December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Clinton's Encryption Plan Fits Law and Market
by Ernest Hua 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Two serious flaws in this letter ... 1. Secretary of Commerce, Mickey Kantor said: > You assume that foreign buyers would not buy key-recovery products, > but you ignore the trend -- especially in Europe -- to require use > of key-recovery products and bar the import of stronger and stronger > encryption products that do not take law enforcement into account. A. This is an old argument constantly rehashed by the government. What it convenient ignores is that no one OUTSIDE the government wants what the government schemes. No one wants the government to mandate key recovery. Some important uses of encryption, such as secure telephone conversations, simply do NOT need key recovery for ANY reason other than law enforcement intercepts. B. The point on other nations barring imports is absurd. Since WHEN do we tailor our export limits to the import limits of OTHER nations? C. The so-called "trend" he refers to is ARTIFICIALLY created by the U.S. government through secret lobbying efforts, the most recent at the OECD in Paris. The administration uses the word "trend" as if other nations are independently pursuing the key-escrow/key-recovery path, when in fact, only a few nations are considering such a move. Other nations, such as Japan, have openly opposed such a direction, and some nations, such as Sweden, have done so secretly because such a policy could not possibliy withstand the scrutiny of democratic processes. 2. Kantor said: > The National Research Council did not say that we should allow the > export of all encryption. Again, more mincing of words. The administration, seeing that the NRC report was staunchly against key escrow and government-mandated schemes, chooses to ignore parts of the report it feels is convenient. The NRC report, in fact, said that the government should immediately relax all symmetric encryption up to 56-bits and all public domain encryption UNCONDITIONALLY. It did not say anything about signing a pledge to develope key escrow or key recovery. This condition invented by the administration is nothing short of blackmail: "play it our way, or you have no chance to compete globally". In short, Kantor's letter is yet more blatant lies and deception on the part of the administration to get what it wants for law enforcement and national security agencies without any concern for the nature of the technology nor the economic impact such policies will have. -- Ernest Hua, Software Sanitation Engineer Chromatic Research, 615 Tasman Drive, Sunnyvale, CA 94089-1707 Phone: 408 752-9375, Fax: 408 752-9301, E-Mail: hua(a)chromatic.com

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Binding cryptography - much work, little point ?
by peter.allan＠aeat.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Eric_Verheul writes: > In our scheme any third party, which is probably never a TRP, can check > equality of the sessionkeys send to the primary recipient (the TRP) and > the second recipient (the real adressee), i.e. *without* needing secret So could anyone anyway by asking the TRP. The TRP returns a Yes/No answer, withou disclosing the session key. Is your binding scheme motivated mainly by avoiding that workload on the TRP ? Or by the fact that everybody might prefer a different TRP ? I suspect the scheme is incomplete anyway. After skimming the web page I see that the aim is to show the same session key has been encrypted under different ElGamal pubkeys. Now who's to say those pubkeys belong to anyone ? Or is this what is meant by "such as Margaret's identity" ? You'd list the ids of the TRPs and also prove that the pubkeys used were theirs .... ? Now to the politics... E__Allen_Smith writes: > Quite simply, you've invented a system that makes censorship more > possible. As a scientist, I try to avoid areas that have such negative > effects The usual Big Problems for GAK 1) What's in it for the user ? 2) What happens when the Feds recover meaningless data ? 2 does not seem to be addressed except by proposing restrictions which Eric dismisses as follows: Adam Back: >system because their stated aims are untrue: they *do* want to outlaw >non-escrowed encryption for domestic US traffic, and they *do* want to Eric Verheul: > Who is they, governments as a whole? If you simplify discussions in this > way, I might as well say: "you guys only want to help criminals". I understand > your fears, but don't exaggerate. -- Peter Allan peter.allan(a)aeat.co.uk

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Re: (2) LET'S MEET DIMITRI
by attila 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In <Pine.SUN.3.91.961010143953.7428A-100000(a)crl.crl.com>, on 10/10/96 at 02:40 PM, Sandy Sandfort <sandfort(a)crl.com> said: . attila sez: . .> WOW! Dimitri as the featured roast, Dean Martin style, would be .> enough for me to seriously consider leaving my high desert Utah .> safe house! . .Will you pledge a few bucks, though? . after I figure out how to allocate the $400+ it takes to get out of here --the disadvantage of living nowhere: $119 each way just to deal with SLC for transfer plus SLC to SFO/SJO it's too late in the year to even consider crossing the sierras on my chopper, ...other than airplane, the sole means of transport. sold my category D twin tprop since I do not have a valid medical endorsement from the FAA or the required certified copilot for Cat II or IIIA landings if SFO is pure blind slop. so, it's commerical time. so far, being in the high desert away from population in an enclave of 100 families as ornery as I, has been a blessing. travel had become more than old. hopefully you can make this one hang together --particularly, if I can be the roastmaster --and choose the panel... <g>

