December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

URGENT: Final draft GLOBAL ALERT: German Government censors dutch site www.xs4all.nl
by tank 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Stanton McCandlish suggested some important corrections. I changed the draft accordingly and extended the sign-on deadline with one day. Please sign on for your organisation to the following alert NOW, deadline: Tu. sept. 17th 24.00 hr. GMT. I added already some (default) signatures, let me know before the deadline when you want your signature deleted. After the deadline I'll make this alert public on Wednesday sept. 18th (again: provided I don't get serious objections!). Arie *** GLOBAL ALERT *** (not yet) FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE SEPT. 18, 1996 - Please redistribute this document widely with this banner intact - Redistribute only in appropriate places & only until 15 October 1996 Global Alert: German Government Pushes Blockage of Netherlands Web Sites At the behest of, and in response to legal threats from, the German government, internet providers in Germany have blocked the Dutch Web site Access For All (www.xs4all.nl) removing German users' access to the entire xs4all system. The German government demanded this action because xs4all hosts a Web "home page" with so called left-wing political content that, though fully legal in the Netherlands, is allegedly illegal in Germany. (see: http://www.anwalt.de/ictf/p960901e.htm) As a result of this action, *all* xs4all web sites, including several thousand that have nothing to do with the offending home page, are unavailable to readers in Germany. Please send a letter of protest to the German ambassador in your country, ask your foreign minister to protest officially to the German government, and distribute this alert as widely as possible online and to the press. Referring to article 19(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political rights, which Germany ratified in 1973, we, the undersigned organizations, consider this censorship an illegal act. Additionally, the value of attepting to ban content the German government finds offensive is highly questionable. The proper response to offensive expression is more and better expression, and prosecution of offending criminals, not censorship. As a result of the overly broad censorship measure which targets and entire Internet access provider instead of a specific user, all 3000 and more Web site hosted by xs4all are virtually inaccessable in Germany.The loss of clients who market in Germany has resulted in economic damage to xs4all. The immeasurable harm of censoring thousands of other users for the speech of one is even greater. Access for All, though it has expressed willingness to assist the Dutch police in identifying online criminals abusing the xs4all system, has a policy against censoring its clients. Mirroring this position, at least one German Net provider has responded to the government demands with skepticism, pointing out that their compliance with the censorship request may cause them to violate contracts with their own German users, and that the governments liability threats are tatamount to holding a phone company liable for what users say on the telephone. Instead of the futile act of censorship that has simply drawn increased attention to the offending material and resulting in its widespread availability on other sites throughout the world, the German government should have acted through legal channels and asked that the authorities in the Netherlands take appropriate actions. We are concerned that German internet providers have cooperated so easily with government censorship efforts. Some level of cooperation was probably assured by underhanded and rather questionable police threats of system operator liability for user content, but we must urge more resistance on that part of Net access providers to such online censorship schemes. As with libraries, there are many who would censor, but there is a responsibility on the part of providers of access to information, to work to protect that access, else libraries, and Internet service providers, lose the reason for their existence. We demand that the German government refrain from further restrictive measures and intimidation of internet providers and recognize the free, democratic, world wide communications represented by the Internet. All governments must recognize that the Internet is not a local, or even national, medium, but a global medium in which regional laws have little useful effect. "Top-down" censorship efforts not only fail to prevent the distribution of material to users in the local jurisdiction (material attacked in this manner can simply be relocated to Italy or Antigua or any other country), but constitutues a direct assault on the rights and other interests of Internet users and service providers in other jurisdictions, not subject to the censorship law in question. For press contacts, and for more information about the Internet, see homepages for the signatories to this message: DB-NL (Digital Citizens Foundation in the Netherlands) * http://www.xs4all.nl/~db.nl ALCEI - Electronic Frontiers Italy * http://www.nexus.it/alcei CITADEL-E F France *http://www.imaginet.fr/~mose/citadel CommUnity (UK) * http://www.community.org.uk Electronic Frontier Canada * http://www.efc.ca/ Electronic Frontier Foundation (USA) * http://www.eff.org Other signatures: Please send the signature of your organisation to me that I can add it to this alert. Arie Dirkzwager, Board member of DB-NL (Digital Citizens Foundation in the Netherlands).

