December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

new-thinking mailing list tidbit; Singapore slings
by P. J. Ponder 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

keywords: thought police; mind control; Stone Age; cluelessness; Island nation; why are remailers bad? the mailing list 'new-thinking' has an interesting piece in the current issue, speaking of on-line communities of interest. the archive is at: ******************************************************************** For a hyperlinked version of this piece, please go to: http://www.nua.ie/NewThinking/Archives/newthinking011/index.html For New thinking archives, please go to: http://www.nua.ie/NewThinking/Archives/index.html ******************************************************************** +++++ sounds like the Singapore brainwashing is working pretty well if their educated people are opposed to even a discussion of whether free speech is a good thing or not. Yikes. It isn't a cultural thing, pinhead. Get life, government goon. Free speech is the right to say things others - even a _majority_ or even the government - may find unpopular. And you can tell your fascist dictator I said so. -- P.J. Ponder OBCrypto: for a keyed-SHA signature system, is there an advantage to pre-pending the keystring as opposed to appending it? I think I read something about this in one of Hugo Kracyk's (sp) papers about a keyed-MD5 system, but now I can't find it. If I recall correctly, he explained why it was better to put the key part in the beginning, instead of the end.... Thanks for any help. [Anti-Dyson and anti-EFF rant left off for now. waiting for more responses from EFF et al. Was nice to get a reply from Esther Dyson. Didn't change my mind about anonymity being a good thing, though. It will be interesting to see what Julf gets back from his survey of why people are opposed or in favor of anonymity.] [See the web page listed in the press release from penet.] I looked at the FTP, Inc. software site referenced here a few days ago for the email package that integrates PGP. Pretty hefty package to ftp over a 28.8 dialup. The write-up on the web page looked good - I'll ftp it at the office over the T1 if I can and see what it does. I assume it blows up after the 30 days (or whatever the trial period is)?

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Re: DON'T Nuke Singapore Back into the Stone Age
by Arun Mehta 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 15:18 01/09/96 -0700, Rishab Aiyer Ghosh wrote: >Arun Mehta wrote: >> and India will be too: the law here holds the ISPs responsible >> for ensuring that nothing objectionable and obscene is carried by >> them, and what simpler way to comply than to > >FWIW: "There is no need to licence content providers; Internet >service providers are not responsible for illegal content." R K >Takkar, Indian Telecom Secretary (at the time of interview) What Mr. Takkar says isn't law, plus he's gone. The law clearly holds ISPs responsible for content: when it suits the government it will pull it out. Doesn't even have to be the government: some headline-seeking opposition politician could take the government to task because the government-run ISPs aren't complying with the law. And please don't get lulled into complacency by a stupid law that isn't being enforced: in 1975, Indira Gandhi pulled out a host of them to *legally* impose dictatorship. >> Ideally, I should be able to >> send via pgp and anonymous remailer a request for a page, which would soon >> come beamed down unencrypted via satellite. No more waiting hours >> for the latest version of Netscape to download > >(!) you'll only have to wait hours for your anonymous-remailer-web-to-e-mail >gateway, EVERY time you want a page. every time I want a BANNED page -- I'd say it's worth it. In the process of accessing it, I also show it to everyone in Asia, thus giving the banned stuff much more publicity than it otherwise would get on the net. >governments will >eventually see sense and stop censorship, if they're interested in >making their countries rich. Singapore in every other field of work >has shown its interest in deregulation; I would expect them to do so >on the Net as well, when it becomes clear that there's rather more to >it than porn and subversion. Governments everywhere (see Declan's long list) seem to think they can separate out the porn and subversion from the "rather more". Just as in the German case, where the Zundel-site was mirrored so that Germans could access it, external measures to help Singaporeans access what they like would certainly help their government "see sense." >In the meanwhile, there's not much point >trying to "help" them, apart from providing moral support. Guess I'll risk being accused of indulging in cliches when I cite the famous Niemoeller quote once more which begins, " First they came for the communists, and I did not speak out, for I was not one"... and ends "And then they came for me. There was no one left to say anything..." Freedom is won and lost in inches, and you have to fight every single inch they try to take away. Arun Mehta Phone +91-11-6841172, 6849103 amehta(a)cpsr.org http://www.cerfnet.com/~amehta/ finger amehta(a)cerfnet.com for public key