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Re: Why not PGP?
by apteryx＠super.zippo.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Jim Ray wrote: >Rollo Silver wrote: [snip] >> 2. Suppose someone writes a program Z that has no expicit crypto code in >> it, but has hooks for installing one or another version of PGP. Given a >> copy of Z, someone in this country could install PGP he got from MIT, >> whereas someone in Europe could install the international version. >> Would export of Z violate ITAR restrictions? > >Yes. >JMR Does this mean that exporting Private Idaho, PGPfront, WinPGP, etc. would be a violation of ITAR because they function only when combined with PGP and contain "hooks" for using PGP? I don't recall any restrictions on who could download these files from their host sites. Mark -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQB1AwUBMl6ZSN36bir1/qfZAQGUWAMAmbh59CK2wMBt/AVCEcwoiknVgIYMNRmS B2s4YJyvq5QQnUkynUcMSU17vltRhwQyapz22lg4rZZxYIoEC0P3vVDkH3mPCnnE qPSMtwtV+o1//cOQHjD7VfjeScO69R7u =Np5A -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ----------------------------------------------------------------- Mark Heaney finger snipe(a)starburst.cbl.cees.edu for public key PGP Fingerprint= BB D8 9B 07 51 87 05 AC 47 7B F2 4F A6 AB 1A CD ----------------------------------------------------------------- You keep using that word, I dunna think it means what you think it means.

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Re: BAY AREA CYPHERPUNKS SATURDAY 10/12 TRESSIDER HALL STANFORD
by Eric Chiu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:06 AM 10/11/96 -0700, you wrote: >There will be a San Francisco Bay Area Cypherpunks meeting on Saturday 10/12 >at Stanford University. The meeting location will be the tables outside >Tressider Hall, where we've met for several previous meetings. >The canonical time is noon for lunch and milling around, and 1pm >for organized program. Bill - What time is the meeting? Eric Chiu IS-Finance and Adminstration Tel: 408-527-1665 Pager: 415-424-7282

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EUB bank on PRI "Marketplace" tonight
by David Lesher 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Heard a teaser that EUBank will be mentioned on Public Radio Intl's Marketplace tonight. -- A host is a host from coast to coast.................wb8foz(a)nrk.com & no one will talk to a host that's close........[v].(301) 56-LINUX Unless the host (that isn't close).........................pob 1433 is busy, hung or dead....................................20915-1433

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Burma bans modems
by John Fricker 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: George Sadowsky <George.Sadowsky(a)nyu.edu> Subject: Re: Burma Bans modems Here is the text of the web page referenced below: RANGOON, BURMA, 1996 SEP 27 (NB) -- Burma has made owning, using, importing or borrowing a modem or fax machine without government permission a crime, punishable by up to 15 years in jail, according to a report by United Press International. Burma's military government has imposed what's called "The Computer Science Development Law" which empowers the Ministry of Communications, Posts and Telegraphs to specify what exactly can be restricted, UPI reports. UPI quotes the government-run newspaper New Light of Myanmar as saying the same punishment is prescribed for anyone who sets up a link with a computer network without the prior permission of the ministry, or who uses computer network and information technology "for undermining state security, law and order, national unity, national economy and national culture, or who obtains or transmits state secrets." UPI reports that in July a diplomat, Leo Nichols, died in prison after he was sentenced to a lengthy term for illegal possession of fax machines. It's clear from this action that the SLORC, i.e. the "State Law and Order Restoration Committee" (sic!) understands full well the benefits and importance of the Internet and other forms of electronic communication to open societies, and is determined to deny these benefits to its citizens. Given its recent history and the quasi-imprisonment of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, this new action is perfectly consistent with the government's previous abysmal record. Countries who would deny open Internet access to its citizens might well pause to consider if they wish to be associated with the current government of Myanmar in doing so. George Sadowsky, Director Voice: +1.212.998.3040 Academic Computing Facility Fax: +1.212.995.4120 New York University 251 Mercer Street George.Sadowsky(a)nyu.edu New York, New York 10012-1185 http://www.nyu.edu/acf/staff/sadowsky/ --j You can retrieve my PGP public key by sending mail with subject "send pgp key". Take a look at www.Program.com for a good programmer web site.

