December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: John Gilmore, 58, dead of AIDS
by aga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Sun, 5 Jan 1997, Paul Pomes wrote: > |Somebody said it was a lie, but has anybody really SEEN this queer lately? > > Why do you care so much about Mr Gilmore's sexual orientation? Could there > be some internal conflict about your own that you'd like to share with us? > It would make a nice change from your usual rantings. > We care about his sexual orientation because it supports the proposition that MOST of the problem people currently on UseNet are "confirmed" homosexuals. Here is a list of three of the biggest problem people, and they are ALL problem people. J.D. Falk Peter Berger John Gilmore Of course, tale and Chris lewis have not been confirmed as homosexuals, so the percentage of "homos per.problem humanoids" will decline. > /pbp > -- > Fire mission ... battery one round ... rifle company in the open. Fire for > effect. (6 105mm rounds later) Add four hundred, left two hundred, > battalion six rounds. Fire for effect. > -- Lt Allen Bell, Chorwan Valley, Korea 1951 > > Nonetheless, the inordinately high percentage of homosexuals in the newsgroup administration is probably explained by the same social factors as the extremely high number of jews in the medical and legal professions and the high number of blacks in sports.

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SPI_nRx
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

01-04-97: "Commerce Official Sees Little Chance of Encryption Bill" Reinsch said it's unlikely Congress will pass legislation to change new encryption export policy. He defended new export policy and said that Supreme Court ultimately will decide constitutionality of regulations. And another spin on DoD's defensive IW. ----- SPI_nRx

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)miron.vip.best.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{'alpha'} = '<alias(a)alpha.c2.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'nymrod'} = '<nymrod(a)nym.jpunix.com> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"lead"} = "<mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"exon"} = "<remailer(a)remailer.nl.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"haystack"} = "<haystack(a)holy.cow.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"lucifer"} = "<lucifer(a)dhp.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"winsock"} = "<winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub reord"; $remailer{'nym'} = '<config(a)nym.alias.net> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"balls"} = "<remailer(a)huge.cajones.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"squirrel"} = "<mix(a)squirrel.owl.de> cpunk mix pgp pgponly hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"middle"} = "<middleman(a)jpunix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?"; $remailer{'cyber'} = '<alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"dustbin"} = "<dustman(a)athensnet.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek mix reord middle ?"; $remailer{'weasel'} = '<config(a)weasel.owl.de> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"death"} = "<x(a)deathsdoor.com> cpunk pgp hash latent post"; $remailer{"reno"} = "<middleman(a)cyberpass.net> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. remailer(a)crynwr.com is _not_ a remailer. There is no remailer at relay.com. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (cyber mix) (weasel squirrel) The alpha and nymrod nymservers are down due to abuse. However, you can use the nym or weasel (newnym style) nymservers. The cyber nymserver is quite reliable for outgoing mail (which is what's measured here), but is exhibiting serious reliability problems for incoming mail. The squirrel and winsock remailers accept PGP encrypted mail only. 403 Permission denied errors have been caused by a flaky disk on the Berkeley WWW server. This seems to be fixed now. The penet remailer is closed. Last update: Mon 6 Jan 97 6:49:24 PST remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- weasel config(a)weasel.owl.de ++++++++++++ 1:06:21 99.99% nym config(a)nym.alias.net #*####***#*# :44 99.98% lucifer lucifer(a)dhp.com ++++-++++++* 36:39 99.95% middle middleman(a)jpunix.com -----------+ 2:15:55 99.95% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com +++++++++++* 49:01 99.94% balls remailer(a)huge.cajones.com ** +****+*** 3:49 99.93% squirrel mix(a)squirrel.owl.de +++++++++++ 1:07:31 99.93% exon remailer(a)remailer.nl.com #** *# #**#* :50 99.76% cyber alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net **+++*+++*+ 29:19 99.75% haystack haystack(a)holy.cow.net *#+#+*#+ ### 1:23 99.69% dustbin dustman(a)athensnet.com .-*+-+-+_.- 14:53:49 99.51% winsock winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net .- _-------+ 6:37:01 99.49% replay remailer(a)replay.com -** +.-*+* * 1:16:47 99.13% reno middleman(a)cyberpass.net ----+- - --* 3:03:51 97.27% extropia remail(a)miron.vip.best.com -- ------- 5:42:33 96.37% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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Double crypt strength
by Rick Osborne 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I am curious as to the strength of Un*x crypt when used upon itself. I was thinking of was to obfuscate passwords and a few came to mind (obviously not original): 1. Use a hashed passphrase. 2. Encrypt your original password and then used that as your password. (Or triple, quadruple, ad inifinitum...) Re #1: I know that a good hash will take a pass phrase and reduce it to a statistically random sequence. I'm not intending to use the hash for verfication, but for two reasons: 1. Get a nice random jumble 2. Come out with something shorter than I came in with. Re #2: This I thought might help spoil a dictionary attack. Granted, if the attacker knows that you are doing this, it only adds one step in his process, but if he doesn't it turns his attack into plain brute force. Plus, for Un*x users, it's right there on the command line and only adds a few seconds to the entire procees of changing passwords. The added benefit with both of these is that the user does not have to remember some cryptic string, but can remember his normal password/phrase. By this, it is obviously not a commercial-use scheme, but one for individual users. (If everyone used the same algorithm, it'd be kinda pointless, right?) So with everyone (hashing down/reencrypting) their (passphrases/passwords) with different algorithms, all attacks are reduced to brute force. Either that, or the attacker has to figure out what algorithm the user used, still making a dictionary attack that much harder. So what are the comments on a system like this? Obviously, they are not original ideas, but I would like to know what has been said about them. Rick Osborne / osborne(a)gateway.grumman.com / Northrop Grumman Corporation ------------------------------------------------------------------------- What the hell, it's only 4 month's grant - I can live in a cardboard box, and catch pigeons for food. After all, I've got raytracing to do!