1 0

I could get arrested by German authorities (German censorship) (fwd)
by tank 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A letter from Felipe Rodriqeuz, chairman of XS4ALL internet. Forwarded message: > From felipe(a)xs1.xs4all.nl Sat Sep 14 22:34:56 1996 > From: Felipe Rodriquez <felipe(a)xs4all.nl> > Message-Id: <199609142034.WAA29923(a)xs1.xs4all.nl> > X-Length: 00001286 > Subject: I could get arrested by German authorities (German censorship) > To: declan(a)well.com, hkunzru(a)wired.co.uk > Date: Sat, 14 Sep 1996 22:34:52 +0200 (MET DST) > Cc: barlow(a)eff.com, lr(a)wired.com, rena(a)bionic.zer.de, > geert(a)xs4all.nl (Geert Lovink), patrice(a)xs4all.nl (Patrice Riemens), > boom(a)xs4all.nl (Marianne van den Boomen), > fvjole(a)xs4all.nl (Francisco van Jole) > X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.4 PL25] > MIME-Version: 1.0 > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII > Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit > > Hi, > > I got a message from Lorenz Lorenz-Meyer, Editor DER SPIEGEL online. He > spoke to the German Authorities and got some shocking news. > It seems that there is a possibility that I, as CEO of Dutch > internetprovider Xs4all, could get arrested by German authorities. > > This seems a bit far-off, but he is not the only person that > warned me about this possibility. People in the left-wing movement > in Holland have informed me about the agressive behaviour of the > German government against the Radikal publications. Subscribers > have been violently arrested in the past. It was also predicted > by them that the German Authorities would not easily stop their > censorship of radikal. There seems to be a lot of old pain. > > Contemplating a bit further about the risk of being arrested, > I thought about these developments on a larger scale. The first > thing that popped to mind is that all the owners of the Radikal > mirror-sites may also be arrested if they ever visit Germany. These > are over 30 people and organisations. One of the sites Radikal was > mirrored on is EFF. The Board-members of EFF could, in theory, > be held responsible by the German Authorities. John Perry Barlow > could be arrested next time he comes to give a lecture in a > German city, because the EFF has illegal German documents on > it's website. Declan McCullagh has put the Radikal information > in the Well. He and the managers of the Well might be questioned > when they enter Germany. Et cetera. It would be an outrage if > anything like this happens, but friends and this journalist told me > that it could happen to me anytime I travel to Germany. > > I'm tempted to disconnect the Radikal pages from Xs4all, because > of this intense intimidation. But if Xs4all would bend to this kind > of intimidation, we would create a precedent. The Germans might see it as > a 'reward' for their acts. They'd be stimulated to continue on this > road, and may become an example for other countries. > Imagine if every country would have these standards. Any country can > order their own ISP's to block a certain foreign site. Imagine the > authorities of those countries have the powers to prosecute against > foreign ISP's when they visit their country, or when they are extradited. > These acts of agression against ISP's and internetusers will profoundly > change the Internet if they'd be tolerated. > > The possibility of being arrested in our neighbour country is almost > too surreal to think about. But now people start telling me to seriously > prepare for it, in case it may happen. It would not be the first time > a foreign citizen was arrested and put in jail by the Germans for > dissiminating information. Just a couple of weeks ago a US citizen > was arrested by the Germans because he sent nazi documentation to > Germany through the mail, i think his name was Koch, but i'm not > sure. > > > Here is the message lorenz sent me: > > Date: Sat, 14 Sep 1996 13:13:52 +0200 > To: felipe(a)xs4all.nl > From: Lorenz Lorenz-Meyer <lorenzl(a)well.com> > Subject: third attempt > > Hi Felipe, > > I just had an extensive and controversial talk > via phone with Mr. Hannich, spokesman of the german > Generalbundesanwalt, about the legal action taken > against the distributors of "radikal". As is the > nature of talks with official spokespersons it was > not utterly satisfying. But anyway. Just one question: > > The possible targets of german public > prosecution are not only german ISPs. > There are 'preliminary proceedings' of the > Bundesanwaltschaft against 'unknown' - i.e. > the persons responsible for making > "radikal" accessible in Germany over > the Internet, _even if they are in foreign > countries_. I'm afraid that this already includes > you. Have you been notified of this fact? > And do you have plans to guard/defend yourself? > > Regards, > > Lorenz. > > > >

