are unfamiliar with capabilities based operating systems or don't know why they are the only currently available solution to a whole host of computer security problems, do a search for "KeyKOS". It should get you started. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred "I do believe that where there is a choice only between cowardice and violence, I would advise violence." Mahatma Gandhi

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RE: Hard to Tax Scenario
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 8:44 pm -0500 on 3/29/97, Hal Finney wrote: > I think Robin's example of an anonymous doctor is a bit extreme, > since doctors typically do hands-on work. Ain't quite so far-fetched as it looks. At the ACM 50 year thing a bit ago, they were doing telemedical diagnoses. The Army has a teleoperated meatball-surgery system for battlefields. Onion routed surgery, anyone? > Yes, I think there is general agreement that these methods will not work > well for large businesses. Another issue is the requirement to keep > fraudulent records, etc., which may involve a large number of people in > the conspiracy. Right, but, in a <ducking> geodesic </duck> market, large entities dissolve anyway because (another of my wildly unsubstantiated claims) large firms' internal transfer pricing efficiencies aren't any higher than those of the open market. > I gather that similar dodges are employeed today by wealthy lawyers and, > yes, doctors, to hide some of their income. They hire offshore companies > to perform some services, which are actually under their control via > shell corporations, trusts, etc., set up in banking-secrecy jurisdictions. > Presumably crypto could smooth the way somewhat and open these methods > up to more people, but I don't see it as a particularly essential ingredient. I think, soon enough, we're all going to be sole proprietors of some kind, transacting business on our own behalf on the net, and cash will always king in that kind of world. Frankly, corporations have no way to hide, or they would. Heck, when you think about it, corporations, as legal entities, anyway, can't survive in an environment where laws can't work, anyway. (By the way, I'm going to embarass Doug Barnes now by naming a law after him. He said a thing of beauty at FC97: "Any transaction protocol which has, as one of it's steps, '...and then you call the cops', isn't a real good idea on the internet." Shall we call it Barnes' Law, anyone? Sure, lots have said it before, but no one's said it better...) > These all assume a model where the transaction is open, but where the > ownership issues are hidden. However I think we have been talking about > simpler methods, where the fact of the initial income is what is hidden. Right. Or, if the income is actually earned and spent on the net. There, cash is the best payment method because it settles instantly without the recordkeeping overhead -- much less the indirect cost of law-enforcement :-). > Or she takes some work on the side > via an anonymous network, and the cash goes straight into her pocket. Oops. I shoulda read further, I guess. :-). > If receipt-skimming is facilitated by the untraceable nature of ecash, > then presumably sales tax can be under-reported as easily as income tax. Or capital gains, or any other book-entry tax. > I don't know how or whether crypto could help with the more elaborate > techniques you are really asking about, dummy trading partners and such. > If you're really paying taxes on your gross receipts, then presumably > the only way to save is to hide those receipts. You could do this by > taking some fraction of your work anonymously, even if most of your > income is reported. I think of this stuff at the boundry between cypherspace and meatspace as the equivalent of turbulence. And, as the joke goes, turbulence is a hard problem. :-). However, I do know that as it becomes more and more easy to buy and hold assets on the net, particularly financial assets (the largest category thereof) and, someday, maybe even actual meatspace-physical *stuff*, this problem, like that of punching through the turbulence at the sound barrier, or that any other "barrier" for that matter, will be not such a big deal. (Another paragraph of Proustian proportions, that...) Cheers, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA Lesley Stahl: "You mean *anyone* can set up a web site and compete with the New York Times?" Andrew Kantor: "Yes." Stahl: "Isn't that dangerous?" The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/

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National Citizen-Unit Tracking Database coming soon
by Brad Dolan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

National Citizen Dossier System Being Quietly Set Up That's what the headlines should be saying, anyway. Instead they're saying things like: (_Knoxville Journal_, 3/27/97) Governor's Budget Includes Money to Set Up Gang-Tracking Network [...] [A]s part of the governor's anti-gang proposals, he's proposing to spend $625,000 worth of state and federal money to set up a gang-tracking computer database and network. Four agents of the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation will be assigned to do nothing but gather and maintain information about gangs in the state's four regions. They will analyze and compile the information on computer for dissemination throughout the state, the Southeast, and the nation - but not for public use. Law enforcement agencies will be able to use it and update it. Information on the database could include a picture, a description, the gang affiliation, criminal convictions, crimes that a person is suspected in, and possible nicknames. [...] Other press reports have indicated that the database will include "domestic terrorist groups" and will incorporate a great deal of additional data, such as a roster of vehicles which should be given special attention at the now-innumberable roadblocks and checkpoints. The important thing to note is that - as I understand the description of the program - a person does not have to commit a crime to be included in the database. They just have to have contact with a person or group which is already in it. Didn't somebody named Jospeh McCarthy get himself in trouble over this kind of thing? bd