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The FAGGOT list
by aga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Mon, 6 Jan 1997, Wm_Wallace wrote: > Blow me!! > That is another FAGGOT coming out of the woodwork! > > > > > > > In article <Pine.LNX.3.95.970103055306.29988A-100000(a)dhp.com>, aga > <aga(a)dhp.com> wrote: > > > On Thu, 2 Jan 1997, Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote: > > > Date: Thu, 2 Jan 1997 10:50:21 -0500 (EST) > > > From: Chris Rapier <rapier(a)psc.edu> > > > To: spam-list(a)psc.edu > > > Subject: regarding the minutes for the filtering meeting... (fwd) > > > Message-Id: <Pine.BSI.3.95.970102104539.22816E-100000(a)triste.psc.edu> > > > Mime-Version: 1.0 > > > Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII > > > Sender: owner-spam-list(a)psc.edu > > > Precedence: bulk > > > Reply-To: spam-list(a)psc.edu > > > > > > Hello all, > > > > > > These are the minutes from the informal meeting we had at IETF. As you can > > > see the focus of the work shifted from a narrowly defined anti-spam > > > concept to a more generalized mail filtering routine. I, and others, have > > > come to believe that shifting the focus like this will be more effective > > > in the long run. > > > > > > This is not to say that this is the only way to combat spamming. However, > > > at the present time it does seem the most promising and most likely to > > > garner IETF support. > > > > > > I'll be making some annnouncements with regards to direction and focus and > > > other resources in the next couple of days. I'm also going to start > > > working on a proposed Charter for this. If all goes well there is a > > > possibility we can have a real honest to goodness official type BOF in > > > Memphis. > > > > > > Chris Rapier > > > Systems Programmer/Cabin Boy 2nd Class > > > Pittsburgh Supercomputing Center The Pittsburgh Supercomputing Center is a well known FAGGOT operation, with both Peter Berger and the dyke Esther Felderman working there to hire FAGGOTS exclusively for future positions. > > > 11EE > > > > This guy said he was not a faggot, but I am not too sure > > any more. I am going to have to see this Chris Rapier personally > > in the next few months, and straighten the boy out. This little boy > > needs a Pittsburgh Education. > > > > > > > > Chaired: Chris Rapier > > > Minutes: Jack De Winter > > > > > > > Now it appears we have another problem gathering of faggots here. > > Just how many KNOWN faggots are on this list? > > > > > > > Attended: > > > Jack De Winter <jack(a)wildbear.on.ca> > > > Kirpal Khalsa <kirpal_khalsa(a)ccmail.com> > > > Benjamin Franz <snowhare(a)netimages.com> > > > Steve Hole <steve(a)esys.ca> > > > David Morris <dwm(a)xpasc.com> > > > Yaron Y. Goland <yarong(a)microsoft.com> > > > Chris Rapier <rapier(a)psc.edu> > > > Rob Earheart <earhart(a)cmu.edu> > > > Sam Weiler <srw+filtering(a)cmu.edu> > > > Chris Neumann <chris(a)innosoft.com> > > > Randy Gellens <randy(a)qualcomm.com> > > > Lyndon Nerenberg <lyndon(a)esys.ca> > > > Matt Wall <wall(a)cmu.edu> > > > John Meyers <jgm(a)cmu.edu> > > > Neal A Dillman <neald(a)glyph.com> > > > Ned Freed <ned(a)innosoft.com> > > > Dan N. <dan(a)innosoft.com> > > > Peter Taylor <peter.taylor(a)ncl.ac.uk> > > > John Noremburg <jwnz(a)qualcomm.com> > > > Neal McBurnett <nealmcb(a)bell-labs.com> > > Most of the above men are apparently FAGGOTS, since they conspire to censor Freedom Of Speech on the InterNet, under the guise of "spam elimination." Actually, is all a front for censorship by homosexuals on the InterNet. > > All of these who are faggots must be labeled > > and watched, as we know that faggots are the worst censors. > > > > Let's all hope that John Gilmore fucks Peter Berger up > > the ass before he dies. > > > > Does anyone know this last guy from Bell Labs? > The question is does Bell Labs knowingly hire faggots?