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Re: Silenced Machine Guns Are Safer Than TWA
by qut＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

tcmay(a)got.net (Skippy) wrote: ! At 4:33 AM 9/2/96, qut(a)netcom.com (Net God) wrote: ! ! >Contrary to popular fiction, ALL firearms have been permanently ! >registered since the 1968 Gun Control Act. The media monopoly lies when ! >they say the contrary. ! ! Nope. Gun sales between individuals without any paperwork were fully legal ! in some places until recently (and may still be fully legal...I can only ! speak of California). So? I was talking about NEW sales of firearms from license holders. Let's consider improving the future rather than preserving the past, shall we? ! >From 1974 until a couple of years ago, I bought and sold a dozen or more ! rifles, handguns, and even Evil Assault Weapons, mostly through fully legal ! gun shows. I even sold a .357 Smith to some guy, made a joke about how ! great these gun shows were and how great it was to be able to just take ! cash and hand over a gun without any paperwork...the guy laughed and said ! he was a San Jose cop. I felt nervous for a few seconds, but quickly ! realized there was no law *I* was breaking, so I laughed too. ! ! Most of these guns I kept no records on, nor did any laws say I had to. ! ! (A few years ago it became necessary for even private citizen-units to ! obtain the proper firearms transfer papers from the gubment. I wanted to ! sell a laser-equipped Heckler & Koch SP-89 without creating a paper trail ! (as I'd not had one when I acquired the piece a few years earlier), so a ! friend of mine used his friendly neighborhood libertarian FFL dealer, who ! has a policy that the stack of transfer forms he is required to keep on ! file will mysteriously burn up if the Feds ever seek out his records. (Who ! knows if he'll abide by this policy, but the point is that there are ! literally tens of thousands of these "kitchen table FFL dealers," and no ! computerized filing of records. This is one reason I quit the NRA: they are ! advocating the "instant check." Such an instant check would mean massive ! computerization of all files, and of course cross-referencing to files on ! citizens. This would be much worse than the "paper chaos" of stacks of ! firearms paperwork sitting in dusty filing cabinets. I'll take a 10-day ! ineffectual waiting period to a Big Brother database of all purchasers.) So you'ld prefer the security of obscurity? I'd prefer to have much more government protected rights, openly. Do you belive the civil courts have a role in protecting people's rights? If so, then "government protected rights." ! >BTW, I muse that the issue of guns, drugs and censorship make an ! >excellent litmus test for libertarians: either you support the ! >legalization of, all of, or your a fake. ! ! I'm not sure what the "legalization of censorship" would mean, though I ! support the right of anyone to screen out what they choose not to read or ! view. And I support the right of companies to decide what materials to buy, ! have viewed by employees, etc. (So if the "Valley Lesbigays" want to show a ! tape at Hewlett-Packard, H-P can just say "Nope--we're not interested.) ! ! I fully support legalization of all drugs, all guns, and am unalterably ! opposed to any form of government censorship. I meant the good side of the censorship issue! But I also support enforcement of the anti-trust laws, so some would view the court enforced break up of illegal collusion of the media to crush competition as "government censorship."

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Too few nymservers
by nobody＠replay.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Sun 1 Sep 1996 Dave Harman OBC wrote : [snip] > There has to be more crypto anonymizing aliasing remailers and with > easier interfaces. Closing the Kleinpaste derived server will help > put the pressure of demand to start better remailer systems. > There's not enough capacity and reliability with the servers extant. > There should be thousands of full featured remailers. Exactly. Sometimes *all* the nymservers are down at the same time.