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Heaven's Cypherpunks
by nobody＠huge.cajones.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

If you like weird connections, how about a Cypherpunks-Heaven's Gate link? If you like really weird connections, how about a Cypherpunks- Heaven's Gate-Solar Temple link? If you like really, really weird connections, how about a Cypherpunks-Heaven's Gate-Solar Temple- Waco link? Lest you think I jest, let me explain that what I am about to tell you is fairly easy to verify and document, and is not based on vague allusions to some psychic vibrations from the comet, which seem to be rather commonplace lately. In the early 1970's there was a small group in Canada, known as the Bartonian Metaphysical Society. The group was joined by an individual named C.J. Parker, who had just had his first experience of "the end of the world" as a member of Herbert W. Armstrong's Worldwide Church of God. Parker became a teacher and leader in the group, which soon became the Institute for Applied Metaphysics, with metaphysical retreats in Saskatchewan, Ontario and Quebec. There were often UFO reports surrounding the dates of their intensive seminars in Eastern Canada, which received press coverage, I believe. Parker was involved, according to both himself and many others, in the founding of the New Covenant Club during his involvement with IAM. This was centered around the belief that the "old covenant" with God, which involved circumcision, had now been replaced with a "new covenant," which involved vasectomies. Later, some of the Eastern leaders began indicating that if vasectomies were a good way of indicating one's dedication to spirituality in the end-times, then castration was even better. Parker was soon involved in a second "end of the world" when Winifred Barton made her prediction in the mid-to-late 1970's. After her prediction appeared (to some) not to come true, then many left the group and quite a few migrated to other groups, including the Solar Temple. Parker migrated to Texas, where he was involved in the music business, and in running clubs for mob interests. He managed clubs in Waco and Killeen, Texas, where he apparently became involved with David Koresh, although that might have been at a later date. He was arrested and convicted in Bell County, Texas for assault on police officers there, sometime around 1980. Parker became a recording artist and soon afterward moved to Tucson, Arizona, where he continued to dabble in music and metaphysics, travelling across the SouthWestern U.S., as well as up and down the west coast. He started a computer company in Tucson, called "Pearl Harbor Computers," which was based on the belief that computers were the work of Satan, that Bill Gates and Microsoft were tenacles of the Satan, and that those who wished to fight evil must dedicate themselves to promoting other operating systems, UNIX in particular. Parker apparently fathered an organization called the "Circle of Eunuchs" that was dedicated to recruiting individuals who had the skills and the intelligence to develop systems and methodologies which could serve to work against what he saw as the plans of Satan to bring domination over the whole earth At various times, he has had vehicles registered in the states which were his main recruiting area: Texas, Arizona, California, New Mexico, and Oregon. (He also made limited recruiting trips to Germany, Poland, and, I believe, Russia.) Parker spent time in California where he was in contact with Do, who shared his fetish for mixing computers and spirituality, and it was apparently Parker who introduced him to the concepts underlying the New Covenant Club. Parker and Do also shared an affinity for mixing spirituality and alien theories, and decided that the Internet was going to be the battleground of the future in the fight between good and evil. Parker was also involved with a group in Berkeley, California, Basis, Inc., which was heavily involved in a Unix time-sharing enterprise and gave Parker access to a wide variety of young students and programmers to introduce to his belief system. Parker named the evil protagonist in the manuscript after the login name for one of Basis' founders, "Gomez." Parker wrote the book under the pseudonym of "son of gomez," as Basis' Gomez was his mentor in the world of UNIX. Parker was responsible for a manuscript titled "The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre" that contained a character, Bubba Rom Dos, which was loosely based on Do, including veiled references to his sexual inclination toward youngsters. Among those in the Circle of Eunuchs, it was also referred to as Part I of "The True Story of the Internet," which they foresaw as the vehicle that would prove the manuscript prophetic. Parker and his tenacles used the Internet to quietly spread the manuscript among those thought to be potential recruits, even as Do's group began making their impact on the Internet. Parker believed that Phil Zimmerman's troubles were a result of his group using Zimmerman's PGP to spread the manuscript secretly across the Internet. He apparently impressed upon Do the need to use PGP to secure any communications which were of a nature that they could cause undue trouble for groups which were working against Satan and Gates. Parker's second manuscript, Part II , began as "TV World" and later was changed to "WebWorld and the Mythical Circle of Eunuchs." This manuscript was apparently supposed to be converted to hypertext, with complete graphics, by Higher Source, and several chapters were in the works, but about a week before the El Rancho suicides, Parker was told that he should go ahead and release it in its present form, because Higher Source would not be in a position to complete the work. Parker began converting the second manuscript to hypertext himself and has had members of his organization releasing it on the Cypherpunks list. Chapters of the manuscript have been released from various points in the U.S., Canada, the U.K., and Russia. Although the manuscript had already been completed around a year before this, Parker, after receiving word to begin its release, began making _changes_ in the manuscript, apparently as a result of no longer having a need to so heavily disguise the connection between the Circle of Eunuchs and Do. A prologue was written for "WebWorld," sent to the Cypherpunks list on March 18, 1997, in which the opening strains contained the quote, "Why didn't I _do_ something?" The word "do" was in bold hypertext. Then, the next word in bold format was the word _me_, indicating that the first bold word should be pronounced as in the musical notes, do, re, me. The sentence containing the world _me_? It was a reference to Do soon being 'picked up,' "This time, they are coming for _me_." And the new opening sentence of the manuscript? A veiled reference to the fact that those left behind had been warned of their last chance to 'escape' the fate that awaits them. "The great tragedy of it, is that it didn't have to happen. Not at all... we were warned." The URL's of the manuscripts are: http://bureau42.base.org/public/webworld/ http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html They are apparently hosted by David E. Smith <dsmith(a)prairienet.org> I don't believe that he is a member of Parker's inner circle, although he does have many connections to hackers and phreaks in the Edmonton, Alberta area. Except for the prologue, the sections of the original manuscript seem to be in small print, with the newly written sections in large print. The new sections appear to use the Cypherpunks as analogous to the space aliens, and a new character, Jonathan, representing one of the Heaven's Gate members, is added. "He rode the river of tears once again, only this time the journey was _toward_ the CypherPunks, and toward freedom." It is my understanding that the "Magic Circle" is quite active in both Western Canada and the Southwest U.S. They seem to be a very secretive organization with ties to a number of groups, including the Solar Temple cult in Quebec, and a Diamond System (?) Freudian-Sufi sect centered in the Bay area. I dropped all involvement with these people a year or so ago, as I decided that involvement with them is unhealthy. I hope that you will make an effort to check out what I have told you, and perhaps expose any activities which could lead to more deaths and castrations. I don't want to be involved with anything further to do with them, as I am uneasy about being connected with them in any way, shape, or form, although I still keep track of their activities through certain members who are on the periphery of their organizations. C.J. Parker is a nome-de-plume he took on as a musician, and I can't recall his real name, but it shouldn't be too difficult to find, given the fact that he has a criminal record in the U.S. which should link the pseudonym with his birth name. He also might be located by tracking him through his record releases, which were done in Canada, I believe. TruthMonger