1 0

Re: Fed appellate judge remarks re anonymity, free speech o
by paul＠fatmans.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> >The article quotes Kozinski as saying "I have a severe problem with > >anonymous E-mailers . . . You don't have a right to walk up to somebody's > >door and knock with a bag over your head." The article says Kozinski likened > >anonymous E-mail to menacing someone. What is the offense involved then, going bagged in a public place? since when do I or anyone else not have the right to wear a bag on my head? Datacomms Technologies web authoring and data security Paul Bradley, Paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk Http://www.fatmans.demon.co.uk/crypt/ "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey" -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.3ia mQCNAjH9j+cAAAEEAMBvREiQR0ot9dFCO0TiSCSunAYLv2g1Bc6I3bz8FzKXNH53 6mieJf/W4rD+CxJpT0q9RQaaoRtkHJLwbjfK2il3D7mEahMAyqvF/xRJNqkXfhM3 sRJM0Jh43l+W0M5vwokbEbk25/bxWWGspTsLD3YHbzKnG6pOcL5OPIRbv66xAAUR tCdQYXVsIEJyYWRsZXkgPHBhdWxAZmF0bWFucy5kZW1vbi5jby51az6JAJUDBRAy NwfvNkCBjDT0xHEBATQPA/9TORmN/UjNecj03q4anpvdyCLiez5sKuNbnYK50RiP Jj4QpWWvST3smyQ0A86DrZY/re056MXwQmARESx0rFZxdnD0oORICl5r8dJLIy3b j8rbA5olXwZwKz73/X5s13v/pvHYX4cIsbVK8NHXqh5llSKt6TBAuGgkIGF29z5k C4kAlQMFEDI3B9mdtf/umVkv7QEBcRYD/1FBteLqsUmr81euxqqnnrpLlyHb58B/ 9sdATuua4uSjX46hXDZ264YozspNrzSB4NEdrmXOWVX3fiE0ga6XkSSkIeF23V90 En37Z0BdbFzgF00FRYTFyTq8eezQrdg/+rBPUsZUmG5wpq3e12FKHQsX01i+1mB2 YmqqwCV5e95eiQCVAgUQMh8uSb5OPIRbv66xAQEqJwP/fxQyiCasjFcbDpsFfsYp put5cCC/9pOx6X3DlbKShPMpUOS+A9HsTEmJQN8Iawv1nSwPdtc2cR/GhW6ilVjW LSloGdMVLabm9pGpZZMkRaZlXFUkOv7VhfgsUiL+vIDryBCAwUZCzQiWycjt/cPi mUqFH41Z7NkyO8ZFdi5GGX0= =CMZA -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

1 0

Re: SPL -- Suspicious Persons List
by Hallam-Baker 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Steven Weller wrote: > > >Perry E. Metzger wrote: > >> > >> Yes, we could be a workers paradise like one of those lovely European > >> countries with double digit unemployment and all. Too bad we didn't go > >> in for democratic socialism while we could have, eh? > > > >Perry, hate to burst your bubble but unemployment in the UK _trippled_ > >in the first eighteen months of rule by that great socialist Margret > ^^^^^^^^^ > >Thatcher. One third of UK manufaturing industry went bankrupt in the > >only large scale application of Freedman's ideas. > I think she was a little bit Tory. Conservative, maybe? Right wing? Funded > by industry? On kissing terms with Reagan? Socialist, no. Or was this an > attempt by Doctor Sarcasm at wit? Its difficult to know what the US definition of "socialism" is. Particularly on Cypherpunks. I would consider it reasonable to call Thatcher a statist and authoratarian which many on the list consider to be the definition of socialism. > Actually the UK is now way ahead of the rest of Europe in terms of > deregulation, low labor costs, efficient manufacturing, etc. Germany and > France are now up the familiar creek because of their too-socialist > policies. But there are those who say that Thatcher's slash and burn > approach was appalling. I would prefer to have the ecconomic figures for any European country over those of the UK. At the start of the Conservative rule the UK was the second biggest ecconomy. Today we have just been overtaken by Spain. Italy and France overtook long ago. With the exception of the UK the politics in Europe are much more left wing than those of the states. Excluding Major there is no European head of government to the right of Clinton. Its not really a case of "too socialist" as the natural rotation of power amongst the parties. Phill