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Pseudocrypto detector is going wild (was: Re: ALPHACIPHER - An unbreakable encryption program.)
by C Matthew Curtin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The following message is a courtesy copy of an article that has been posted as well. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- "Alex Walker" <survival(a)aa.net> writes: > The strongest encryption system available to the public will be available > soon at: > http://www.aa.net/cyber-survival-hq > > ALPHACIPHER has been in the making for the past ten years, and has come > into its own > with the proliferation of Internet communications. > > A demo of this program along with a FAQ can be downloaded from > cyber-survival-hq 1SEP. This is an unbreakable program... Here we go again. I just got done surfing the site above. Assuming that all statements regarding the unbreakability of the cipher, the lack of applicability of the question regarding its key size, etc., are at least based on some degree of truth, "alphacipher" is a one-time pad. Given that anything else is not really "unbreakable," if it's not a one-time pad, the claims about its security are bogus. But let's assume that it is. In exchange for the great security of one-time pads, users of such must be willing to tolerate their drawbacks, and there are some significant ones. 1 The unbreakability of the one-time pad is completely thrown out the window if the key is not _truly_ random. A software based pseudorandom number generator simply won't cut it; even the best PRNGs will have some degree of predicability. It is possible that these random keys are truly random (given point 2, below), but I find this to be unlikely, since the overview boasts that the keys are generated by a "proprietary random key set generator." Now, we're getting into *another* issue, and that is of the wisdom (or, more correctly, lack thereof) in using proprietary algorithms. Not only does this fail to ensure any higher level of security when compared to that of a well-known algorithm, but actually increases the liklihood that an error has gone undiscovered, since fewer experts have had the opportunity scrutinize it. 2 The pool (or "pad") of random bits from which the keys are generated must be distributed ahead of time. Given this requirement, the "random bit pad" must be distributed with the program itself. In fact, the two "comm key disks" seem to be just this. A third "vault key" disk, used for local online storage, seems to be another random bit pad. 3 Keys must stay perfectly in sync. A single bit-shift either way, and you're hosed. Given that there is a finite number of bits in the pad (as there must be, since they need to be precalculated and distributed with the program), that they all must stay perfectly in sync, and that the program appears to be marketed for widespread (albeit low-bandwidth) use, there must be some mechanism by which the encrypting program can tell the decrypting program how far along in the bit pad to advance before using them for the key. Otherwise, if I send a message to Alice, then I send one to Bob, Bob is going to use a different starting point in the pad for the key assembly than I did to create the message, unless he also received a copy of what I sent Alice, and every person before that. Giving an indication of the byte offset to use for decryption seems the only workable solution to this problem. 4 The keysize must be exactly equal to the size of the plaintext to be encrypted. 5 Bits from the pad that are used for key generation must never be used again. Ever. Since there are only two "comm key" disks, which must be the same for every distribution, you can get probably get somewhere between two and 10 million "random" bits on the disks, depending on whether you're using compression, and if so, what compression algorithm you're using. Let's assume that you've got 10 million bits on there. Since the encryption of one bit exhausts one bit from the pad, I can exhaust the entire supply by sending someone a 10MB mail message. Or two five MB mail messages, or 10 one MB messages. In any case, it doesn't take long. And as soon as I'm out, if I start over again at the beginning, I'm blowing the security, since I'm reusing keys. 6 Anyone with access to the key pad can decrypt a message sent to anyone else, as long as they know the proper bit offset. Because of what I've described in item 3, it seems likely that I'll know that ahead of time. Hence, the security of the "alphacipher" encrypted messages decreases with each additional user that "alphacipher" gains. So, it seems to me that I can break *any* message that anyone encrypts with "alphacipher" by getting a copy of the comm key disks, figure out how "alphacipher" calculates where in the pad to begin generating the key, and apply the appropriate key to the encrypted message. Perhaps a bit of additional obfuscation is occuring somewhere in there, but the basic premise is that because of what it's trying to do, this has to be a very poor implementation of a one-time pad, and therefore completely vulnerable to passive attack. (This is using the "comm key"; the "vault key" has much more potential, since it can be unique for every user, but it can still be exhausted very quickly, and therefore have a successful cryptanalysis made of that data, using other means: a larger amount of data will be necessary to reconstruct the bit pad before any messages can be broken, but once again, after it's constructed, anything encrypted using that bit pad can be broken. And, since it seems unlikely that we're dealing with REAL random numbers here, this probably isn't nearly as tough as it ought to be.) I have absolutely no knowledge of "alphacipher" beyond what is contained in the original posting I saw on alt.security which pointed me to the web page (http://www.aa.net/cyber-survival-hq/Alpha1.htm) but it seems that I've made a decent (albeit trivial) analysis of its weakness, and at least given serious raise to your ability to make such claims about its security. If I'm wrong, please show me how so. If not, please do us all a favor and quit with the advertising claims. (All I need now is someone to threaten to sue me, and I'll maintain my record of having lawsuit threats made against me every time I criticize something that claims to be "strong crypto.") - -- C Matthew Curtin MEGASOFT, INC Chief Scientist I speak only for myself. Don't whine to anyone but me about anything I say. Hacker Security Firewall Crypto PGP Privacy Unix Perl Java Internet Intranet cmcurtin(a)research.megasoft.com http://research.megasoft.com/people/cmcurtin/ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Have you encrypted your data today? iQEVAwUBMisu2X6R34u/f3zNAQFKSgf/T/cB0X33sDGHoiqVfbXZcW9VEFBcbtVA bTjFLEKrh89pEeZ8VR7FsZRkbC5C7ceuy1aoTAK+RLdaOBZN8AkOTWXvo139gVW/ 9P+gv8eitZlhWzSnXfpURp45m737wjRfgsP7drgWZr3AdGCu3XOipIyy3tcJrcGY fPBpBZXvAfdmxX5B3CiRgLFOdhVxzhyO7Cv019ybRTCYjZncPEyyXIYMzrCJkyBi QbZzcsvgwTq+vD0Cw9/REVqxH6Av3tzJacLLgo33hO1cvti9910FcTSCIdnmR+E+ Pse2Gm0nx8Ochcfw2ZmEVtJI7hXkLbOXMq7i/i++jtMSeMVrIsfXUg== =ZbJf -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Encourage Singapore To Come Out Of the Stone Age
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 07:13 PM 9/2/96 +1000, James Seng wrote: > What i am saying is that Asian (Singapore) > values are _DIFFERENT_ from western (America) values. One of the classic Greek rationalizations for slavery was that Asians are slaves by nature. It would seem that you are saying that they were right. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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Re: Scoring Politicians on Digital Liberty Issues (Re: Net Politics)
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I would suggest that support for "parental empowerment" and for any sort of mandated rating system (e.g., PICS with a requirement to rate pages for parental censorship use) be a down-rating. -Allen