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Re: PSYOPS/infowar
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:47 PM 3/29/97 -0500, Robert Hettinga wrote: >This is surely going to piss some people off, but let's some fun with this, >shall we? > >At 9:30 pm -0500 on 3/29/97, Greg Broiles wrote: > >> According to Ronald Duchin, graduate of the US Army War College and >> former special assistant to the Secy of Defense and director of the >> Veterans of Foreign Wars, activists fall into one of four categories: >> radicals, opportunists, idealists, and realists. He recommends a >> three-step strategy to neutralize activists: >> >> 1. isolate the radicals > >Tim May >Kelly Goen >Phil Zimmermann (then) >Belize, say I'm PISSED! Ya forgot me!!! B^) Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: Money Laundering Conference
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:13 pm -0500 on 3/30/97, Black Unicorn forwarded to DCSB: > This is a formal invitation to you to attend the upcoming 8th > International Oceana Conference on Money Laundering, The Caribbean & Latin > America, Cybercrime, Financial Crytography and International ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ Wonder where they got *that* from? :-) > Financial Crimes on May 6-7, 1997 at the Sonesta Beach Resort and Casino > Curacao, Curacao, Netherlands Antilles. This conference sponsored by > Oceana Publications, Inc. in cooperation with the > Association of International Bankers of the Netherlands Antilles (IBNA), > The Association of the Compliance Officers of the Netherlands Antilles > (CONA), and the Centre for International Financial Crimes > Studies, College of Law, University of Florida will provide global and > regional coverage of Money Laundering and International Financial Crimes. > > > (See, http://www.oceanalaw.com/seminar/ml2toc.htm) Hey!!! There's an *echo* in this room. What's the propagation delay here? Say, what, 3 months? Sheesh. Don't ever look behind you. They might be gaining... Cheers, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA Lesley Stahl: "You mean *anyone* can set up a web site and compete with the New York Times?" Andrew Kantor: "Yes." Stahl: "Isn't that dangerous?" The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/

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