1 0

(fwd)Atlanta NRC Cryptography Briefing
by camcc＠abraxis.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>X-Sender: splatter(a)pop.io.com >Date: Sat, 14 Sep 1996 22:36:19 -0400 >To: 2600(a)ninja.techwood.org, efg-action(a)ninja.techwood.org >From: myron.cramer(a)gtri.gatech.edu (Myron L. Cramer) (by way of * <splatter(a)io.com>) >Subject: [EFG] BoS: c4i-pro Atlanta NRC Cryptography Briefing >Sender: owner-efg-action(a)ninja.techwood.org >Reply-To: efg-action(a)ninja.techwood.org > >myron.cramer(a)gtri.gatech.edu (Myron L. Cramer) > > I am hosting a presentation by Dr. Herb Lin of the prestigious National >Research Council (National Academy of Science). He is the director of >their recent study on Cryptography. > > Cryptography is the key technology that underlies anything being done to >secure the internet or to make electronic commerce a reality. Policies >controlling the use of modern cryptographic technologies will determine the >future feasability of the internet for business both in the near and far >terms. > > National cryptography policies also significantly impact on the >capabilities of the intelligence and law enforcement communities. > > Feel free to forward the following notice to anyone you think would be >interested in attending. > > Thank you. > > Myron Cramer > >------------------------------------------------------------------------ > Presentation > October 21, 1996 > > "Cryptography's Role in Securing the Information Society" > > Dr. Herb Lin > National Research Council > > >Cryptography, the work of creating and deciphering coded information using >mathematical formulas, long has been the sphere of spies and the military. >But in the past 10 years private-sector use of cryptography has exploded as >a result of advances in electronic communications and information >technologies. Decisions about national cryptography policy now have >important implications not only for national security, but also for U.S. >economic competitiveness, law enforcement interests, and the protection of >the privacy and other rights of individuals. The Computer Science and >Telecommunications Board of the National Research Council recently >completed a congressionally mandated study to examine the issues and >conflicting interests involved in cryptography and made recommendations on >national policy in this highly controverial area. > >There will be a public briefing in Atlanta, Georgia by the National >Research Council on this report. The briefing will be held at the >Manufacturing Research Center on the campus of the Georgia Institute of >Technology on Monday October 21, from 1:30 to 3:30. Dr. Herbert Lin, >director of the NRC study will conduct the briefing. Questions from the >audience will be entertained. > >For further information, please contact Dr. Myron L. Cramer (404) 894-7292, ><myron.cramer(a)gtri.gatech.edu> at the Georgia Tech Research Institute. > >The event is open to the press and the public. > >Directions: From I-75/85 exit on Tenth Street and head West. Turn left on >Hemphill Street and follow it to where it ends on Ferst Street. The >Manufacturing Research Center is the modern building in front of you. >Parking is limited; use public transportation or allow yourself extra time. > >This meeting is hosted by the Georgia Tech Research Institute and the >College of Computing. > >__________________________________________________________________________ >Dr. Myron L. Cramer, Principal Research Scientist >Georgia Tech Research Institute (GTRI) | Voice: (404) 894-7292 >400 10th St, Room 554B | FAX : (404) 894-8636 >Atlanta, Georgia 30332-0840 | myron.cramer(a)gtri.gatech.edu >__________________________________________________________________________ > > > > >

