December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

RE: FUCK YOU punk
by nobody＠zifi.genetics.utah.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

_______________________________________________________________________________ From: aga on Wed, Nov 20, 1996 15:24 Subject: FUCK YOU punk/was:Taking out the garbage To: freedom-knights(a)jetcafe.org Cc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com >If you try to make or enforce any rules and YOU DIE cocksucker! You might want to watch yourself. It would be hard to *not* see this as a direct threat... >Your presents shall be totally eliminated form this InterNet! ^^^^^^^ Yeah, Lucky! You better watch out, or there'll be NO CHRISTMAS!! :-) >Your connection will be TERMINATED at once! Suddenly, agatha is everyone's sysadmin... >fuck you punk, and fuck all of your "rules" Whether stated or not, there _are_ certain guidelines (or rules) we all should follow, just so we aren't *ASSHOLES*... >-aga

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Re: Anon
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:06 PM 11/20/96 -0700, Roderick Simpson wrote: >Who has made the strongest case _against_ anonymity on the Net that you >have ever heard? Someone intelligent and theoretical rather than trapped in >some child porn or commerce pov. > >Thanks, >Rod Recruiting for a future Brain Tennis I take it? The Thursday Computer columnist for the WSJ (whose name escapes me) is a possibility. I don't know how strong he is but he is consistently opposed. I wouldn't recommend L. Detweiler though he is opposed to anonymity. How about Esther Dyson? DCF

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Re: Anon
by Hal Finney 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

As I mentioned a couple of days ago, science fiction writer David Brin has an argument against not only anonymity, but _privacy_ as well. Where cypherpunks tend to think of privacy as both beneficial and inevitable, Brin sees it as harmful and doomed. He has an article in the December 1996 issue of Wired discussing his ideas. BTW cypherpunk Doug Barnes is also quoted several times in the long article in that issue by Neal Stephenson (Snow Crash, The Diamond Age) about the undersea cables that carry most transnational information traffic. Hal

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Re: Why I Don't Read SF Much Anymore
by Hal Finney 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Duncan Frissell <frissell(a)panix.com> > The problem with straight SF for me is that computers and networks have > changed the future so much that (in the words of the motto of the SF > Writer's Association) The Future Ain't What It Used to Be. The science > fictional futures of my childhood are now dead as doornails. And I can't > enjoy contemporary SF that doesn't include a healthy dose of computers and > networking. I find this to be largely true as well. The cyberpunk genre does the best job at grappling with the impact of communications tech but it is traditionally dystopian. It would be nice to see a story about better living through crypto. What fiction can people recommend which presents crypto/privacy issues realistically? How about this new book that Neal Stephenson is working on, does anyone know what it's about? His short story, "Hack the Spew", a few months ago (in Wired, I think?) had a strong crypto flavor. Hal

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Re: Stewart Baker on new crypto rules
by Hal Finney 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: "Michael Froomkin - U.Miami School of Law" <froomkin(a)law.miami.edu> > http://www.steptoe.com/oped.htm > > argues that industry won't accept any system that threatens to cut off > backwards compatibility after 2 years, hence DES export liberalization > will have to extend beyond the proposed period. I take a slightly different moral. Baker (former NSA attorney) writes: > If buying key-recovery encryption means customers must give up all > of their legacy encryption systems, key recovery products will carry a > near-fatal burden in many markets where encryption is now used widely. The > transition to key recovery will have to be gradual or it won't happen > at all. What I see this as is a call to come up with architectures that will allow transparent phase-in of government key access (so-called "key recovery") technology. The current HP proposal fits in very well with this model. The appear to be planning on using standard API's so that applications will be able to switch to using key escrow software without changing the applications themselves, just the OS. Maybe there could be a transition period where both the old and new crypto would both be accepted, then after a period of time the old wouldn't work any more. As Baker goes on to say: > Three years ago, no one in the PC world would have bought an operating > system that didn't run MS-DOS. Three years from now, we'll be happy to buy > an operating system that is backward-compatible with Windows 95 but not > with MS-DOS. And then, at last, we'll throw out all our old DOS programs. This suggests to me that we need to be vigilant in watching for systems that will allow for easy "drop in" of key escrow. Hal

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RE: Mass-market crypto phones
by Mullen Patrick 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