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Solid Foundations
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 9:57 PM 9/2/96, lcs Remailer Administrator wrote: >Well, I just designed a nymserver that's probably more complicated and >difficult to use than any previous one. From this experience, I have >concluded that if you want to design a remailer with real security (as >opposed to a penet-style server), it just won't be easy to use that >remailer manually. Even alpha.c2.org was kind of a pain to use >manually. I therefore think in the long run it's better to bite the >bullet, write as secure a nym server as possible, and expect that ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ >people will use special client software to use the remailer. I strongly agree. It's very important that _foundations_ be as robust and strong as possible. Then on top of this foundation, other layers can be added without the whole structure tumbling down when flaws in the underlying protocols are discovered. This has been one of my pet theories for a long time. Not just the fairly obvious point that foundations need to be robust, but the specific point that one of the strengths of PGP was that it dealt with *text blocks*. Though we all want integration into our favorite programs, by building PGP around a text block there were several advantages. First, a simpler problem than trying to deal with n different programs. Second, a text block has fewer places for flaws to creep in. Third, platform independence. Fourth, any editor or other program that can access text can potentially be used with PGP. Fifth, separating crypto functions from other functions is good, orthogonal, method-oriented design. Sixth, this allows drop-in replacements (where "hooks" are used.) (To understand why these points are so important, one needs to look at programs which integrate crypto directly...independent verification is harder to do, bugs may be less apparent, and delays in supporting other platforms (if ever) are likely, etc..) --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Silenced Machine Guns Are Safer Than TWA
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 6:37 PM 9/2/96, Dave Harman OBC wrote: >tcmay(a)got.net (Skippy) wrote: > >! At 4:33 AM 9/2/96, qut(a)netcom.com (Net God) wrote: >! >! >Contrary to popular fiction, ALL firearms have been permanently >! >registered since the 1968 Gun Control Act. The media monopoly lies when >! >they say the contrary. >! >! Nope. Gun sales between individuals without any paperwork were fully legal >! in some places until recently (and may still be fully legal...I can only >! speak of California). > >So? I was talking about NEW sales of firearms from license holders. Let's >consider improving the future rather than preserving the past, shall >we? My apologies! I assumed when you wrote "since the 1968 Gun Control Act" you meant since the 1968 Gun Control Act. I did not realize that you translate "since the 1968 Gun Control Act" into "NEW sales of of firearms." Sorry. I'll consult my qut-dictionary more often. --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Whistleblowing on the Internet
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There's also the point that some whistleblowing isn't exactly what some political groups would want to occur. For instance, opponents to unions such as myself aren't going to want a whistleblower to be able conveniently to report their exclusion from a job due to union membership. -Allen From: IN%"adam(a)homeport.org" "Adam Shostack" 27-AUG-1996 02:41:17.66 To: IN%"geoff(a)digidem.com" CC: IN%"cypherpunks(a)toad.com" Subj: RE: Whistleblowing on the Internet Geoffrey Gussis wrote: | Overall, I am quite surprised that there isn't a whistleblowing | clearinghouse on the Internet; a site sponsored by a non-profit that lists | email addresses and secure forms for sending anonymized email to those | areas of the public and private sector that deal with whistleblowing. As | the Internet is a great medium for information dissemination, and offers | significant privacy advantages, I really expected to find much more. Such a clearinghouse is what we call a fat target; something likely to attract attention since wiretapping it could be very useful to an organization that worried about having a whistleblower. As such, the correct attitude towords whistleblowing is to use an anonymous remailer, and send to interested parties. That's how the AT&T deal that sunk the des phones and made clipper a household word was publicized; a member of the list(?) interested party sent a number of interesting documents through remailers to cypherpunks. Adam -- "It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once." -Hume

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