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An observation on the moderation thread.
by roy＠sendai.scytale.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Of passing interest: I'm seeing the majority of complaints about list moderation only as they are quoted in others' replies, because the origional complainents are already in my killfile. Carry on, Sandy and John. - -- Roy M. Silvernail [ ] roy(a)scytale.com DNRC Minister Plenipotentiary of All Things Confusing, Software Division PGP Public Key fingerprint = 31 86 EC B9 DB 76 A7 54 13 0B 6A 6B CC 09 18 B6 Key available from pubkey(a)scytale.com, which works now -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMtD6Phvikii9febJAQEYywP9GrCx0/UQJNns2kdwvyK2UcdGrETObWDG JeFc8ob+pEvX3mm89astZ2c6AF8tb77pGYofbGJu3qyLtsOFnQ+BJPBusZNta5wv 4NJ4I79rp5uioxyg/8mQbvoaMffYuuvAWVTzmI53eHXRl605Za8fkRlejXah2HSH iefACIE5pIw= =oeKw -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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No Subject
by DAVID ARTHUR 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

unsribrive

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Re: Sandy and I will run a cypherpunks "moderation" experim
by Rich Burroughs 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:54 AM 1/6/97 -0800, "Ross Wright" <rwright(a)adnetsol.com> wrote: [snip] >So my question is: is there going to be a maximum number of times I >can say fuck in a good post? Like a 3-fuck limit? Or will you take >out the magic marker and draw through them? 5 fucks. Rich p.s. Has anyone mentioned censoring the word "fuck," besides Ross? ______________________________________________________________________ Rich Burroughs richieb(a)teleport.com http://www.teleport.com/~richieb U.S. State Censorship Page at - http://www.teleport.com/~richieb/state dec96 issue "cause for alarm" - http://www.teleport.com/~richieb/cause

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'96 Act Tech Fund
by Jeff Grantham 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Greetings, I am a researcher at the University of Colorado and I am looking for information on the Technology Fund mentioned in Section 552 of the Telecom Act. I have had little success in getting information on this fund perhaps because the v-chip has replaced it. This fund was supposed to be a voluntary effort by industry to come up with an alternative to the v-chip. The top 4 networks pledged $2 Million to this fund before the act was passed, but now it seems dead. The original legislation was proposed by Rep. Coburn (R-OKLA). This part of the telecom act is much milder than the v-chip stuff, but nobody knows what happended. If you have any information, web sites, new groups or articles that might be useful it would be very valuable to me. I am willing to share whatever information I find and post the final reserach on my web page. Thanks, Jeff Grantham

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Re: Sandy and I will run a cypherpunks "moderation" experiment in Jan
by Rich Burroughs 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 03:06 AM 1/6/97 -0800, toto(a)sk.sympatico.ca wrote: >I believe that every "EASY $$$ MONEY" posting ought to be forwarded >to the webmaster at the site from which it originated. > Those who are harboring these generous souls should also be afforded >the opportunity to rake in the cash. I can hardly see how anybody >could possibly resent being reminded of the wonderful opportuninties >they are making it possible for us to learn of. Be careful when mailbombing in retribution for spam. Often the aricles are forged, and sometimes it's with the direct intention of getting someone else mailbombed. I traded some email with a system administrator a few days ago in this boat -- they had cancelled a customer's account, and to get revenge the former customer sent out a bunch of spam that was forged to look like it came from this sys admin's domain. Even if the site wasn't literally mailbombed, the system administrator had to spend a lot of time, I'm sure, delaing with unhappy recipients of the spam, like myself. Mailbombing is almost always a bad plan, IMHO, besides being a denial of service attack and probably illegal in a lot of places. Rich ______________________________________________________________________ Rich Burroughs richieb(a)teleport.com http://www.teleport.com/~richieb U.S. State Censorship Page at - http://www.teleport.com/~richieb/state dec96 issue "cause for alarm" - http://www.teleport.com/~richieb/cause

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