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Kantor on GAK
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The New York Times, October 11, 1996, p. A38. Clinton's Encryption Plan Fits Law and Market To the Editor: "A Flawed Encryption Policy" (editorial, Oct. 4) mischaracterizes the Clinton Administration's recent proposal on data-scrambling software, the proposal's impact and the results of a study by the National Research Council. This Administration has never proposed that United States citizens be limited in the type of encryption products they choose to use domestically. The current plan relates only to exports of encryption products that are, for all practical purposes, unbreakable in the commercial environment. Unbreakable encryption generates the need for "key" management among personal and business users of encryption products. Users may need a "spare key" to recover information that is lost or otherwise inaccessible, in much the same way that we give a trusted neighbor a spare key to our house. President Clinton's plan insures that the United States -- and not other countries -- will develop such a system, which both protects and is based on the rule of law, not the whim of governments or trade barriers masquerading as import restrictions. You assume that foreign buyers would not buy key-recovery products, but you ignore the trend -- especially in Europe -- to require use of key-recovery products and bar the import of stronger and stronger encryption products that do not take law enforcement into account. The number of companies that have expressed a willingness to work with the Administration to balance commercial and law enforcement issues belies your pronouncement that our proposal is unworkable. In fact, the number of companies that stand ready now to market such products will soon prove that there Is a market for encryption products that provide safeguards for both the owner and for society. The National Research Council did not say that we should allow the export of all encryption. It supported some export controls, while allowing the export of encryption up to the strength of 56 bits. Our plan allows the export of encryption up to 56 bits, but does so in a way that will encourage the production and marketing of products that both protect privacy and prevent crime. The United States is the world leader in information technology. Under the Administration's plan, we will remain so through a market-driven key-recovery system that both promotes the export of encryption products and protects our national security and the public safety. Mickey Kantor U.S. Secretary of Commerce Washington, Oct., 9, 1996

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Forged "unsubscribe"
by Timothy C. May 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Though I am avoiding commenting on the continuing Vulis nonsense, something has come up which necessitates my comment. I received a message from majordomotoad.com saying that my (alleged/purported) message, "unsubscribe cypherpunks dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com", is being forwarded for processing. The full message is included below. It appears that someone is attempting to make it look like I am trying to unsubscribe Dmitri Vulis! I assure you all that I have sent no such message to majordomo(a)toad.com. I'm cc:ing Hugh Daniel to make sure he sees this. Perhaps he can look at the full headers and path information of the alleged message from me and figure out who is playing this kind of game. --Tim May >Received: from you for tcmay > with Cubic Circle's cucipop (v1.10 1996/09/06) Fri Oct 11 14:26:44 1996 >X-From_: Majordomo-Owner(a)toad.com Fri Oct 11 13:46:54 1996 >Received: from toad.com (toad.com [140.174.2.1]) by you (8.7.6/8.7.3) with >ESMTP id NAA13723 for <tcmay(a)got.net>; Fri, 11 Oct 1996 13:46:54 -0700 >Received: (from majordom@localhost) by toad.com (8.7.5/8.7.3) id NAA00496; >Fri, 11 Oct 1996 13:53:05 -0700 (PDT) >Date: Fri, 11 Oct 1996 13:53:05 -0700 (PDT) >Message-Id: <199610112053.NAA00496(a)toad.com> >To: tcmay(a)got.net >From: Majordomo(a)toad.com >Subject: Your Majordomo request results: unsubscribe >Reply-To: Majordomo(a)toad.com > >-- > >Your request of Majordomo was: >>>>> unsubscribe cypherpunks dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com >Your request to Majordomo(a)toad.com: > > unsubscribe cypherpunks dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com > >has been forwarded to the owner of the "cypherpunks" list for approval. >This could be for any of several reasons: > > You might have asked to subscribe to a "closed" list, where all new > additions must be approved by the list owner. > > You might have asked to subscribe or unsubscribe an address other than > the one that appears in the headers of your mail message. > >When the list owner approves your request, you will be notified. > >If you have any questions about the policy of the list owner, please >contact "cypherpunks-approval(a)toad.com". > > >Thanks! > >Majordomo(a)toad.com > > > "The government announcement is disastrous," said Jim Bidzos,.."We warned IBM that the National Security Agency would try to twist their technology." [NYT, 1996-10-02] We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1,257,787-1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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LET'S MEET DIMITRI
by Sandy Sandfort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Bay Area Cypherpunks, I am hereby pledging US$100 towards a fund to fly Dimitri to the SF Bay area for a Cypherpunk meeting. I certainly would like to meet a real cryptographer, and I'm sure many of you would too. We should throw in a hotel room and local transportation as well. I want Dimitri to be our featured speaker--his choice of topic, of course. I am ABSOLUTELY serious in this offer, but I will need donations from other Cypherpunks. If I get sufficient pledges to cover Dimitri's travel expenses, I will coordinate with Dimitri and make the necessary travel and hotel arrangements. Dimitri, what say you? Are you willing in flying to California to address the Mother of All Cypherpunk Meetings? I hope so. I'm sure it would be one of our most highly attended meetings. S a n d y ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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