1 0

(Long) RFC: Public Key Finger: A preliminary proposal for a distributed key publishing system
by Geoff Dale 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- The original (html) document may be obtained at: http://www.fqa.com/geoff/pkf.htm - --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Version 0.2, Draft Public Key Finger (aka the People's Key Front) A preliminary proposal for a distributed key publishing system - --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Wouldn't it be nice if distributing your public key(s) was as easy as publishing your e-mail address? As a matter of fact, it would be nice if you didn't even have to do anything more than giving out your e-mail address. Keyfinger is a way to make this possible. Requirements: Simplicity Components must be easy to understand, use, integrate, set-up and maintain. Scalability The system must be designed to be distributed and scale to accommodate large users like Netcom and AOL. To this end keyfinger uses the convention of connecting to keys.host.domain.com, allowing the administrator to use various methods to handle request traffic. Flexibility The system should be designed to allow interim solutions and phased deployment. Because of the fact that this system will not be deployed all at once, interim methods will be designed into the protocol. Security Ideally the fetching of keys should be across secure links, signed by the key-server, to avoid man-in-the-middle attacks. The individual keys should be self-certifying if signed by a known trusted entity (such as the ISP). Protocol: Client opens a socket connection to host (keys.host.domain.com or host.domain.com or domain.com) on designated port (a default port should be determined). Sends and inquiry string (user(a)host.domain.com) then the Host returns the contents of the .keyplan file. If the connection fails, the client may try to connect using http with a URL of form (http://host.domain.com/~user/.keyplan) Other supported methods may be finger and DNS lookup. Components: keyfinger Program for fetching the key. E-mail programs could incorporate this to allow automated key lookups within the mail authoring and authorization process. Various search engines could use this to allow key searches. Usage: keyfinger user[@host][.domain.com][@keyserver.domain.com][:port] ex: keyfinger geoff1(a)home.net Host and domain are resolved in the standard manner, a default port is tbd. The optional usage is to add an actual keyserver which could be used for a more traditional key-server system. keyfingerd Program (daemon) run on isp's key server. Would automatically serve up .keyplan files from user's home directories. Some versions may access a local key database instead. 'Nym servers and e-mail gateways would require this kind of service. The keyfinger server would be responsible for keeping the keyplan entries up to date. keyfinger-proxy Program (daemon) running on firewall to allow keyfinger to run through firewalls. Allows keyfinger-ing of foreign systems from within the firewall, but not the reverse. key-setup Program that provides a gui interface to aid in the account setup. Should be able to work with .keyplan files and key databases. Authentication required to change key info required. .keyplan File in the user's home directory that contains the key information. User's on ISP's that don't provide keyfinger service could publish their .keyplan files in the top level of their web directory (/~/public_html or whatever). The contents would be a multipart mime document containing available keys with key-type (and size) information, perhaps in preference order. Allowable mime parts would also include key-revocation certificates. Note: It is a question as to how strictly these allowable types should be enforced. To allow extension of new key types enforce mime-type: key/... but not subtype (eg - key/pgp ). content-handler Java content-handler for dealing with .keyplan files. Actually a content handler could be written for each key mime-type. The java code could actually use http to do retrieval. protocol-handler Java protocol-handler for dealing with "keyfinger:" URLs. This would essentially be an implementation of the keyfinger component. Usage: keyfinger:user[@host][.domain.com][:port] Action Items In no particular order: * IETF Format Draft * Write reference code * Need port designation * Need mime-types for keys and the .keyplan file. Important Dates * 96-09-07 First Publication to the Coderpunks list. * 96-09-14 Presented to SF Bay Cypherpunks Physical Meeting. - --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page Maintained by Geoff Dale Last Modified: September 15, 1996 _____________________________________________ Geoff Dale - geoff1(a)home.net Paraphrasing Larry Niven: - -- Just think of it as economics in action -- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMjxVrv1Xc5SjvRJ5AQEUoAQAnU193QKDiV5wW+Iv+ozfZfEH7cyi/cz3 LqduEO3BGkmW4Xfz/bXCwIwwSph1LEcePt6v0Wv+QUGOTXR/CZqjtxTzr3uCTHvP 0Zd76ZlfLD+JI3NSFniXsAXEeGeYLnQJqSHAa9cGUCYPh3/pgwfBuwNC+ZTgYkJo ghLkuxHXrLE= =4icU -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

2 1

Re: HipCrime as MetaSPAM
by Greg Broiles 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:10 AM 9/15/96 -0700, Bill Stewart wrote: >Just a Hippie Of Crime, not a Hippie Of Clue. Indeed. He's also collecting user data for spams or trojan horse attacks in the future; a disassembly of his VisitorID.class and StealStuff.class files reveals that he's collecting (via Java) data about a user's IP address, email address, operating system, machine class (e.g., processor type), and collecting some filesystem info; the filesystem info collector seems to be prepared to cope with Macs, Windows boxes, and Unix systems. The user data is sent back both as an E-mail message and via HTTP to his home system. As far as I can tell, Netscape 3.0 on Win95 won't let it get any file system info but will let it detect IP addr, processor, and OS. He's also got at least one mostly harmless but annoying JavaScript trick where he opens far too many copies of Netscape; I clobbered it after 9 or 10 windows had opened. (the windows claim to be "formatting your hard disk".) As far as I can tell, he thinks that because some artists have a cynical, grouchy attitude, anything he does while affecting such an attitude is art. What he's lost track of is that some artists are also assholes, and some people are simply juvenile assholes (no art). -- Greg Broiles | "We pretend to be their friends, gbroiles(a)netbox.com | but they fuck with our heads." http://www.io.com/~gbroiles | |