_______________________________________________________________________________ From: Clay Olbon II on Thu, Nov 21, 1996 15:20 >A while back, Eric Blossom posted a URL for a mass-market, phone encyrption >device (http://www.comsec.com/) The point of this post is to posit a The above mentioned crypto phone was incredibly expensive, if I remember correctly. What it basically was (Please keep in mind I may be thinking of a different product) a box containing a modem and a crypto-crunching CPU. Phone in one end, processed by said CPU, and send out other end. I have/had a similar idea, but I want to try make it a totally software product (assuming you have the necessary hw requirements on your computer) where you talk in through a microphone (can something be wired so you can use a regular phone plugged into your computer/modem/soundcard???) your CPU crunches code, and spits out the encrypted data. Obviously, the complementing steps would be done on the receiving end. Has anyone ever tried anything like this? >I think we need to keep a couple of goals in mind. The first, is to get >encrypting phones (or phone add-ons) into Wal-mart, K-mart, etc (where >probably most Americans now buy their phones). The prices need to be low >enough that people will want to buy them (<$100?). Is this technically >feasible? The comsec device from the above URL already demonstrates the >needed capability. Is the cost target possible? My guess is soon, given >the lowering costs and increasing capabilities of current processors. Goals sound good. I feel it *definately* has to be below $100. Personally, I use a phone bought at K-Mart that cost $12 _after_ tax... I wouldn't mind paying $50 for a techno gizmo that made my conversations, inane as they may be, private. The price would also have to be low to assure the other end has a similar techno-gizmo, or I would have wasted my money. Anyone else see the *immediate* need for a standard? >The second goal needs to be to push a similar product for cell-phones. If I'm not mistaken (and I've been known to be from time to time :-), cell phones are already encrypted between the phone and cell tower. That way, they are no less private than a regular phone. Of course, you may be referring to further end-to-end encryption built into the phone in addition to this, but as far as they being less secure than a house phone, I'm not sure about that one. >Given that these goals are met, I think widespread use of crypto over phone >lines would become almost inevitable. However, the fun part would be the >introduction of such products. The FUD coming from police, the government, >etc. would be amazing to behold. Agreed! > Clay >******************************************************* >Clay Olbon olbon(a)ix.netcom.com >engineer, programmer, statistitian, etc. >**********************************************tanstaafl PM USER ERROR: REPLACE AND STRIKE ANY KEY WHEN READY

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Re: U.S. CIA employee caught spying
by Adamsc＠io-online.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Mon, 18 Nov 1996 17:05:47 -0500 (EST), Tim Scanlon wrote: >This is on the local DC news; >Harold Nicholson age 46, a CIA employee was arrested for spying today >at Dulles airport. He allegedly has been working for the Russians >for the past 2 years. Here's a good question to ask: "Why are we getting security policy from the [un]intelligence agencies?" What will get mentioned, however, will be: "If he'd been using PGP we'd never have caught him. This is why we need GAK!" # Chris Adams <adamsc(a)io-online.com> | http://www.io-online.com/adamsc/adamsc.htp # <cadams(a)acucobol.com> | send mail with subject "send PGPKEY" "That's our advantage at Microsoft; we set the standards and we can change them." --- Karen Hargrove, Microsoft (quoted in the Feb 1993 Unix Review editorial)

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CAVE Report
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

We've put the CAVE-based report at: http://jya.com/tr453.htm (46 kb with 7 images) CAVE = Cellular Authentication and Voice Encryption algorithm. Nokia, for one, uses a CAVE algorithm to secure its latest toy.

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Re: Database law... silver lining??
by Richard L. Field 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I am not suggesting patent-like protection. Rather, I'd argue that there is very little "independent creation" with respect to my personal database. Provided it is considered my database to begin with, information that I give on a warranty card, when I ask for credit, etc. remains mine under the proposed U.S. law. Just because a third party tries to assemble it from those sources doesn't mean it suddenly becomes free data, from a non-database source. By that line of reasoning, any protected database would lose all protection upon its publication by a licensee, so long as you copied it from the licensee and not the originator. This is not how I read the proposed law, and it is not how big database publishers would want it read. - Richard Field (Nothing in this line of argument is meant to imply that I am in favor of the proposal.) At 11:47 PM 11/21/96 -0800, Greg Broiles wrote: [my proposal snipped] > >Cute, but any such proposal is almost guaranteed to allow for independent >creation from a non-database source - e.g., warranty cards, info extracted >from you when you ask for credit, public records, etc. For example, one >comment to Article 3 of the proposed WIPO treaty on sui generis protection >of databases provides: > >"3.02 The protection provided does not preclude any person from >independently collecting, assembling or compiling works, data or materials >from any source other than a protected database." > >(see <http://www.loc.gov/copyright/wipo6.html> for more.) > >It's very unlikely that Congress (or the PTO) intends to do anything >that'll screw up what's already working well for big database publishers. >Your theory is similar to a patent flavor for databases, while the >proposals floated out so far are much more like copyright - e.g., >independent creation is OK, but copying is not, even with wide public >distribution, and long protection times. With patent, independent creation >is not OK, copying (the information, not the device) is encouraged/allowed, >and protection time is short.

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Re: 1996 Codebreakers
by Sean Roach 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Adam Shostack <adam(a)homeport.org> writes: >> I just got a review copy of the new (1996) ed. of Kahn's The >> Codebreakers from my local used bookstore. Its a little disapointing, >... >> & DH. Nothing on Cypherpunks, little on how privacy can be enhanced. The above was stripped from a reply made by Dr Dimitri Vulis. I have just one question, was the copy that you purchased hardcopy or paperback? I found the paperback in a school library and found that it said that the technical portion had been abridged to save space, (and money). I cannot say that I read the whole text, only the first half chapter and then some skipping around trying to find the RSA algorthim. I later found it in a periodical to which I am subscribed.

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