1 0

Re: 56 kbps modems
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:31 AM 9/15/96 -0700, Bill Stewart wrote: >Unless they're _really_ talking about ISDN "modems", I'm surprised >to hear somebody saying they can take 56 kbps, turn it into analog, >let the phone company quantize and mu-law the analog into 64kbps, >and still get the original 56kbps back out. But if they can, well, >yee-hah, ISDN is nearly dead :-) (Not totally dead; the signalling is >still useful for some applications, the convenience of two channels on >one wire pair is nice, and the fact that people can get 56kbps without >the phone company's help will pressure them into offering ISDN for >a lower price in areas where the Phone Company's idea of "all the market >will bear" is substantially higher than voice pricing.) If the phoneco was realistic about ISDN value, they'd decide that since anybody can buy a 31k modem for $100 or so, the "value" of a 128K connection is about $400, and then they'd charge based on the actuarial value of this hypothetical one-time fee, at perhaps an interest rate of 5% or so: In other words, about a $20 per year charge, or around $2 per month. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

1 0

Re: Workers Paradise. /Political rant.
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 7:08 PM 9/14/96, Asgaard wrote: >The problem with the 100% market economy approach is what to do >with those who just can't get it together, i.e. who buy beer for the >money that should go to health insurance and then fall ill. It's >against basic human instincts to just let them stay in agony. I have no problem with letting them stay in agony (but you all knew this). "Saving for a rainy day," whether saving, investing, getting an education (while others are out partying), preparing, etc., all takes effort and commitment. If those who save and prepare are then told they have to pay high taxes to support those who partied....well, the predictable effect is that many of them will say "I'll just party and let The System take care of me." Thus, the effect of "not letting them stay in agony" is _more_ people in agony. When you tell people that a compassionate society will meet their basic needs, a predictable fraction of them will choose not to work hard and prepare themselves. I say we need to let about 20 million Americans, and a couple of billion in the rest of the world, meet their fate. While I will not _actively_ seek to dispose of them, I will work to make sure they cannot continue to subsidize their lives at my expense. Crypto Anarchy means getting rid of deadwood the old-fashioned way. --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1,257,787-1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

5 4

Re: PRESS RELEASE: GERMANY CENSORS DUTCH WEBSITE WWW.XS4ALL.NL
by John Gilmore 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Xs4all Internet will rotate the IP-numbering of the website www.xs4all.nl > to ensure that it's 3100 userpages will all remain available for any > internet-user. While you are at it, you could move just the censored material to a separate IP address from the rest of the archives, and issue Web redirects for requests sent to the old address. In fact it might be interesting to redirect readers to various mirror sites automatically, at random and in rotation. Thus, when someone connects to your web site to read censored material, they will be automatically redirected to one of dozens or hundreds of other places where the material can be found. The German censors will likely find it impossible to block access to all those sites (and each such site can also be changing its IP address periodically). It's my impression that the draft Mobile-IP protocols will make it possible for a site to use IP addresses from all over the Internet. Mobile IP is normally designed for permitting a physical host to move to various physical locations while retaining a fixed logical IP address (corresponding to its "home" location). It can probably also be used to permit a physical host at a single physical location to respond to multiple logical IP addresses at multiple virtual "home" locations. See http://www.ietf.org/html-charters/mobileip-charter.html, or search for "Mobile IP" in a web search engine. The Mobile IP protocols require strong authentication in order to "move" around the network securely. We hope this will prevent them from being used to subvert Internet hosts. However, in the presence of *cooperation* from a variety of Internet sites, they can also be used to make the physical location and Internet-address of actual stored information invisible to the requesters of that information -- and to the censors attempting to block access to it. Curiously enough, the National University of Singapore has implemented Mobile IP for Linux! See http://zaphod.ee.nus.sg/mip/. Even in the backyards of the most egregious censors, freely available technology for combatting censorship is being built and distributed. (A second Linux implementation from http://anchor.cs.binghamton.edu/~mobileip/ is also available.) John Gilmore

1 0